




THE OUTLINE OF HISTORY
IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOLUME FOUR

The Realities and Imaginations of the Nineteenth Century
The Catastrophe of Modern Imperialism
The Effort to Reconstruct the World Begins
The Next Stage of History
Chronological Table
Chronological Diagrams
Index



THE MECHANICAL MONSTER OF THE WORLD WAR

A British tank whose 30-ton bulk could advance over shell holes, embankments, or buildings

THE OUTLINE *of* HISTORY

BEING A PLAIN HISTORY OF LIFE AND MANKIND

BY

H. G. WELLS

WRITTEN ORIGINALLY WITH THE ADVICE
AND EDITORIAL HELP OF

MR. ERNEST BARKER, SIR H. H. JOHNSTON
SIR E. RAY LANKESTER, AND PROFESSOR
GILBERT MURRAY

ILLUSTRATED WITH LINE DRAWINGS BY J. F. HORRABIN, AND
WITH REPRODUCTIONS OF MANY FAMOUS PAINTINGS



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(WITH SEVERAL NEW MAPS AND DIAGRAMS)
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VOLUME FOUR

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XXXVIII

THE REALITIES AND IMAGINATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

§ 1. *The Mechanical Revolution.* § 2. *Relation of the Mechanical to the Industrial Revolution.* § 3. *The Fermentation of Ideas, 1848.* § 4. *The Development of the Idea of Socialism.* § 5. *Shortcomings of Socialism as a Scheme of Human Society.* § 6. *How Darwinism Affected Religious and Political Ideas.* § 7. *The Idea of Nationalism.* § 8. *The Great Exhibition of 1851.* § 9. *The Career of Napoleon III.* § 10. *Lincoln and the Civil War in America.* § 11. *The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin.* § 12. *The Second Scramble for Overseas Empire.* § 13. *The Indian Precedent in Asia.* § 14. *The History of Japan.* § 15. *Close of the Period of Overseas Expansion.* § 16. *The British Empire in 1914.*

§ 1

THE career and personality of Napoleon I bulks disproportionately in the nineteenth century histories. He was of little significance to the broad onward movement of human affairs; he was an interruption, a reminder of latent evils, a thing like the bacterium of some pestilence. Even regarded as a pestilence, he was not of supreme rank; he killed far fewer people than the influenza epidemic of 1918, and produced less political and social disruption than the plague of Justinian. Some such interlude had to happen, and some such patched-up settlement of Europe as the Concert of Europe, because there was no worked-out system of ideas upon which a new world could be constructed. And even the Concert of Europe had in it an

element of progress. It did at least set aside the individualism of Machiavellian monarchy and declare that there was a human or at any rate a European commonweal. If it divided the world among the kings, it made respectful gestures towards human unity and the service of God and man.

The permanently effective task before mankind which had to be done before any new and enduring social and political edifice was possible, the task upon which the human intelligence is, with many interruptions and amidst much anger and turmoil, still engaged, was, and is, the task of working out and applying a Science of Property as a basis for freedom and social justice, a Science of Currency to ensure and preserve an efficient economic medium, a Science of Government and Collective Operations whereby in every community men may learn to pursue their common interests in harmony, a Science of World Politics, through which the stark waste and cruelty of warfare between races, peoples, and nations may be brought to an end and the common interests of mankind brought under a common control, and, above all, a world-wide System of Education to sustain the will and interest of men in their common human adventure. The real makers of history in the nineteenth century, the people whose consequences will be determining human life a century ahead, were those who advanced and contributed to this five-fold constructive effort. Compared to them, the foreign ministers and "statesmen" and politicians of this period were no more than a number of troublesome and occasionally incendiary schoolboys—and a few metal thieves—playing about and doing transitory mischief amidst the accumulating materials upon the site of a great building whose nature they did not understand.

And while throughout the nineteenth century the mind of Western civilization, which the Renaissance had released, gathered itself to the task of creative social and political reconstruction that still lies before it, there swept across the world a wave of universal change in human power and the material conditions of life that the first scientific efforts of that liberated mind had made possible. The prophecies of

Roger Bacon began to live in reality. The accumulating knowledge and confidence of the little succession of men who had been carrying on the development of science, now began to bear fruit that common men could understand. The most obvious firstfruit was the steam-engine. The first steam-engines in the eighteenth century were pumping engines used to keep water out of the newly opened coal mines. These coal mines were being worked to supply coke for iron smelting, for which wood-charcoal had previously been employed. It was James Watt, a mathematical instrument maker of Glasgow, who improved this steam-pumping engine and made it available for the driving of machinery. The first engine so employed was installed in a cotton mill in Nottingham in 1785. In 1804 Trevithick adapted the Watt engine to transport, and made the first locomotive. In 1825 the first railway, between Stockton and Darlington, was opened for traffic. The original engine (locomotive No. 1, 1825) still adorns Darlington platform. By the middle of the century a network of railways had spread all over Europe.

Here was a sudden change in what had long been a fixed condition of human life, the maximum rate of land transport. After the Russian disaster, Napoleon travelled from near Vilna to Paris in 312 hours. This was a journey of about 1,400 miles. He was travelling with every conceivable advantage, and he averaged under five miles an hour. An ordinary traveller could not have done this distance in twice the time. These were about the same maximum rates of travel as held good between Rome and Gaul in the first century A. D., or between Sardis and Susa in the fourth century B. C. Then suddenly came a tremendous change. The railways reduced this journey for any ordinary traveller to less than forty-eight hours. That is to say, they reduced the chief European distances to about a tenth of what they had been. They made it possible to carry out administrative work in areas ten times as great as any that had hitherto been workable under one administration. The full significance of that possibility in Europe still remains to be realized.

Europe is still netted in boundaries drawn in the horse and road era. In America the effects were immediate. To the United States of America, sprawling westward, it meant the possibility of a continuous access to Washington, however far the frontier travelled across the continent. It meant unity, sustained on a scale that would otherwise have been impossible.

The steamboat was, if anything, a little ahead of the steam-engine in its earlier phases. There was a steamboat, the *Charlotte Dundas*, on the Firth of Clyde Canal in 1802, and in 1807 an American named Fulton had a paying steamer, *The Clermont*, with British-built engines, upon the Hudson River above New York. The first steamship to put to sea was also an American, the *Phoenix*, which went from New York (Hoboken) to Philadelphia. So, too, was the first ship using steam (she also had sails) to cross the Atlantic, the *Savannah* (1819). All these were paddle-wheel boats, and paddle-wheel boats are not adapted to work in heavy seas. The paddles smash too easily, and the boat is then disabled. The screw steamship followed rather slowly. Many difficulties had to be surmounted before the screw was a practical thing. Not until the middle of the century did the tonnage of steamships upon the sea begin to overhaul that of sailing-ships. After that the evolution in sea transport was rapid. For the first time men began to cross the seas and oceans with some certainty as to the date of their arrival. The transatlantic crossing, which had been an uncertain adventure of several weeks—which might stretch to months—was accelerated, until in 1910 it was brought down, in the case of the fastest boats, to under five days, with a practically notifiable hour of arrival. All over the oceans there was the same reduction in the time and the same increase in the certainty of human communications.

Concurrently with the development of steam transport upon land and sea a new and striking addition to the facilities of human intercourse arose out of the investigations of Volta, Galvani, and Faraday into various electrical phenomena. The electric telegraph came into existence in 1835.

The first underseas cable was laid in 1851 between France and England. In a few years the telegraph system had spread over the civilized world, and news which had hitherto travelled slowly from point to point became practically simultaneous throughout the earth.

These things, the steam railway and the electric telegraph, were to the popular imagination of the middle nineteenth century the most striking and revolutionary of inventions, but they were only the most conspicuous and clumsy first-fruits of a far more extensive process. Technical knowledge and skill were developing with an extraordinary rapidity, and to an extraordinary extent measured by the progress of any previous age. Far less conspicuous at first in everyday life, but finally far more important, was the extension of man's power over various structural materials. Before the middle of the eighteenth century iron was reduced from its ores by means of wood-charcoal, was handled in small pieces, and hammered and wrought into shape. It was material for a craftsman. Quality and treatment were enormously dependent upon the experience and sagacity of the individual iron worker. The largest masses of iron that could be dealt with under those conditions amounted at most (in the sixteenth century) to two or three tons. (There was a very definite upward limit, therefore, to the size of cannon.) The blast furnace arose in the eighteenth century, and developed with the use of coke. Not before the eighteenth century do we find rolled sheet iron (1728) and rolled rods and bars (1783). Nasmyth's steam hammer came as late as 1838. The ancient world, because of its metallurgical inferiority, could not use steam. The steam engine, even the primitive pumping engine, could not develop before sheet iron was available. The early engines seem to the modern eye very pitiful and clumsy bits of ironmongery, but they were the utmost that the metallurgical science of the time could do. As late as 1856 came the Bessemer process, and presently (1864) the open-hearth process, in which steel and every sort of iron could be melted, purified, and cast in a manner and upon a scale hitherto un-

heard of. To-day in the electric furnace one may see tons of incandescent steel swirling about like boiling milk in a saucepan. Nothing in the previous practical advances of mankind is comparable in its consequences to the complete mastery over enormous masses of steel and iron and over their texture and quality which man has now achieved. The railways and early engines of all sorts were the mere first triumphs of the new metallurgical methods. Presently came ships of iron and steel, vast bridges, and a new way of building with steel upon a gigantic scale. Men realized too late that they had planned their railways with far too timid a gauge, that they could have organized their travelling with far more steadiness and comfort upon a much bigger scale.

Before the nineteenth century there were no ships in the world much over 2,000 tons burthen; now there is nothing wonderful about a 50,000-ton liner. There are people who sneer at this kind of progress as being a progress in "mere size," but that sort of sneering merely marks the intellectual limitations of those who indulge in it. The great ship or the steel-frame building is not, as they imagine, a magnified version of the small ship or the building of the past; it is a thing different in kind, more lightly and strongly built, of finer and stronger materials; instead of being a thing of precedent and rule-of-thumb, it is a thing of subtle and intricate calculation. In the old house or ship, matter was dominant—the material and its needs had to be slavishly obeyed; in the new, matter has been captured, changed, coerced. Think of the coal and iron and sand dragged out of the banks and pits, wrenched, wrought, molten and cast, to be flung at last, a slender, glittering pinnacle of steel and glass six hundred feet above the crowded city!

We have given these particulars of the advance in man's knowledge of the metallurgy of steel and its results by way of illustration. A parallel story could be told of the metallurgy of copper and tin, and of a multitude of metals, nickel and aluminium to name but two, unknown before the nineteenth century dawned. It is in this great and growing mastery over substances, over different sorts of glass, over

rocks and plasters and the like, over colours and textures, that the main triumphs of the mechanical revolution have thus far been achieved. Yet we are still in the stage of the firstfruits in the matter. We have the power, but we have still to learn how to use our power. Many of the first employments of these gifts of science have been vulgar, tawdry, stupid or horrible. The artist and the adaptor have still hardly begun to work with the endless variety of substances now at their disposal.

Parallel with this extension of mechanical possibilities the new science of electricity grew up. It was only in the eighties of the nineteenth century that this body of inquiry began to yield results to impress the vulgar mind. Then suddenly came electric light and electric traction, and the transmutation of forces, the possibility of sending *power*, that could be changed into mechanical motion or light or heat as one chose, along a copper wire, as water is sent along a pipe, began to come through to the ideas of ordinary people. . . .

The British and the French were at first the leading peoples in this great proliferation of knowledge; but presently the Germans, who had learnt humility under Napoleon, showed such zeal and pertinacity in scientific inquiry as to overhaul these leaders. British science was largely the creation of Englishmen and Scotchmen¹ working outside the ordinary centres of erudition.² We have told how in England the universities after the Reformation ceased to have a wide popular appeal, how they became the educational preserve of the nobility and gentry, and the strongholds of the established church. A pompous and unintelligent classical pretentiousness dominated them, and they dominated the schools of the middle and upper classes. The only knowledge recognized was an uncritical textual knowledge of a

¹ But note Boyle and Sir Wm. Hamilton as conspicuous scientific men who were Irishmen.

² It is worth noting that nearly all the great inventors in England during the eighteenth century were working men, that inventions proceeded from the workshop, and not from the laboratory. It is also worth noting that only two of these inventors accumulated fortunes and founded families.—E. B.

selection of Latin and Greek classics, and the test of a good style was its abundance of quotations, allusions, and stereotyped expressions. The early development of British science went on, therefore, in spite of the formal educational organization, and in the teeth of the bitter hostility of the teaching and clerical professions. French education, too, was dominated by the classical tradition of the Jesuits, and consequently it was not difficult for the Germans to organize a body of investigators, small indeed in relation to the possibilities of the case, but large in proportion to the little band of British and French inventors and experimentalists. And though this work of research and experiment was making Britain and France the most rich and powerful countries in the world, it was not making scientific and inventive men rich and powerful. There is a necessary unworldliness about a sincere scientific man; he is too pre-occupied with his research to plan and scheme how to make money out of it. The economic exploitation of his discoveries falls very easily and naturally, therefore, into the hands of a more acquisitive type; and so we find that the crops of rich men which every fresh phase of scientific and technical progress has produced in Great Britain, though they have not displayed quite the same passionate desire to insult and kill the goose that laid the national golden eggs as the scholastic and clerical professions, have been quite content to let that profitable creature starve. Inventors and discoverers came by nature, they thought, for cleverer people to profit by.

In this matter the Germans were a little wiser. The German "learned" did not display the same vehement hatred of the new learning. They permitted its development. The German business man and manufacturer again had not quite the same contempt for the man of science as had his British competitor. Knowledge, these Germans believed, might be a cultivated crop, responsive to fertilizers. They did concede, therefore, a certain amount of opportunity to the scientific mind; their public expenditure on scientific work was

relatively greater, and this expenditure was abundantly rewarded. By the later half of the nineteenth century the German scientific worker had made German a necessary language for every science student who wished to keep abreast with the latest work in his department, and in certain branches, and particularly in chemistry, Germany acquired a very great superiority over her western neighbours. The scientific effort of the sixties and seventies in Germany began to tell after the eighties, and the Germans gained steadily upon Britain and France in technical and industrial prosperity.

In an Outline of History such as this it is impossible to trace the network of complex mental processes that led to the incessant extension of knowledge and power that is now going on; all we can do here is to call the reader's attention to the most salient turning-points that finally led the toboggan of human affairs into its present swift ice-run of progress. We have told of the first release of human curiosity and of the beginnings of systematic inquiry and experiment. We have told, too, how, when the plutocratic Roman system and its resultant imperialism had come and gone again, this process of inquiry was renewed. We have told of the escape of investigation from ideas of secrecy and personal advantage to the idea of publication and a brotherhood of knowledge, and we have noted the foundation of the British Royal Society, the Florentine Society, and their like as a consequence of this socializing of thought. These things were the roots of the mechanical revolution, and so long as the root of pure scientific inquiry lives, that revolution will progress. The mechanical revolution itself began, we may say, with the exhaustion of the wood supply for the iron-works of England. This led to the use of coal, the coal mine led to the simple pumping engine, the development of the pumping engine by Watt into a machine-driving engine led on to the locomotive and the steamship. This was the first phase of a great expansion in the use of steam. A second phase in the mechanical revolution began

with the application of electrical science to practical problems and the development of electric lighting, power-transmission, and traction.

A third phase is to be distinguished when in the eighties a new type of engine came into use, an engine in which the expansive force of an explosive mixture replaced the expansive force of steam. The light, highly efficient engines that were thus made possible were applied to the automobile, and developed at last to reach such a pitch of lightness and efficiency as to render flight—long known to be possible—a practical achievement. A successful flying-machine—but not a machine large enough to take up a human body—was made by Professor Langley of the Smithsonian Institute of Washington as early as 1897. His next effort, a full size aeroplane, failed on its first trial, but was successfully flown by Curtiss some years later. The efforts of the Wright brothers in America were of primary importance in these experiments. By 1909 the aeroplane was available for human locomotion. There had seemed to be a pause in the increase of human speed with the perfection of railways and automobile road traction, but with the flying machine came fresh reductions in the effective distance between one point of the earth's surface and another. In the eighteenth century the distance from London to Edinburgh was an eight days' journey; in 1918 the British Civil Air transport Commission reported that the journey from London to Melbourne, half-way round the earth, would probably, in a few years' time, be accomplished in that same period of eight days.

Too much stress must not be laid upon these striking reductions in the time distances of one place from another. They are merely one aspect of a much profounder and more momentous enlargement of human possibility. The science of agriculture and agricultural chemistry, for instance, made quite parallel advances during the nineteenth century. Men learnt so to fertilize the soil as to produce quadruple and quintuple the crops got from the same area in the seventeenth century. There was a still more extraordinary advance in medical science; the average duration of life rose, the daily

efficiency increased, the waste of life through ill-health diminished.

Now here altogether we have such a change in human life as to constitute a fresh phase of history. In a little more than a century this mechanical revolution has been brought about. In that time man made a stride in the material conditions of his life vaster than he had done during the whole long interval between the palæolithic stage and the age of cultivation, or between the days of Pepi in Egypt and those of George III. A new gigantic material framework for human affairs has come into existence. Clearly it demands great readjustments of our social, economical, and political methods. But these readjustments have necessarily waited upon the development of the mechanical revolution, and they are still only in their opening stage to-day.

§ 2

There is a tendency in many histories to confuse together what we have here called the *mechanical revolution*, which was an entirely new thing in human experience arising out of the development of organized science, a new step like the invention of agriculture or the discovery of metals, with something else, quite different in its origins, something for which there was already an historical precedent, the social and financial development which is called the *industrial revolution*. The two processes were going on together, they were constantly reacting upon each other, but they were in root and essence different. There would have been an industrial revolution of sorts if there had been no coal, no steam, no machinery; but in that case it would probably have followed far more closely upon the lines of the social and financial developments of the later years of the Roman republic. It would have repeated the story of dispossessed free cultivators, gang labour, great estates, great financial fortunes, and a socially destructive financial process. Even the factory method came before power and machinery. Factories were the product not of machinery, but of the "division of labour."

Drilled and sweated workers were making such things as millinery, cardboard boxes and furniture, and colouring maps and book illustrations, and so forth, before even water-wheels had been used for industrial processes. There were factories in Rome in the days of Augustus. New books, for instance, were dictated to rows of copyists in the factories of the booksellers. The attentive student of Defoe and of the political pamphlets of Fielding will realize that the idea of herding poor people into establishments to work collectively for their living was already current in Britain before the close of the seventeenth century. There are intimations of it even as early as More's *Utopia* (1516). It was a social and not a mechanical development.

Up to past the middle of the eighteenth century the social and economic history of western Europe was in fact retreading the path along which the Roman State had gone in the three centuries B. C. America was in many ways a new Spain, and India and China a new Egypt. But the political disunions of Europe, the political convulsions against monarchy, the recalcitrance of the common folk and perhaps also the greater accessibility of the western European intelligence to mechanical ideas and inventions, turned the process into quite novel directions. Ideas of human solidarity, thanks to Christianity, were far more widely diffused in this newer European world, political power was not so concentrated, and the man of energy anxious to get rich turned his mind, therefore, very willingly from the ideas of the slave and of gang labour to the idea of mechanical power and the machine.

The mechanical revolution, the process of mechanical invention and discovery, was a new thing in human experience, and it went on regardless of the social, political, economic, and industrial consequences it might produce. The industrial revolution, on the other hand, like most other human affairs, was and is more and more profoundly changed and deflected by the constant variation in human conditions caused by the mechanical revolution. And the essential difference between the amassing of riches, the extinction of small farmers and small business men and the phase of big finance in the latter

centuries of the Roman Republic on the one hand, and the very similar concentration of capital in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on the other, lies in the profound difference in the character of labour that the mechanical revolution was bringing about. The power of the old world was human power; everything depended ultimately upon the driving power of human muscle, the muscle of ignorant and subjugated men. A little animal muscle, supplied by draft oxen, horse traction, and the like, contributed. Where a weight had to be lifted, men lifted it; where a rock had to be quarried, men chipped it out; where a field had to be ploughed, men and oxen ploughed it; the Roman equivalent of the steamship was the galley with its banks of sweating rowers. A vast proportion of mankind in the early civilizations was employed in purely mechanical drudgery. At its onset, power-driven machinery did not seem to promise any release from such unintelligent toil. Great gangs of men were employed in excavating canals, in making railway cuttings and embankments, and the like. The number of miners increased enormously. But the extension of facilities and the output of commodities increased much more. And as the nineteenth century went on, the plain logic of the new situation asserted itself more clearly. Human beings were no longer wanted as a source of mere indiscriminated power. What could be done mechanically by a human being could be done faster and better by a machine. The human being was needed now only where choice and intelligence had to be exercised. Human beings were wanted only as human beings. The *drudge*, on whom all the previous civilizations had rested, the creature of mere obedience, the man whose brains were superfluous, had become unnecessary to the welfare of mankind.

This was as true of such ancient industries as agriculture and mining as it was of the newest metallurgical processes. For ploughing, sowing, and harvesting, swift machines came forward to do the work of scores of men.¹ The Roman civilization was built upon cheap and degraded human

¹ Here America led the old world.

beings; modern civilization is being rebuilt upon cheap mechanical power. For a hundred years power has been getting cheaper and labour dearer. If for a generation or so machinery has had to wait its turn in the mine, it is simply because for a time men were cheaper than machinery.¹

Now here was a change-over of quite primary importance in human affairs. The chief solicitude of the rich and of the ruler in the old civilization had been to keep up a supply of drudges. As the nineteenth century went on, it became more and more plain to the intelligent directive people that the common man had now to be something better than a drudge. He had to be educated—if only to secure “industrial efficiency.” He had to understand what he was about. From the days of the first Christian propaganda, popular education had been smouldering in Europe, just as it has smouldered in Asia wherever Islam has set its foot, because of the necessity of making the believer understand a little of the belief by which he is saved, and of enabling him to read a little in the sacred books by which his belief is conveyed. Christian controversies, with their competition for adherents, ploughed the ground for the harvest of popular education. In England, for instance, by the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, the disputes of the sects and the necessity of catching adherents young had produced an abundance of night schools, Sunday schools, and a series of competing educational organizations for children, the dissenting British schools, the church National Schools, and even Roman Catholic elementary schools. The earlier, less enlightened manufacturers, unable to take a broad view of their own interests, hated and opposed these schools. But here again needy Germany led her richer neighbours. The religious teacher in Britain presently found the profit-seeker at his side, unexpectedly eager to get the commonalty, if not educated, at least “trained” to a higher level of economic efficiency.

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of

¹ In Northumberland and Durham in the early days of coal mining they were so cheaply esteemed that it was unusual to hold inquests on the bodies of men killed in mine disasters.


rapid advance in popular education throughout all the Westernized world. There was no parallel advance in the education of the upper classes, some advance no doubt, but nothing to correspond, and so the great gulf that had divided that world hitherto into the readers and the non-reading mass became little more than a slightly perceptible difference in educational level. At the back of this process was the mechanical revolution, apparently regardless of social conditions, but really insisting inexorably upon the complete abolition of a totally illiterate class throughout the world.

The economic revolution of the Roman republic had never been clearly apprehended by the common people of Rome. The ordinary Roman citizen never saw the changes through which he lived, clearly and comprehensively as we see them. But the industrial revolution, as it went on towards the end of the nineteenth century, was more and more distinctly *seen* as one whole process by the common people it was affecting, because presently they could read and discuss and communicate, and because they went about and saw things as no commonalty had ever done before.

In this *Outline of History* we have been careful to indicate the gradual appearance of the ordinary people as a class with a will and ideas in common. It is the writer's belief that massive movements of the "ordinary people" over considerable areas only became possible as a result of the propagandist religions, Christianity and Islam, and their insistence upon individual self respect. We have cited the enthusiasm of the commonalty for the First Crusade as marking a new phase in social history. But before the nineteenth century even these massive movements were comparatively restricted. The equalitarian insurrections of the peasantry, from the Wycliffe period onward, were confined to the peasant communities of definite localities, they spread only slowly into districts affected by similar forces. The town artisan rioted indeed, but only locally. The château burning of the French revolution was not the act of a peasantry who had overthrown a government, it was the act of a peasantry re-

leased by the overthrow of a government. The Commune of Paris was the first effective appearance of the town artisan as a political power, and the Parisian crowd of the First Revolution was a very mixed, primitive-thinking, and savage crowd compared with any Western European crowd after 1830.

But the mechanical revolution was not only pressing education upon the whole population, it was leading to a big-capitalism and to a large-scale reorganization of industry that was to produce a new and distinctive system of ideas in the common people in the place of the mere uncomfortable recalcitrance and elemental rebellions of an illiterate commonalty. We have already noted how the industrial revolution had split the manufacturing class, which had hitherto



Marx

been a middling and various sort of class, into two sections, the employers, who became rich enough to mingle with the financial, merchandizing and land-owning classes, and the employees, who drifted to a status closer and closer to that of mere gang and agricultural labour. As the manufacturing employee sank, the agricultural labourer, by the intro-

duction of agricultural machinery and the increase in his individual productivity, rose. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx (1818-83), a German Jew of great scholarly attainments, was pointing out that the organization of the working classes by the steadily concentrating group of capitalist owners, was developing a new social classification to replace the more complex class systems of the past. Property, so far as it was power, was being gathered together into relatively few hands, the hands of the big rich

men, the capitalist class; while there was a great mingling of workers with little or no property, whom he called the "expropriated," or "proletariat"—a misuse of this word—who were bound to develop a common "class consciousness" of the conflict of their interests with those of the rich men. Differences of education and tradition between the various older social elements which were in process of being fused up into the new class of the expropriated, seemed for a time to contradict this sweeping generalization; the traditions of the professions, the small employers, the farmer peasant and the like were all different from one another and from the various craftsman traditions of the workers; but with the spread of education and the cheapening of literature, this "Marxian" generalization becomes now more and more acceptable. These classes, who were linked at first by nothing but a common impoverishment, were and are being reduced or raised to the same standard of life, forced to read the same books and share the same inconveniences. A sense of solidarity between all sorts of poor and propertyless men, as against the profit-amassing and wealth-concentrating class, is growing more and more evident in our world. Old differences fade away, the difference between craftsman and open-air worker, between black coat and overall, between poor clergyman and elementary school-master, between policeman and bus-driver. They must all buy the same cheap furnishings and live in similar cheap houses; their sons and daughters will all mingle and marry; success at the upper levels becomes more and more hopeless for rank and file. Marx, who did not so much advocate the class-war, the war of the expropriated mass against the appropriating few, as foretell it, is being more and more justified by events.¹

¹ It is sometimes argued against Marx that the proportion of people who have savings invested has increased in many modern communities. These savings are technically "capital" and their owners "capitalists" to that extent, and this is supposed to contradict the statement of Marx that property concentrates into few and fewer hands. Marx used many of his terms carelessly and chose them ill, and his ideas were better than his words. When he wrote property he meant "property so far as it is power." The small investor has remarkably little power over his invested capital.

§ 3

To trace any broad outlines in the fermentation of ideas that went on during the mechanical and industrial revolution of the nineteenth century is a very difficult task. But we must attempt it if we are to link what has gone before in this history with the condition of our world to-day.

It will be convenient to distinguish two main periods in the hundred years between 1814 and 1914. First came the period 1814-48, in which there was a very considerable amount of liberal thinking and writing *in limited circles*, but during which there were no great changes or development of thought in the general mass of the people. Throughout this period the world's affairs were living, so to speak, on their old intellectual capital, they were going on in accordance with the leading ideas of the Revolution and the counter-revolution. The dominant liberal ideas were freedom and a certain vague equalitarianism; the conservative ideas were monarchy, organized religion, social privilege, and obedience.

Until 1848 the spirit of the Holy Alliance, the spirit of Metternich, struggled to prevent a revival of the European revolution that Napoleon had betrayed and set back. In America, both North and South, on the other hand, the revolution had triumphed and nineteenth-century liberalism ruled unchallenged. Britain was an uneasy country, never quite loyally reactionary nor quite loyally progressive, neither truly monarchist nor truly republican, the land of Cromwell and also of the Merry Monarch, Charles; anti-Austrian, anti-Bourbon, anti-papal, yet weakly repressive. We have told of the first series of liberal storms in Europe in and about the year 1830; in Britain in 1832 a Reform Bill, greatly extending the franchise and restoring something of its representative character to the House of Commons, relieved the situation.

Round and about 1848 came a second and much more serious system of outbreaks, that overthrew the Orleans monarchy and established a second Republic in France (1848-52), raised North Italy and Hungary against Austria, and

the Poles in Posen against the Germans, and sent the Pope in flight from the republicans of Rome. A very interesting Pan-Slavic conference held at Prague foreshadowed many of the territorial readjustments of 1919. It dispersed after an insurrection at Prague had been suppressed by Austrian troops.

Ultimately all these insurrections failed; the current system staggered, but kept its feet. There were no doubt serious social discontents beneath these revolts, but as yet, except in the case of Paris, these had no very clear form; and this 1848 storm, so far as the rest of Europe was concerned, may be best described, in a phrase, as a revolt of the natural political map against the artificial arrangements of the Vienna diplomatists, and the system of suppressions those arrangements entailed.

The history of Europe, then, from 1815 to 1848 was, generally speaking, a sequel to the history of Europe from 1789 to 1814. There were no really new *motifs* in the composition. The main trouble was still the struggle, though often a blind and mis-directed struggle, of the interests of ordinary men against the Great Power system which cramped and oppressed the life of mankind.

But after 1848, from 1848 to 1914, though the readjustment of the map still went on towards a free and unified Italy and a unified Germany, there began a fresh phase in the process of mental and political adaptation to the new knowledge and the new material powers of mankind. Came a great irruption of new social, religious, and political ideas into the general European mind. In the next three sections we will consider the origin and quality of these irruptions. They laid the foundations upon which we base our political thought to-day, but for a long time they had no very great effect on contemporary politics. Contemporary politics continued to run on in the old lines, but with a steadily diminishing support in the intellectual convictions and consciences of men.

We have already described the way in which a strong intellectual process undermined the system of Grand Monarchy

in France before 1789. A similar undermining process was going on throughout Europe during the Great Power period of 1848-1914. Profound doubts of the system of government and of the liberties of many forms of property in the economic system spread throughout the social body. Then came the greatest and most disorganizing war in history, so that it is still impossible to estimate the power and range of the accumulated new ideas of those sixty-six years. We have been through a greater catastrophe even than the Napoleonic catastrophe, and we are in a slack-water period, corresponding to the period 1815-30. Our 1830 and our 1848 are still to come and show us where we stand.

§ 4

We have traced throughout this history the gradual restriction of the idea of property from the first unlimited claim of the strong man to possess everything and the gradual realization of brotherhood as something transcending personal self-seeking. Men were first subjugated into more than tribal societies by the fear of monarch and deity. It is only within the last three or at most four thousand years that we have any clear evidence that voluntary self-abandonment to some greater end, without fee or reward, was an acceptable idea to men, or that anyone had propounded it. Then we find spreading over the surface of human affairs, as patches of sunshine spread and pass over the hillsides upon a windy day in spring, the idea that there is a happiness in self-devotion greater than any personal gratification or triumph, and a life of mankind different and greater and more important than the sum of all the individual lives within it. We have seen that idea become vivid as a beacon, vivid as sunshine caught and reflected dazzlingly by some window in the landscape, in the teachings of Buddha, Lao Tse, and, most clearly of all, of Jesus of Nazareth. Through all its variations and corruptions Christianity has never completely lost the suggestion of a devotion to God's commonweal that makes the personal pomps of monarchs and rulers seem like

the insolence of an overdressed servant and the splendours and gratifications of wealth like the waste of robbers. No man living in a community which such a religion as Christianity or Islam has touched can be altogether a slave; there is an ineradicable quality in these religions that compels men to judge their masters and to realize their own responsibility for the world.

As men have felt their way towards this new state of mind from the fierce self-centred greed and instinctive combativeness of the early palæolithic family group, they have sought to express the drift of their thoughts and necessities very variously. They have found themselves in disagreement and conflict with old-established ideas, and there has been a natural tendency to contradict these ideas flatly, to fly over to the absolute contrary. Faced by a world in which rule and classes and order seem to do little but give opportunity for personal selfishness and unrighteous oppression, the first impatient movement was to declare for a universal equality and a practical anarchy. Faced by a world in which property seemed little more than a protection for selfishness and a method of enslavement, it was as natural to repudiate all property. Our history shows an increasing impulse to revolt against rulers and against ownership. We have traced it in the middle ages burning the rich man's châteaux and experimenting in theocracy and communism. In the French revolutions this double revolt is clear and plain. In France we find side by side, inspired by the same spirit and as natural parts of the same revolutionary movement, men who, with their eyes on the ruler's taxes, declared that property should be inviolable, and others who, with their eyes on the employer's hard bargains, declared that property should be abolished. But what they are really revolting against in each case is that the ruler and the employer, instead of becoming servants of the community, still remain, like most of mankind, self-seeking, oppressive individuals.

Throughout the ages we find this belief growing in men's minds that there can be such a rearrangement of laws and

powers as to give rule and order while still restraining the egotism of any ruler and of any ruling class that may be necessary, and such a definition of property as will give freedom without oppressive power. We begin to realize nowadays that these ends are only to be attained by a complex constructive effort; they arise through the conflict of new human needs against ignorance and old human nature; but throughout the nineteenth century here was a persistent disposition to solve the problem by some simple formula. (And be happy ever afterwards, regardless of the fact that all human life, all life, is throughout the ages nothing but the continuing solution of a continuous synthetic problem.)

The earlier half of the nineteenth century saw a number of experiments in the formation of trial human societies of a new kind. Among the most important historically were the experiments and ideas of Robert Owen (1771-1858), a Manchester cotton-spinner. He is very generally regarded as the founder of modern Socialism; it was in connection with his work that the word "socialism" first arose (about 1835).

He seems to have been a thoroughly competent business man; he made a number of innovations in the cotton-spinning industry, and acquired a fair fortune at an early age. He was distressed by the waste of human possibilities among his workers, and he set himself to improve their condition and the relations of employer and employed. This he sought to do first at his Manchester factory and afterwards at New Lanark, where he found himself in practical control of works employing about two thousand people. Between 1800 and 1828 he achieved very considerable things: he reduced the hours of labour, made his factory sanitary and agreeable, abolished the employment of very young children, improved the training of his workers, provided unemployment pay during a period of trade depression, established a system of schools, and made New Lanark a model of a better industrialism, while at the same time sustaining its commercial prosperity. He wrote vigorously to defend the mass of mankind against the charges of intemperance and

improvidence which were held to justify the economic iniquities of the time. He held that men and women are largely the product of their educational environment, a thesis that needs no advocacy to-day. And he set himself to a propaganda of the views that New Lanark had justified. He attacked the selfish indolence of his fellow manufacturers, and in 1819, largely under his urgency, the first Factory Act was passed, the first attempt to restrain employers from taking the most stupid and intolerable advantages of their workers' poverty. Some of the restrictions of that Act amaze us to-day. It seems incredible now that it should ever have been necessary to protect little children of *nine* (!) from work in factories, or to limit the nominal working day of such employees to *twelve hours*!

People are perhaps too apt to write of the industrial revolution as though it led to the enslavement and overworking of poor children who had hitherto been happy and free. But this misinterprets history. From the very beginnings of civilization the little children of the poor had always been obliged to do whatever work they could do. But the factory system gathered up all this infantile toil and made it systematic, conspicuous, and scandalous. The factory system challenged the quickening human conscience on that issue. The British Factory Act of 1819, weak and feeble though it seems to us, was the Magna Carta of childhood; thereafter the protection of the children of the poor, first from toil and then from bodily starvation and ignorance, began.

We cannot tell here in any detail the full story of Owen's life and thought. His work at New Lanark had been, he felt, only a trial upon a small working model. What could be done for one industrial community could be done, he held, for every industrial community in the country; he advocated a resettlement of the industrial population in townships on the New Lanark plan. For a time he seemed to have captured the imagination of the world. The *Times*, and *Morning Post* supported his proposals; among the visitors to New Lanark was the Grand Duke Nicholas who succeeded Alexander I as Tsar; a fast friend was the Duke of

Kent, son of George III and father of Queen Victoria. But all the haters of change and all—and there are always many such—who were jealous of the poor, and all the employers who were likely to be troubled by his projects, were waiting for an excuse to counter-attack him, and they found it in the expression of his religious opinions, which were hostile to official Christianity, and through those he was successfully discredited. But he continued to develop his projects and experiments, of which the chief was a community at New Harmony in Indiana (U. S. A.), in which he sank most of his capital. His partners bought him out of the New Lanark business in 1828.

Owen's experiments and suggestions ranged very widely, and do not fall under any single formula. There was nothing doctrinaire about him. His New Lanark experiment was the first of a number of "benevolent businesses" in the world; Lord Leverhulme's Port Sunlight, the Cadburys' Bournville, and the Ford businesses in America are contemporary instances; it was not really a socialist experiment at all; it was a "paternal" experiment. But his proposals for state settlements were what we should call state socialism to-day. His American experiment and his later writings point to a completer form of socialism, a much wider departure from the existing state of affairs. It is clear that the riddle of currency exercised Owen. He understood that we can no more hope for real economic justice while we pay for work with money of fluctuating value than we could hope for a punctual world if there was a continual inconstant variability in the length of an hour. One of his experiments was an attempt at a circulation of labour notes representing one hour, five hours, or twenty hours of work. The co-operative societies of to-day, societies of poor men which combine for the collective buying and distribution of commodities or for collective manufacture or dairying or other forms of agriculture, arose directly out of his initiatives, though the pioneer co-operative societies of his own time ended in failure. Their successors have spread through-

out the whole world, and number to-day some thirty or forty millions of adherents.

A point to note about this early socialism of Owen's is that it was not at first at all "democratic." Its initiative was benevolent, its early form patriarchal; it was something up to which the workers were to be educated by liberally disposed employers and leaders. The first socialism was not a worker's movement; it was a master's movement.

Concurrently with this work of Owen's, another and quite independent series of developments was going on in America and Britain which was destined to come at last into reaction with his socialistic ideas. The English law had long prohibited combinations in restraint of trade, combinations to raise prices or wages by concerted action. There had been no great hardship in these prohibitions before the agrarian and industrial changes of the eighteenth century let loose a great swarm of workers living from hand to mouth and competing for insufficient employment. Under these new conditions, the workers in many industries found themselves intolerably squeezed. They were played off one against another; day by day and hour by hour none knew what concession his fellow might not have made, and what further reduction of pay or increase of toil might not ensue. It became vitally necessary for the workers to make agreements—illegal though they were—against such underselling. At first these agreements had to be made and sustained by secret societies. Or clubs, established ostensibly for quite other purposes, social clubs, funeral societies, and the like, served to mask the wage-protecting combination. The fact that these associations were illegal disposed them to violence; they were savage against "blacklegs" and "rats" who would not join them, and still more savage with traitors. In 1824 the House of Commons recognized the desirability of relieving tension in these matters by conceding the right of workmen to form combinations for "collective bargaining" with the masters. This enabled Trade Unions to develop with a large measure of freedom. At first very clumsy and primi-

tive organizations and with very restricted freedoms, the Trade Unions have risen gradually to be a real Fourth Estate in the country, a great system of bodies representing the mass of industrial workers.

Arising at first in Britain and America, they have, with various national modifications, and under varying legal conditions, spread to France, Germany, and all the westernized communities.

Organized originally to sustain wages and restrict intolerable hours, the Trade Union movement was at first something altogether distinct from socialism. The Trade Unionist tried to make the best for himself of the existing capitalism and the existing conditions of employment; the socialist proposed to change the system. It was the imagination and generalizing power of Karl Marx which brought these two movements into relationship. He was a man with the sense of history very strongly in him; he was the first to perceive that the old social classes that had endured since the beginning of civilization were in process of dissolution and regrouping. His racial Jewish commercialism made the antagonism of property and labour very plain to him. And his upbringing in Germany—where, as we have pointed out, the tendency of class to harden into caste was more evident than in any other European country—made him conceive of labour as presently becoming “class conscious” and collectively antagonistic to the property-concentrating classes. In the Trade Union movement which was spreading over the world, he believed he saw this development of class-conscious labour.

What, he asked, would be the outcome of the “class war” of the capitalist and proletariat? The capitalist adventurers, he alleged, because of their inherent greed and combativeness, would gather power over capital into fewer and fewer hands,¹ until at last they would concentrate all the means of production, transit, and the like into a form seiz-

¹ Increases or diminutions of the passive share-holding class would not affect this concentration very materially. A shareholder has very little power over his property.

able by the workers, whose class consciousness and solidarity would be developed *pari passu* by the process of organizing and concentrating industry. They would seize this capital and work it for themselves. This would be the social revolution. Then individual property and freedom would be restored, based upon the common ownership of the earth and the management by the community as a whole of the great productive services which the private capitalist had organized and concentrated. This would be the end of the "capitalist" system, but not the end of the system of capitalism. State capitalism would replace private owner capitalism.

This marks a great stride away from the socialism of Owen. Owen (like Plato) looked to the common sense of men of any or every class to reorganize the casual and faulty political, economic, and social structure. Marx found something more in the nature of a driving force in his class hostility based on expropriation and injustice. And he was not simply a prophetic theorist; he was also a propagandist of the revolt of labour, the revolt of the so-called "proletariat." Labour, he perceived, had a common interest against the capitalist everywhere, though under the test of the Great Power wars of the time, and particularly of the liberation of Italy, he showed that he failed to grasp the fact that labour everywhere has a common interest in the peace of the world. But with the social revolution in view he did succeed in inspiring the formation of an international league of workers, the First International.


The subsequent history of socialism was chequered between the British tradition of Owen and the German class feeling of Marx. What was called Fabian Socialism, the exposition of socialism by the London Fabian Society, made its appeal to reasonable men of all classes. What was called "Revisionists" is German Socialism inclined in the same direction. But on the whole, it was Marx who carried the day against Owen, and the general disposition of socialists throughout the world was to look to the organization of labour and labour only to supply the fighting forces that would disentangle the political and economic organization of hu-

man affairs from the hands of the more or less irresponsible private owners and adventurers who controlled it.

These were the broad features of the project called Socialism. We will discuss its incompleteness and inadequacies in our next section. It was perhaps inevitable that Socialism should be greatly distraught and subdivided by doubts and disputes and sects and schools; they are growth symptoms like the spots on a youth's face. Here we can but glance at the difference between state socialism, which would run the economic business of the country through its political government, and the later schools of syndicalism and guild socialism which would entrust a large measure in the government of each industry to the workers of every grade—including the directors and managers—engaged in that industry. This "guild socialism" is really a new sort of capitalism with a committee of workers and officials in each industry taking the place of the free private capitalists of that industry. The *personnel* becomes the collective capitalist.

§ 5

We are all socialists nowadays, said Sir William Harcourt years ago, and that is loosely true to-day. There can be few people who fail to realize the provisional nature and the dangerous instability of our present political and economic system, and still fewer who believe with the doctrinaire individualists that profit-hunting "go as you please" will guide mankind to any haven of prosperity and happiness. Great rearrangements are necessary, and a systematic legal subordination of personal self-seeking to the public good. So far most reasonable men are socialists. But these are only preliminary propositions. How far has socialism and modern thought generally gone towards *working out* the conception of this new political and social order, of which our world admittedly stands in need? We are obliged to answer that there is no clear conception of the new state towards which we vaguely struggle, that our science of human rela-



THE NIHILIST CONSPIRATORS

The revolutionary socialistic movement took form in Russia about 1860 as "nihilism"—so christened by Turgenev in his novel *Fathers and Children*. It culminated in the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. (From the painting by Ilya Repin)



RASPUTIN AMONG HIS ARISTOCRATIC ADMIRERS

The murder of this monk in December, 1916, was closely followed by the Russian revolution

tionships is still so crude and speculative as to leave us without definite guidance upon a score of primarily important issues. In 1920 we are no more in a position to set up a scientifically conceived political system in the world than were men to set up an electric power station in 1820. They could not have done that then to save their lives.

The Marxist system points us to an accumulation of revolutionary forces in the modern world. These forces will continually tend towards revolution. But Marx assumed too hastily that a revolutionary impulse would necessarily produce an ordered state of a new and better kind. A revolution may stop half way in mere destruction. No socialist sect has yet defined its projected government clearly; the Bolsheviks in their Russian experiment seem to have been guided by a phrase, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in practice, we are told, Trotsky and Lenin have proved as autocratic as the less intelligent but equally well-meaning Tsar, Alexander I. We have been at some pains to show from our brief study of the French revolution that a revolution can establish nothing permanent that has not already been thought out beforehand and apprehended by the general mind. The French republic, confronted with unexpected difficulties in economics, currency, and international relationships, collapsed to the egotisms of the newly rich people of the Directory, and finally to the egotism of Napoleon. Law and a plan, steadily upheld, are more necessary in revolutionary times than in ordinary humdrum times, because in revolutionary times society degenerates much more readily into a mere scramble under the ascendancy of the forcible and cunning.

If in general terms we take stock of the political and social science of our age, we shall measure something of the preliminary intellectual task still to be done by mankind before we can hope to see any permanent constructive achievements emerging from the mere traditionalism and adventuring that rule our collective affairs to-day. This Socialism, which professes to be a complete theory of a new social order, we discover, when we look into it, to be no more

than a partial theory—very illuminating, so far as it goes—about property. We have already discussed the relationship of social development to the restriction of the idea of property. There are various schools of thought which would restrict property more or less completely. Communism is the proposal to abolish property altogether, or, in other words, to hold all things in common. Modern Socialism, on the other hand—or, to give it a more precise name, “Collectivism”—does clearly distinguish between personal property and collective property. The gist of the socialist proposal is that land and all the natural means of production, transit, and distribution should be collectively owned. Within these limits there is to be much free private ownership and unrestricted personal freedom. Given efficient administration, it may be doubted whether many people nowadays would dispute that proposal. But socialism has never gone on to a thorough examination of that proviso for efficient administration.

Again, what community is it that is to own the collective property; is it to be the sovereign or the township or the county or the nation or mankind? Socialism makes no clear answer. Socialists are very free with the word “nationalize,” but we have been subjecting the ideas of “nations” and “nationalism” to some destructive criticism in this Outline. If socialists object to a single individual claiming a mine or a great stretch of agricultural land as his own individual property, with a right to refuse or barter its use and profit to others, why should they permit a single nation to monopolize the mines or trade routes or natural wealth of the territories in which it lives, against the rest of mankind? There seems to be great confusion in socialist theory in this matter. And unless human life is to become a mass meeting of the race in permanent session, how is the community to appoint its officers to carry on its collective concerns? After all, the private owner of land or of a business or the like, is a sort of public official in so far as his ownership is sanctioned and protected by the community. Instead of

being paid a salary or fees, he is allowed to make a profit. The only valid reason for dismissing him from his ownership is that the new control to be substituted will be more efficient and profitable and satisfactory to the community. And, being dismissed, he has at least the same claim to consideration from the community that he himself has shown in the past to the worker thrown out of employment by a mechanical invention.

This question of administration, the sound and adequate bar to much immediate socialization, brings us to the still largely unsolved problem of human association; how are we to secure the best direction of human affairs and the maximum of willing co-operation with that direction? This is ultimately a complex problem in psychology, but it is absurd to pretend that it is an insoluble one. There must be a definite best, which is the right thing, in these matters. But if it is not insoluble, it is equally unreasonable to pretend that it has been solved. The problem in its completeness involves the working out of the best methods in the following departments, and their complete correlation:—

(i) *Education*.—The preparation of the individual for and understanding and willing co-operation in the world's affairs.

(ii) *Information*.—The continual truthful presentation of public affairs to the individual for his judgment and approval. Closely connected with this need for current information is the codification of the law, the problem of keeping the law plain, clear, and accessible to all.

(iii) *Representation*.—The selection of representatives and agents to act in the collective interest in harmony with the general will based on this education and plain information.

(iv) *The Executive*.—The appointment of executive agents and the maintenance of means for keeping them responsible to the community, without at the same time hampering intelligent initiatives.

(v) *Thought and Research*.—The systematic criticism of

affairs and laws to provide data for popular judgments, and through those judgments to ensure the secular improvement of the human organization.

These are the five heads under which the broad problem of human society presents itself to us. In the world around us we see makeshift devices at work in all those branches, ill co-ordinated one with another and unsatisfactory in themselves. We see an educational system meanly financed and equipped, badly organized and crippled by the interventions and hostilities of religious bodies; we see popular information supplied chiefly by a venal press dependent upon advertisements and subsidies; we see farcical methods of election returning politicians to power as unrepresentative as any hereditary ruler or casual conqueror; everywhere the executive is more or less influenced or controlled by groups of rich adventurers, and the pursuit of political and social science and of public criticism is still the work of devoted and eccentric individuals rather than a recognized and honoured function in the state. There is a gigantic task before right-thinking men in the cleansing and sweetening of the politician's stable; and until it is done, any complete realization of socialism is impossible. While private adventurers control the political life of the state, it is ridiculous to think of the state taking over collective economic interests from private adventurers.

Not only has the socialist movement failed thus far to produce a scientifically reasoned scheme for the correlation of education, law, and the exercise of public power, but even in the economic field, as we have already pointed out, creative forces wait for the conception of a right organization of credit and a right method of payment and interchange. It is a truism that the willingness of the worker depends, among other things, upon his complete confidence in the purchasing power of the currency in which he is paid. As this confidence goes, work ceases, except in so far as it can be rewarded by payment in goods. But there is no sufficient science of currency and business psychology to restrain governments from the most disturbing interferences with

the public credit and with the circulation. And such interferences lead straight to the cessation of work, that is, of the production of necessary things. Upon such vital practical questions it is scarcely too much to say that the mass of those socialists who would recast the world have no definite ideas at all. Yet in a socialist world quite as much as in any other sort of world, people must be paid in money for their work rather than to be paid in kind if any such thing as personal freedom is to continue. Here too there must be an ascertainable right thing to do. Until that is determined, history in these matters will continue to be not so much a record of experiments as of floundering.

And in another direction the social and political thinking of the nineteenth century was, in the face of the vastness of the mechanical revolution, timid, limited, and insufficient, and that was in regard to international relations. The reader of socialistic literature will find the socialists constantly writing and talking of the "State," and never betraying any realization that the "State" might be all sorts of organizations in all sorts of areas, from the republic of San Marino to the British Empire. It is true that Karl Marx had a conception of a solidarity of interests between the workers in all the industrialized countries, but there is little or no suggestion in Marxist socialism of the logical corollary of this, the establishment of a democratic world federal government (with national or provincial "state" governments) as a natural consequence of his projected social revolution. At most there is a vague aspiration. But if there is any logic about the Marxist, it should be his declared political end for which we should work without ceasing. Put to the test of the war of 1914, the socialists of almost all the European countries showed that their class-conscious internationalism was veneered very thinly indeed over their patriotic feelings, and had to no degree replaced them. Everywhere during the German war socialists denounced that war as made by capitalist governments, but it produces little or no permanent effect to denounce a govern-

ment or a world system unless you have a working idea of a better government and a better system to replace it.

We state these things here because they are facts, and a living and necessary part of a contemporary survey of human history. It is not our present task either to advocate or controvert socialism. But it is in our picture to note that political and social life are, and must remain, chaotic and disastrous without the development of some such constructive scheme as socialism *sketches*, and to point out clearly how far away the world is at present from any such scheme. An enormous amount of intellectual toil and discussion and education and many years—whether decades or centuries, no man can tell—must intervene before a new order, planned as ships and railways are planned, runs, as the cables and the postal deliveries run, over the whole surface of our earth. And until such a new order draws mankind together with its net, human life, as we shall presently show by the story of the European wars since 1854, must become more and more casual, dangerous, miserable, anxious, and disastrous because of the continually more powerful and destructive war methods the continuing mechanical revolution produces.

§ 6¹

While the mechanical revolution which the growth of physical science had brought about was destroying the ancient social classification of the civilized state which had been evolved through thousands of years, and producing new possibilities and new ideals of a righteous human community and a righteous world order, a change at least as great and novel was going on in the field of religious thought. That same growth of scientific knowledge from which sprang the mechanical revolution was the moving cause of these religious disturbances.

In the opening chapters of this *Outline* we have given

¹For a closely parallel view of religion to that given here, see *Out-spoken Essays*, by Dean Inge, Essays VIII and IX on *St. Paul* and on *Institutionalism and Mysticism*.

the main story of the Record of the Rocks; we have shown life for the little beginning of consciousness that it is in the still waiting vastness of the void of space and time. But before the end of the eighteenth century, this enormous prospect of the past which fills a modern mind with humility and illimitable hope, was hidden from the general consciousness of our race. It was veiled by the curtains of a Sumerian legend. The heavens were no more than a stage background to a little drama of kings. Men had been too occupied with their own private passions and personal affairs to heed the intimations of their own great destiny that lay about them everywhere.

They learnt their true position in space long before they placed themselves in time. We have already named the earlier astronomers, and told how Galileo was made to recant his assertion that the earth moved round the sun. He was made to do so by the church, and the church was stirred to make him do so because any doubt that the world was the centre of the universe seemed to strike fatally at the authority of Christianity.

Now, upon that matter the teller of a modern history is obliged to be at once cautious and bold. He has to pick his way between cowardly evasion on the one hand, and partisanship on the other. As far as possible he must confine himself to facts and restrain his opinions. Yet it is well to remember that no opinions can be altogether restrained. The writer has his own very strong and definite persuasions, and the reader must bear that in mind. It is a fact in history that the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth had in it something profoundly new and creative; he preached a new Kingdom of Heaven in the hearts and in the world of men. There was nothing in his teaching, so far as we can judge it at this distance of time, to clash or interfere with any discovery or expansion of the history of the world and mankind. But it is equally a fact in history that St. Paul and his successors added to or completed or imposed upon or substituted another doctrine for—as you may prefer to think—the plain and profoundly revolutionary teachings

of Jesus by expounding a subtle and complex theory of salvation, a salvation which could be attained very largely by belief and formalities, without any serious disturbances of the believer's ordinary habits and occupations, and that this Pauline teaching *did* involve very definite beliefs about the history of the world and man. It is not the business of the historian to controvert or explain these matters; the question of their ultimate significance depends upon the theologian; the historian's concern is merely with the fact that official Christianity throughout the world adopted St. Paul's view so plainly expressed in his epistles and so untraceable in the Gospels, that the meaning of religion lay not in the future, but in the past, and that Jesus was not so much a teacher of wonderful new things, as a predestinate divine blood sacrifice of deep mystery and sacredness made in atonement of a particular historical act of disobedience to the Creator committed by our first parents, Adam and Eve, in response to the temptation of a serpent in the Garden of Eden. Upon the belief in that Fall as a fact, and not upon the personality of Jesus of Nazareth, upon the theories of Paul, and not upon the injunctions of Jesus, doctrinal Christianity built itself.

We have already noted that this story of the special creation of the world and of Adam and Eve and the serpent was also an ancient Babylonian story, and probably a still more ancient Sumerian story, and that the Jewish sacred books were the medium by which this very ancient and primitive "heliolithic" serpent legend entered Christianity. Wherever official Christianity has gone, it has taken this story with it. It has tied itself up to that story. Until a century and less ago the whole Christianized world felt bound to believe and did believe, that the universe had been specially created in the course of six days by the word of God a few thousand years before—according to Bishop Ussher, 4004 B. C. (*The Universal History*, in forty-two volumes published in 1779 by a group of London booksellers, discusses whether the precise date of the first day of Creation was March 21st or


September 21st, 4004 B. C., and inclines to the view that the latter was the more probable season.)

Upon this historical assumption rested the religious fabric of the Western and Westernized civilization, and yet the whole world was littered, the hills, mountains, deltas, and seas were bursting with evidence of its utter absurdity. The religious life of the leading nations, still a very intense and sincere religious life, was going on in a house of history built upon sand.

There is frequent recognition in classical literature of a sounder cosmogony. Aristotle was aware of the broad principles of modern geology, they shine through the speculations of Lucretius, and we have noted also Leonardo da Vinci's (1452-1519) lucid interpretation of fossils. A Frenchman, Descartes (1596-1650), speculated boldly upon the incandescent beginnings of our globe, and a Dane, Steno, (1631-87) began the collection of fossils and the description of strata. But it was only as the eighteenth century drew to its close that the systematic study of geology assumed such proportions as to affect the general authority of the Bible version of that ancient Sumerian narrative. Contemporaneously with the *Universal History* quoted above, a great French naturalist, Buffon, was writing upon the Epochs of Nature (1778), and boldly extending the age of the world to 70,000 or 75,000 years. He divided his story into six epochs to square with the six days of the Creation story. These days, it was argued, were figurative days; they were really ages. There was a general disposition to do this on the part of the new science of geology. By that accommodating device, geology contrived to make a peace with orthodox religious teaching that lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

We cannot trace here the contributions of such men as Hutton and Playfair and Sir Charles Lyell, and the Frenchmen Lamarck and Cuvier, in unfolding and developing the record of the rocks. It was only slowly that the general intelligence of the Western world was awakened to two dis-

concerting facts: firstly, that the succession of life in the geological record did not correspond to the acts of the six days of creation; and, secondly, that the record, in harmony with a mass of biological facts, pointed away from the Bible assertion of a separate creation of each species straight towards a genetic relation between all forms of life, *in which even man was included!* The importance of this last issue to the existing doctrinal system was manifest. If all the animals and man had been evolved in this ascendant manner, then there had been no first parents, no Eden, and no Fall. And if there had been no fall, then the entire historical



Darwin—

fabric of Christianity, the story of the first sin and the reason for an atonement, upon which the current teaching based Christian emotions and morality, collapsed like a house of cards.

It was with something like horror, therefore, that great numbers of honest and religious-spirited men followed the work of the English naturalist, Charles Dar-

win (1809–82); in 1859 he published his *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, a powerful and permanently valuable exposition of that conception of the change and development of species which we have sketched briefly in Chapter III; and in 1871 he completed the outline of his work with the *Descent of Man*, which brought man definitely into the same scheme of development with the rest of life.

Many men and women are still living who can remember the dismay and distress among ordinary intelligent people in the Western communities as the invincible case of the

biologists and geologists against the orthodox Christian cosmogony unfolded itself. The minds of many resisted the new knowledge instinctively and irrationally. Their whole moral edifice was built upon false history; they were too old and set to rebuild it; they felt the practical truth of their moral convictions, and this new truth seemed to them to be incompatible with that. They believed that to assent to it would be to prepare a moral collapse for the world. And so they produced a moral collapse by not assenting to it. The universities in England particularly, being primarily clerical in their constitution, resisted the new learning very bitterly. During the seventies and eighties a stormy controversy raged throughout the civilized world. The quality of the discussions and the fatal ignorance of the church may be gauged by a description in Hackett's *Commonplace Book* of a meeting of the British Association in 1860, at which Bishop Wilberforce assailed Huxley, the great champion of the Darwinian views, in this fashion.

Facing "Huxley with a smiling insolence, he begged to know, *was it through his grandfather or grandmother that he claimed his descent from a monkey?*" Huxley turned to his neighbour, and said, 'The Lord hath delivered him into my hands.' Then he stood before us and spoke these tremendous words, 'He was not ashamed to have a monkey for his ancestor; but he would be ashamed to be connected with a man who used great gifts to obscure the truth.'" (Another version has it: "I have certainly said that a man has no reason to be ashamed of having an ape for his grandfather. If there were an ancestor whom I should feel ashamed in recalling, it would rather be a man of restless and versatile intellect who plunges into scientific questions with which he has no real acquaintance, only to obscure them by an aimless rhetoric and distract the attention of his audience from the real point at issue by eloquent digressions and skilled appeals to prejudice.") These words were certainly spoken with passion. The scene was one of great excitement. A lady fainted, says Hackett. . . . Such was the temper of this controversy.

The Darwinian movement took formal Christianity unawares, suddenly. Formal Christianity was confronted with a clearly demonstrable error in her theological statements. The Christian theologians were neither wise enough nor mentally nimble enough to accept the new truth, modify their formulæ, and insist upon the living and undiminished vitality of the religious reality those formulæ had hitherto sufficed to express. For the discovery of man's descent from sub-human forms does not even remotely touch the teaching of the Kingdom of Heaven. Yet priests and bishops raged at Darwin; foolish attempts were made to suppress Darwinian literature and to insult and discredit the exponents of the new views. There was much wild talk of the "antagonism" of religion and science. Now in all ages there have been sceptics in Christendom. The Emperor Frederick II was certainly a sceptic; in the eighteenth century Gibbon and Voltaire were openly anti-Christian, and their writings influenced a number of scattered readers. But these were exceptional people. . . . Now the whole of Christendom became as a whole sceptical. This new controversy touched everybody who read a book or heard intelligent conversation. A new generation of young people grew up, and they found the defenders of Christianity in an evil temper, fighting their cause without dignity or fairness. It was the orthodox theology that the new scientific advances had compromised, but the angry theologians declared that it was religion.

In the end men may discover that religion shines all the brighter for the loss of its doctrinal wrappings, but to the young it seemed as if indeed there had been a conflict of science and religion, and that in that conflict science had won.

The immediate effect of this great dispute upon the ideas and methods of people in the prosperous and influential classes throughout the westernized world was very detrimental indeed. The new biological science was bringing nothing constructive as yet to replace the old moral stand-bys. A real de-moralization ensued. The general level of social life in those classes was far higher in the early twentieth

than in the early seventeenth century, but in one respect, in respect to disinterestedness and conscientiousness in these classes, it is probable that the tone of the earlier age was better than the latter. In the owning and active classes of the seventeenth century, in spite of a few definite "infidels," there was probably a much higher percentage of men and women who prayed sincerely, who searched their souls to find if they had done evil, and who were prepared to suffer and make great sacrifices for what they conceived to be right, than in the opening years of the twentieth century. There was a real loss of faith after 1859. The true gold of religion was in many cases thrown away with the worn-out purse that had contained it for so long, and it was not recovered. Towards the close of the nineteenth century a crude misunderstanding of Darwinism had become the fundamental mindstuff of great masses of the "educated" everywhere. The seventeenth-century kings and owners and rulers and leaders had had the idea at the back of their minds that they prevailed by the will of God; they really feared him, they got priests to put things right for them with him; when they were wicked, they tried not to think of him. But the old faith of the kings, owners, and rulers of the opening twentieth century had faded under the actinic light of scientific criticism. Prevalent peoples at the close of the nineteenth century believed that they prevailed by virtue of the Struggle for Existence, in which the strong and cunning get the better of the weak and confiding. And they believed further that they had to be strong, energetic, ruthless, "practical," egotistical, because God was dead, and had always, it seemed, been dead—which was going altogether further than the new knowledge justified.

They soon got beyond the first crude popular misconception of Darwinism, the idea that every man is for himself alone. But they stuck at the next level. Man, they decided, is a social animal like the Indian hunting dog. He is much more than a dog—but this they did not see. And just as in a pack it is necessary to bully and subdue the younger and weaker for the general good, so it seemed right to them that

the big dogs of the human pack should bully and subdue. Hence a new scorn for the ideas of democracy that had ruled the earlier nineteenth century, and a revived admiration for the overbearing and the cruel. It was quite characteristic of the times that Mr. Kipling should lead the children of the middle and upper-class British public back to the Jungle, to learn "the law," and that in his book *Stalky and Co.* he should give an appreciative description of the torture of two boys by three others, who have by a subterfuge tied up their victims helplessly before revealing their hostile intentions.

It is worth while to give a little attention to this incident in *Stalky and Co.*, because it lights up the political psychology of the British Empire at the close of the nineteenth century very vividly. The history of the last half century is not to be understood without an understanding of the mental twist which this story exemplifies. The two boys who are tortured are "bullies," that is the excuse of their tormentors, and these latter have further been incited to the orgy by a clergyman. Nothing can restrain the gusto with which they (and Mr. Kipling) set about the job. Before resorting to torture, the teaching seems to be, see that you pump up a little justifiable moral indignation, and all will be well. If you have the authorities on your side, then you cannot be to blame. Such, apparently, is the simple doctrine of this typical imperialist. But every bully has to the best of his ability followed that doctrine since the human animal developed sufficient intelligence to be consciously cruel.

Another point in the story is very significant indeed. The head master and his clerical assistant are both represented as being privy to the affair. They *want* this bullying to occur. Instead of exercising their own authority, they use these boys, who are Mr. Kipling's heroes, to punish the two victims. Head master and clergyman turn a deaf ear to the complaints of an indignant mother. All this Mr. Kipling represents as a most desirable state of affairs. In this we have the key to the ugliest, most retrogressive, and finally fatal idea of modern imperialism; the idea of a *tacit conspiracy between*

the law and illegal violence. Just as the Tsardom wrecked itself at last by a furtive encouragement of the ruffians of the Black Hundreds, who massacred Jews and other people supposed to be inimical to the Tsar, so the good name of the British Imperial Government has been tainted—and is still tainted—by an illegal raid made by Doctor Jameson into the Transvaal before the Boer War, by the adventures, which we shall presently describe, of Sir Edward Carson, now Lord Carson, in Ireland, and by the tacit connivance of the British government in Ireland with the so-called “reprisals” undertaken by the loyalists against the perpetrators or alleged perpetrators of Sinn Fein outrages. By such treasons against their subjects, empires destroy themselves. The true strength of rulers and empires lies not in armies and navies, but in the belief of men that they are inflexibly open and truthful and legal. So soon as a government departs from that standard, it ceases to be anything more than “the gang in possession,” and its days are numbered.

§ 7

We have already pointed out that there must be a natural political map of the world which gives the best possible geographical divisions for human administrations. Any other political division of the world than this natural political map will necessarily be a misfit, and must produce stresses of hostility and insurrection tending to shift boundaries in the direction indicated by the natural political map. These would seem to be self-evident propositions were it not that the diplomatists at Vienna evidently neither believed nor understood anything of the sort, and thought themselves as free to carve up the world as one is free to carve up such a boneless structure as a cheese. Most of the upheavals and conflicts that began in Europe as the world recovered from the exhaustion of the Napoleonic wars were quite obviously attempts of the ordinary common men to get rid of governments that were such misfits as to be in many cases intolerable. Generally the existing governments were misfits

throughout Europe because they were not socially representative, and so they were hampering production and wasting human possibilities; but when there were added to these universal annoyances differences of religion and racial culture between rulers and ruled (as in most of Ireland), differences in race and language (as in Austrian North Italy and throughout most of the Austrian Empire), or differences in all these respects (as in Poland and the Turkish Empire in Europe), the exasperation drove towards bloodshed. Europe was a system of governing machines abominably adjusted. From the stress of this maladjustment the various "nationalist" movements that played so large a part in the history of the nineteenth century drew their driving force.

What is a nation? What is nationality? If our story of the world has demonstrated anything, it has demonstrated the mingling of races and peoples, the instability of human divisions, the swirling variety of human groups and human ideas of association. A nation, it has been said, is an accumulation of human beings who think they are one people; but we are told that Ireland is a nation, and Protestant Ulster certainly does not share that idea; and Italy did not think it was one people until long after its unity was accomplished. When the writer was in Italy in 1916, people were saying: "This war will make us one nation." Again, are the English a nation or have they merged into a "British nationality"? Scotchmen do not seem to believe very much in this British nationality. It cannot be a community of race or language that constitutes a nation, because the Gaels and the Lowlanders make up the Scotch "nation"; it cannot be a common religion, for England has scores; nor a common literature, or why is Britain separated from the United States, and the Argentine Republic from Spain? We may suggest that a nation is in effect any assembly, mixture, or confusion of people which is either afflicted by or wishes to be afflicted by a foreign office of its own, in order that it should behave collectively as if its needs, desires, and vanities were beyond comparison more important than the general welfare of humanity. We have already traced the development of



BISMARCK AT VERSAILLES, 1870

The German Chancellor delivering his ultimatum to M. Thiers



LINCOLN AT THE FRONT IN THE CIVIL WAR

President Lincoln's visit to the camps at Antietam October 8, 1862. Puzzled to understand how Lee could have circumvented a superior force on the Peninsula, he was now anxious to learn why a crushing blow had not been struck. On Lincoln's right stands Allan Pinkerton, the famous detective and organizer of the Secret Service of the army: at his left is General John A. McClernand

Tribal Gods — national symbols for which men would die — of the 19th Century



John Bull



Britannia



Germania



France



Cathleen ni Houlihan

the Machiavellian monarchies into the rule of their foreign offices, playing the part of "Powers." The "nationality" which dominated the political thought of the nineteenth century was really no more than the romantic and emotional exaggeration of the stresses produced by the discord of the natural political map with unsuitable political arrangements in the interests of such "Powers."

Throughout the nineteenth century, and particularly throughout its latter half, there has been a great working up of this nationalism in the world. All men are by nature partisans and patriots, but the natural tribalism of men in the nineteenth century was unnaturally exaggerated, it was fretted and over-stimulated and inflamed and forced into the nationalist mould. Nationalism was taught in schools, emphasized by newspapers, preached and mocked and sung into men. It became a monstrous cant which darkened all human affairs. Men were brought to feel that they were as improper without a nationality as without their clothes in a crowded assembly. Oriental peoples who had never heard of nationality before, took to it as they took to the cigarettes and bowler hats of the west. India, a galaxy of contrasted races, religions, and cultures, Dravidian, Mongolian, and Aryan, became a "nation." There were perplexing cases, of course, as when a young Whitechapel Jew had to decide whether he belonged to the British or the Jewish nation. Caricature and political cartoons played a large part in this elevation of the cult of these newer and bigger tribal gods—for such indeed the modern "nations" are—to their ascendancy over the imagination of the nineteenth century. If one turns over the pages of *Punch*, that queer contemporary record of the British soul, which has lasted now since 1841, one finds the figures of Britannia, Hibernia, France, and Germania embracing, disputing, reproving, rejoicing, grieving. It greatly helped the diplomatists to carry on their game of Great Powers to convey politics in this form to the doubting general intelligence. To the common man, resentful that his son should be sent abroad to be shot, it was made clear that instead of this being

merely the result of the obstinacy and greed of two foreign offices, it was really a necessary part of a righteous inevitable gigantic struggle between two of these dim vast divinities. France had been wronged by Germania, or Italia was showing a proper spirit to Austria. The boy's death ceased to appear an outrage on common sense; it assumed a sort of mythological dignity. And insurrection could clothe itself in the same romantic habiliments as diplomacy. Ireland became a Cinderella goddess, Cathleen ni Houlihan, full of heartrending and unforgivable wrongs; young India transcended its realities in the worship of Bande Mataram.

The essential idea of nineteenth century nationalism was the "legitimate claim" of every nation to complete sovereignty, the claim of every nation to manage all its affairs within its own territory, regardless of any other nation. The flaw in this idea is that the affairs and interests of every modern community extend to the uttermost parts of the earth. The assassination of Sarajevo in 1914, for example, which caused the great war, produced the utmost distress among the Indian tribes of Labrador because that war interrupted the marketing of the furs upon which they relied for such necessities as ammunition, without which they could not get sufficient food. A world of independent sovereign nations means, therefore, a world of perpetual injuries, a world of states constantly preparing for or waging war. But concurrently and discordantly with the preaching of this nationalism there was, among the stronger nationalities, a vigorous propagation of another set of ideas, the ideas of imperialism, in which a powerful and advanced nation was conceded the right to dominate a group of other less advanced nations or less politically developed nations or peoples whose nationality was still undeveloped, who were expected by the dominating nation to be grateful for its protection and dominance. This use of the word empire was evidently a different one from its former universal significance. The new empires did not even pretend to be a continuation of the world empire of Rome. They had lost the last connexion between the idea of the empire and the peace of the world.

These two ideas of nationality and, as the crown of national success, "empire," ruled European political thought, ruled indeed the political thought of the world, throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, and ruled it to the practical exclusion of any wider conception of a common human welfare. They were plausible and dangerously unsound working ideas. They represented nothing fundamental and inalterable in human nature, and they failed to meet the new needs of world controls and world security that the mechanical revolution was every day making more imperative. They were accepted because people in general had neither the sweeping views that a study of world history can give, nor had they any longer the comprehensive charity of a world religion. Their danger to all the routines of ordinary life was not realized until it was too late.

§ 8

After the middle of the nineteenth century, this world of new powers and old ideas, this fermenting new wine in the old bottles of diplomacy, broke out through the flimsy restraints of the Treaty of Vienna into a series of wars. But by an ironical accident the new system of disturbances was preceded by a peace festival in London, the Great Exhibition of 1851. This exhibition deserves a paragraph or so.

The moving spirit in this exhibition was Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the nephew of Leopold I, the German king who had been placed upon the Belgian throne in 1831, and who was also the maternal uncle of the young Queen Victoria of England. She had become queen in 1837 at the age of eighteen. The two young cousins—they were of the same age—had married in 1840 under their uncle's auspices, and Prince Albert was known to the British as the "Prince Consort." He was a young man of sound intelligence and exceptional education, and he seems to have been greatly shocked by the mental stagnation into which England had sunken. Oxford and Cambridge, those once starry centres, were still recovering but slowly from the intellectual ebb of

the later eighteenth century. At neither university did the annual matriculations number more than four hundred. The examinations were for the most part mere *viva voce* ceremonies. Except for two colleges in London (the University of London) and one in Durham, this was all the education on a university footing that England had to offer. It was very largely the initiative of this scandalized young German who had married the British queen which produced the university commission of 1850, and it was with a view to waking up England further that he promoted the first International Exhibition which was to afford some opportunity for a comparison of the artistic and industrial products of the various European nations.

The project was bitterly opposed. In the House of Commons it was prophesied that England would be overrun by foreign rogues and revolutionaries who would corrupt the morals of the people and destroy all faith and loyalty in the country.

The exhibition was held in Hyde Park in a great building of glass and iron—which afterwards was re-erected as the Crystal Palace. Financially it was a great success. It made many English people realize for the first time that theirs was not the only industrial country in the world, and that commercial prosperity was not a divinely appointed British monopoly. There was the clearest evidence of a Europe recovering steadily from the devastation of the Napoleonic wars, and rapidly overtaking the British lead in trade and manufacture. It was followed directly by the organization of a Science and Art Department (1853), to recover, if possible, the educational leeway that Britain had lost.

The exhibition released a considerable amount of international talk and sentiment. It had already found expression in the work of such young poets as Tennyson, who had glanced down the vista of the future.

“Till the war-drums throb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d.

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.”

The vision was premature. Beneath the apparent peace of that brief interval of liberalism and superficial enlightenment the seeds of a new crop of international conflicts were germinating. France was nominally a liberal Republic. But her president was a Bonaparte, the nephew of the first Napoleon, he was a person of great cunning and enterprise, and he was destined to bring upon France and Europe even greater disasters than those his uncle had achieved a century before.

§ 9

The French republic which had replaced the Orleans monarchy in 1848 had a brief and troubled career. From the outset it was embarrassed by crude socialistic proposals which produced much economic disorganization and even more business anxiety. This second Napoleon Bonaparte, posing as a liberal "safe" man, who would restore confidence and stabilize affairs, was able to secure his election as President in the October of that year. He took an oath as President to be faithful to the democratic republic, and to regard as enemies all who attempted to change the form of government. In two years' time (December 1852) he was Emperor of the French.

At first he was regarded with considerable suspicion by Queen Victoria, or rather by Baron Stockmar, the friend and servant of King Leopold of Belgium, and the keeper of the international conscience of the British queen and her consort. All this group of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha people had a reasonable and generous enthusiasm for the unity and well-being of Germany—upon liberal lines—and they were disposed to be alarmed at this Bonapartist revival. Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister, was, on the other hand, friendly with the usurper from the outset; he offended the queen by sending amiable dispatches to the French President without submitting them for her examination and so giving her sufficient time to consult Stockmar upon them, and he was obliged to resign. But subsequently the British

Court veered round to a more cordial attitude to the new adventurer. The opening years of his reign promised a liberal monarchy rather than a Napoleonic career; a government of "cheap bread, great public works, and holidays,"¹ and he expressed himself warmly in favour of the idea of national-

Map of EUROPE, 1848-1871



ism, which was naturally a very acceptable idea to any liberal German intelligence. There had been a brief all-German parliament at Frankfort in 1848, which was overthrown in 1849 by the Prussian monarchy.

Before 1848 all the great European courts of the Vienna settlement had been kept in a kind of alliance by the fear of a second and more universal democratic revolution. After

¹ Albert Thomas in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

the revolutionary failures of 1848 and the restoration of monarchy in France, this fear was lifted, and they were free to resume the scheming and counter-scheming of the days before 1789—with the vastly more powerful armies and fleets the first Napoleonic phase had given them. The game of Great Powers was resumed with zest, after an interval of sixty years, and it continued until it produced the catastrophe of 1914.

For a time the new Napoleon went warily. It was the Tsar of Russia, Nicholas I, who made the first move towards war. He resumed the traditional thrust of Peter the Great towards Constantinople. Nicholas invented the phrase of the "sick man of Europe" for the Sultan, and, finding an excuse in the misgovernment of the Christian population of the Turkish empire, he occupied the Danubian principalities in 1853. It was a real international retrocession. European diplomatists found themselves with a question of quite the eighteenth-century pattern. The designs of Russia were understood to clash with the designs of France in Syria, and to threaten the Mediterranean route to India of Great Britain, and the outcome was an alliance of France and England to bolster up Turkey and a war, the Crimean War, which ended in the repulse of Russia. One might have thought that the restraint of Russia was rather the business of Austria and Germany, but the passion of the foreign offices of France and England for burning their fingers in Russian affairs has always been very difficult to control. And the new Napoleon saw in this war an opportunity of cementing his insecure friendship with Britain and the British court, which had so far held aloof from him.

The next phase of interest in this revival of the Great Power drama was the exploitation by the Emperor Napoleon III and the king of the small kingdom of Sardinia in North Italy, of the inconveniences and miseries of the divided state of Italy, and particularly of the Austrian rule in the north. The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel, made an old-time bargain for Napoleon's help in return for the provinces of Nice and Savoy. France was to have these and Sardinia was

to be compensated in Italy. The war between France and Sardinia on the one hand, and Austria on the other, broke out in 1859, and was over in a few weeks. The Austrians were badly beaten at Magenta and Solferino. Then, being threatened by Prussia on the Rhine, Napoleon made peace, leaving Sardinia the richer for Lombardy.



The next move in the game of Victor Emmanuel, and of his chief minister Cavour, was an insurrectionary movement in Sicily led by the great Italian patriot Garibaldi. Sicily and Naples were liberated, and all Italy, except only Rome (which remained loyal to the Pope) and Venetia, which was held by the Austrians, fell to the king of Sardinia. A

general Italian parliament met at Turin in 1861, and Victor Emmanuel became the first king of Italy.

But now the interest in this game of European diplomacy shifted to Germany. Already the common sense of the natural political map had asserted itself. In 1848 all Germany, including, of course, German Austria, was for a time united under the Frankfort parliament. But that sort of union was particularly offensive to all the German courts and foreign offices; they did not want a Germany united by the will of its people, they wanted Germany united by legal and diplomatic action—as Italy was being united. In 1848



Bismarck

the German Parliament had insisted that the largely German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, which had been in the German Bund, must belong to Germany. It had ordered the Prussian army to occupy them, and the king of Prussia had refused to take his orders from the German parliament, and so had precipitated the downfall of that body. Now the King of Denmark, Christian IX, for no conceivable motive

except the natural folly of kings, embarked upon a campaign of annoyance against the Germans in these two duchies. Prussian affairs were then very much in the hands of a minister of the seventeenth-century type, von Bismarck (count in 1865, prince in 1871), and he saw brilliant opportunities in this trouble. He became the champion of the German nationality in these duchies—it must be remembered that the King of Prussia had refused to undertake this role for democratic Germany in 1848—and he persuaded Austria to side with Prussia in a military intervention.

Denmark had no chance against these Great Powers; she

was easily beaten and obliged to relinquish the duchies.

Then Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria for the possession of these two small states. So he brought about a needless and fratricidal war of Germans for the greater glory of Prussia and the ascendancy of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany. He consolidated Germany under the Prussian Hohenzollerns. German writers of a romantic turn of mind represent Bismarck as a great statesman planning the unity of Germany; but indeed he was doing nothing of the kind. The unity of Germany was a reality in 1848. It was and is in the nature of things. The Prussian monarchy was simply delaying the inevitable in order to seem to achieve it in Prussian fashion. That is why, when at last Germany was unified, instead of bearing the likeness of a modern civilized people, it presented itself to the world with the face of this archaic Bismarck, with a fierce moustache, huge jack boots, a spiked helmet, and a sword.

In this war between Prussia and Austria, Prussia had for an ally Italy; while most of the smaller German states, who dreaded the schemes of Prussia, fought on the side of Austria. The reader will naturally want to know why Napoleon III did not grasp this admirable occasion for statecraft and come into the war to his own advantage. All the rules of the Great Power game required that he should. He was allowing a dangerous rival to France to arise in Europe in the shape of Prussia. He should have done something to prevent this. But Napoleon, unhappily for himself, had got his fingers in a trap on the other side of the Atlantic, and was in no position just then to intervene.

He had been sorely tempted, by America. The discord between the interests of the southern and northern states in the North American union, due to the economic differences based on slavery, had at last led to open civil war. In our next section we will deal with this civil war more fully; here we will only say that it lasted four years, and ended at last in a reunited United States. All the elements of reaction in Europe rejoiced during the four years of republican dissension; the British aristocracy openly sided with the confed-

erate states, and the British Government permitted several privateers, and particularly the *Alabama*, to be launched in England to attack the federal shipping.

Napoleon III was even more rash in his assumption that after all the new world had fallen before the old. Hitherto the United States had forbidden European interference upon the continent of America. This was, so to speak, a fixed rule of American policy. It had been first clearly enunciated by President Monroe, and it was called the Monroe doctrine. The sure shield of the Monroe doctrine, it seemed to Napoleon, was now thrust aside for good, the Great Powers might meddle again in America, and the blessings of an adventurous monarchy be restored there.

A pretext for interference was found in certain liberties taken with the property of foreigners by the Mexican president. A joint expedition of French, British, and Spanish occupied Vera Cruz, but Napoleon's projects were too bold for his allies, and they withdrew when it became clear that he contemplated nothing less than the establishment of a Mexican empire. This he did, after much stiff fighting, making the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, Emperor of Mexico in 1864. The French forces, however, remained in effectual possession of the country, and a crowd of French speculators poured into Mexico to exploit its mines and resources.

But in April, 1865, the civil war in the United States was brought to an end and the little group of eager Europeans in possession of Mexico found themselves faced by the victorious United States government in a thoroughly grim mood, with a large, dangerous-looking army in hand. The French imperialists were bluntly given the alternative of war with the United States or clearing out of America. In effect this was an instruction to go. This was the entanglement which prevented Napoleon III from interference between Prussia and Austria in 1866, and this was the reason why Bismarck precipitated his struggle with Austria.

While Prussia was fighting Austria, Napoleon III was trying to escape with dignity from the briars of Mexico.

He invented a shabby quarrel upon financial grounds with Maximilian and withdrew the French troops. Then, by all the rules of kingship, Maximilian should have abdicated. But instead he made a fight for his empire; he was defeated by his recalcitrant subjects, caught, and shot as a public nuisance in 1867. So the peace of President Monroe was restored to the new world.

But while Napoleon was busy with his American misadventure, Prussia and Italy were snatching victory over the Austrians (1866). Italy, it is true, was badly beaten at Custozza and in the naval battle of Lissa, but the Austrian army was so crushed by the Prussian at the battle of Sadowa, that Austria made an abject surrender. Italy gained the province of Venetia, so making one more step towards unity—only Rome and Trieste and a few small towns on the north and north-western frontiers remained—and Prussia became the head of a North German Confederation, from which Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Austria were excluded.

This victory of Prussia, this supersession of Austria as even the nominal head of things German, this restoration of the predominance of the kingdom of Frederick the Great, brought Prussia and France face to face. A great rivalry had become clear, a rivalry that was to produce at last the greatest and most desolating war in all history. It was only a question of time before France and Prussia clashed. Each armed, but Prussia had better schoolmasters and a higher standard of obedience and efficiency than France. The war almost came in 1867, when, so soon as he was free from Mexico, Napoleon sought to pick a quarrel with Prussia over Luxembourg. It came in 1870 quite on eighteenth century grounds, with a dispute about the candidates for the vacant throne of Spain. Napoleon had some theory in his mind that Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and the other states outside the North German Confederation would side with him against Prussia. He probably thought this would happen because he wanted it to happen. But since 1848 the Germans, so far as foreign meddling was concerned, had

been in spirit a united people; Bismarck had merely imposed the Hohenzollern monarchy, with pomp, ceremony, and bloodshed, upon accomplished facts. All Germany sided with Prussia.

Early in August 1870 the united German forces invaded France. In numbers, discipline, equipment, and leading they proved better than the French. The debacle of France was swift and complete. After the battles of Wörth and Gravelotte, one French army under Bazaine was forced into Metz and surrounded there, and, on September 1st, a second, with which was Napoleon, was defeated and obliged to capitulate at Sedan. Napoleon became a prisoner. Paris found herself bare to the invader. For a second time the promises of Napoleonism had failed France disastrously.

On September 4th, France declared herself a republic again, and thus regenerated, prepared to fight for existence against triumphant Prussianism. For though it was a united Germany that had overcome French imperialism, it had Prussia in the saddle. The army in Metz capitulated in October; Paris, after a siege and bombardment, surrendered in January 1871, and France sued for peace.

With pomp and ceremony, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, amidst a great array of military uniforms, the King of Prussia was declared German Emperor, and Bismarck and the sword of the Hohenzollerns claimed the credit for that German unity which a common language and literature had long since assured.

The peace of Frankfort which followed was a Hohenzollern peace. Bismarck had availed himself of the national feeling of Germany to secure the aid of the South German states, but he had no grasp of the essential forces that had given victory to him and to his royal master. The power that had driven Prussia to victory was the power of the natural political map of Europe insisting upon the unity of the German-speaking peoples. In the east, Germany was already sinning against that natural map by her administration of Posen and other Polish districts. Now greedy for territory, and particularly for iron mines, she annexed

a considerable area of French-speaking Lorraine, including Metz, and Alsace, which, in spite of its German speech, was largely French in sympathy. Inevitably there was a clash between German rulers and French subjects in these annexed provinces; inevitably the wrongs and bitterness of the subjugated France of Lorraine echoed in Paris and kept alive the passionate resentment of the French. . . . How at last that flared up in a great *revanche* we shall tell later. . . . Napoleon III hid his diminished head in England, and died there a year or so after his collapse. So ended the second Bonapartist régime in France.

§ 10

It is a relief to turn from the disastrous exploits of this Bonapartist adventurer in France and the temporary triumph of the Hohenzollern family over the popular movement in Germany to an altogether greater and more significant figure, the figure of Abraham Lincoln, about which the incidents of the great war of secession in America may very conveniently be grouped.

The opening half of the nineteenth century, which had been an age of reaction and recovery in Europe, was in America a period of extravagant growth. The new means of communication, the steamboat and the railway and presently the electric telegraph, came just in time to carry forward the movement of the population across the continent. But for these mechanical aids, the United States even to-day might not reach westward beyond the Rocky Mountains, and an entirely different people might be in possession of the western coast.

It is still very imperfectly grasped by politicians how dependent are the areas enclosed by governmental and administrative boundaries upon the means of communication available and the character of the country in relation to transport. Given roads and writing, open valleys tend to become consolidated under one government; mountainous barriers separated not only peoples but rulers; the Roman

empire was an empire of high road and wheel, and its divisions and separations and fall were due to the impossibility of maintaining swift communications between part and part. The Western Europe that emerged from the Napoleonic storm was divided into national states that were perhaps as large as they could become without loss of solidarity, with high-road horse traction as their swiftest linking method. Had the people of the United States spread over the American continent with only horse traction, rough roads and letter-writing to keep them together, it seems inevitable that differences in local economic conditions would have developed different social types, that wide separation would have fostered differences of dialect and effaced sympathy, that the inconvenience of attending Congress at Washington would have increased with every advance of the frontier westward, until at last the States would have fallen apart into a loose league of practically independent and divergent nations. Wars, for mineral wealth, for access to the sea and so forth, would have followed, and America would have become another Europe.

But the river steamboat, the railway and the telegraph arrived in time to prevent this separation, and the United States became the first of a new type of modern transport state, altogether larger, more powerful, and more conscious of its unity than any state the world had ever seen before. For the tendency now in America is not to diverge but assimilate, and citizens from various parts of the States grew not more but less unlike each other in speech and thought and habit. The United States is really not comparable to a European power such as France or Italy. It is a new and bigger type of political organization.

Empires there have been before in the world comparable in area and population to the United States, but they were merely accumulations of diverse tribute-paying peoples united only by a government. The unity of the United States is inherent. It is a community of outlook of over one hundred million men. The railways which intensified the conflicts and congestions of Europe, the inventions that in-



GLADSTONE, THE "GRAND OLD MAN"

After sixty years of distinguished political life as England's foremost statesman, William Ewart Gladstone died, 1908, in his ninetieth year, after the passage of his life's work in the House of Commons.




THE YOUNG QUEEN VICTORIA

First portrait made after her accession. It is the original study made by the American painter, Thomas Sully, March 22 to May 15, 1838, for the portrait in the Wallace Collection and two other portraits in America. (At the Metropolitan Museum of Art)

creased the striking distance of the European armies and gave them ever greater destructive power, so that there seems now no choice for western Europe between voluntary unification or forcible unification under some one predominant power, or chaos and destruction, confirmed the free unity of republican America. To Europe steam brought congestion, to America opportunity.

But on the way to this present greatness and security the American people passed through one phase of dire conflict. The river steamboats, the railways, the telegraph and their associate facilities, did not come soon enough to avert the deepening conflict of interests and ideas between the southern slave-holding states and the free industrial north. The railways and steamboats at first did but bring into sharper conflict an already established difference. There was a profound difference in spirit between the two sections of the United States, and the increasing unification due to the new means of transport made the question whether the southern spirit or the northern should prevail an ever more urgent one. There was little possibility of compromise. The northern spirit was free and individualistic; the southern made for great estates and a conscious gentility ruling over a dusky subject multitude. The sympathies of British liberalism and radicalism were for the North; the sympathies of the British landlords and the British ruling class were for the South.

Every territory that was organized into a state, every new incorporation into the fast growing American system, became a field of conflict between the two ideas, whether it should become a state of free citizens or whether the estate system should prevail. The issue crept slowly to predominance in American affairs after the establishment of Missouri (1821) and Arkansas (1836) as slave-holding states. From 1833 an American anti-slavery society was not merely resisting the extension of the institution but agitating the whole country for its complete abolition. The issue flamed up into open conflict over the admission of Texas to the union. Texas had originally been a part of the republic of



Mexico, but it was largely colonized by Americans from the slave-holding states, and it seceded from Mexico and established its independence in 1835. A vigorous agitation for the annexation of Texas followed, and Texas was annexed in 1844 and admitted as a state in 1845. Under the Mexican law slavery had been forbidden in Texas, but now the south claimed Texas for slavery. And got it.

Moreover a war with Mexico arising out of the Texas annexation had added New Mexico and other areas to the United States, and in these regions also slavery was permitted and a Fugitive Slave Bill increased the efficiency of the methods of catching and returning slaves who had fled to free states. But meanwhile the development of ocean navigation was bringing a growing swarm of immigrants from Europe to swell the spreading population of the northern states, and the raising of Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Oregon, all northern farm lands, to state level gave the anti-slavery north the possibility of predominance both in the senate and the House of Representatives. The cotton-growing south, irritated by the growing threat of the Abolitionist movement, and fearing this predominance in Congress, began to talk of secession from the Union. Southerners began to dream of annexations to the south of them in Mexico and the West Indies and of a great slave state, detached from the north and reaching from the Mason and Dixon line to Panama.

Kansas became the region for the final decision. The slavery issue plunged the territory of Kansas into what was practically a civil war between settlers from the free and immigrants from the slave states, a war that continued until 1857 and ended in the victory of the anti-slavery settlers. But until 1861 Kansas was not raised to statehood. The extension of slavery was the chief issue before the country in the presidential election of 1860, and the return of Abraham Lincoln as an anti-extension president decided the south to split the Union. South Carolina passed an "ordinance of secession," and prepared for war. Mississippi, Florida,

Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas joined her early in 1861, and a convention met at Montgomery in Alabama, elected Jefferson Davis president of the "Confederated States" of America, and adopted a constitution similar to that of the United States but specifically upholding "the institution of negro slavery."

Such was the political situation with which Abraham Lincoln was called to deal as president of the Union. He was, it chanced, a man entirely typical of the new people that had grown up after the War of Independence. His people were quite common folk, his father could not read or write until after his marriage, and his mother, it is said, was an illegitimate child. She



Abraham Lincoln—

was a woman of exceptional intellect and character. His early years had been spent as a drifting particle in the general westward flow of the population. He was born in Kentucky (1809), was taken to Indiana as a boy and later on to Illinois. Life was rough in the backwoods of Indiana in those days; the house was a mere log cabin in the wilderness, and his schooling was poor and casual.

But his mother taught him to read early, and he became a voracious reader. At seventeen he was a big athletic youth, a great wrestler and runner. At nineteen he went down river to New Orleans as a hired hand on a flat boat. He worked for a time as a clerk in a store, served as a volunteer in an Indian war, went into business as a store-keeper with a drunken partner, and contracted debts that he did not fully pay off for fifteen years. Finally when he was about twenty-four he got a job as deputy to the county surveyor of

Sangamon county which, he said, "kept body and soul together."

All this time he was reading hard. His earlier books, those early books that make the mind, seem to have been few but good; he read all he could get; he knew his Shakespeare and Burns well, the life of Washington, a history of the United States, and so forth. He had the instinct for expression, and from his boyhood he wrote as well as studied, producing verse, essays, and the like. Much of this was coarse, homely stuff. Politics soon attracted him. In 1834, when he was still only five and twenty, he was elected member of the House of Representatives for the State of Illinois; he read for the bar and was admitted in 1836. For a time he worked rather at law than politics.

But the great question before the people of the United States insisted upon the attention of every able man. This big, capable, self-educated man, so typically a man of the middle west, could not fail to be profoundly stirred by the steady development of the issues of slavery and secession. In Illinois particularly the question flamed because the great leader in Congress of the party for the extension of slavery was Senator Douglas of Illinois. There was a personal rivalry between the two; they had both courted the lady who became Mrs. Lincoln. Douglas was a man of great ability and prestige, and for some years Lincoln fought against him by speech and pamphlet, first in Illinois and then throughout the eastern states, rising steadily to the position of his most formidable and finally victorious antagonist. Their culminating struggle was the presidential campaign of 1860, and on the fourth of March, 1861, Lincoln was inaugurated president with the southern states already in active secession and committing acts of war.

The first proceeding of the secessionists was the seizure of all Federal forts and stores within their boundaries. These federal posts were built on territory belonging to the states in which they stood, and these states claimed the right to "resume" their property. The garrison of Fort Sumter at Charleston resisted, and the war began with the bombard-

ment of this fort on the twelfth of April, 1861. America at that time had only a very small regular army, it remained loyal to the president, and these opening operations of the Confederacy were conducted by state levies. President Lincoln at once called for 75,000 men, and Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia immediately went over to the Confederacy, which had now hoisted its own flag, the "Stars and Bars" against the "Stars and Stripes."

So began the civil war in America. It was fought by improvised armies that grew steadily from a few score thousands to hundreds of thousands—until at last the Federal forces exceeded a million men; it was fought over a vast area between New Mexico and the sea, Washington and Richmond were the chief objectives. It is beyond our scope here to tell of the mounting energy of that epic struggle that rolled to and fro across the hills and woods of Tennessee and Virginia and down the Mississippi. There was a terrible waste and killing of men. Thrust was followed by counter thrust; hope gave way to despondency, and returned and was again disappointed. Sometimes Washington seemed within the Confederate grasp; and again the Federal armies were driving towards Richmond. The Confederates, outnumbered and far poorer in resources, fought under a general of supreme ability, General Lee. The generalship of the Union was far inferior. For long Lincoln clung to General McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," a pedantic, dilatory, and disappointing commander. Generals were dismissed, new generals appointed; until at last under Sherman and Grant came victory, over the ragged and depleted south. In October 1864, a Federal army under Sherman broke through the Confederate left and marched down from Tennessee through Georgia to the coast, right across the Confederate country, and then turned up through the Carolinas, coming in upon the rear of the Confederate armies. Meanwhile Grant held Lee before Richmond until Sherman closed on him.

On April 2nd the Confederate troops evacuated Richmond; on April 9th, 1865, Lee and his army surrendered at Appomattox Court House and within a month all the remaining

secessionist armies had laid down their arms and the Confederacy was at an end.

But this four years' struggle had meant an enormous physical and moral strain for the people of the United States. In many states, in Maryland and Kentucky for example, opinion upon the war was acutely divided. The principle of state autonomy was very dear to many minds, and the north seemed in effect to be forcing abolition upon the south. Many men were against slavery, but also against interference with the free power of each individual state over its own people. In the border states brothers and cousins, even fathers and sons, would take opposite sides and find themselves in antagonistic armies. The north felt its cause a righteous one, but for great numbers of people it was not a full-bodied and unchallenged righteousness. But for Lincoln there was no doubt. He was a clear-minded man in the midst of much confusion. He stood for the Union; he stood for the great peace of America. He was opposed to slavery, but slavery he held to be a secondary issue; his primary purpose was that the United States should not be torn into two contracted and jarring fragments. So through the long four years of struggle he stood out with an inflexible conviction, a steadfast will.

When in the opening stages of the war Congress and the Federal generals embarked upon a precipitate emancipation, Lincoln opposed and mitigated their enthusiasm. He was for emancipation by stages and with compensation. It was only in January 1865 that the situation had ripened to a point when Congress could propose to abolish slavery for ever by a constitutional amendment, and the war was already over before this amendment was ratified by the states.

As the war dragged on through 1862 and 1863, the first passions and enthusiasms waned, and America learnt all the phases of war weariness and war disgust. Conscription replaced volunteering, and changed the spirit of the fighting both in the south and the north. The war became a prolonged dismal, fratricidal struggle. July 1863 saw New York rioting against the drafts, and the Democratic party

in the north sought to win the presidential election on the plea that the war was a failure and should be discontinued. This would of course have meant a practical victory for the south. There were organized conspiracies to defeat the draft. The gaunt, tall man at the White House found himself with defeatists, traitors, dismissed generals, tortuous party politicians, and a doubting and fatigued people behind him and uninspired generals and depressed troops before him; and his chief consolation must have been that Jefferson Davis at Richmond could be in little better case. The English government had misbehaved, and permitted the Confederate agents in England to launch and man three swift privateer ships—the *Alabama* is the best remembered of them—which were chasing United States shipping from the seas. The French army in Mexico was trampling the Monroe doctrine in the dirt. Came subtle proposals from Richmond, to drop the war, leave the issues of the war for subsequent discussion, and turn, Federal and Confederate in alliance, upon the French in Mexico. But Lincoln would not listen to such proposals unless the supremacy of the Union was maintained. The Americans might do such things as one people but not as two.

He held the United States together through long weary months of reverses and ineffective effort, through black phases of division and failing courage; and there is no record that he ever faltered from his purpose. There were times when there was nothing to be done, when he sat in the White House silent and motionless, a grim monument of resolve; times when he relaxed his mind by jesting and broad anecdotes. He was full of sardonic humour, but very tender with the pain of others. When some enemies of Grant came to tell him that general drank, he asked for the brand of his whiskey—"for the others." He was himself a man very abstemious in his habits, capable either of an immense industry or an immense patience. At last in the early months of 1865 it was plain that victory was coming, and he set himself with all his force to make surrender easy and the treatment of the vanquished the beginning of a

reconciliation. Still his watchword was "Union." He was soon in conflict with the extremists of his own side who wished for a vindictive peace.

He saw the Union triumphant. He entered Richmond the day after its surrender, and heard of Lee's capitulation. He returned to Washington, and on April 11th made his last public address. His theme was reconciliation and the reconstruction of loyal government in the defeated states. On the evening of April 14th he went to Ford's theatre in Washington, and as he sat looking at the stage, he was shot in the back of the head and killed instantly by an actor named Booth who had some sort of grievance against him,¹ and who had crept into the box unobserved.

If the work of healing was impaired and if the United States had more trouble and bitterness in the years following the war than there was need for, it was because Lincoln was dead. But his work was done, and the Union was saved and saved for good. At the beginning of the war there was no railway to the Pacific coast; now the railways spread like a swiftly growing plant until they had clutched and held and woven all the vast territories of the United States into one now indissoluble mental and material unity.

From that time the consolidation of the United States has gone on steadfastly. Within half a century its population had passed the hundred million mark. And there is no sign that growth and development have yet reached any limitation. This Titanic democracy, without king or elaborate foreign policy, is, we repeat, a new thing in the world's experience. It is not a "Great Power" in the sense in which that phrase is used in Europe. It is something more modern in its nature, and greater, and with a greater destiny.

§ 11

A fresh upthrust of what we have here called the natural map against the diplomatic arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna began in 1875, when the Christian races in the Bal-

¹ See Elson's—*History of United States*, IV, 293.

kans, and particularly the Bulgarians, became restless and insurgent. The Turks adopted violent repressive measures, and embarked upon massacres of Bulgarians on an enormous scale.

Thereupon Russia intervened (1877), and after a year of costly warfare obliged the Turks to sign the treaty of San



Stefano, which was, on the whole, a sensible treaty, breaking up the artificial Turkish Empire, and to a large extent establishing the natural map. But it had become the tradition of British policy to thwart "the designs of Russia"—heaven knows why!—whenever Russia appeared to have a design, and the British foreign office, under the premiership of Lord Beaconsfield, intervened with a threat of war, if a

considerable restoration of the Turks' facilities for exaction, persecution, and massacre was not made. For a time war seemed very probable. The British music-halls, those lamps to British foreign policy, were lit with patriotic fire, and the London errand-boy on his rounds was inspired to chant, with the simple dignity of a great people conscious of its high destinies, a song declaring that:

"We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo,¹ if we do,

We got the ships, we got the men, we got the munn-aye too" . . .

and so on to a climax:

"The Russ'ns shall not 'ave Con-stan-te-no - - ple."

In consequence of this British opposition, a conference was assembled in 1878 at Berlin to revise the treaty of San Stefano, chiefly in the interests of the Turkish and Austrian monarchies, the British acquired the island of Cyprus, to which they had no sort of right whatever, and which has never been of the slightest use to them, and Lord Beaconsfield returned triumphantly from the Berlin Conference, with what the British were given to understand at the time was "Peace with Honour."

This treaty of Berlin was the second main factor, the peace of Frankfort being the first, in bringing about the great war of 1914-18.

§ 12

We have suggested that in the political history of Europe between 1848 and 1878, the mechanical revolution was not yet producing any very revolutionary changes. The post-revolutionary Great Powers were still going on within boundaries of practically the same size and with much the same formalities as they had done in pre-revolutionary times. But where the increased speed and certainty of transport and telegraphic communications were already producing very considerable changes of condition and method, was in the overseas enterprises of Britain and the other European

¹Hence "Jingo" for any rabid patriot.

powers, and in the reaction of Asia and Africa to Europe.

The end of the eighteenth century was a period of disrupting empires and disillusioned expansionists. The long and tedious journey between Britain and Spain and their colonies in America prevented any really free coming and going between the home land and the daughter lands, and so the colonies separated into new and distinct communities, with distinctive ideas and interests and even modes of speech. As they grew they strained more and more at the feeble and uncertain link of shipping that joined them. Weak trading-posts in the wilderness, like those of France in Canada, or trading establishments in great alien communities, like those of Britain in India, might well cling for bare existence to the nation which gave them support and a reason for their existence. That much and no more seemed to many thinkers in the early part of the nineteenth century to be the limit set to overseas rule. In 1820 the sketchy great European "empires" outside of Europe that had figured so bravely in the maps of the middle eighteenth century, had shrunken to very small dimensions. Only the Russian sprawled as large as ever across Asia. It sprawled much larger in the imaginations of many Europeans than in reality, because of their habit of studying the geography of the world upon Mercator's projection, which enormously exaggerated the size of Siberia.

The British Empire in 1815 consisted of the thinly populated coastal river and lake regions of Canada, and a great hinterland of wilderness in which the only settlements as yet were the fur-trading stations of the Hudson's Bay Company, about a third of the Indian peninsula, under the rule of the East India Company, the coast districts of the Cape of Good Hope inhabited by blacks and rebellious-spirited Dutch settlers; a few trading stations on the coast of West Africa, the rock of Gibraltar, the island of Malta, Jamaica, a few minor slave-labour possessions in the West Indies, British Guiana in South America, and, on the other side of the world, two dumps for convicts at Botany Bay in Australia and in Tasmania. Spain retained Cuba and a few settle-

Comparative Maps of ASIA

(a) as part of hemisphere

(b) on Mercator's projection

to show relative sizes of Asiatic Russia and India in the two cases.



ments in the Philippine Islands. Portugal had in Africa some vestiges of her ancient claims. Holland had various islands and possessions in the East Indies and Dutch Guiana, and Denmark an island or so in the West Indies. France had one or two West Indian Islands and French Guiana. This seemed to be as much as the European powers needed, or were likely to acquire of the rest of the world. Only the East India Company showed any spirit of expansion.

In India, as we have already told, a peculiar empire was being built up, not by the British peoples, nor by the British Government, but by this company of private adventurers with their monopoly and royal charter. The company had been forced to become a military and political power during the years of Indian division and insecurity that followed the break-up of India after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707. It had learnt to trade in states and peoples during the eighteenth century. Clive founded, Warren Hastings organized, this strange new sort of empire; French rivalry was defeated, as we have already told; and by 1798, Lord Morington, afterwards the Marquis Wellesley, the elder brother of that General Wellesley who became the Duke of Wellington, became Governor-General of India, and set the policy of the company definitely upon the line of replacing the fading empire of the Grand Mogul by its own rule. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt was a direct attack upon the empire of this British company. While Europe was busy with the Napoleonic wars, the East India Company, under a succession of governors-general, was playing much the same rôle in India that had been played before by Turkoman and such-like invaders from the north but playing it with a greater efficiency and far less violence and cruelty. And after the peace of Vienna it went on, levying its revenues, making wars, sending ambassadors to Asiatic powers, a quasi-independent state, a state, however, with a marked disposition to send wealth westward.

In a previous chapter, we have sketched the break-up of the empire of the Great Mogul and the appearance of the



Mahratta states, the Rajput principalities, the Moslem kingdoms of Oudh and Bengal, and the Sikhs. We cannot tell here in any detail how the British company made its way to supremacy sometimes as the ally of this power, sometimes as that, and finally as the conqueror of all. Its power spread to Assam, Sind, Oudh. The map of India began to take on the outlines familiar to the English schoolboy of to-day, a patchwork of native states embraced and held together by the great provinces under direct British rule. . . .

Now as this strange unprecedented empire of the company grew in the period between 1800 and 1858, the mechanical revolution was quietly abolishing the great distance that had once separated India and Britain. In the old days the rule of the company had interfered little in the domestic life of the Indian states; it had given India foreign overlords, but India was used to foreign overlords, and had hitherto assimilated them; these Englishmen came into the country young, lived there most of their lives, and became a part of its system. But now the mechanical revolution began to alter this state of affairs. It became easier for the British officials to go home and to have holidays in Europe, easier for them to bring out wives and families; they ceased to be Indianized; they remained more conspicuously foreign and western—and there were more of them. And they began to interfere more vigorously with Indian customs. Magical and terrible things like the telegraph and the railway arrived. Christian missions became offensively busy. If they did not make very many converts, at least they made sceptics among the adherents of the older faiths. The young men in the towns began to be “Europeanized” to the great dismay of their elders.

India had endured many changes of rulers before, but never the sort of changes in her ways that these things portended. The Moslem teachers and the Brahmins were alike alarmed, and the British were blamed for the progress of mankind. Conflicts of economic interests grew more acute with the increasing nearness of Europe; Indian industries, and particularly the ancient cotton industry, suffered from

legislation that favoured the British manufacturer. A piece of incredible folly on the part of the company precipitated an outbreak. To the Brahmin a cow is sacred; to the Moslem the pig is unclean. A new rifle, needing greased cartridges—which the men had to bite—was served out to the company's Indian soldiers; the troops discovered that their cartridges were greased with the fat of cows and swine. This discovery precipitated a revolt of the company's Indian army, the Indian Mutiny (1857). First the troops mutinied at Meerut. Then Delhi rose to restore the empire of the Great Mogul. . . .

The British public suddenly discovered India. They became aware of that little garrison of British people, far away in that strange land of fiery dust and weary sunshine, fighting for life against dark multitudes of assailants. How they got there and what right they had there, the British public did not ask. The love of one's kin in danger overrides such questions. There were massacres and cruelties. 1857 was a year of passionate anxiety in Great Britain. With mere handfuls of troops the British leaders, and notably Lawrence and Nicholson, did amazing things. They did not sit down to be besieged while the mutineers organized and gathered prestige; that would have lost them India for ever. They attacked often against overwhelming odds. "Clubs, not spades, are trumps," said Lawrence. The Sikhs, the Gurkhas, the Punjab troops stuck to the British. The south remained tranquil. Of the massacres of Cawnpore and Lucknow in Oudh, and how a greatly outnumbered force of British troops besieged and stormed Delhi, other histories must tell. By April, 1859, the last embers of the blaze had been stamped out, and the British were masters of India again. In no sense had the mutiny been a popular insurrection; it was a mutiny merely of the Bengal Army, due largely to the unimaginative rule of the company officials. Its story abounds in instances of Indian help and kindness to British fugitives. But it was a warning.

The direct result of the mutiny was the annexation of the Indian Empire to the British Crown. By the Act entitled

An Act for the Better Government of India, the Governor-General became a Viceroy representing the Sovereign, and the place of the company was taken by a Secretary of State for India responsible to the British Parliament. In 1877, Lord Beaconsfield, to complete this work, caused Queen Victoria to be proclaimed Empress of India.

Upon these extraordinary lines India and Britain are linked at the present time. India is still the empire of the Great Mogul, expanded, but the Great Mogul has been replaced by the "crowned republic" of Great Britain. India became an autocracy without an autocrat. Its rule combines the disadvantage of absolute monarchy with the impersonality and irresponsibility of democratic officialdom. The Indian with a complaint to make had no visible monarch to go to; his Emperor was a golden symbol; he must circulate pamphlets in England or inspire a question in the British House of Commons. The more occupied Parliament was with British affairs, the less attention India received, and the more she was at the mercy of her small group of higher officials.

This was manifestly impossible as a permanent state of affairs. Indian life, whatever its restraints, was moving forward with the rest of the world; India had an increasing service of newspapers, an increasing number of educated people affected by Western ideas, and an increasing sense of a common grievance against her government. There had been little or no corresponding advance in the education and quality of the British official in India during the century. His tradition was a high one; he was often a man of exceptional quality, but the system was unimaginative and inflexible. Moreover, the military power that stood behind these officials had developed neither in character nor intelligence during the century. No other class had been so stagnant intellectually as the British military caste. Confronted with a more educated India, the British military man, uneasily aware of his educational defects and constantly apprehensive of ridicule, displayed a disposition towards spasmodic violence that had some very lamentable results.

For a time the great war altogether diverted what small amount of British public attention was previously given to India, and drew away the more intelligent military men from her service. During those years, and the feverish years of unsettlement that followed, things occurred in India, the massacre of an unarmed crowd at Amritsar in which nearly two thousand people were killed or wounded, floggings and humiliating outrages, a sort of official's Terror, that produced a profound moral shock when at last the Hunter Commission of 1919 brought them before the home public. In liberal-minded Englishmen, who have been wont to regard their empire as an incipient league of free peoples, this revelation of the barbaric quality in its administrators produced a very understandable dismay. . . .

The growth of the British Empire in directions other than that of India was by no means so rapid during the earlier half of the nineteenth century. A considerable school of political thinkers in Britain was disposed to regard overseas possessions as a source of weakness to the kingdom. The Australian settlements developed slowly until in 1842 the discovery of valuable copper mines, and in 1851 of gold, gave them a new importance. Improvements in transport were also making Australian wool an increasingly marketable commodity in Europe. Canada too was not remarkably progressive until 1849; it was troubled by dissensions between its French and British inhabitants, there were several serious revolts, and it was only in 1867 that a new constitution creating a Federal Dominion of Canada relieved its internal strains. It was the railway that altered the Canadian outlook. It enabled Canada, just as it enabled the United States, to expand westward, to market its corn and other produce in Europe, and in spite of its swift and extensive growth, to remain in language and sympathy and interests one community. The railway, the steamship, and the telegraphic cable were indeed changing all the conditions of colonial development.

Before 1840, English settlements had already begun in New Zealand, and a New Zealand Land Company had been

formed to exploit the possibilities of the island. In 1840 New Zealand also was added to the colonial possessions of the British Crown.

Canada, as we have noted, was the first of the British possessions to respond richly to the new economic possibilities the new methods of transport were opening. Presently the republics of South America, and particularly the Argentine Republic, began to feel, in their cattle trade and coffee growing, the increased nearness of the European market. Hitherto the chief commodities that had attracted the European powers into unsettled and barbaric regions had been gold or other metals, spices, ivory, or slaves. But in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century the increase of the European populations was obliging their governments to look abroad for staple foods; and the growth of scientific industrialism was creating a demand for new raw materials, fats and greases of every kind, rubber, and other hitherto disregarded substances. It was plain that Great Britain and Holland and Portugal were reaping a great and growing commercial advantage from their very considerable control of tropical and sub-tropical products. After 1871 Germany and presently France and later Italy began to look for unannexed raw-material areas, or for Oriental countries capable of profitable modernization.

So began a fresh scramble all over the world, except in the American region where the Monroe Doctrine now barred such adventures, for politically unprotected lands. Close to Europe was the continent of Africa, full of vaguely known possibilities. In 1850 it was a continent of black mystery; only Egypt and the coast were known. A map must show the greatness of the European ignorance at that time. It would need a book as long as this *Outline* to do justice to the amazing story of the explorers and adventurers who first pierced this cloud of darkness, and to the political agents, administrators, traders, settlers, and scientific men who followed in their track. Wonderful races of men like the pigmies, strange beasts like the okapi, marvellous fruits and flowers and insects, terrible diseases, astounding scenery, of forest

and mountain, enormous inland seas and gigantic rivers and cascades were revealed; a whole new world. Even remains (at Zimbabwe) of some unrecorded and vanished civilization, the southward enterprise of an early people, were discovered. Into this new world came the Europeans, and found the rifle already there in the hands of the Arab slave-traders, and negro life in disorder. By 1900, as our second map must show, all Africa was mapped, explored, estimated, and divided between the European powers, divided with much snarling and disputation into portions that left each power uneasy or discontented. Little heed was given to the welfare of the natives in this scramble. The Arab slaver



was indeed curbed rather than expelled, but the greed for rubber, which was a wild product collected under compulsion by the natives in the Belgian Congo, a greed exacerbated by the pitiless avarice of the King of the Belgians, and the clash of inexperienced European administrators with the native population in many other annexations, led to horrible atrocities. No European power has perfectly clean hands in this matter.

We cannot tell here in any detail how Great Britain got possession of Egypt in 1883, and remained there in spite of the fact that Egypt was technically a part of the Turkish Empire, nor how nearly this scramble led to war between France and Great Britain in 1898, when a certain Colonel Marchand, crossing Central Africa from the west coast, tried at Fashoda to seize the Upper Nile. In Uganda the French Catholic and the British Anglican missionaries disseminated a form of Christianity so heavily charged with the spirit of Napoleon, and so finely insistent upon the nuances of doctrine, that a few years after its first glimpse of European civilization, Mengo, the capital of Uganda, was littered with dead "Protestants" and "Catholics" extremely difficult to distinguish from the entirely unspiritual warriors of the old régime.

Nor can we tell how the British Government first let the Boers, or Dutch settlers, of the Orange River district and the Transvaal set up independent republics in the inland parts of South Africa, and then repented and annexed the Transvaal Republic in 1877; nor how the Transvaal Boers fought for freedom and won it after the Battle of Majuba Hill (1881). Majuba Hill was made to rankle in the memory of the English people by a persistent press campaign. A war with both republics broke out in 1899, a three years' war enormously costly to the British people, which ended at last in the surrender of the two republics.

Their period of subjugation was a brief one. In 1907, after the downfall of the imperialist government which had conquered them, the Liberals took the South African problem in hand, and these former republics became free and

fairly willing associates with Cape Colony and Natal in a confederation of all the states of South Africa as one self-governing republic under the British Crown.

In a quarter of a century the partition of Africa was completed. There remained unannexed three comparatively small countries: Liberia, a settlement of liberated negro slaves on the west coast; Morocco, under a Moslem Sultan; and Abyssinia, a barbaric country, with an ancient and peculiar form of Christianity, which had successfully maintained its independence against Italy at the Battle of Adowa in 1896.

§ 13

It is difficult to believe that any large number of people really accepted this headlong painting of the map of Africa in European colours as a permanent new settlement of the world's affairs, but it is the duty of the historian to record that it was so accepted. There was but a shallow historical background to the European mind in the nineteenth century, hardly any sense of what constitutes an enduring political system, and no habit of penetrating criticism. The quite temporary advantages that the onset of the mechanical revolution in the west had given the European Great Powers over the rest of the old world were regarded by people, blankly ignorant of the great Mongol conquests of the thirteenth and following centuries, as evidences of a permanent and assured European leadership of mankind. They had no sense of the transferability of science and its fruits. They did not realize that Chinamen and Indians could carry on the work of research as ably as Frenchmen or Englishmen. They believed that there was some innate intellectual drive in the west, and some innate indolence and conservatism in the east, that assured the Europeans a world predominance for ever.

The consequence of this infatuation was that the various European foreign offices set themselves not merely to scramble with the British for the savage and undeveloped regions of

AFRICA 1914

British....

French.....

German....

Portuguese.

Belgian.....

Spanish....

Italian....

J.F.H.

profitable possessions of the Dutch in the East Indies, filled the ruling and mercantile classes of the rival Great Powers with dreams of similar glories in Persia, in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, and in Further India, China, and Japan. In the closing years of the nineteenth century it was assumed, as the reader may verify by an examination of the current literature of the period, to be a natural and in-

evitable thing that all the world should fall under European dominion. With a reluctant benevolent effort the European mind prepared itself to take up what Mr. Rudyard Kipling called "the White Man's Burthen"—that is to say, the lordship of the earth. The Powers set themselves to this enterprise in a mood of jostling rivalry, with half-educated or illiterate populations at home, with a mere handful of men, a few thousand at most, engaged in scientific research, with their internal political systems in a state of tension or convulsive change, with a creaking economic system of the most provisional sort, and with their religions far gone in decay. They really believed that the vast populations of eastern Asia could be permanently subordinated to such a Europe.

Even to-day there are many people who fail to grasp the essential facts of this situation. They do not realize that in Asia the average brain is not one whit inferior in quality to the average European brain; that history shows Asiatics to be as bold, as vigorous, as generous, as self-sacrificing, and as capable of strong collective action as Europeans, and that there are and must continue to be a great many more Asiatics than Europeans in the world. It has always been difficult to restrain the leakage of knowledge from one population to another, and now it becomes impossible. Under modern conditions world-wide economic and educational equalization is in the long run inevitable. An intellectual and moral rally of the Asiatics is going on at the present time. The slight leeway of a century or so, a few decades may recover. At the present time, for example, for one Englishman who knows Chinese thoroughly, or has any intimate knowledge of Chinese life and thought, there are hundreds of Chinamen conversant with everything the English know. The balance of knowledge in favour of India may be even greater. To Britain, India sends students; to India, Britain sends officials, for the most part men untrained in scientific observation. There is no organization whatever for the sending of European students, as students, to examine and inquire into Indian history, archæology, and current affairs, or

for bringing learned Indians into contact with British students in Britain.

Since the year 1898, the year of the seizure of Kiau-Chau by Germany and of Wei-hai-wei by Britain, and the year after the Russian taking of Port Arthur, events in China have moved more rapidly than in any other country except Japan. A great hatred of Europeans swept like a flame over China, and a political society for the expulsion of Europeans, the Boxers, grew up and broke out into violence in 1900. This was an outbreak of rage and mischief on quite old-fashioned lines. In 1900 the Boxers murdered 250 Europeans and, it is said, nearly 30,000 Christians. China, not for the first time in history, was under the sway of a dowager empress. She was an ignorant woman, but of great force of character and in close sympathy with the Boxers. She supported them, and protected those who perpetrated outrages on the Europeans. All that again is what might have happened in 500 B. C. or thereabouts against the Huns.

Things came to a crisis in 1900. The Boxers became more and more threatening to the Europeans in China. Attempts were made to send up additional European guards to the Peking legations, but this only precipitated matters. The German minister was shot down in the streets of Peking by a soldier of the imperial guard. The rest of the foreign representatives gathered together and made a fortification of the more favourably situated legations and stood a siege of two months. A combined allied force of 20,000 under a German general then marched up to Peking and relieved the legations, and the old empress fled to Siam-fu, the old capital of Tai-tsung in Shensi. Some of the European troops committed grave atrocities upon the Chinese civil population.¹ That brings one up to about the level of 1850, let us say.

There followed the practical annexation of Manchuria by Russia, a squabble among the powers, and in 1904 a British invasion of Tibet, hitherto a forbidden country. But what did not appear on the surface of these events, and what made

¹ See Putnam Weale's *Indiscreet Letters from Peking*, a partly fictitious book, but true and vivid in its effects.

all these events fundamentally different, was that China now contained a considerable number of able people who had a European education and European knowledge. The Boxer Insurrection subsided, and then the influence of this new factor began to appear in talk of a constitution (1906), in the suppression of opium-smoking, and in educational reforms. A constitution of the Japanese type came into existence in 1909, making China a limited monarchy. But China is not to be moulded to the Japanese pattern, and the revolutionary stir continued. Japan, in her own reorganization, and in accordance with her temperament, had turned her eyes to the monarchist west, but China was looking across the Pacific. In 1911 the essential Chinese revolution began. In 1912 the emperor abdicated, and the greatest community in the world became a republic. The overthrow of the emperor was also the overthrow of the Manchus, and the Mongolian pigtail, which had been worn by the Chinese since 1644, ceased to be compulsory upon them.


At the present time it is probable that there is more good brain matter and more devoted men working out the modernization and the reorganization of the Chinese civilization than we should find directed to the welfare of any single European people. China will presently have a modernized practicable script, a press, new and vigorous modern universities, a reorganized industrial system, and a growing body of scientific and economic inquiry. The natural industry and ingenuity of her vast population will be released to co-operate upon terms of equality with the Western world. She may have great internal difficulties ahead of her yet; of that no man can judge. Nevertheless, the time may not be very distant when the Federated States of China may be at one with the United States of America and a pacified and reconciled Europe in upholding the organized peace of the world.

§ 14

The pioneer country, however, in the recovery of the Asiatic peoples was not China, but Japan. We have outrun

our story in telling of China. Hitherto Japan has played but a small part in this history; her secluded civilization has not contributed very largely to the general shaping of human destinies; she has received much, but she has given little. The original inhabitants of the Japanese Islands were probably a northern people with remote Nordic affinities, the Hairy Ainu. But the Japanese proper are of the Mongolian race. Physically they resemble the Amer-Indians, and there are many curious resemblances between the pre-historic pottery and so forth of Japan and similar Peruvian products. It is not impossible that they are a back-flow from the trans-Pacific drift of the early heliolithic culture, but they may also have absorbed from the south a Malay and even a Negrito element.

Whatever the origin of the Japanese, there can be no doubt that their civilization, their writing, and their literary and artistic traditions, are derived from the Chinese. They were emerging from barbarism in the second and third century of the Christian Era, and one of their earliest acts as a people outside their own country was an invasion of Korea under a queen Jingo, who seems to have played a large part in establishing their civilization. Their history is an interesting and romantic one; they developed a feudal system and a tradition of chivalry; their attacks upon Korea and China are an Eastern equivalent of the English wars in France. Japan was first brought into contact with Europe in the sixteenth century; in 1542 some Portuguese reached it in a Chinese junk, and in 1549 a Jesuit missionary, Francis Xavier, began his teaching there. The Jesuit accounts describe a country greatly devastated by perpetual feudal war. For a time Japan welcomed European intercourse, and the Christian missionaries made a great number of converts. A certain William Adams, of Gillingham, in Kent, became the most trusted European adviser of the Japanese, and showed them how to build big ships. There were voyages in Japanese-built ships to India and Peru. Then arose complicated quarrels between the Spanish Dominicans, the Portuguese Jesuits, and the English and Dutch Protestants,



each warning the Japanese against the evil political designs of the others. The Jesuits, in a phase of ascendancy, persecuted and insulted the Buddhists with great acrimony. These troubles interwove with the feudal conflicts of the time. In the end the Japanese came to the conclusion that the Europeans and their Christianity were an intolerable nuisance, and that Catholic Christianity in particular was a mere cloak for the political dreams of the Pope and the Spanish monarchy—already in possession of the Philippine Islands; there was a great and conclusive persecution of the Christians, and in 1638 Japan with the exception of one wretched Dutch factory on the minute island of Deshima in the harbour of Nagasaki, was absolutely closed to Europeans, and remained closed for over 200 years. The Dutch on Deshima were exposed to almost unendurable indignities. They had no intercourse with any Japanese except the special officials appointed to deal with them. During two centuries the Japanese remained as completely cut off from the rest of the world as though they lived upon another planet. It was forbidden to build any ship larger than a mere coasting boat. No Japanese could go abroad, and no European enter the country.

For two centuries Japan remained outside the main current of history. She lived on in a state of picturesque feudalism enlivened by blood feuds, in which about five per cent. of the population, the *samurai*, or fighting men, with the nobles and their families, tyrannized without restraint over the rest of the population. All common men knelt when a noble passed; to betray the slightest disrespect was to risk being slashed to death by his *samurai*. The elect classes lived lives of romantic adventure without one redeeming gleam of novelty; they loved, murdered, and pursued fine points of honour—which probably bored the intelligent ones extremely. We can imagine the wretchedness of a curious mind, tormented by the craving for travel and knowledge, cooped up in these islands of empty romance.

Meanwhile the great world outside went on to wider visions and new powers. Strange shipping became more

frequent, passing the Japanese headlands; sometimes ships were wrecked and sailors brought ashore. Through Deshima, their one link with the outer universe, came warnings that Japan was not keeping pace with the power of the Western world. In 1837 a ship sailed into Yedo Bay flying a strange flag of stripes and stars, and carrying some Japanese sailors she had picked up far adrift in the Pacific. She was driven off by a cannon shot. This flag presently reappeared on other ships. One in 1849 came to demand the liberation of eighteen shipwrecked American sailors. Then in 1853 came four American warships under Commodore Perry, and refused to be driven away. He lay at anchor in forbidden waters, and sent messages to the two rulers who at that time shared the control of Japan. In 1854 he returned with ten ships, amazing ships propelled by steam, and equipped with big guns, and he made proposals for trade and intercourse that the Japanese had no power to resist. He landed with a guard of 500 men to sign the treaty. Incredulous crowds watched this visitation from the outer world, marching through the streets.

Russia, Holland, and Britain followed in the wake of America. Foreigners entered the country, and conflicts between them and Japanese gentlemen of spirit ensued. A British subject was killed in a street brawl, and a Japanese town was bombarded by the British (1863). A great nobleman whose estates commanded the Straits of Shimonoseki saw fit to fire on foreign vessels, and a second bombardment by a fleet of British, French, Dutch, and American warships destroyed his batteries and scattered his swordsmen. Finally an allied squadron (1865), at anchor off Kioto, imposed a ratification of the treaties which opened Japan to the world.

The humiliation of the Japanese by these events was intense, and it would seem that the salvation of peoples lies largely in such humiliations. With astonishing energy and intelligence they set themselves to bring their culture and organization up to the level of the European powers. Never in all the history of mankind did a nation make such a stride

as Japan then did. In 1866 she was a mediæval people, a fantastic caricature of the extremist romantic feudalism; in 1899 hers was a completely Westernized people, on a level with the most advanced European powers, and well in advance of Russia. She completely dispelled the persuasion that Asia was in some irrevocable way hopelessly behind Europe. She made all European progress seem sluggish and tentative by comparison.

We cannot tell here in any detail of Japan's war with China in 1894-95. It demonstrated the extent of her Westernization. She had an efficient Westernized army and a small but sound fleet. But the significance of her renaissance, though it was appreciated by Britain and the United States, who were already treating her as if she were a European state, was not understood by the other Great Powers engaged in the pursuit of new Indias in Asia. Russia was pushing down through Manchuria to Korea, France was already established far to the south in Tonkin and Annam, Germany was prowling hungrily on the lookout for some settlement. The three powers combined to prevent Japan reaping any fruits from the Chinese war, and particularly from establishing herself on the mainland at the points commanding the Japan sea. She was exhausted by her war with China and they threatened her with war.

In 1898 Germany descended upon China, and, making the murder of two missionaries her excuse, annexed a portion of the province of Shan-tung. Thereupon Russia seized the Liao-tung peninsula, and extorted the consent of China to an extension of her trans-Siberian railway to Port Arthur; and in 1900 she occupied Manchuria. Britain was unable to resist the imitative impulse, and seized the port of Wei-hai-wei (1898). How alarming these movements must have been to every intelligent Japanese a glance at the map will show. They led to a war with Russia which marks an epoch in the history of Asia, the close of the period of European arrogance. The Russian people were, of course, innocent and ignorant of this trouble that was being made for them halfway round the world, and the wiser Russian statesmen were against these



WHEN AFRICAN SAVAGES SAW AN AIRPLANE

The air service played a large part in the tangled struggle in the African colonies during the World War. These natives are seeing their first plane go over



HYDROPLANE AND BATTLESHIP

War in the air and bomb dropping were among the new elements that entered with the World War

foolish thrusts; but a gang of financial adventurers surrounded the Tsar, including the Grand Dukes, his cousins. They had gambled deeply in the prospective looting of Manchuria and China, and they would suffer no withdrawal. So there began a transportation of great armies of Japanese soldiers across the sea to Port Arthur and Korea, and the sending of endless trainloads of Russian peasants along the Siberian railway to die in those distant battlefields.

The Russians, badly led and dishonestly provided, were beaten on sea and land alike. The Russian Baltic Fleet sailed round Africa to be utterly destroyed in the Straits of Tshushima. A revolutionary movement among the common people of Russia, infuriated by this remote and reasonless slaughter, obliged the Tsar to end the war (1905); he returned the southern half of Saghalien, which had been seized by Russia in 1875, evacuated Manchuria, resigned Korea to Japan. The White Man was beginning to drop his load in eastern Asia. For some years, however, Germany remained in uneasy possession of Kiau-Chau.

§ 15

We have already noted how the enterprise of Italy in Abyssinia had been checked at the terrible battle of Adowa (1896), in which over 3,000 Italians were killed and more than 4,000 taken prisoner. The phase of imperial expansion at the expense of organized non-European states was manifestly drawing to a close. It had entangled the quite sufficiently difficult political and social problems of Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia with the affairs of considerable alien, unassimilable, and resentful populations; Great Britain had Egypt (not formally annexed as yet), India, Burmah, and a variety of such minor problems as Malta and Shanghai; France had cumbered herself with Tonkin and Annam in addition to Algiers and Tunis; Spain was newly entangled in Morocco; Italy had found trouble for herself in Tripoli; and German overseas imperialism, though its "place in the sun" seemed a poor one, derived what satis-

faction it could from the thought of a prospective war with Japan over Kiau-Chau. All these "subject" lands had populations at a level of intelligence and education very little lower than those of the possessing country; the development of a native press, of a collective self-consciousness, and of demands for self-government was in each case inevitable, and the statesmen of Europe had been far too busy achieving these empires to have any clear ideas of what they would do with them when they got them.

The Western democracies, as they woke up to freedom, discovered themselves "imperial," and were considerably embarrassed by the discovery. The East came to the Western capitals with perplexing demands. In London the common Englishman, much preoccupied by strikes, by economic riddles, by questions of nationalization, municipalization, and the like, found that his path was crossed and his public meetings attended by a large and increasing number of swarthy gentlemen in turbans, fezes, and other strange headgear, all saying in effect: "You have got us. The people who represent your government have destroyed our own government, and prevent us from making a new one. What are you going to do with us?"

§ 16

We may note here briefly the very various nature of the constituents of the British Empire in 1914. It was and is a quite unique political combination; nothing of the sort has ever existed before.

First and central to the whole system was the "crowned republic" of the United British Kingdoms, including (against the will of a considerable part of the Irish people) Ireland. The majority of the British Parliament, made up of the three united parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland, determines the headship, the quality and policy of the ministry, and determines it largely on considerations arising out of British domestic politics. It is this ministry

which is the effective supreme government, with powers of peace and war, over all the rest of the empire.

Next in order of political importance to the British States were the "crowned republics" of Australia, Canada, Newfoundland (the oldest British possession, 1583), New Zealand, and South Africa, all practically independent and self-governing states in alliance with Great Britain, but each with a representative of the Crown appointed by the Government in office;

Next the Indian Empire, an extension of the empire of the Great Mogul, with its dependent and "protected" states reaching now from Baluchistan to Burmah, and including, Aden, in all of which empire the British Crown *and* the Indian Office (under Parliamentary control) played the rôle of the original Turkoman dynasty;

Then the ambiguous possession of Egypt, still nominally a part of the Turkish Empire and still retaining its own monarch, the Khedive, but under almost despotic British official rule;¹

Then the still more ambiguous "Anglo-Egyptian" Sudan province, occupied and administered jointly by the British and by the Egyptian Government;

Then a number of partially self-governing communities, some British in origin and some not, with elected legislatures and an appointed executive, such as Malta,² Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Bermuda;

Then the Crown colonies, in which the rule of the British Home Government (through the Colonial Office) verged on autocracy, as in Ceylon, Trinidad, and Fiji (where there was an appointed council), and Gibraltar and St. Helena (where there was a governor);

Then great areas of (chiefly) tropical lands, raw-product areas, with politically weak and under-civilized native com-

¹ Egypt was made a quasi-independent kingdom in alliance with Britain in 1922.

² A new and much more liberal Maltese constitution was promulgated in June 1920, practically putting Malta on the footing of a self-governing colony.

munities, which were nominally protectorates, and administered either by a High Commissioner set over native chiefs (as in Basutoland) or over a chartered company (as in Rhodesia). In some cases the Foreign Office, in some cases the Colonial Office, and in some cases the India Office had been concerned in acquiring the possessions that fell into this last and least definite class of all, but for the most part the Colonial Office was now responsible for them.

It will be manifest, therefore, that no single office and no single brain had ever comprehended the British Empire as a whole. It was a mixture of growths and accumulations entirely different from anything that has ever been called an empire before. It guaranteed a wide peace and security; that is why it was endured and sustained by many men of the "subject" races—in spite of official tyrannies and insufficiencies, and of much negligence on the part of the "home" public. Like the "Athenian empire," it was an overseas empire; its ways were sea ways, and its common link was the British Navy. Like all empires, its cohesion was dependent physically upon a method of communication; the development of seamanship, ship-building, and steamships between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries had made it a possible and convenient Pax—the "Pax Britannica," and fresh developments of air or swift land transport or of undersea warfare, might at any time make it inconvenient or helplessly insecure.

XXXIX

THE CATASTROPHE OF MODERN IMPERIALISM

§ 1. *The Armed Peace Before the Great War.* § 2. *Imperial Germany.* § 3. *The Spirit of Imperialism in Britain and Ireland.* § 4. *Imperialism in France, Italy, and the Balkans.* § 5. *Russia a Grand Monarchy.* § 6. *The United States and the Imperial Idea.* § 7. *The Immediate Causes of the Great War.* § 8. *A Summary of the Great War up to 1917.* § 9. *The Great War from the Russian Collapse to the Armistice.*

§ 1

FOR thirty-six years after the Treaty of San Stefano and the Berlin Conference, Europe maintained an uneasy peace within its borders; there was no war between any of the leading states during this period. They jostled, browbeat, and threatened one another, but they did not come to actual hostilities. There was a general realization after 1871 that modern war was a much more serious thing than the professional warfare of the eighteenth century, an effort of peoples as a whole that might strain the social fabric very severely, an adventure not to be rashly embarked upon. The mechanical revolution was giving constantly more powerful (and expensive) weapons by land and sea, and more rapid methods of transport; and making it more and more impossible to carry on warfare without a complete dislocation of the economic life of the community. Even the foreign offices felt the fear of war.

But though war was dreaded as it had never been dreaded in the world before, nothing was done in the way of setting up a federal control to prevent human affairs drifting towards

war. In 1898, it is true, the young Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) issued a rescript inviting the other Great Powers to a conference of states "seeking to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over the elements of trouble and discord." His rescript recalls the declaration of his predecessor, Alexander I, which gave its tone to the Holy Alliance, and it is vitiated by the same assumption that peace can be established between sovereign governments rather than by a broad appeal to the needs and rights of the one people of mankind. The lesson of the United States of America, which showed that there could be neither unity of action nor peace until the thought of the "people of Virginia" and the "people of Massachusetts" had been swept aside by the thought of the "people of the United States," went entirely disregarded in the European attempts at pacification. Two conferences were held at The Hague in Holland, one in 1899 and another in 1907, and at the second nearly all the sovereign states of the world were represented. They were represented diplomatically, there was no direction of the general intelligence of the world to their deliberations, the ordinary common man did not even know that these conferences were sitting, and for the most part the assembled representatives haggled cunningly upon points of international law affecting war, leaving aside the abolition of war as a chimæra. These Hague Conferences did nothing to dispel the idea that international life is necessarily competitive. They accepted that idea. They did nothing to develop the consciousness of a world commonweal overriding sovereigns and foreign offices. The international lawyers and statesmen who attended these gatherings were as little disposed to hasten on a world commonweal on such a basis as were the Prussian statesmen of 1848 to welcome an all-German parliament overriding the rights and "policy" of the King of Prussia.

In America a series of three Pan-American conferences in 1889, 1901, and 1906 went some way towards the development of a scheme of international arbitration for the whole American continent.

OVERSEAS EMPIRES of EUROPEAN POWERS, January 1914.



The character and good faith of Nicholas II, who initiated these Hague gatherings, we will not discuss at any length here. He may have thought that time was on the side of Russia. But of the general unwillingness of the Great Powers to face the prospect of a merger of sovereign powers, without which permanent peace projects are absurd, there can be no sort of doubt whatever. It was no cessation of international competition with its acute phase of war that they desired, but rather a cheapening of war, which was becoming too costly. Each wanted to economize the wastage of minor disputes and conflicts, and to establish international laws that would embarrass its more formidable opponents in war-time without incommoding itself. These were the practical ends they sought at the Hague Conference. It was a gathering they attended to please Nicholas II, just as the monarchs of Europe had subscribed to the evangelical propositions of the Holy Alliance to please Alexander I; and as they had attended it, they tried to make what they conceived to be some use of it.

§ 2

The peace of Frankfort had left Germany Prussianized and united, the most formidable of all the Great Powers of Europe. France was humiliated and crippled. Her lapse into republicanism seemed likely to leave her without friends in any European court. Italy was as yet a mere stripling. Austria sank now rapidly to the position of a confederate in German policy. Russia was vast, but undeveloped; and the British Empire was mighty only on the sea. Beyond Europe the one power to be reckoned with by Germany was the United States of America, growing now into a great industrial nation, but with no army nor navy worth considering by European standards.

The new Germany which was embodied in the empire that had been created at Versailles was a complex and astonishing mixture of the fresh intellectual and material forces of the world, with the narrowest political traditions of the

European system. She was vigorously educational; she was by far the most educational state in the world; she made the educational pace for all her neighbours and rivals. In this time of reckoning for Germany, it may help the British reader to a balanced attitude to recall the educational stimulation for which his country has to thank first the German Prince Consort and then German competition. That mean jealousy of the educated common man on the part of the British ruling class, which no patriotic pride or generous impulse had ever sufficed to overcome, went down before a growing fear of German efficiency. And Germany took up the organization of scientific research and of the application of scientific method to industrial and social development with such a faith and energy as no other community had ever shown before. Throughout all this period of the armed peace she was reaping and sowing afresh and reaping again the harvests, the unfailing harvests, of freely disseminated knowledge. She grew swiftly to become a great manufacturing and trading power; her steel output outran the British; in a hundred new fields of production and commerce, where intelligence and system was of more account than mere trader's cunning, in the manufacture of optical glasses, of dyes and of a multitude of chemical products and in endless novel processes, she led the world.

To the British manufacturer who was accustomed to see inventions come into his works, he knew not whence nor why, begging to be adopted, this new German method of keeping and paying scientific men seemed abominably unfair. It was compelling fortune, he felt. It was packing the cards. It was encouraging a nasty class of intellectuals to interfere in the affairs of sound business men. Science went abroad from its first home like an unloved child. The splendid chemical industry of Germany was built on the work of the Englishman Sir William Perkin, who could find no "practical" English business man to back him. And Germany also led the way in many forms of social legislation. Germany realized that labour is a national asset, that it deteriorates through unemployment, and that, for the common good,

it has to be taken care of outside the works. The British employer was still under the delusion that labour had no business to exist outside the works, and that the worse such exterior existence was, the better somehow for him. Moreover, because of his general illiteracy, he was an intense individualist: his was the insensate rivalry of the vulgar mind; he hated his fellow manufacturers about as much as he hated his labour and his customers. German producers, on the other hand, were persuaded of the great advantages of combination and civility; their enterprises tended to flow together and assume more and more the character of national undertakings.

This educating, scientific, and organizing Germany was the natural development of the liberal Germany of 1848; it had its roots far back in the recuperative effort that drew its impulse from the shame of the Napoleonic conquest. All that was good, all that was great in this modern Germany, she owed indeed to her schoolmasters. But this scientific organizing spirit was only one of the two factors that made up the new German Empire. The other factor was the Hohenzollern monarchy which had survived Jena, which had tricked and bested the revolution of 1848, and which, under the guidance of Bismarck, had now clambered to the legal headship of all Germany outside Austria. Except the Tsardom, no other European state had so preserved the tradition of the Grand Monarchy of the eighteenth century as the Prussian. Through the tradition of Frederick the Great, Machiavelli now reigned in Germany. In the head of this fine new modern state, therefore, there sat no fine modern brain to guide it to a world predominance in world service, but an old spider lusting for power. Prussianized Germany was at once the newest and the most antiquated thing in Western Europe. She was the best and the wickedest state of her time.

The psychology of nations is still but a rudimentary science. Psychologists have scarcely begun to study the citizen side of the individual man. But it is of the utmost

importance to our subject that the student of universal history should give some thought to the mental growth of the generations of Germans educated since the victories of 1871. They were naturally inflated by their sweeping unqualified successes in war, and by their rapid progress from comparative poverty to wealth. It would have been more than human in them if they had not given way to some excesses of patriotic vanity. But this reaction was deliberately seized upon and fostered and developed by a systematic exploitation and control of school and college, literature and press, in the interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. A teacher, a professor, who did not teach and preach, in and out of season, the racial, moral, intellectual, and physical superiority of the Germans to all other peoples, their extraordinary devotion to war and their dynasty, and their inevitable destiny under that dynasty to lead the world, was a marked man, doomed to failure and obscurity. German historical teaching became an immense systematic falsification of the human past, with a view to the Hohenzollern future. All other nations were represented as incompetent and decadent; the Prussians were the leaders and regenerators of mankind. The young German read this in his school-books, heard it in church, found it in his literature, had it poured into him with passionate conviction by his professor. It was poured into him by all his professors; lecturers in biology or mathematics would break off from their proper subject to indulge in long passages of patriotic rant. Only minds of extraordinary toughness and originality could resist such a torrent of suggestion. Insensibly there was built up in the German mind a conception of Germany and its emperor as of something splendid and predominant as nothing else had ever been before, a god-like nation in "shining armour" brandishing the "good German sword" in a world of inferior—and very badly disposed—peoples. We have told our story of Europe; the reader may judge whether the glitter of the German sword is exceptionally blinding. Germania was deliberately intoxicated, she was systematically kept drunk, with this sort

of patriotic rhetoric. It is the greatest of the Hohenzollern crimes that the Crown constantly and persistently tampered with education, and particularly with historical teaching. No other modern state has so sinned against education. The oligarchy of the crowned republic of Great Britain may have crippled and starved education, but the Hohenzollern monarchy corrupted and prostituted it.

It cannot be too clearly stated, it is the most important fact in the history of the last half century, that the German people was methodically indoctrinated with the idea of a German world-predominance based on might, and with the theory that war was a necessary thing in life. The key to German historical teaching is to be found in Count Moltke's dictum: "Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the order of the world ordained by God." "Without war the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism." And the anti-Christian German philosopher, Nietzsche, found himself quite at one with the pious field-marshal. "It is mere illusion and pretty sentiment," he observes, "to expect much (even anything at all) from mankind if it forgets how to make war. As yet no means are known which call so much into action as a great war, that rough energy born of the camp, that deep impersonality born of hatred, that conscience born of murder and cold-bloodedness, that fervour born of effort in the annihilation of the enemy, that proud indifference to loss, to one's own existence, to that of one's fellows, that earthquake-like soul-shaking which a people needs when it is losing its vitality."¹

This sort of teaching, which pervaded the German Empire from end to end, was bound to be noted abroad, bound to alarm every other power and people in the world, bound to provoke an anti-German confederation and it was accompanied by a parade of military, and presently of naval preparation, that threatened France, Russia, and Britain alike.

¹ These quotations are from Sir Thomas Barclay's article "Peace" in *The Encyclopædia Britannica*.

It affected the thoughts, the manners, and morals of the entire German people. After 1871, the German abroad thrust out his chest and raised his voice. He threw a sort of trampling quality even into the operations of commerce. His machinery came on the markets of the world, his shipping took the seas with a splash of patriotic challenge. His very merits he used as a means of offence. (And probably most other peoples, if they had had the same experiences and undergone the same training, would have behaved in a similar manner.)

By one of those accidents in history that personify and precipitate catastrophes, the ruler of Germany, the emperor William II, embodied the new education of his people and the Hohenzollern tradition in the completest form. He came to the throne in 1888 at the age of twenty-nine; his father, Frederick III, had succeeded his grandfather, William I, in the March, to die in the June of that year. William II was the grandson of Queen Victoria on his mother's side, but his temperament showed no traces of the liberal German tradition that distinguished the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha family. His head was full of the frothy stuff of the new imperialism. He signalized his accession by an address to his army and



The Emperor William II.

navy; his address to his people followed three days later. A high note of contempt for democracy was sounded: "The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities, have welded together the German Empire. My trust is placed in the army." So the patient work of the German school-masters was disowned, and the Hohenzollern declared himself triumphant.

The next exploit of the young monarch was to quarrel with the old Chancellor, Bismarck, who had made the new German Empire, and to dismiss him (1890). There were no profound differences of opinion between them, but, as Bismarck said, the Emperor intended to be his own chancellor.

These were the opening acts of an active and aggressive career. This William II meant to make a noise in the world, a louder noise than any other monarch had ever made. The whole of Europe was soon familiar with the figure of the new monarch, invariably in military uniform of the most glittering sort, staring valiantly, fiercely moustached, and with a withered left arm ingeniously minimized. He affected silver shining breastplates and long white cloaks. A great restlessness was manifest. It was clear he conceived himself destined for great things, but for a time it was not manifest what particular great things these were. There was no oracle at Delphi now to tell him that he was destined to destroy a great empire.

The note of theatricality about him and the dismissal of Bismarck alarmed many of his subjects, but they were presently reassured by the idea that he was using his influence in the cause of peace and to consolidate Germany. He travelled much, to London, Vienna, Rome—where he had private conversations with the Pope—to Athens, where his sister married the king in 1889, and to Constantinople. He was the first Christian sovereign to be a Sultan's guest. He also went to Palestine. A special gate was knocked through the ancient wall of Jerusalem so that he could ride into that place; it was beneath his dignity to walk in. He induced the Sultan to commence the reorganization of the Turkish Army

upon German lines and under German officers. In 1895 he announced that Germany was a "world power," and that "the future of Germany lay upon the water"—regardless of the fact that the British considered that they were there already—and he began to interest himself more and more in the building up of a great navy. He also took German art and literature under his care; he used his influence to retain the distinctive and blinding German blackletter against the Roman type used by the rest of western Europe, and he supported the Pan-German movement, which claimed the Dutch, the Scandinavians, the Flemish Belgians, and the German Swiss as members of a great German brotherhood—as in fact good assimilable stuff for a hungry young empire which meant to grow. All other monarchs in Europe paled before him.

He used the general hostility against Britain aroused throughout Europe by the war against the Boer Republics to press forward his schemes for a great navy, and this together with the rapid and challenging extension of the German colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific Ocean, alarmed and irritated the British extremely. British liberal opinion in particular found itself under the exasperating necessity of supporting an ever-increasing British Navy. "I will not rest," he said, "until I have brought my navy to the same height at which my army stands." The most peace-loving of the islanders could not ignore that threat.

In 1890 he had acquired the small island Heligoland from Britain. This he made into a great naval fortress.

As his navy grew, his enterprise increased. He proclaimed the Germans "the salt of the earth." They must not "weary in the work of civilization; Germany, like the spirit of Imperial Rome, must expand and impose itself." This he said on Polish soil, in support of the steady efforts the Germans were making to suppress the Polish language and culture, and to Germanize their share of Poland. God he described as his "Divine Ally." In the old absolutisms the monarch was either God himself or the adopted agent of God; the Kaiser took God for his trusty henchman. "Our

old God," he said affectionately. When the Germans seized Kiau-Chau, he spoke of the German "mailed fist." When he backed Austria against Russia, he talked of Germany in her "shining armour."

The disasters of Russia in Manchuria in 1905 released the spirit of German imperialism to bolder aggressions. The fear of a joint attack from France and Russia seemed lifting. The emperor made a kind of regal progress through the Holy Land, landed at Tangier to assure the Sultan of Morocco of his support against the French, and inflicted upon France the crowning indignity of compelling her by a threat of war to dismiss Delcassé, her foreign minister. He drew tighter the links between Austria and Germany, and in 1908, Austria, with his support, defied the rest of Europe by annexing from the Turk the Yugo-Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So by his naval challenge to Britain and these aggressions upon France and the Slavs he forced Britain, France, and Russia into a defensive understanding against him. The Bosnian annexation had the further effect of estranging Italy, which had hitherto been his ally.

Such was the personality that the evil fate of Germany set over her to stimulate, organize, and render intolerable to the rest of the world the natural pride and self-assertion of a great people who had at last, after long centuries of division and weakness, escaped from a jungle of princes to unity and the world's respect. It was natural that the commercial and industrial leaders of this new Germany who were now getting rich, the financiers intent upon overseas exploits, the official and the vulgar, should find this leader very much to their taste. Many Germans who thought him rash or tawdry in their secret hearts, supported him publicly because he had so taking an air of success. *Hoch der Kaiser!*

Yet Germany did not yield itself without a struggle to the strong-flowing tide of imperialism. Important elements in German life struggled against this swaggering new autocracy. The old German nations, and particularly the Bavarians, refused to be swallowed up in Prussianism. And with the



ARMOR AGAINST GAS WARFARE

Gas masks and respirators made necessary by the use of poison gas in the
World War



THE LATEST CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM
General Allenby's entry during the World War

spread of education and the rapid industrialization of Germany, organized labour developed its ideas and a steady antagonism to the military and patriotic clattering of its ruler. A new political party was growing up in the state, the Social Democrats, professing the doctrines of Marx. In the teeth of the utmost opposition from the official and clerical organizations, and of violently repressive laws against its propaganda and against combinations, this party grew. The Kaiser denounced it again and again; its leaders were sent to prison or driven abroad. Still it grew. When he came to the throne it polled not half a million votes; in 1907 it polled over three million. He attempted to concede many things, old age and sickness insurance, for example, as a condescending gift, things which it claimed for the workers as their right. His conversion to socialism was noted, but it gained no converts to imperialism. His naval ambitions were ably and bitterly denounced; the colonial adventures of the new German capitalists were incessantly attacked by this party of the common sense of the common man. But to the army, the Social Democrats accorded a moderate support, because, much as they detested their home-grown autocrat, they hated and dreaded the barbaric and retrogressive autocracy of Russia on their eastern frontier more.

The danger plainly before Germany was that this swaggering imperialism would compel Britain, Russia, and France into a combined attack upon her, an offensive-defensive. The Kaiser wavered between a stiff attitude towards Britain and clumsy attempts to propitiate her, while his fleet grew and while he prepared for a preliminary struggle with Russia and France. When in 1913 the British government proposed a cessation on either hand of naval construction for a year, it was refused. The Kaiser was afflicted with a son and heir more Hohenzollern, more imperialistic, more Pan-Germanic than his father. He had been nurtured upon imperialist propaganda. His toys had been soldiers and guns. He snatched at a premature popularity by outdoing his father's patriotic and aggressive attitudes. His father, it was felt, was growing middle-aged and

over-careful. The Crown Prince renewed him. Germany had never been so strong, never so ready for a new great adventure and another harvest of victories. The Russians, he was instructed, were decayed, the French degenerate, the British on the verge of civil war. This young Crown Prince was but a sample of the abounding upper-class youth of Germany in the spring of 1914. They had all drunken from the same cup. Their professors and teachers, their speakers and leaders, their mothers and sweethearts, had been preparing them for the great occasion that was now very nearly at hand. They were full of the tremulous sense of imminent conflict, of a trumpet call to stupendous achievements, of victory over mankind abroad, triumph over the recalcitrant workers at home. The country was taut and excited like an athletic competitor at the end of his training.

§ 3

Throughout the period of the armed peace Germany was making the pace and setting the tone for the rest of Europe. The influence of her new doctrines of aggressive imperialism was particularly strong upon the British mind, which was ill-equipped to resist a strong intellectual thrust from abroad. The educational impulse the Prince Consort had given had died away after his death; the universities of Oxford and Cambridge were hindered in their task of effective revision of upper-class education by the fears and prejudices the so-called "conflict of science and religion" had roused in the clergy who dominated them through Convocation; popular education was crippled by religious squabbling, by the extreme parsimony of the public authorities, by the desire of employers for child labour, and by individualistic objection to "educating other people's children." The old tradition of the English, the tradition of plain statement, legality, fair play, and a certain measure of republican freedom had faded considerably during the stresses of the Napoleonic Wars; romanticism, of which Sir Walter Scott, the great novelist, was the chief promoter, had infected the national

imagination with a craving for the florid and picturesque. "Mr. Briggs," the comic Englishman of *Punch* in the fifties and sixties, getting himself into highland costume and stalking deer, was fairly representative of the spirit of the new movement. It presently dawned upon Mr. Briggs as a richly coloured and creditable fact he had hitherto not observed, that the sun never set on his dominions. The country which had once put Clive and Warren Hastings on trial for their unrighteous treatment of Indians, was now persuaded to regard them as entirely chivalrous and devoted figures. They were "empire builders." Under the spell of Disraeli's Oriental imagination, which had made Queen Victoria "empress," the Englishman turned readily enough towards the vague exaltations of modern imperialism.

The perverted ethnology and distorted history which was persuading the mixed Slavic, Keltic, and Teutonic Germans that they were a wonderful race apart, was imitated by English writers who began to exalt a new ethnological invention, the "Anglo-Saxon." This remarkable compound was presented as the culmination of humanity, the crown and reward of the accumulated effort of Greek and Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, Jew, Mongol, and such-like lowly precursors of its white splendour. The senseless legend of German superiority did much to exacerbate the irritations of the Poles in Posen and the French in Lorraine. The even more ridiculous legend of the superior Anglo-Saxon did not merely increase the irritations of English rule in Ireland, but it lowered the tone of British dealings with "subject" peoples throughout the entire world. For the cessation of respect and the cultivation of "superior" ideas are the cessation of civility and justice.

The imitation of German patriotic misconceptions did not end with this "Anglo-Saxon" fabrication. The clever young men at the British universities in the eighties and nineties, bored by the flatness and insincerities of domestic politics, were moved to imitation and rivalry by this new teaching of an arrogant, subtle, and forceful nationalist imperialism, this combination of Machiavelli and Attila, which was being im-

posed upon the thought and activities of young Germany. Britain, too, they thought, must have her shining armour and wave her good sword. The new British imperialism found its poet in Mr. Kipling and its practical support in a number of financial and business interests whose way to monopolies and exploitations was lighted by its glow. These Prussianizing Englishmen carried their imitation of Germany to the most extraordinary lengths. Central Europe is one continuous economic system, best worked as one; and the new Germany had achieved a great customs union, a Zollverein of all its constituents. It became naturally one compact system, like a clenched fist. The British Empire sprawled like an open hand throughout the world, its members different in nature, need, and relationship, with no common interest except the common guarantee of safety. But the new Imperialists were blind to that difference. If new Germany had a Zollverein, then the British Empire must be in the fashion; and the natural development of its various elements must be hampered everywhere by "imperial preferences" and the like. . . .

Yet the imperialist movement in Great Britain never had the authority nor the unanimity it had in Germany. It was not a natural product of any of the three united but diverse British peoples. It was not congenial to them. Queen Victoria and her successors, Edward VII and George V, were indisposed, either by temperament or tradition, to wear "shining armour," shake "mailed fists," and flourish "good swords" in the Hohenzollern fashion. They had the wisdom to refrain from any overt meddling with the public ideas. And this "British" imperialist movement had from the first aroused the hostility of the large number of English, Welsh, Irish, and Scotch writers who refused to recognize this new "British" nationality or to accept the theory that they were these "Anglo-Saxon" supermen. And many great interests in Britain, and notably the shipping interest, had been built up upon free trade, and regarded the fiscal proposals of the new imperialists, and the new financial and mercantile ad-

venturers with whom they were associated, with a justifiable suspicion. On the other hand, these ideas ran like wildfire through the military class, through Indian officialdom and the like. Hitherto there had always been something apologetic about the army man in England. He was not native to that soil. Here was a movement that promised to make him as splendidly important as his Prussian brother in arms. And the imperialist idea also found support in the cheap popular press that was now coming into existence to cater for the new stratum of readers created by elementary education. This press wanted plain, bright, simple ideas adapted to the needs of readers who had scarcely begun to think.

In spite of such support, and its strong appeal to national vanity, British imperialism never saturated the mass of the British peoples. The English are not a mentally docile people, and the noisy and rather forced enthusiasm for imperialism and higher tariffs of the old Tory Party, the army class, the country clergy, the music-halls, the assimilated alien, the vulgar rich and the new large employers, inclined the commoner sort, and particularly organized labour, to a suspicious attitude. If the continually irritated sore of the Majuba defeat permitted the country to be rushed into the needless, toilsome, and costly conquest of the Boer republics in South Africa, the strain of that adventure produced a sufficient reaction towards decency and justice to reinstate the Liberal Party in power, and to undo the worst of that mischief by the creation of a South African confederation. Considerable advances continued to be made in popular education, and in the recovery of public interests and the general wealth from the possession of the few. And in these years of the armed peace, the three British peoples came very near to a settlement, on fairly just and reasonable lines, of their long-standing misunderstanding with Ireland. The great war, unluckily for them, overtook them in the very crisis of this effort.

Like Japan, Ireland has figured but little in this *Outline of History*, and for the same reason, because she is an ex-

treme island country, receiving much, but hitherto giving but little back into the general drama. Her population is a very mixed one, its basis, and probably its main substance, being of the dark "Mediterranean" strain, pre-Nordic and pre-Aryan, like the Basques and the people of Portugal and south Italy. Over this original basis there flowed, about the sixth century B. C.—we do not know to what degree of submergence—a wave of Keltic peoples, in at least sufficient strength to establish a Keltic language, the Irish Gaelic. There were comings and goings, invasions and counter-invasions of this and that Keltic or Kelticized people between Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England. The island was Christianized in the fifth century. Later on the east coast was raided and settled by Northmen, but we do not know to what extent they altered the racial quality. The Norman-English came in 1169, in the time of Henry II and onward. The Teutonic strain may be as strong or stronger than the Keltic in modern Ireland. Hitherto Ireland had been a tribal and barbaric country, with a few centres of security wherein the artistic tendencies of the more ancient race found scope in metal-work and the illumination of holy books. Now, in the twelfth century, there was an imperfect conquest by the English Crown, and scattered settlements by Normans and English in various parts of the country. From the outset profound temperamental differences between the Irish and English were manifest, differences exacerbated by a difference of language, and these became much more evident after the Protestant Reformation. The English became Protestant; the Irish by a natural reaction rallied about the persecuted Catholic church.

The English rule in Ireland had been from the first an intermittent civil war due to the clash of languages and the different laws of land tenure and inheritance of the two peoples. The rebellions, massacres, and subjugations of the unhappy island during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I we cannot tell of here; but under James came a new discord with the confiscation of large areas of Ulster and their settlement with Presbyterian Scotch colonists. They formed

a Protestant community in necessary permanent conflict with the Catholic remainder of Ireland.

In the political conflicts during the reign of Charles I and the Commonwealth, and of James II and William and Mary, the two sides in English affairs found sympathizers and allies in the Irish parties. There is a saying in Ireland that England's misfortune is Ireland's opportunity, and the English civil trouble that led to the execution of Strafford, was the occasion also of a massacre of the English in Ireland (1641). Later on Cromwell was to avenge that massacre by giving no quarter to any men found under arms, a severity remembered by the Irish Catholics with extreme bitterness. Between 1689 and 1691 Ireland was again torn by civil war. James II sought the support of the Irish Catholics against William III, and his adherents were badly beaten at the battle of the Boyne (1690) and Aughrim (1691).

There was a settlement, the Treaty of Limerick, a disputed settlement in which the English Government promised much in the way of tolerance for Catholics and the like, and failed to keep its promises. Limerick is still a cardinal memory in the long story of Irish embitterment. Comparatively few English people have even heard of this Treaty of Limerick; in Ireland it rankles to this day.

The eighteenth century was a century of accumulating grievance. English commercial jealousy put heavy restraints upon Irish trade, and the development of a wool industry was destroyed in the south and west. The Ulster Protestants were treated little better than the Catholics in these matters, and they were the chief of the rebels. There was more agrarian revolt in the north than in the south in the eighteenth century.

Let us state as clearly as our space permits the parallelisms and contrasts of the British and Irish situation at this time. There was a parliament in Ireland, but it was a Protestant parliament, even more limited and corrupt than the contemporary British Parliament; there was a considerable civilization in and about Dublin, and much literary and scientific activity, conducted in English and centring upon the Protestant university of Trinity College. This was **the**

Ireland of Swift, Goldsmith, Burke, Berkeley, and Boyle. It was essentially a part of the English culture. It had nothing distinctively Irish about it. The Catholic religion and the Irish language were outcast and persecuted things in the darkness at this time.



It was from this Ireland of the darkness that the recalcitrant Ireland of the twentieth century arose. The Irish Parliament, its fine literature, its science, all its culture, gravitated naturally enough to London, because they were inseparably a part of that world. The more prosperous landlords went to England to live, and had their children educated there. This meant a steady drain of wealth from Ireland to England in the form of rent, spent or invested

out of the country. The increasing facilities of communication steadily enhanced this tendency, depleted Dublin and bled Ireland white. The Act of Union (January 1st, 1801) was the natural coalescence of two entirely kindred systems, of the Anglo-Irish Parliament with the British Parliament, both oligarchic, both politically corrupt in the same fashion. There was a vigorous opposition to the Union on the part not so much of the outer Irish as of Protestants settled in Ireland, and a futile insurrection under Robert Emmet in 1803. Dublin, which had been a fine Anglo-Irish city in the middle eighteenth century, was gradually deserted by its intellectual and political life, and invaded by the outer Irish of Ireland. Its fashionable life became more and more official, centring upon the Lord Lieutenant in Dublin Castle; its intellectual life flickered and for a time nearly died.

But while the Ireland of Swift and Goldsmith was part and lot with the England of Pope, Dr. Johnson, and Sir Joshua Reynolds, while there has never been and is not now any real definable difference except one of geography between the "governing class," in Ireland and in Britain, the Irish underworld and the English underworld were essentially dissimilar. The upward struggle of the English "democracy" to education, to political recognition, was different in many respects from the struggles of the Irish underworld. Britain was producing a great industrial population, Protestant or sceptical; she had agricultural labourers indeed, but no peasants. Ireland with no coal, with a poorer soil and landlords who lived in England, had become a land of rent-paying peasants. Their cultivation was allowed to degenerate more and more into a growing of potatoes and a feeding of pigs. The people married and bred; except for the consumption of whisky when it could be got, and a little fighting, family life was their only amusement. Here are the appalling consequences. The population of Ireland

in 1785 was 2,845,932,

in 1803 was 5,536,594,

in 1845 was 8,295,061,

at which date the weary potato gave way under its ever-growing burthen and there was a frightful famine. Many died, many emigrated, especially to the United States; an outflow of emigration began that made Ireland for a time a land of old people and empty nests.

Now because of the Union of the Parliaments, the enfranchisement of the English and Irish populations went on simultaneously. Catholic enfranchisement in England meant Catholic enfranchisement in Ireland. The British got votes because they wanted them; the Irish commonalty got votes because the English did. Ireland was over-represented in the Union Parliament, because originally Irish seats had been easier for the governing class to manipulate than English; and so it came about that this Irish and Catholic Ireland, which had never before had any political instrument at all, and which had never sought a political instrument, suddenly found itself with the power to thrust a solid body of members into the legislature of Great Britain. After the general election of 1874, the old type of venal Irish member was swept aside, and the newly enfranchised "democracy" of Britain found itself confronted by a strange and perplexing Irish "democracy," different in its religion, its traditions, and its needs, telling a tale of wrongs of which the common English had never heard, clamouring passionately for a separation which they could not understand and which impressed them chiefly as being needlessly unfriendly.

The national egotism of the Irish is intense; their circumstances have made it intense; they were incapable of considering the state of affairs in England; the new Irish Party came into the British Parliament to obstruct and disorder English business until Ireland became free, and to make themselves a nuisance to the English. This spirit was only too welcome to the oligarchy which still ruled the British Empire; they allied themselves with the "loyal" Protestants in the north of Ireland—loyal that is to the Imperial Government because of their dread of a Catholic predominance in Ireland—and they watched and assisted the gradual exaspera-

tion of the British common people by this indiscriminate hostility of the common people of Ireland.

The story of the relation of Ireland to Britain for the last half-century is one that reflects the utmost discredit upon the governing class of the British Empire, but it is not one of which the English commons need be ashamed. Again and again they have given evidences of goodwill. British legislation in relation to Ireland for nearly half a century shows a series of clumsy attempts on the part of liberal England, made in the face of a strenuous opposition from the Conservative Party and the Ulster Irish, to satisfy Irish complaints and get to a footing of fellowship. The name of Parnell, an Irish Protestant, stands out as that of the chief leader of the Home Rule movement. In 1886 Gladstone, the great liberal British prime minister, brought political disaster upon himself by introducing the first Irish Home Rule Bill, a genuine attempt to give over Irish affairs *for the first time in history* to the Irish people. The bill broke the Liberal Party asunder; and a coalition government, the Unionist Government, replaced that of Mr. Gladstone.

This digression into the history of Ireland now comes up to the time of infectious imperialism in Europe. The Unionist Government, which ousted Mr. Gladstone, had a predominantly Tory element, and was in spirit "imperialist" as no previous British Government had been. The British political history of the subsequent years is largely a history of the conflict of the new imperialism, through which an arrogant "British" nationalism sought to override the rest of the empire against the temperamental liberalism and reasonableness of the English, which tended to develop the empire into a federation of free and willing allies. Naturally the "British" imperialists wanted a subjugated Irish; naturally the English Liberals wanted a free, participating Irish. In 1892 Gladstone struggled back to power with a small Home Rule majority; and in 1893 his second Home Rule Bill passed the Commons, and was rejected by the Lords. It was not, however, until 1895 that an imperialist

government took office. The party which sustained it was called not Imperialist, but "Unionist"—an odd name when we consider how steadily and strenuously it has worked to destroy any possibility of an Empire commonweal. These Imperialists remained in power for ten years. We have already noted their conquest of South Africa. They were defeated in 1905 in an attempt to establish a tariff wall on the Teutonic model. The ensuing Liberal Government then turned the conquered South African Dutch into contented fellow-subjects by creating the self-governing Dominion of South Africa. After which it embarked upon a long-impending struggle with the persistently imperialist House of Lords.

This was a very fundamental struggle in British affairs. On the one hand was the Liberal majority of the people of Great Britain honestly and wisely anxious to put this Irish affair upon a new and more hopeful footing, and, if possible, to change the animosity of the Irish into friendship; on the other were all the factors of this new British Imperialism resolved at any cost and in spite of every electoral verdict, legally, if possible, but if not, illegally, to maintain their ascendancy over the affairs of the English, Scotch, and Irish and all the rest of the empire alike. It was, under new names, the age-long internal struggle of the English community; that same conflict of a free and liberal-spirited commonalty against powerful "big men" and big adventurers and authoritative persons which we have already dealt with in our account of the liberation of America. Ireland was merely a battleground as America had been. In India, in Ireland, in England, the governing class and their associated adventurers were all of one mind; but the Irish people, thanks to their religious difference, had little sense of solidarity with the English. Yet such Irish statesmen as Redmond, the leader of the Irish party in the House of Commons, transcended this national narrowness for a time, and gave a generous response to English good intentions. Slowly yet steadily the barrier of the House of Lords was broken down, and a third Irish Home Rule Bill was brought

in by Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, in 1912. Throughout 1913 and the early part of 1914 this bill was fought and re-fought through Parliament. At first it gave Home Rule to all Ireland; but an Amending Act, excluding Ulster on certain conditions, was promised. This struggle lasted right up to the outbreak of the Great War. The royal assent was given to this bill after the actual outbreak of war, and also to a bill suspending the coming into force of Irish Home Rule until after the end of the war. These bills were put upon the Statute Book.

But from the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill onward, the opposition to it had assumed a violent and extravagant form. Sir Edward Carson, a Dublin lawyer who had become a member of the English Bar, and who had held a legal position in the ministry of Mr. Gladstone (before the Home Rule split) and in the subsequent imperialist government, was the organizer and leader of this resistance to a reconciliation of the two peoples. In spite of his Dublin origin, he set up to be a leader of the Ulster Protestants; and he brought to the conflict that contempt for law which is all too common a characteristic of the successful barrister, and those gifts of persistent, unqualified, and uncompromising hostility which distinguish a certain type of Irishman. He was the most "un-English" of men, dark, romantic, and violent; and from the opening of the struggle he talked with gusto of armed resistance to this freer reunion of the English and Irish which the third Home Rule Bill contemplated. A body of volunteers had been organized in Ulster in 1911, arms were now smuggled into the country, and Sir Edward Carson and a rising lawyer named F. E. Smith trapped up in semi-military style, toured Ulster, inspecting these volunteers and inflaming local passion. The arms of these prospective rebels were obtained from Germany, and various utterances of Sir Edward Carson's associates hinted at support from "a great Protestant monarch." Contrasted with Ulster, the rest of Ireland was at that time a land of order and decency, relying upon its great leader Redmond and the good faith of the three British peoples.

Now these threats of civil war from Ireland were not in themselves anything very exceptional in the record of that unhappy island; what makes them significant in the world's history of this time is the vehement support they found among the English military and governing classes, and the immunity from punishment and restraint of Sir Edward Carson and his friends. The virus of reaction which came from the success and splendour of German imperialism had spread widely, as we have explained, throughout the prevalent and prosperous classes in Great Britain. A generation had grown up forgetful of the mighty traditions of their forefathers, and ready to exchange the greatness of English fairness and freedom for the tawdriest of imperialisms. A fund of a million pounds was raised, chiefly in England, to support the Ulster Rebellion, an Ulster Provisional Government was formed, prominent English people mingled in the fray and careered about Ulster in automobiles, assisting in the gun-running, and there is evidence that a number of British officers and generals were prepared for a pronunciamiento upon South American lines rather than obedience to the law. The natural result of all this upper-class disorderliness was to alarm the main part of Ireland, never a ready friend to England. That Ireland also began in its turn to organize "National Volunteers" and to smuggle arms. The military authorities showed themselves much keener in the suppression of the Nationalist than of the Ulster gun importation, and in July, 1914, an attempt to run guns at Howth, near Dublin, led to fighting and bloodshed in the Dublin streets. The British Isles were on the verge of civil war.

Such in outline is the story of the imperialist revolutionary movement in Great Britain up to the eve of the Great War. For revolutionary this movement of Sir Edward Carson and his associates was. It was plainly an attempt to set aside parliamentary government and the slow-grown, imperfect liberties of the British peoples, and, with the assistance of the army, to substitute a more Prussianized type of rule, using the Irish conflict as the point of departure. It was the re-

actionary effort of a few score thousand people to arrest the world movement towards democratic law and social justice, strictly parallel to and closely sympathetic with the new imperialism of the German junkers and rich men. But in one very important respect British and German imperialism differed. In Germany it centred upon the crown; its noisiest, most conspicuous advocate was the heir-apparent. In Great Britain the king stood aloof. By no single public act did King George V betray the slightest approval of the new movement, and the behaviour of the Prince of Wales, his son and heir, has been equally correct.

In August, 1914, the storm of the Great War burst upon the world. In September, Sir Edward Carson was denouncing the placing of the Home Rule Bill upon the Statute Book. Its operation was suspended until after the war. On the same day, Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish majority, the proper representative of Ireland, was calling upon the Irish people to take their equal part in the burthen and effort of the war. For a time Ireland played her part in the war side by side with England faithfully and well, until in 1915 the Liberal Government was replaced by a coalition, in which through the moral feebleness of Mr. Asquith, the prime minister, this Sir Edward Carson figured as Attorney-General (with a salary of £7,000 and fees), to be replaced presently by his associate in the Ulster sedition, Sir F. E. Smith.

Grosser insult was never offered to a friendly people. The work of reconciliation, begun by Gladstone in 1886, and brought so near to completion in 1914, was completely and finally wrecked.

In the spring of 1916 Dublin revolted unsuccessfully against this new government. The ringleaders of this insurrection, many of them mere boys, were shot with a deliberate and clumsy sternness that, in view of the treatment of the Ulster rebel leaders, impressed all Ireland as atrociously unjust. A traitor, Sir Roger Casement, who had been knighted for previous services to the empire, was tried and executed, no doubt deservedly, but his prosecutor was Sir

F. E. Smith of the Ulster insurrection, a shocking conjunction. The Dublin revolt had had little support in Ireland generally, but thereafter the movement for an independent republic grew rapidly to great proportions. Against this strong emotional drive there struggled the more moderate ideas of such Irish statesmen as Sir Horace Plunkett, who wished to see Ireland become a Dominion, a "crowned republic" that is, within the empire, on an equal footing with Canada and Australia.

§ 4

Our studies of modern imperialism in Germany and Britain bring out certain forces common to the two countries, and we shall find these same forces at work in variable degrees and with various modifications in the case of the other great modern communities at which we shall now glance. This modern imperialism is not a synthetic world-uniting movement like the older imperialism; it is essentially a *megalomaniac nationalism*, a nationalism made aggressive by prosperity; and always it finds its stronger support in the military and official castes, and in the enterprising and acquisitive strata of society, in new money, that is, and big business; its chief critics in the educated poor, and its chief opponents in the peasantry and the labour masses. It accepts monarchy where it finds it, but it is not necessarily a monarchist movement. It does, however, need a foreign office of the traditional type for its full development. Its origin, which we have traced very carefully in this book of our history, makes this clear. Modern imperialism is the natural development of the Great Power system which arose, with the foreign office method of policy, out of the Machiavelian monarchies after the break up of Christendom. It will only come to an end when the intercourse of nations and peoples through embassies and foreign offices is replaced by an assembly of elected representatives in direct touch with their peoples.

French imperialism during the period of the Armed Peace

GERMAN TRENCHES OF THE HINDENBURG LINE





THE RUINED TOWN OF VERDUN

in Europe was naturally of a less confident type than the German. It called itself "nationalism" rather than imperialism, and it set itself, by appeals to patriotic pride, to thwart the efforts of those socialists and rationalists who sought to get into touch with liberal elements in German life. It brooded upon the *Revanche*, the return match with Prussia.



But in spite of that preoccupation, it set itself to the adventure of annexation and exploitation in the Far East and in Africa, narrowly escaping a war with Britain upon the Fashoda clash (1898), and it never relinquished a dream of acquisitions in Syria. Italy, too, caught the imperialist

fever; the blood letting of Adowa cooled her for a time, and then she resumed in 1911 with a war upon Turkey and the annexation of Tripoli. The Italian imperialists exhorted their countrymen to forget Mazzini and remember Julius Cæsar; for were they not the heirs of the Roman Empire? Imperialism touched the Balkans; little countries not a hundred years from slavery began to betray exalted intentions; King Ferdinand of Bulgaria assumed the title of Tsar, the latest of the pseudo-Cæsars, and in the shop-windows of Athens the curious student could study maps showing the dream of a vast Greek empire in Europe and Asia.

In 1913 the three states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece fell upon Turkey, already weakened by her war with Italy, and swept her out of all her European possessions except the country between Adrianople and Constantinople; later in that year they quarrelled among themselves over the division of the spoils. Roumania joined in the game and helped to crush Bulgaria. Turkey recovered Adrianople. The greater imperialisms of Austria, Russia, and Italy watched that conflict and one another. . . .

§ 5

While all the world to the west of her was changing rapidly, Russia throughout the nineteenth century changed very slowly indeed. At the end of the nineteenth century, as at its beginning, she was still a Grand Monarchy of the later seventeenth-century type standing on a basis of barbarism, she was still at a stage where court intrigues and imperial favourites could control her international relations. She had driven a great railway across Siberia to find the disasters of the Japanese war at the end of it; she was using modern methods and modern weapons so far as her undeveloped industrialism and her small supply of sufficiently educated people permitted; such writers as Dostoievski had devised a sort of mystical imperialism based on the idea of Holy Russia and her mission, coloured by racial illusions and anti-Semitic passion; but, as events were to show, this had

not sunken very deeply into the imagination of the Russian masses. A vague, very simple Christianity pervaded the illiterate peasant life, mixed with much superstition. It was like the pre-reformation peasant life of France or Germany. The Russian moujik was supposed to worship and revere his Tsar and to love to serve a gentleman; in 1913 reactionary English writers were still praising his simple and unquestioning loyalty. But, as in the case of the western European peasant of the days of the peasant revolts, this reverence for the monarchy was mixed up with the idea that the monarch and the nobleman had to be good, and beneficial, and this simple loyalty could, under sufficient provocation, be turned into the same pitiless intolerance of social injustice that burnt the châteaux in the Jacquerie and set up the theocracy in Munster. Once the commons were moved to anger, there were no links of understanding in a generally diffused education in Russia to mitigate the fury of the outbreak. The upper classes were as much beyond the sympathy of the lower as a different species of animal. These Russian masses were three centuries away from such nationalistic imperialism as Germany displayed.

And in another respect Russia differed from modern Western Europe and paralleled its mediæval phase, and that was in the fact that her universities were the resort of many very poor students quite out of touch and out of sympathy with the bureaucratic autocracy. Before 1917 the significance of the proximity of these two factors of revolution, the fuel of discontent and the match of free ideas, was not recognized in European thought, and few people realized that in Russia more than in any other country lay the possibilities of a fundamental revolution.

§ 6

When we turn from these European Great Powers, with their inheritance of foreign offices and national policies, to the United States of America, which broke away completely

from the Great Power System in 1776, we find a most interesting contrast in the operation of the forces which produced the expansive imperialism of Europe. For America, as for Europe, the mechanical revolution had brought all the world within the range of a few days' journey. The United States, like the Great Powers, had worldwide financial and mercantile interests; a great industrialism had grown up and was in need of overseas markets; the same crises of belief that had shaken the moral solidarity of Europe had occurred in the American world. Her people were as patriotic and spirited as any. Why then did not the United States develop armaments and an aggressive policy? Why was not the stars and stripes waving over Mexico, and why was there not a new Indian system growing up in China under that flag? It was the American who had opened up Japan. After doing so, he had let that power Europeanize itself and become formidable without a protest. That alone was enough to make Machiavelli, the father of modern foreign policy, turn in his grave. If a Europeanized Great Power had been in the place of the United States, Great Britain would have had to fortify the Canadian frontier from end to end—it is now absolutely unarmed—and to maintain a great arsenal in the St. Lawrence. All the divided states of Central and South America would long since have been subjugated and placed under the disciplinary control of United States officials of the "governing class." There would have been a perpetual campaign to Americanize Australia and new Zealand, and yet another claimant for a share in tropical Africa.

And by an odd accident America had produced in President Roosevelt (President 1901–1908) a man of an energy as restless as the German Kaiser's, as eager for large achievements, as florid and eloquent, an adventurous man with a turn for world politics and an instinct for armaments, the very man, we might imagine, to have involved his country in the scramble for over-seas possession.

There does not appear to be any other explanation of this general restraint and abstinence on the part of the United

States except in their fundamentally different institutions and traditions. In the first place the United States Government has no foreign office and no diplomatic corps of the European type, no body of "experts" to maintain the tradition of an aggressive policy. The president has great powers, but they are checked by the powers of the senate, which is directly elected by the people. The senate must assent to every treaty with a foreign power. The foreign relations of the country are thus under open and public control. Secret treaties are impossible under such a system, and foreign powers complain of the difficulty and uncertainty of "understandings" with the United States, a very excellent state of affairs. The United States is¹ constitutionally incapacitated, therefore, from the kind of foreign policy that has kept Europe for so long constantly on the verge of war.

And, secondly, there has hitherto existed in the States no organization for and no tradition of what one may call non-assimilable possessions. Where there is no crown there cannot be crown colonies. In spreading across the American continent, the United States had developed a quite distinctive method of dealing with new territories, admirably adapted for unsettled lands, but very inconvenient if applied too freely to areas already containing an alien population. This method was based on the idea that there cannot be in the United States system a permanently subject people. The first stage of the ordinary process of assimilation had been the creation of a "territory" under the federal government, having a considerable measure of self-government, sending a delegate (who could not vote) to congress, and destined, in the natural course of things, as the country became settled and population increased, to flower at last into full statehood. This had been the process of development of all the latter states of the Union; the latest territories to become states being Arizona and New Mexico in 1910. The frozen wilderness of Alaska, bought from Russia, remained politically undeveloped simply because it had an insufficient population for state organization. As the annexations of

¹ 'Is,' not 'are'; the U. S. A. is one nation.—A. C.

Germany and Great Britain in the Pacific threatened to deprive the United States navy of coaling stations in that ocean, a part of the Samoan Islands (1889) and the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) were annexed (1898). Here for the first time the United States had real subject populations to deal with. But in the absence of any class comparable to the Anglo-Indian officials who sway British opinion, the American procedure followed the territorial method. Every effort was made to bring the educational standards of Hawaii up to the American level and a domestic legislature on the territorial pattern was organized so that these dusky islanders seem destined ultimately to obtain full United States citizenship. The small Samoan Islands are taken care of by a United States naval administrator.

In 1895 occurred a quarrel between the United States and Britain upon the subject of Venezuela, and the Monroe doctrine was upheld stoutly by President Cleveland. Then Mr. Olney made this remarkable declaration: "To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." This, together with the various Pan-American congresses that have been held, point to a real open "foreign policy" of alliance and mutual help throughout America. Treaties of arbitration hold good over all that continent, and the future seems to point to a gradual development of interstate organization, a Pax Americana, of the English-speaking and Spanish-speaking peoples, the former in the rôle of elder brother. Here is something we cannot even call an empire, something going far beyond the great alliance of the British Empire in the open equality of its constituent parts.

Consistently with this idea of a common American welfare, the United States in 1898 intervened in the affairs of Cuba, which had been in a state of chronic insurrection against Spain for many years. A brief war ended in the acquisition of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. Cuba is now an independent self-governing republic. Porto Rico and the Philippines were given a special sort of government, with a popularly elected lower house and an upper body

containing members appointed in the beginning by the United States senate. It is improbable that either Porto Rico or the Philippines will ever become states in the Union. They are much more likely to become free states in some comprehensive alliance with both English-speaking and Latin America.

Both Cuba and Porto Rico welcomed the American intervention in their affairs, but in the Philippine Islands there was a demand for complete and immediate freedom after the Spanish war, and a considerable resistance to the American military administration. There it was that the United States came nearest to imperialism of the Great Power type, and that her record is most questionable. There was much sympathy with the insurgents in the states. Here is the point of view of ex-President Roosevelt as he wrote it in his *Autobiography* (1913):

"As regards the Philippines, my belief was that we should train them for self-government as rapidly as possible, and then leave them free to decide their own fate. I did not believe in setting the time-limit within which we would give them independence, because I did not believe it wise to try to forecast how soon they would be fit for self-government; and once having made the promise, I would have felt that it was imperative to keep it. Within a few months of my assuming office we had stamped out the last armed resistance in the Philippines that was not of merely sporadic character; and as soon as peace was secured, we turned our energies to developing the islands in the interests of the natives. We established schools everywhere; we built roads; we administered an even-handed justice; we did everything possible to encourage agriculture and industry; and in constantly increasing measure we employed natives to do their own governing, and finally provided a legislative chamber. . . . We are governing, and have been governing, the islands in the interests of the Filipinos themselves. If after due time the Filipinos themselves decide that they do not wish to be thus governed, then I trust that we will leave; but when we do leave, it must be distinctly understood that we

retain no protectorate—and above all that we take part in no joint protectorate—over the islands, and give them no guarantee, of neutrality, or otherwise; that in short, we are absolutely quit of responsibility for them, of every kind and description.”

This is an entirely different outlook from that of a British or French foreign office or colonial office official. But it is not very widely different from the spirit that created the Dominions of Canada, South Africa, and Australia, and brought forward the three Home Rule Bills for Ireland. It is in the older and more characteristic English tradition from which the Declaration of Independence derives. It sets aside, without discussion, the detestable idea of “subject peoples.”

Here we will not enter into political complications attendant upon the making of the Panama Canal, for they introduce no fresh light upon this interesting question of the American method in world politics. The history of Panama is American history purely. But manifestly just as the internal political structure of the Union was a new thing in the world, so too were its relations with the world beyond its borders.

§ 7

We have been at some pains to examine the state of mind of Europe and of America in regard to international relations in the years that led up to the world tragedy of 1914 because, as more and more people are coming to recognize, that great war or some such war was a necessary consequence of the mentality of the period. All the things that men and nations do are the outcome of instinctive motives reacting upon the ideas which talk and books and newspapers and schoolmasters and so forth have put into people's heads. Physical necessities, pestilences, changes of climate, and the like outer things may deflect and distort the growth of human history, but its living root is thought.

All human history is fundamentally a history of ideas.

Between the man of to-day and the Cro-Magnard the physical and mental differences are very slight; their essential difference lies in the extent and content of the mental background which we have acquired in the five or six hundred generations that intervene.

We are too close to the events of the Great War to pretend that this *Outline* can record the verdict of history thereupon, but we may hazard the guess that when the passions of the conflict have faded, it will be Germany that will be most blamed for bringing it about, and she will be blamed not because she was morally and intellectually very different from her neighbours, but because she had the common disease of imperialism in its most complete and energetic form. No self-respecting historian, however superficial and popular his aims may be, can countenance the legend, produced by the stresses of the war, that the German is a sort of human being more cruel and abominable than any other variety of men. All the great states of Europe before 1914 were in a condition of aggressive nationalism and drifting towards war; the government of Germany did but lead the general movement. She fell into the pit first, and she floundered deepest. She became the dreadful example at which all her fellow sinners could cry out.

For long, Germany and Austria had been plotting an extension of German influence eastward through Asia Minor to the East. The German idea was crystallized in the phrase "Berlin to Bagdad." Antagonized to the German dreams were those of Russia, which was scheming for an extension of the Slav ascendancy to Constantinople and through Serbia to the Adriatic. These lines of ambition lay across one another and were mutually incompatible. The feverish state of affairs in the Balkans was largely the outcome of the intrigues and propagandas sustained by the German and Slav schemes. Turkey turned for support to Germany, Serbia to Russia. Roumania and Italy, both Latin in tradition, both nominally allies of Germany, pursued remoter and deeper schemes in common. Ferdinand, the Tsar of Bulgaria, was following still darker ends; and the squalid

mysteries of the Greek court, whose king was the German Kaiser's brother-in-law, are beyond our present powers of inquiry.

But the tangle did not end with Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other. The greed of Germany in 1871 had made France her inveterate enemy. The French people, aware of their inability to recover their lost provinces by their own strength, had conceived exaggerated ideas of the power and helpfulness of Russia. The French people had subscribed enormously to Russian loans. France was the ally of Russia. If the German powers made war upon Russia, France would certainly attack them.

Now the short eastern French frontier was very strongly defended. There was little prospect of Germany repeating the successes of 1870-71 against that barrier. But the Belgian frontier of France was longer and less strongly defended. An attack in overwhelming force on France through Belgium might repeat 1870 on a larger scale. The French left might be swung back south-eastwardly on Verdun as a pivot, and crowded back upon its right, as one shuts an open razor. This scheme the German strategists had worked out with great care and elaboration. Its execution involved an outrage upon the law of nations because Prussia had undertaken to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium and had no quarrel with her, and it involved the risk of bringing in Great Britain (which power was also pledged to protect Belgium) against Germany. Yet the Germans believed that their fleet had grown strong enough to make Great Britain hesitate to interfere, and with a view to possibilities they had constructed a great system of strategic railways to the Belgian frontier, and made every preparation for the execution of this scheme. So they might hope to strike down France at one blow, and deal at their leisure with Russia.

In 1914 all things seemed moving together in favour of the two Central Powers. Russia, it is true, had been recovering since 1906, but only very slowly; France was distracted by financial scandals. The astounding murder of M.

Calmette, the editor of the *Figaro*, by the wife of M. Cail-
laux, the minister of finance, brought these to a climax in
March; Britain, all Germany was assured, was on the verge
of a civil war in Ireland. Repeated efforts were made both
by foreign and English people to get some definite statement
of what Britain would do if Germany and Austria assailed
France and Russia; but the British Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey, maintained a front of heavy ambiguity up to
the very day of the British entry into the war. As a conse-
quence, there was a feeling on the continent that Britain
would either not fight or delay fighting, and this may have
encouraged Germany to go on threatening France. Events
were precipitated on June 28th by the assassination of the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian Em-
pire, when on a state visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia.
Here was a timely excuse to set the armies marching. "It
is now or never," said the German Emperor.¹ Serbia was
accused of instigating the murderers, and notwithstanding
the fact that Austrian commissioners reported that there was
no evidence to implicate the Serbian government, the Austro-
Hungarian government contrived to press this grievance to-
wards war. On July 23rd Austria discharged an ultimatum
at Serbia, and, in spite of a practical submission on the part
of Serbia, and of the efforts of Sir Edward Grey, the British
Foreign Secretary, to call a conference of the powers, de-
clared war against Serbia on July 28th.

Russia mobilized her army on July 30th, and on August
1st Germany declared war upon her. German troops
crossed into French territory next day, and, simultaneously
with the delivery of an ultimatum to the unfortunate Bel-
gians, the big flanking movement through Luxembourg and
Belgium began. Westward rode the scouts and advance
guards. Westward rushed a multitude of automobiles packed
with soldiers. Enormous columns of grey-clad infantry
followed; round-eyed, fair young Germans they were for
the most part—law-abiding, educated youngsters who had
never yet seen a shot fired in anger. "This was war," they

¹ Kautsky's report on the origin of the war.

were told. They had to be bold and ruthless. Some of them did their best to carry out these militarist instructions at the expense of the ill-fated Belgians.

A disproportionate fuss has been made over the detailed atrocities in Belgium, disproportionate, that is, in relation to the fundamental atrocity of August 1914, which was the invasion of Belgium. Given that, the casual shootings and lootings, the wanton destruction of property, the plundering of inns and of food and drink shops by hungry and weary men, and the consequent rapes and incendiarism follow naturally enough. Only very simple people believe that an army in the field can maintain as high a level of honesty, decency, and justice as a settled community at home. And the tradition of the Thirty Years War still influenced the Prussian army. It has been customary in the countries allied against Germany to treat all this vileness and bloodshed of the Belgian months as though nothing of the sort had ever happened before, and as if it were due to some distinctively evil strain in the German character. They were nicknamed "Huns." But nothing could be less like the systematic destructions of these nomads (who once proposed to exterminate the entire Chinese population in order to restore China to pasture) than the German crimes in Belgium. Much of that crime was the drunken brutality of men who for the first time in their lives were free to use lethal weapons, much of it was the hysterical violence of men shocked at their own proceedings and in deadly fear of the revenge of the people whose country they had outraged, and much of it was done under duress because of the theory that men should be terrible in warfare and that populations are best subdued by fear. The German common people were bundled from an orderly obedience into this war in such a manner that atrocities were bound to ensue. They certainly did horrible and disgusting things. But any people who had been worked up for war and led into war as the Germans were, would have behaved in a similar manner.

On the night of August 2nd, while most of Europe, still under the tranquil inertias of half a century of peace, still

in habitual enjoyment of such a widely diffused plenty and cheapness and freedom as no man living will ever see again, was thinking about its summer holidays, the little Belgian village of Visé was ablaze, and stupefied rustics were being led out and shot because it was alleged some one had fired on



the invaders. The officers who ordered these acts, the men who obeyed, must surely have felt scared at the strangeness of the things they did. Most of them had never yet seen a violent death. And they had set light not to a village, but a world. It was the beginning of the end of an age of

comfort, confidence, and gentle and seemly behaviour in Europe.

So soon as it was clear that Belgium was to be invaded, Great Britain ceased to hesitate, and (at eleven at night on August 4th) declared war upon Germany. The following day a German mine-laying vessel was caught off the Thames mouth by the cruiser *Amphion* and sunk,—the first time that the British and Germans had ever met in conflict under their own national flags upon land or water. . . .

All Europe still remembers the strange atmosphere of those eventful sunny August days, the end of the Armed Peace. For nearly half a century the Western world had been tranquil and had seemed *safe*. Only a few middle-aged and ageing people in France had had any practical experience of warfare. The newspapers spoke of a world catastrophe, but that conveyed very little meaning to those for whom the world had always seemed secure, who were indeed almost incapable of thinking of it as otherwise than secure. In Britain particularly for some weeks the peace-time routine continued in a slightly dazed fashion. It was like a man still walking about the world unaware that he has contracted a fatal disease which will alter every routine and habit in his life. People went on with their summer holidays; shops reassured their customers with the announcement “business as usual.” There was much talk and excitement when the newspapers came, but it was the talk and excitement of spectators who have no vivid sense of participation in the catastrophe that was presently to involve them all.

§ 8

We will now review very briefly the main phases of the world struggle which had thus commenced. Planned by Germany, it began with a swift attack designed to “knock out” France while Russia was still getting her forces together in the East. For a time all went well. Military science is never up to date under modern conditions, because military men are as a class unimaginative, there are always at

any date undeveloped inventions capable of disturbing current tactical and strategic practice which the military intelligence has declined. The German plan had been made for some years; it was a stale plan; it could probably have been foiled at the outset by a proper use of entrenchments and barbed wire and machine guns, but the French were by no means as advanced in their military science as the Germans, and they trusted to methods of open warfare that were at least fourteen years behind the times. They had a proper equipment neither of barbed wire nor machine guns, and there was a ridiculous tradition that the Frenchman did not fight well behind earthworks. The Belgian frontier was defended by the fortress of Liège, ten or twelve years out of date, with forts whose armament had been furnished and fitted in many cases by German contractors; and the French north-eastern frontier was very badly equipped. Naturally the German armament firm of Krupp had provided nut-crackers for these nuts in the form of exceptionally heavy guns firing high explosive shell. These defences proved therefore to be mere traps for their garrisons. The French attacked and failed in the southern Ardennes. The German hosts swung round the French left with an effect of being irresistible; Liège fell on August 9th, Brussels was reached on August 20th, and the small British army of about 70,000, which had arrived in Belgium, was struck at Mons (August 22nd) in overwhelming force, and driven backward in spite of the very deadly rifle tactics it had learnt during the South African War. The little British force was pushed aside westward, and the German right swept down so as to leave Paris to the west and crumple the entire French army back upon itself.

So confident was the German higher command at this stage of having won the war, that by the end of August German troops were already being withdrawn for the Eastern front, where the Russians were playing havoc in East and West Prussia. And then came the French counter-attack, strategically a very swift and brilliant counter-attack. The French struck back on their centre, they produced an unexpected

army on their left, and the small British army, shaken but reinforced, was still fit to play a worthy part in the counter-stroke. The German right overran itself, lost its cohesion, and was driven back from the Marne to the Aisne (Battle of the Marne, September 6th to 10th). It would have been driven back farther had it not had the art of entrenchment in reserve. Upon the Aisne it stood and dug itself in. The heavy guns, the high explosive shell, the tanks, needed by the allies to smash up these entrenchments, did not yet exist.

The Battle of the Marne shattered the original German plan. For a time France was saved. But the German was not defeated; he had still a great offensive superiority in men and equipment. His fear of the Russian in the east had been relieved by a tremendous victory at Tannenberg. His next phase was a headlong, less elaborately planned campaign to outflank the left of the allied armies and to seize the Channel ports and cut off supplies coming from Britain to France. Both armies extended to the west in a sort of race to the coast. Then the Germans, with a great superiority of guns and equipment, struck at the British round and about Ypres. They came very near to a break through, but the British held them.

The war on the Western front settled down to trench warfare. Neither side had the science and equipment needed to solve the problem of breaking through modern entrenchments and entanglements, and both sides were now compelled to resort to scientific men, inventors, and such-like unmilitary persons for counsel and help in their difficulty. At that time the essential problem of trench warfare had already been solved; there existed in England, for instance, the model of a tank, which would have given the allies a swift and easy victory before 1916; but the professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling; nearly all supremely great soldiers have been either inexperienced fresh-minded young men like Alexander, Napoleon, and Hoche, politicians turned soldiers like Julius Cæsar, nomads like the Hun and Mongol captains, or



WHEN A ZEPPELIN FELL

Shot down on a raid over England, this airship fell on a cottage



A ZEPPELIN ASCENDING

The British dirigible, R-34, of this general type, which crossed the Atlantic both ways in 1919, was 650 feet long

amateurs like Cromwell and Washington; whereas this war after fifty years of militarism was a hopelessly professional war; from first to last it was impossible to get it out of the hands of the regular generals, and neither the German nor



allied headquarters was disposed to regard an invention with toleration that would destroy their traditional methods. The tank was not only disagreeably strange to these military gentlemen, but it gave an unprofessional protection to the common soldiers within it. The Germans, however, did make some innovations. In February (28th) they produced a rather futile novelty, the flame projector, the user of which was in constant danger of being burnt alive, and in

April, in the midst of a second great offensive upon the British (second Battle of Ypres, April 17th to May 17th), they employed a cloud of poison gas. This horrible device was used against Algerian and Canadian troops; it shook them by the physical torture it inflicted, and by the anguish of those who died, but it failed to break through them. For some weeks chemists were of more importance than soldiers on the allied front, and within six weeks the defensive troops were already in possession of protective methods and devices.

For a year and a half, until July, 1916, the Western front remained in a state of indecisive tension. There were heavy attacks on either side that ended in bloody repulses. The French made costly but glorious thrusts at Arras and in Champagne in 1915, the British at Loos. From Switzerland to the North Sea there ran two continuous lines of entrenchment, sometimes at a distance of a mile or more, sometimes at a distance of a few feet (at Arras *e. g.*), and in and behind these lines of trenches millions of men toiled, raided their enemies, and prepared for sanguinary and foredoomed offensives. In any preceding age these stagnant masses of men would have engendered a pestilence inevitably, but here again modern science had altered the conditions of warfare. Certain novel diseases appeared, trench feet for instance, caused by prolonged standing in cold water, new forms of dysentery, and the like, but none developed to an extent to disable either combatant force. Behind this front the whole life of the belligerent nations was being turned more and more to the task of maintaining supplies of food, munitions, and, above all, men to supply the places of those who day by day were killed or mangled. The Germans had had the luck to possess a considerable number of big siege guns intended for the frontier fortresses; these were now available for trench smashing with high explosive, a use no one had foreseen for them. The Allies throughout the first years were markedly inferior in their supply of big guns and ammunition, and their losses were steadily greater than the German. Mr. Asquith, the British Prime Minister, though a very fine practitioner in all the

arts of Parliament, was wanting in creative ability; and it is probably due to the push and hustle of Mr. Lloyd George (who presently ousted him in December, 1916) and the clamour of the British press that this inferiority of supplies was eventually rectified.

There was a tremendous German onslaught upon the French throughout the first half of 1916 round and about Verdun. The Germans suffered enormous losses and were held, after pushing in the French lines for some miles. The French losses were as great or greater. "*Ils ne passeront pas,*" said and sang the French infantry—and kept their word.

The Eastern German front was more extended and less systematically entrenched than the Western. For a time the Russian armies continued to press westward in spite of the Tannenberg disaster. They conquered nearly the whole of Galicia from the Austrians, took Lemberg on September 2nd, 1914, and the great fortress of Przemyśl on March 22nd, 1915. But after the Germans had failed to break the Western front of the Allies, and after an ineffective Allied offensive made without proper material, they turned to Russia, and a series of heavy blows, with a novel use of massed artillery, were struck first in the south and then at the north of the Russian front. On June 22nd, Przemyśl was retaken, and the whole Russian line was driven back until Vilna (September 2nd) was in German hands.

In May 1915 (23rd) Italy joined the allies, and declared war upon Austria. (Not until a year later did she declare war on Germany.) She pushed over her eastern boundary towards Goritzia (which fell in the summer of 1916), but her intervention was of little use at that time to either Russia or the two Western powers. She merely established another line of trench warfare among the high mountains of her picturesque north-eastern frontier.

While the main fronts of the chief combatants were in this state of exhaustive deadlock, both sides were attempting to strike round behind the front of their adversaries. The Germans made a series of Zeppelin, and later of aeroplane

raids upon Paris and the east of England. Ostensibly these aimed at depôts, munition works, and the like targets of military importance, but practically they bombed promiscuously at inhabited places. At first these raiders dropped not very effective bombs, but later the size and quality of these missiles increased, considerable numbers of people were killed and injured, and very much damage was done. The English people were roused to a pitch of extreme indignation by these outrages. Although the Germans had possessed Zeppelins for some years, no one in authority in Great Britain had thought out the proper methods of dealing with them, and it was not until late in 1916 that an adequate supply of anti-aircraft guns was brought into play and that these raiders were systematically attacked by aeroplanes. Then came a series of Zeppelin disasters, and after the spring of 1917 they ceased to be used for any purpose but sea scouting, and their place as raiders was taken by large aeroplanes (the Gothas). The visits of these latter machines to London and the east of England became systematic after the summer of 1917. All through the winter of 1917-18, London on every moonlight night became familiar with the banging of warning maroons, the shrill whistles of the police alarm, the hasty clearance of the streets, the distant rumbling of scores and hundreds of anti-aircraft guns growing steadily to a wild uproar of thuds and crashes, the swish of flying shrapnel, and at last, if any of the raiders got through the barrage, with the dull heavy bang of the bursting bombs. Then presently, amidst the diminuendo of the gun fire would come the inimitable rushing sound of the fire brigade engines and the hurry of the ambulances. . . . War was brought home to every Londoner by these experiences.

While the Germans were thus assailing the nerve of their enemy home population through the air, they were also attacking the overseas trade of the British by every means in their power. At the outset of the war they had various trade destroyers scattered over the world, and a squadron of powerful modern cruisers in the Pacific, namely the *Scharnhorst*, the *Gneisenau*, the *Leipzig*, the *Nürnberg*, and the

Dresden. Some of the detached cruisers, and particularly the *Emden*, did a considerable amount of commerce destroying before they were hunted down, and the main squadron caught an inferior British force off the coast of Chile and sank the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* on November 1st, 1914. A month later these German ships were themselves pounced upon by a British force, and all (except the *Dresden*) sunk by Admiral Sturdee in the Battle of the Falkland Isles. After this conflict the allies remained in undisputed possession of the surface of the sea, a supremacy which the great naval Battle of Jutland (May 1st, 1916) did nothing to shake. The Germans concentrated their attention more and more upon submarine warfare. From the beginning of the war they had had considerable submarine successes. On one day, September 22nd, 1914, they sank three powerful cruisers, the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue*, and the *Cressy*, with 1,473 men. They continued to levy a toll upon British shipping throughout the war; at first they hailed and examined passenger and mercantile shipping, but this practice they discontinued for fear of traps, and in the spring of 1915 they began to sink ships without notice. In May 1915 they sank the great passenger liner, the *Lusitania*, without any warning, drowning a number of American citizens. This embittered American feeling against them, but the possibility of injuring and perhaps reducing Britain by a submarine blockade was so great, that they persisted in a more and more intensified submarine campaign, regardless of the danger of dragging the United States into the circle of their enemies.

Meanwhile, Turkish forces, very ill-equipped, were making threatening gestures at Egypt across the desert of Sinai.

And while the Germans were thus striking at Britain, their least accessible and most formidable antagonist, through the air and under the sea, the French and British were also embarking upon a disastrous flank attack in the east upon the Central Powers through Turkey. The Gallipoli campaign was finely imagined, but disgracefully executed. Had it succeeded, the Allies would have captured Constantinople in 1915. But the Turks were given two months' notice of

the project by a premature bombardment of the Dardanelles in February, the scheme was also probably betrayed through the Greek Court, and when at last British and French forces were landed upon the Gallipoli peninsula in April, they found the Turks well entrenched and better equipped for trench warfare than themselves. The Allies trusted for heavy artillery to the great guns of the ships, which were comparatively useless for battering down entrenchments, and among every other sort of thing that they had failed to foresee, they had not foreseen hostile submarines. Several great battleships were lost; they went down in the same clear waters over which the ships of Xerxes had once sailed to their fate at Salamis. The story of the Gallipoli campaign from the side of the Allies is at once heroic and pitiful, a story of courage and incompetence, and of life, material, and prestige wasted, culminating in a withdrawal in January, 1916.

Linked up closely with the vacillation of Greece throughout this time was the entry of Bulgaria into the war (October 12th, 1915). The king of Bulgaria had hesitated for more than a year to make any decision between the two sides. Now the manifest failure of the British at Gallipoli, coupled with a strong Austro-German attack in Serbia, swung him over to the Central Powers. While the Serbs were hotly engaged with the Austro-German invaders upon the Danube he attacked Serbia in the rear, and in a few weeks the country had been completely overrun. The Serbian army made a terrible retreat through the mountains of Albania to the coast, where its remains were rescued by an Allied fleet.

An Allied force landed at Salonika in Greece, and pushed inland towards Monastir, but was unable to render any effectual assistance to the Serbians. It was the Salonika plan which sealed the fate of the Gallipoli expedition.

To the east, in Mesopotamia, the British, using Indian troops chiefly, made a still remoter flank attack upon the Central Powers. An army, very ill provided for the campaign, was landed at Basra in the November of 1914, and pushed up towards Bagdad in the following year. It gained a victory at Ctesiphon, the ancient Arsacid and Sassanid

capital within twenty-five miles of Bagdad, but the Turks were heavily reinforced, there was a retreat to Kut, and there the British army, under General Townshend, was surrounded and starved into surrender on April 29th, 1916.

All these campaigns in the air, under the seas, in Russia, Turkey, and Asia, were subsidiary to the main front, the front of decision, between Switzerland and the sea; and there the main millions lay entrenched, slowly learning the necessary methods of modern scientific warfare. There was a rapid progress in the use of the aeroplane. At the outset of the war this had been used chiefly for scouting, and by the Germans for the dropping of marks for the artillery. Such a thing as aerial fighting was unheard of. In 1916 the aeroplanes carried machine guns and fought in the air; their bombing work was increasingly important, they had developed a wonderful art of aerial photography, and all the aerial side of artillery work, both with aeroplanes and observation balloons, had enormously developed. But the military mind was still resisting the use of the tank, the obvious weapon for decision in trench warfare.

Many intelligent people outside military circles understood this quite clearly. The use of the tank against trenches was an altogether obvious expedient. Leonardo da Vinci invented an early tank, but what military "expert" has ever had the wits to study Leonardo? Soon after the South African War, in 1903, there were stories in magazines describing imaginary battles in which tanks figured and a complete working model of a tank, made by Mr. J. A. Corry of Leeds, was shown to the British military authorities—who of course rejected it—in 1911. Tanks had been invented and re-invented before the war began. But had the matter rested entirely in the hands of the military, there would never have been any use of tanks. It was Mr. Winston Churchill, who was at the British Admiralty in 1915-16, who insisted upon the manufacture of the first tanks, and it was in the teeth of the grimmest opposition that they were sent to France. To the British navy, and not to the army, military science owes the use of these devices. The German

military authorities were equally set against them. In July 1916 Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander-in-chief, began a great offensive which failed to break through the German line. In some places he advanced a few miles; in others he was completely defeated. There was a huge slaughter of the new British armies. And he did not use tanks.

In September, when the season was growing too late for a sustained offensive, tanks first appeared in warfare. A few were put into action by the British generals in a not very intelligent fashion. Their effect upon the German was profound, they produced something like a panic, and there can be little doubt that had they been used in July in sufficient numbers and handled by a general of imagination and energy, they would have ended the war there and then. At that time the Allies were in greater strength than the Germans upon the Western front. The odds were roughly seven to four, Russia, though fast approaching exhaustion, was still fighting, Italy was pressing the Austrians hard, and Roumania was just entering the war on the side of the Allies. But the waste of men in this disastrous July offensive, and the incompetence of the British military command, brought the Allied cause to the very brink of disaster.

Directly the British failure of July had reassured the Germans, they turned on the Roumanians, and the winter of 1916 saw the same fate overtake Roumania that had fallen upon Serbia in 1915. The year that had begun with the retreat from Gallipoli and the surrender of Kut, ended with the crushing of Roumania and with volleys fired at a landing party of French and British marines by a royalist crowd in the port of Athens. It looked as though King Constantine of Greece meant to lead his people in the footsteps of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. But the coast line of Greece is one much exposed to naval action. Greece was blockaded, and a French force from Salonika joined hands with an Italian force from Valona to cut the king of Greece off from his Central European friends.

(In July, 1917, Constantine was forced to abdicate by the

Allies and his son Alexander was made king in his place.)

On the whole, things looked much less dangerous for the Hohenzollern imperialism at the end of 1916 than they had done after the failure of the first great rush at the Marne. The Allies had wasted two years of opportunity. Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania, and large areas of France and Russia, were occupied by Austro-German troops. Counterstroke after counterstroke had failed, and Russia was now tottering towards a collapse. Had Germany been ruled with any wisdom, she might have made a reasonable peace at this time. But the touch of success had intoxicated her imperialists. They wanted not safety, but triumph, not world welfare, but world empire. "World power or downfall" was their formula; it gave their antagonists no alternative but a fight to a conclusive end.

§ 9

Early in 1917 Russia collapsed.

By this time the enormous strain of the war was telling hardly upon all the European populations. There had been a great disorganization of transport everywhere, a discontinuance of the normal repairs and replacements of shipping, railways, and the like, a using-up of material of all sorts, a dwindling of food production, a withdrawal of greater and greater masses of men from industry, a cessation of educational work, and a steady diminution of the ordinary securities and honesties of life. Nowhere was the available directive ability capable of keeping a grip upon affairs in the face of the rupture of habitual bonds and the replacement of the subtle disciplines of peace by the clumsy brutalities of military "order." More and more of the European population was being transferred from surroundings and conditions to which it was accustomed, to novel circumstances which distressed, stimulated, and demoralized it. But Russia suffered first and most from this universal pulling up of civilization from its roots. The Russian autocracy was dishonest and incompetent. The Tsar, like several of

his ancestors, had now given way to a crazy pietism, and the court was dominated by a religious impostor, Rasputin, whose cult was one of unspeakable foulness, a reeking scandal in the face of the world. Beneath the rule of this dirty mysticism, indolence and scoundrelism mismanaged the war. The Russian common soldiers were sent into battle without guns to support them, without even rifle ammunition; they were wasted by their officers and generals in a delirium of militarist enthusiasm. For a time they seemed to be suffering mutely as the beasts suffer; but there is a limit to the endurance even of the most ignorant. A profound disgust for the Tsardom was creeping through these armies of betrayed and wasted men. From the close of 1915 onwards Russia was a source of deepening anxiety to her Western allies. Throughout 1916 she remained largely on the defensive, and there were rumours of a separate peace with Germany. She gave little help to Roumania.

On December 29th, 1916, the monk Rasputin was murdered at a dinner-party in Petrograd, and a belated attempt was made to put the Tsardom in order. By March things were moving rapidly; food riots in Petrograd developed into revolutionary insurrection; there was an attempted suppression of the Duma, the representative body, attempted arrests of liberal leaders, the formation of a provisional government under Prince Lvoff, and an abdication (March 15th) by the Tsar. For a time it seemed that a moderate and controlled revolution might be possible—perhaps under a new Tsar. Then it became evident that the destruction of confidence in Russia had gone too far for any such adjustments. The Russian people were sick to death of the old order of things in Europe, of Tsars and of wars and great powers; it wanted relief, and that speedily, from unendurable miseries. The Allies had no understanding of Russian realities; their diplomatists were ignorant of Russian, genteel persons, with their attention directed to the Russian Court rather than Russia, they blundered steadily with the new situation. There was little goodwill among the diplomatists for republicanism, and a manifest disposition to embarrass the

new government as much as possible. At the head of the Russian republican government was an eloquent and picturesque leader, Kerensky, who found himself assailed by the deep forces of a profounder revolutionary movement, the "social revolution," at home and cold-shouldered by the Allied governments abroad. His allies would neither let him give the Russian people land nor peace beyond their frontiers. The French and the British press pestered their exhausted ally for a fresh offensive, but when presently the Germans made a strong attack by sea and land upon Riga, the British Admiralty quailed before the prospect of a Baltic expedition in relief. The new Russian republic had to fight unsupported. In spite of their great naval predominance and the bitter protests of the great English admiral, Lord Fisher (1841-1920), it is to be noted that the Allies, except for some submarine attacks, left the Germans the complete mastery of the Baltic throughout the war.

The Russian masses were resolute to end the war. There had come into existence in Petrograd a body representing the workers and common soldiers, the Soviet, and this body clamoured for an international conference of socialists at Stockholm. Food riots were occurring in Berlin at this time, war weariness in Austria and Germany was profound, and there can be little doubt, in the light of subsequent events, that such a conference would have precipitated a reasonable peace on democratic lines in 1917 and a German revolution. Kerensky implored his Western allies to allow this conference to take place, but, fearful of a worldwide outbreak of socialism and republicanism, they refused, in spite of the favourable response of a small majority of the British Labour Party. Without either moral or physical help from the Allies, the "moderate" Russian republic still fought on and made a last desperate offensive effort in July. It failed after some preliminary successes and another great slaughtering of Russians.

The limit of Russian endurance was reached. Mutinies broke out in the Russian armies, and particularly upon the northern front, and upon November 7th, 1917, Kerensky's

government was overthrown and power was seized by the Soviet Government, dominated by the Bolshevik socialists under Lenin, and pledged to make peace regardless of the Western powers. Russia passed definitely "out of the war."

In the spring of 1917 there had been a costly and ineffective French attack upon the Champagne front which had failed to break through and sustained enormous losses. Here, then, by the end of 1917, was a phase of events altogether favourable to Germany, had her government been fighting for security and well-being rather than for pride and victory. But to the very end, to the pitch of final exhaustion, the people of the Central Powers were held to the effort to realize an impossible world imperialism.

To that end it was necessary that Britain should be not merely resisted, but subjugated, and in order to do that Germany had already dragged America into the circle of her enemies. Throughout 1916 the submarine campaign had been growing in intensity, but hitherto it had respected neutral shipping. In January 1917, a completer "blockade" of Great Britain and France was proclaimed, and all neutral powers were warned to withdraw their shipping from the British seas. An indiscriminate sinking of the world's shipping began which compelled the United States to enter the war in April (6th) 1917. Throughout 1917, while Russia was breaking up and becoming impotent, the American people were changing swiftly and steadily into a great military nation. And the unrestricted submarine campaign, for which the German imperialists had accepted the risk of this fresh antagonist, was far less successful than had been hoped. The British navy proved itself much more inventive and resourceful than the British army; there was a rapid development of anti-submarine devices under water, upon the surface, and in the air; and after a month or so of serious destruction, the tale of submarine sinkings declined. The British found it necessary to put themselves upon food rations; but the regulations were well framed and ably administered, the public showed an excellent spirit and intelli-


gence, and the danger of famine and social disorder was kept at arm's length.

Yet the German imperial government persisted in its course. If the submarine was not doing all that had been expected, and if the armies of America gathered like a thunder-cloud, yet Russia was definitely down; and in October the same sort of autumn offensive that had overthrown Serbia in 1915 and Roumania in 1916 was now turned with crushing effect against Italy. The Italian front collapsed after the Battle of Caporetto, and the Austro-German armies poured down into Venetia and came almost within gunfire of Venice. Germany felt justified, therefore, in taking a high line with the Russian peace proposals, and the peace of Brest Litovsk (March 2nd, 1918) gave the Western allies some intimation of what a German victory would mean to them. It was a crushing and exorbitant peace, dictated with the utmost arrogance of confident victors.


All through the winter German troops had been shifting from the Eastern to the Western front, and now, in the spring of 1918, the jaded enthusiasm of hungry, weary, and bleeding Germany was lashed up for the one supreme effort that was really and truly to end the war. For some months American troops had been in France, but the bulk of the American army was still across the Atlantic. It was high time for the final conclusive blow upon the Western front, if such a blow was ever to be delivered. The first attack was upon the British in the Somme region. The not very brilliant cavalry generals who were still in command of a front upon which cavalry was a useless encumbrance, were caught napping; and on March 21st, in "Gough's Disaster," the fifth British army was driven back in disorder. The jealousies of the British and French generals had prevented any unified command of the Allied armies in France, and there was no general reserve whatever behind Gough. Thousands of guns were lost, and scores of thousands of prisoners. The British were driven back almost to Amiens. Throughout April and May the Germans rained offensives on the Allied front. They came near to a break through in the north,

and they made a great drive back to the Marne, which they reached again on May 30th, 1918.

This was the climax of the German effort. Behind it was nothing but an exhausted homeland. Marshal Foch was put in supreme command of all the allied armies. Fresh troops were hurrying from Britain across the Channel, and America was now pouring men into France by the hundred



thousand. In June the weary Austrians made a last effort in Italy, and collapsed before an Italian counter-attack. Early in June Foch began to develop a counter-attack in the Marne angle. By July the tide was turning, and the Germans were reeling back. The Battle of Château Thierry (July 18th) proved the quality of the new American armies. In August the British opened a great and successful thrust



into Belgium, and the bulge of the German lines towards Amiens wilted and collapsed. Germany had finished. The fighting spirit passed out of her army, and October was a story of defeat and retreat along the entire Western front. Early in November British troops were in Valenciennes and Americans in Sedan. In Italy also the Austrian armies were in a state of disorderly retreat. But everywhere now the Hohenzollern and Habsburg forces were collapsing. The smash at the end was amazingly swift. Frenchmen and Englishmen could not believe their newspapers as day after day they announced the capture of more hundreds of guns and more thousands of prisoners.

In September a great allied offensive against Bulgaria had produced a revolution in that country and peace proposals. Turkey had followed with a capitulation at the end of October, and Austro-Hungary on November 4th. There was an attempt to bring out the German Fleet for a last fight, but the sailors mutined (November 7th).

The Kaiser and the Crown Prince bolted hastily, and without a scrap of dignity, into Holland. On November 11th an armistice was signed and the war was at an end. . . .

For four years and a quarter the war had lasted, and gradually it had drawn nearly every one in the Western world, at least, into its vortex. Upwards of ten millions of people had been actually killed through the fighting, another twenty or twenty-five million had died through the hardships and disorders entailed. Scores of millions were suffering and enfeebled by under-nourishment and misery. A vast proportion of the living were now engaged in war work, in drilling and armament, in making munitions, in hospitals, in working as substitutes for men who had gone into the armies and the like. Business men had been adapting themselves to the more hectic methods necessary for profit in a world in a state of crisis. The war had become, indeed, an atmosphere, a habit of life, a new social order. Then suddenly it ended.

In London the armistice was proclaimed about midday on November 11th. It produced a strange cessation of every



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The greatest naval fight of modern times



WAR CONTROL OF ROAD TRANSPORT

From a painting by Nerlman, showing how order was restored out of chaos on French highways

ordinary routine. Clerks poured out of their offices and would not return, assistants deserted their shops, omnibus drivers and the drivers of military lorries set out upon journeys of their own devising with picked-up loads of astounded and cheering passengers going nowhere in particular and careless whither they went. Vast vacant crowds presently choked the streets, and every house and shop that possessed such adornment hung out flags. When night came, many of the main streets, which had been kept in darkness for many months because of the air raids, were brightly lit. It was very strange to see thronging multitudes assembled in an artificial light again. Every one felt aimless, with a kind of strained and aching relief. It was over at last. There would be no more killing in France, no more air raids—and things would get better. People wanted to laugh, and weep—and could do neither. Youths of spirit and young soldiers on leave formed thin noisy processions that shoved their way through the general drift, and did their best to make a jollification. A captured German gun was hauled from the Mall, where a vast array of such trophies had been set out, into Trafalgar Square, and its carriage burnt. Squibs and crackers were thrown about. But there was little concerted rejoicing. Nearly every one had lost too much and suffered too much to rejoice with any fervour.

CHAPTER XL

THE EFFORT TO RECONSTRUCT THE WORLD BEGINS

§ 1. *The Political, Economic, and Social Disorganization Caused by the Great War.* § 2. *The Bolsheviks.* § 3. *President Wilson at Versailles.* § 4. *Summary of the First Covenant of the League of Nations.* § 5. *A General Outline of the Treaties of 1919 and 1920.* § 6. *The "Next War."* § 7. *Processes of Readjustment in the British Empire.* § 8. *Processes of Readjustment in Europe and French Political Conservatism.* § 9. *President Harding and the Idea of an Association of Nations.*

§ 1

THE world in the years immediately after the great war was like a man who has had some vital surgical operation very roughly performed, and who is not yet sure whether he can now go on living or whether he has not been so profoundly shocked and injured that he will presently fall down and die. It was a world dazed and stunned. German militarist imperialism had been defeated, but at an overwhelming cost. It had come very near to victory. Everything went on, now that the strain of the conflict had ceased, rather laxly, rather weakly, and with a gusty and uncertain temper. There was a universal hunger for peace, a universal desire for the lost safety and liberty and prosperity of pre-war times, without any power of will to achieve and secure these things.

Just as with the Roman Republic under the long strain of the Punic War, so now there had been a great release of violence and cruelty, and a profound deterioration in financial and economic morality. Generous spirits had sacrificed themselves freely to the urgent demands of the war, but the

sly and base of the worlds of business and money had watched the convulsive opportunities of the time and secured a firm grip upon the resources and political power of their countries. Everywhere men who would have been regarded as shady adventurers before 1914 had acquired power and influence while better men toiled unprofitably. Such men as Lord Rhondda, the British food controller, killed themselves with hard work, while the war profiteer waxed rich and secured his grip upon press and party organization.

In the course of the war there had been extraordinary experiments in collective management in nearly all the belligerent countries. It was realized that the common expedients of peace-time commerce, the higgling of the market, the holding out for a favourable bargain, were incompatible with the swift needs of warfare. Transport, fuel, food supply, and the distribution of the raw materials not only of clothing, housing, and the like, but of everything needed for war munitions, had been brought under public control. No longer had farmers been allowed to under-farm; cattle had been put upon deer-parks and grasslands ploughed up, with or without the owner's approval. Luxury building and speculative company promotion had been restrained. In effect, a sort of emergency socialist state had been established throughout belligerent Europe. It was rough-and-ready and wasteful, but it was more effective than the tangled incessant profit-seeking, the cornering and forestalling and incoherent productiveness of "private enterprise."

In the earlier years of the war there was a very widespread feeling of brotherhood and the common interest in all the belligerent states. The common men were everywhere sacrificing life and health for what they believed to be the common good of the state. In return, it was promised, there would be less social injustice after the war, a more universal devotion to the common welfare. In Great Britain, for instance, Mr. Lloyd George was particularly insistent upon his intention to make the after-war Britain "a land fit for heroes." He foreshadowed the continuation of this new war communism into the peace period in discourses of great

fire and beauty. In Great Britain, there was created a Ministry of Reconstruction, which was understood to be planning a new and more generous social order, better labour conditions, better housing, extended education, a complete and scientific revision of the economic system. Similar hopes of a better world sustained the common soldiers of France and Germany and Italy. It was premature disillusionment that caused the Russian collapse. So that two mutually dangerous streams of anticipation were running through the minds of men in Western Europe towards the end of the war. The rich and adventurous men, and particularly the new war profiteers, were making their plans to prevent such developments as that air transport should become a state property, and to snatch back manufactures, shipping, land transport, the public services generally, and the trade in staples from the hands of the commonweal into the grip of private profit; they were securing possession of newspapers and busying themselves with party caucuses and the like to that end; while the masses of common men were looking forward naïvely to a new state of society planned almost entirely in their interest and according to generous general ideas. The history of 1919 is largely the clash of these two streams of anticipation. There was a hasty selling off by the "business" government in control, of every remunerative public enterprise to private speculators. . . .

By the middle of 1919 the labour masses throughout the world were manifestly disappointed and in a thoroughly bad temper. The British "Ministry of Reconstruction" and its foreign equivalents were exposed as a soothing sham. The common man felt he had been cheated. There was to be no reconstruction, but only a restoration of the old order—in the harsher form necessitated by the poverty of the new time.

For four years the drama of the war had obscured the social question which had been developing in the Western civilizations throughout the nineteenth century. Now that the war was over, this question reappeared gaunt and bare, as it had never been seen before.

And the irritations and hardships and the general in-

security of the new time were exacerbated by a profound disturbance of currency and credit. Money, a complicated growth of conventions rather than a system of values, had been deprived within the belligerent countries of the support of a gold standard. Gold had been retained only for international trade, and every government had produced excessive quantities of paper money for domestic use. With the breaking down of the war-time barriers the international exchange became a wildly fluctuating confusion, a source of distress to every one except a few gamblers and wily speculators. Prices rose and rose—with an infuriating effect upon the wage-earner. On the one hand was the employer resisting his demands for more pay; on the other hand, food, house-room, and clothing were being steadily cornered against him. And, which was the essential danger of the situation, he had lost any confidence he had ever possessed that any patience or industrial willingness he displayed would really alleviate the shortages and inconveniences by which he suffered.

In the speeches of politicians towards the close of 1919 and the spring of 1920, there was manifest an increasing recognition of the fact that what is called the capitalist system—the private ownership system that is, in which private profit is the working incentive—was on its trial. It had to produce general prosperity, they admitted, or it had to be revised. It is interesting to note such a speech as that of Mr. Lloyd George, the British premier, delivered on Saturday, December 6th, 1919. Mr. Lloyd George had had the education and training of a Welsh solicitor; he entered politics early, and in the course of a brilliant parliamentary career he had had few later opportunities for reading and thought. But being a man of great natural shrewdness, he was expressing here very accurately the ideas of the more intelligent of the business men and wealthy men and ordinary citizens who supported him.

“There is a new challenge to civilization,” he said. “What is it? It is fundamental. It affects the whole fabric of society as we know it; its commerce, its trade, its industry its finance, its social order—all are involved in it. There

are those who maintain that the prosperity and strength of the country have been built up by the stimulating and invigorating appeal to individual impulse, to individual action. That is one view. The State must educate; the State must assist where necessary; the State must control where necessary; the State must shield the weak against the arrogance of the strong; but the life springs from individual impulse and energy. (Cheers.) That is one view. What is the other? That private enterprise is a failure, tried, and found wanting—a complete failure, a cruel failure. It must be rooted out, and the community must take charge as a community, to produce, to distribute, as well as to control.

“Those are great challenges for us to decide. *We* say that the ills of private enterprise can be averted. *They* say ‘No, they cannot. No ameliorative, no palliative, no restrictive, no remedial measure will avail. These evils are inherent in the system. They are the fruit of the tree, and you must cut it down.’ That is the challenge we hear ringing through the civilized world to-day, from ocean to ocean, through valley and plain. You hear it in the whining and maniacal shrieking of the Bolshevists. You hear it in the loud, clear, but more restrained tones of Congresses and Conferences. The Bolshevists would blow up the fabric with high explosive, with horror. Others would pull down with the crowbars and with cranks—especially cranks. (Laughter.)

“Unemployment, with its injustice for the man who seeks and thirsts for employment, who begs for labour and cannot get it, and who is punished for failure he is not responsible for by the starvation of his children—that torture is *something that private enterprise ought to remedy for its own sake*. (Cheers.) Sweating, slums, the sense of semi-slavery in labour, must go. We must cultivate a sense of manhood by treating men as men. If I—and I say this deliberately—if I had to choose between this fabric I believe in, and allowing millions of men and women and children to rot in its cellars, I would not hesitate one hour. That is not the choice. Thank God it is not the choice. Private enterprise can pro-

duce more, so that all men get a fair share of it. . . .”¹

Here, put into quasi-eloquent phrasing, and with a jest adapted to the mental habits of the audience, we have the common-sense view of the ordinary prosperous man not only of Great Britain, but of America or France or Italy or Germany. In quality and tone it is a fair sample of British political thought in 1919. The prevailing economic system has made us what we are, is the underlying idea; and we do not want any process of social destruction to precede a renaissance of society, we do not want to experiment with the fundamentals of our social order. Let us accept that. Adaptation, Mr. Lloyd George admitted, there had to be. Now this occasion of his speaking was a year and a month after the Armistice, and for all that period private enterprise had been failing to do all that Mr. Lloyd George was so cheerfully promising it would do. The community was in urgent need of houses. Throughout the war there had been a cessation not only of building, but of repairs. The shortage of houses in the last months of 1919 amounted to scores of thousands in Britain alone.² Multitudes of people were living in a state of exasperating congestion, and the most shameless profiteering in apartments and houses was going on. It was a difficult but not an impossible situation. Given the same enthusiasm and energy and self-sacrifice that had tidied over the monstrous crisis of 1916, the far easier task of providing a million houses could have been performed in a year or so. But there had been corners in building materials, transport was in a disordered state, and it did not *pay* private enterprise to build houses at any rents within the means of the people who needed them. Private enterprise, therefore, so far from bothering about the public need of housing, did nothing but corner and speculate in rents and sub-letting. It now demanded grants in aid from the State—in order to build at a profit. And there was a great crowding and dislocation of goods at the depôts because there was insufficient road transport. There was an urgent want of

¹ *The Times*, December 8th, 1919.

² Authorities vary between 250,000 and a million houses.

cheap automobiles to move about goods and workers. But private enterprises in the automobile industry imagined it would be far more profitable to produce splendid and costly cars for those whom the war had made rich. The munition factories built with public money could have been converted very readily into factories for the mass production of cheap automobiles, but private enterprise had insisted upon these factories being sold by the State, and would neither meet the public need itself nor let the State do so. So, too, with the world in the direst discomfort for need of shipping, private enterprise insisted upon the shutting down of the newly constructed State shipyards. Currency was dislocated everywhere, but private enterprise was busy buying and selling francs or marks and intensifying the trouble. While Mr. George was making the very characteristic speech we have quoted, the discontent of the common man was gathering everywhere, and little or nothing was being done to satisfy his needs. It was becoming very evident that unless there was to be some profound change in the spirit of business, under an unrestrained private enterprise system there was little or no hope, in Europe at any rate, of decent housing, clothing, or education for the workers for two or three generations.

These are facts that the historian of mankind is obliged to note with as little comment as possible. Private enterprise in Europe in 1919 and 1920 displayed neither will nor capacity for meeting the crying needs of the time. So soon as it was released from control, it ran naturally into speculation, cornering, and luxury production. It followed the line of maximum profit. It displayed no sense of its own dangers; and it resisted any attempt to restrain and moderate its profits and make itself serviceable, even in its own interest. And this went on in the face of the most striking manifestations of the extreme recalcitrance on the part of the European masses to the prolonged continuance of the privations and inconveniences they suffered. In 1913 these masses were living as they had lived since birth; they were habituated to the life they led. The masses of 1919, on the other hand,

had been uprooted everywhere, to go into the armies, to go into munition factories, and so on. They had lost their habits of acquiescence, and they were hardier and more capable of desperate action. Great multitudes of men had gone through such brutalizing training as, for instance, bayonet drill; they had learnt to be ferocious, and to think less either of killing or being killed. Social unrest had become, therefore, much more dangerous. Everything seemed to point to a refusal to tolerate the current state of affairs for many years. Unless the educated and prosperous and comfortable people of Europe could speedily get their private enterprise under sufficient restraint to make it work well and rapidly for the common good, unless they could develop the idea of business as primarily a form of public service and not primarily a method of profit-making, unless they could in their own interest achieve a security of peace that would admit of a cessation not only of war preparation, but of international commercial warfare, strike and insurrection promised to follow strike and insurrection up to a complete social and political collapse. It was not that the masses had or imagined that they had the plan of a new social, political, and economic system. They had not, and they did not believe they had. The defects we have pointed out in the socialist scheme were no secret from them. It was a much more dangerous state of affairs than that. It was that they were becoming so disgusted with the current system, with its silly luxury, its universal waste, and its general misery, that they did not care what happened afterwards so long as they could destroy it. It was a return to a state of mind comparable to that which had rendered possible the debacle of the Roman Empire.

In one way or another it seems inevitable now that the new standard of well-being which the mechanical revolution of the last century has rendered possible, should become the general standard of life or that the social organization should collapse. Revolution is conditional upon public discomfort. Social peace is impossible without a rapid amelioration of the needless discomforts of the present time. A rapid resort

to willing service and social reconstruction on the part of those who own and rule, or else a world-wide social revolution leading towards an equalization of conditions and an attempt to secure comfort on new and untried lines, seem now to be the only alternatives before mankind. The choice which route shall be taken lies, we believe, in western Europe, and still more so in America, with the educated, possessing, and influential classes. The former route demands much sacrifice, for prosperous people in particular, a voluntary assumption of public duties and a voluntary acceptance of class discipline and self-denial; the latter may take an indefinite time to traverse, it will certainly be a very destructive and bloody process, and whether it will lead to a new and better state of affairs at last is questionable. A social revolution, if ultimately the Western European States blunder into it, may prove to be a process extending over centuries; it may involve a social breakdown as complete as that of the Roman Empire, and it may necessitate as slow a recuperation.

§ 2

In this connection it is that the second Russian revolution of 1917 which placed the Bolsheviks in power, is most illuminating. In Russia the breakdown was complete. In Russia the experiment of a new order was actually made. It had an air, a deceitful air, of being a final and conclusive trying out of the Socialist idea in practice. It did in fact demonstrate those insufficiencies of socialist theory to which we have already drawn attention, and particularly did it demonstrate the sterility of the Marxist school of socialism. It proved again the soundness of the principle that a *revolution can create nothing that has not been fully discussed, planned, thought out, and explained beforehand*. Otherwise a revolution merely destroys a government, a dynasty, an organization as the case may be.

We have already told of the collapse of Russia in 1917 due to the moral rottenness, and administrative incompetence of the Tzardom; and how the moderate republican régime

that succeeded it gave way in November to an extremist régime, the Bolshevik dictatorship. It becomes necessary now to describe in outline this extraordinary phase in the social and political history of Russia.

We have given an account of the growth of socialist ideas in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and of the large part played in that development by the "class war" ideas of Karl Marx. These ideas flattered the pride and stimulated the ambition of the more energetic and discontented personalities in all the industrial regions of the world. Marxism became the creed of the restless industrial worker everywhere. But since there is no great appeal in the socialist formula to the peasant, who owns or wants to own the land he cultivates, and since the great town communities of western Europe and America are middle-class rather than industrial in their mentality, the Marxists soon came to see that the social and economic revolution they contemplated could not wait for parliamentary methods and majority votes, it would have in the first place to be the work of a minority, a minority of industrial workers, who would seize power, establish institutions, and so train the rest of the world to the happiness of the millennium that would ensue. This phase of minority rule which was to bring about the millennium was called in the Marxist phraseology the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Everywhere, with an intense propagandist energy, unpaid, fanatical men spent their lives and energies in spreading this idea. In the opening decade of the twentieth century there were perhaps a million or more men in the world absolutely convinced that if this vaguely conceived "dictatorship of the proletariat" could be brought about, a new and better social order would follow almost automatically upon its establishment. How illusory that idea was we have already pointed out.

The Marxists had no clear and settled plans either for the payment of the worker, or for public discussion, or for economic administration when "capitalism" was destroyed. All these things had been provided for in what was no doubt a very empirical and unjust fashion, but which was neverthe-

less a working fashion, in the individualist capitalist system. The Marxists had never worked out an alternative method of doing those things, and did not seem to be aware that an alternative method was needed. They said in effect to the workers: "give us power, and everything shall be done." And Russia, tortured, wasted, and betrayed by the Allies she had served so well, gave herself over in despair to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The Communist party in Russia has never claimed more than 800,000 adherents, and it has in truth probably never exceeded a quarter of a million of members. But this comparatively little organization, because it was resolute and devoted, and because there was nothing else honest or resolute or competent enough in the whole of that disorganized country to stand against it, was able to establish itself in Petersburg, Moscow, and most of the towns of Russia, to secure the adhesion of the sailors of the fleet, (who killed most of their officers and occupied the fortresses of Sevastopol and Cronstadt) and to become *de facto* rulers of Russia.

There was a phase of Terroristic government. Bolsheviks claim that it was inevitable that at first they should rule by terror. The social disorganization of the country was extreme. Over large areas the peasants had risen against the land owners, and there was a cutting up of the estates and château burning going on very like the parallel process of the first French revolution. There were many abominable atrocities. The peasants took over the land and divided it up among themselves, being in entire ignorance of the teachings of Karl Marx in that matter. At the same time hundreds of thousands of soldiers with arms in their hands were wandering back from the war zone to their homes. The Tzarist government had conscripted over eight million men altogether, far more men than it could ever equip or handle at the front, it had torn them up by the roots from their own villages, and great multitudes of these conscripts were now practically brigands living upon the countryside. Moscow in October and November, 1917, swarmed with such men. They banded themselves together, they went into houses and

looted and raped, no one interfering. Law and administration had vanished. Robbed and murdered men lay neglected in the streets for days together. This we have to remember was the state of affairs when the Bolsheviks came into power; it was not brought about by their usurpation. For a time in their attempts to restore order anyone found bearing arms was shot. Thousands of men were seized and shot, and it is doubtful if Moscow could have been restored to even a semblance of order without some such violence. The debacle of Tzarist Russia was so complete that the very framework and habit of public order had gone.

In the spring of 1918 the Bolsheviks had secured a control of the large towns, the railways, and the shipping of most of Russia. A Constituent Assembly had been dissolved and dispersed in January, the Bolsheviks could not work with it; it was too divided in its aims and counsels they allege, for vigorous action; and in March peace, a very submissive peace, with Germany was signed at Brest Litovsk. At the head of the Bolshevik dictatorship, which now set itself to govern Russia, was Lenin, a little, very energetic and nimble-witted man who had spent most of his life in exile in London and Geneva, engaged in political speculations and the obscure politics of the Russian Marxist organizations. He was a quite honest doctrinaire, simple living and indefatigable, with no experience whatever of practical administration. Associated with him was Trotsky, who was presently to develop considerable practical military ability. Radek, Lunarcharsky, Zinoviev, Zorin, Kamenev, Krassin, were other conspicuous members of the small group which now set itself to reorganize Russia and steer it straight out of the disastrous position to which the war had brought it to a communist millennium.

But at first the ambition of the Bolshevik leaders went far beyond Russia. Russia was not a big enough task for them. They proclaimed the social revolution throughout the world, and called in the workers everywhere to unite, overthrow the capitalist system, and so bring about the planless, shapeless Marxist millennium. This procedure natu-

rally brought them into conflict with all other existing governments. It added to their task of establishing communism in Russia, the task of maintaining her against a series of counter attacks to which this denunciation of foreign governments exposed her.

In two or three years the failure of the Bolsheviks, so far as the establishment of a working communism went, and their demonstration of the uncreative barrenness of the Marxist doctrine, was complete. They did not get Russia to her feet again. They were quite unable to get the shattered Russian industries going. Most of their leaders were of the writing, talking type, without any managerial experience. At the outset of their rule, their narrow class hatred inspired them to destroy most of what remained in Russia of the class of works' managers, technical experts, foremen, and the like. They had no systematic knowledge—and the conceit of the Marxist doctrinaires prompted them to despise any knowledge they did not possess—of the psychology of the worker at work. They had not even the practical working knowledge of the old capitalist they despised. All they knew about that sort of thing was the psychology of the worker in a mass meeting. They tried to run Russia by exhortation, and neither the worker when he returned to the factory nor the peasant when he got back to his plough responded with any practical results. Transport and mechanical production in the towns fell steadily into dislocation and decay, and the peasant produced for his own needs and hid his surplus. When the writer visited Petersburg in 1920 he beheld an astonishing spectacle of desolation. It was the first time a modern city had collapsed in this fashion. Nothing had been repaired for four years. There were great holes in the streets where the surface had fallen into the broken drains, lamp posts lay as they had fallen, not a shop was open and most were boarded up over their broken windows. The scanty drift of people in the streets wore shabby and incongruous clothing, for there were no new clothes in Russia, no new boots. Many people wore bast wrappings on their feet. People, city, everything was shabby and thread-

bare. Even the Bolshevik commissars had scrubby chins, for razors and suchlike things were being neither made nor imported. The death rate was enormous, and the population of this doomed city was falling by the hundred thousand every year.

There are many reasons for believing that even in 1918 and 1919 the Bolshevik dictatorship would have recognized the error of its ways and begun to adapt itself to the unanticipated factors in the situation in which it found itself. They were narrow and doctrinaire, but many of them were men of imagination and intellectual flexibility, and there can be no disputing that in all the evil they did, they were honest in intention and devoted in method. Left to themselves they might have worked out an experiment of very great value to mankind. They would have been forced to link their system on to the slowly evolved economic tradition of the monetary system, and to come to dealings with the incurable individualism of the peasant cultivator. But they were not left to themselves. From the outset of their career they raised a frenzy of opposition in western Europe and America. None of the tolerance that had been shown the almost equally incapable and disastrous régime of the Tzar was shown to the Marxist adventurers. They were universally boycotted, and the reactionary governments of France and Great Britain subsidized and assisted every sort of adventurer within and without Russia to assail them. A press campaign of incredible malevolence, headed by an organ of such respectable traditions as the *London Times*, confused the public mind by a stream of fantasies and evil suggestions about the Bolsheviks. They were incapable doctrinaire men with a bad social and economic theory, muddling along with a shattered country. But the *Times* propaganda and the kindred propaganda in France and America represented them as an abomination unparalleled in the world's history. Something like a crusade against the Bolsheviks was preached.

As a consequence the Bolsheviks in Russia from the very



LENIN ADDRESSING A MOSCOW CROWD

From November, 1917, Nikolai Lenin became the dominating figure in the Russian Government



THE BOLSHEVISTS TAKE CONTROL IN RUSSIA

Demonstration in Petrograd against the Kerensky Government by forces which shortly after captured the Winter Palace

beginning were forced into an attitude of defence against foreign aggression. The persistent hostility of the western governments to them strengthened them greatly in Russia. In spite of the internationalist theories of the Marxists the Bolshevik government in Moscow became a patriotic government defending the country against foreigners, and in particular defending the peasant against the return of the landowner and debt collector. It was a paradoxical position, but communism in Russia created peasant proprietors. And Trotsky, who had been a pacifist, was educated into a great general in spite of himself. But this militarism, and this patriotism which was thus forced upon Lenin's government, this concentration of attention upon the frontiers, forbade any effective reconstruction of police and disciplinary method within, even had the Bolsheviks been capable of much reconstruction. The old inquisitorial and tyrannous Tzarist police was practically continued under the new government. A clumsy and inaccurate detective system with summary powers and bloodthirsty traditions struggled against foreign emissaries from abroad and against sedition, fear, and betrayal within, and incidentally gratified its ugly craving for punishment. In July, 1918, the Tzar and his family—there being some danger of their being rescued by reactionary troops—were massacred at the instance of a minor official.

In January, 1919, four Grand Dukes, uncles of the Tzar, were executed at Petersburg by the police commission in flat defiance of Lenin's reprieve.

For five years the Russian people under this strange and unprecedented rule maintained its solidarity against every attempt to divide and subjugate it. In August, 1918, British and French forces landed at Archangel; they were withdrawn in September 1919. The Japanese made strenuous attempts from 1918 onward to establish themselves in eastern Siberia. In 1919 the Russians were fighting not only the British at Archangel and the Japanese but they had a reactionary force under Admiral Koltchak against them in Siberia, Roumanians in the south with French and Greek

contingents, and General Denikin with an army of Russian reactionaries and enormous supplies of British and French war material and the support of the French fleet in the Crimea. In July Koltchak and Denikin had united and held south-eastern Russia from Odessa to Ufa, and an Esthonian army under General Yudenitch was marching on Petersburg. It seemed as though the end of Bolshevism could be but a question of weeks or days. Yet by the end of the year Yudenitch was routed and forgotten, Koltchak was in full retreat to Siberia, and Denikin to the Black Sea. Denikin and the remnant of his forces were taken off by British and French ships in the early part of 1920, and Koltchak was captured and shot in Siberia.

But Russia was to have no respite. The Poles, incited by the French, opened a new campaign in April, 1920, and a fresh reactionary raider, General Wrangel, resumed the task of Denikin in invading and devastating his own country. The Poles, after being driven back upon Warsaw, recovered with French assistance and supplies, and made a victorious advance into Russian territory; and a treaty, much to the territorial advantage of Poland, was made at Riga in October, 1920. Wrangel, after destroying crops and food over great areas, suffered the fate of Denikin and retired upon the hospitality of the western powers at the end of the year. In March, 1921, the Bolshevik government had to suppress, and did suppress, an insurrection of the sailors in Cronstadt, "the Pretorian Guard of Bolshevism."

Throughout 1920 the fantastic and irrational hostility to the Bolsheviks in western Europe and western America was slowly giving way to saner conceptions of the situation. There were many difficulties in the way of "recognizing" the Bolshevik government fully and completely, difficulties largely due to the unreason that also prevailed on the Bolshevik side, but by the end of 1920 a sort of uncivil peace existed between Russia and most of the rest of the world, and American, British, and French enquirers were able to go in and out of the country. Early in 1921 both Britain and Italy made Trade Agreements with Russia, and Russian repre-

sentatives in the form of "Trade Delegations" opened communications between that outcast land and the rest of the world.

But now a new and still more frightful disaster was preparing for this most tragic people. In 1921 there was an unusual drought. The attentive reader of this history will have noted already what a precarious and fluctuating thing is the climate of the great land areas about the Caspian sea. Naturally these are nomadic lands; it is doubtful if they will ever be safe for a large agricultural population. Now with the drought the crops over vast areas of south-eastern Russia failed absolutely, and the most terrible famine in the whole recorded history of our race ensued. Millions perished. Multitudes, whole villages, and townships sat down in their homes to die, and died. Many ate hay and earth and indescribable filth. Men dug in the graveyards, and became cannibals. Great areas were depopulated. Yet there was corn to burn not only in America but even in the Ukraine and Roumania and Hungary. But the communications of this country had been hopelessly shattered by the operations of Koltchak, Denikin, and Wrangel, and the Bolshevik government had neither the resources nor the ability to cope with this monstrous disaster. An American commission and a commission under Dr. Nansen, the great Arctic explorer, organized relief with the assent and assistance of the government, and fairly generous American supplies were poured into the country. But the chief European governments, their people being misled by the propagandist dishonesty of the European press, responded grudgingly or not at all to the extreme appeal of the situation. The British government, which had spent a hundred millions in illegitimate military operations against her former ally, smirched the good name of Britain in the world by refusing any contribution to the work of relief. So little as yet had the lesson of human solidarity, that the great war should have taught mankind, been learnt. And while the hapless multitudes perished in Russia, corn wasted in the granaries a few hundred miles away, ships lay up for want of freight, steel works where

rails and engines could have been made stood idle, and millions of workmen were unemployed because, said the business men, "there was nothing for them to do." And so thousands of square miles of south-eastern Russia became a desert of abandoned fields and of towns and villages of the dead.

Yet amidst this desolation the Bolshevik government remained. And gradually the necessity of recognizing and dealing with this strange new sort of state, however uncongenial it might be, was borne in upon the European mind. At last at Genoa in April, 1922, Russian Bolshevik representatives found themselves sitting on terms of practical equality in council with the other European powers, discussing whether it was still possible to save Europe from economic collapse. They were prepared now to abandon their propaganda against the "capitalist" states, to "acknowledge" the Tzarist debts, and to make enormous concessions of Marxist doctrine; and in return the western powers with such grace as was possible, were to mitigate the harshness of their earlier intolerance.

§ 3

We have dealt with the social and economic disorder of the European communities in the years following the war, before giving any account of the work of world settlement that centred on the Peace Conference at Paris, because the worried and preoccupied state of everyone concerned with private problems of income, prices, employment, and the like goes far to explain the jaded atmosphere in which that Conference addressed itself to the vast task before it. One cannot expect a vigorous public life when individual lives are confused and distressed.

The story of the Conference turns very largely upon the adventure of one particular man, one of those men whom accident or personal quality picks out as a type to lighten the task of the historian. We have in the course of this history found it very helpful at times to focus our attention upon some individual, Buddha, Alexander the Great, Yuan

Chwang, the Emperor Frederick II and Charles V and Napoleon I for example, and to let him by reflection illuminate the period in which he lived. The conclusion of the Great War can be seen most easily as the rise of the American President, President Wilson, to predominant importance in the world's hopes and attention, and his failure to justify that predominance.

President Wilson (born 1856) had previously been a prominent student and teacher of history, constitutional law, and the political sciences generally. He had held various professorial chairs, and had been President of Princeton University (New Jersey).

There is a long list of books to his credit, and they show a mind rather exclusively directed to American history and American politics. He was mentally the new thing in history, negligent of and rather ignorant of the older things out of which his new world had arisen. He retired from academic life, and was elected Democratic Governor of New Jersey in 1910. In 1913 he became the Democratic presidential candidate, and as a consequence of a

violent quarrel between ex-President Roosevelt and President Taft, which split the dominant Republican party, he became President of the United States.

The events of August, 1914, seem to have taken President Wilson, like the rest of his fellow-countrymen, by surprise. We find him cabling an offer of his services as a mediator on August 3rd. Then, for a time, he and America watched the conflict. At first neither the American people nor their President seem to have had a very clear or profound understanding of that long-gathered catastrophe. Their tradition for a century had been to disregard the problems of the



President Wilson

Old World, and it was not to be lightly changed. The imperialistic arrogance of the German Court and the stupid inclination of the German military authorities toward melodramatic "frightfulness," their invasion of Belgium, their cruelties there, their use of poison gas, and the nuisance of their submarine campaign, created a deepening hostility to Germany in the United States as the war proceeded; but the tradition of political abstinence and the deep-rooted persuasion that America possessed a political morality altogether superior to European conflicts, restrained the President from active intervention. He adopted a lofty tone. He professed to be unable to judge the causes and justice of the Great War. It was largely his high pacific attitude that secured his re-election as President for a second term. But the world is not to be mended by merely regarding evil-doers with an expression of rather indiscriminating disapproval. By the end of 1916 the Germans had been encouraged to believe that under no circumstances whatever would the United States fight, and in 1917 they began their unrestricted submarine warfare and the sinking of American ships without notice. President Wilson and the American people were dragged into the war by this supreme folly. And also they were dragged into a reluctant attempt to define their relations to Old-World politics in some other terms than those of mere aloofness. Their thoughts and temper changed very rapidly. They came into the war side by side with the Allies, but not in any pact with the Allies. They came into the war, in the name of their own modern civilization, to punish and end an intolerable political and military situation.

Slow and belated judgments are sometimes the best judgments. In a series of "notes," too long and various for detailed treatment in this *Outline*, thinking aloud, as it were, in the hearing of all mankind, President Wilson sought to state the essential differences of the American State from the Great Powers of the Old World. We have been at some pains in this history to make plain the development of these differences. He unfolded a conception of inter-

national relationships that came like a gospel, like the hope of a better world, to the whole eastern hemisphere. Secret agreements were to cease, "nations" were to determine their own destinies, militarist aggression was to cease, the seaways were to be free to all mankind. These commonplaces of American thought, these secret desires of every sane man, came like a great light upon the darkness of anger and conflict in Europe. At last, men felt, the ranks of diplomacy were broken, the veils of Great Power "policy" were rent in twain. Here with authority, with the strength of a powerful new nation behind it, was the desire of the common man throughout the world, plainly said.

Manifestly there was needed some overriding instrument of government to establish world law and maintain these broad and liberal generalizations upon human intercourse. A number of schemes had floated in men's minds for the attainment of that end. In particular there was a movement for some sort of world league, a "League of Nations." The American President adopted this phrase and sought to realize it. An essential condition of the peace he sought through the overthrow of German imperialism was, he declared, to be this federal organ. This League of Nations was to be the final court of appeal in international affairs. It was to be the substantial realization of the peace. Here again he awakened a tremendous echo.

President Wilson was for a time the spokesman of a new age. Throughout the war, and for some little time after it had ended, he held, so far as the Old World was concerned, that exalted position. But in America, where they knew him better, there were doubts. And writing as we do now with the wisdom of subsequent events, we can understand these doubts. America, throughout a century and more of detachment and security, had developed new ideals and formulæ of political thought, without realizing with any intensity that, under conditions of stress and danger, these ideals and formulæ might have to be passionately sustained. To her community many things were platitudes that had to the Old-World communities, entangled still in ancient

political complications, the quality of a saving gospel. President Wilson was responding to the thought and conditions of his own people and his own country, based on a liberal tradition that had first found its full expression in English speech; but to Europe and Asia he seemed to be thinking and saying, for the first time in history, things hitherto undeveloped and altogether secret. And that misconception he may have shared.

We are dealing here with an able and successful professor of political science, who did not fully realize what he owed to his contemporaries and the literary and political atmosphere he had breathed throughout his life; and who passed very rapidly after his re-election as President, from the mental attitudes of a political leader to those of a Messiah. His "notes" are a series of explorations of the elements of the world situation. When at last, in his address to Congress of January 8th, 1918, he produced his Fourteen Points as a definite statement of the American peace intentions, they were, as a statement, far better in their spirit than in their arrangement and matter. This document demanded open agreements between nations and an end to secret diplomacy, free navigation of the high seas, free commerce, disarmament, and a number of political readjustments upon the lines of national independence. Finally in the Fourteenth Point it required "a general association of nations" to guarantee the peace of the world.

These Fourteen Points had an immense reception throughout the world. Here at last seemed a peace for reasonable men everywhere, as good and acceptable to honest and decent Germans and Russians, as to honest and decent Frenchmen and Englishmen and Belgians; and for some months the whole world was lit by faith in Wilson. Could they have been made the basis of a world settlement in 1919, they would forthwith have opened a new and more hopeful era in human affairs.

But, as we must tell, they did not do that. There was about President Wilson a certain narrow egotism; there was in the generation of people in the United States to whom

this great occasion came, a generation born in security, reared in plenty and, so far as history goes in ignorance, a generation remote from the tragic issues that had made Europe grave, a certain superficiality and lightness of mind. It was not that the American people were superficial by nature and necessity, but that they had never been deeply stirred by the idea of a human community larger than their own. It was an intellectual but not a moral conviction, with them. One had on the one hand these new people of the new world, with their new ideas, their finer and better ideas, of peace and world righteousness, and on the other the old, bitter, deeply entangled peoples of the Great Power system; and the former were crude and rather childish in their immense inexperience, and the latter were seasoned and bitter and intricate. The theme of this clash of the raw idealist youthfulness of a new age with the experienced ripeness of the old, was treated years ago by that great novelist, Henry James, in a very typical story called *Daisy Miller*. It is the pathetic story of a frank, trustful, high-minded, but rather simple-minded American girl, with a real disposition towards righteousness and a great desire for a "good time," and how she came to Europe and was swiftly entangled and put in the wrong, and at last driven to welcome death by the complex tortuousness and obstinate limitations of the older world. There have been a thousand variants of that theme in real life, a thousand such trans-Atlantic tragedies, and the story of President Wilson is one of them. But it is not to be supposed, because the new thing succumbs to the old infections, that is the final condemnation of the new thing.

Probably no fallible human being manifestly trying to do his best amidst overwhelming circumstances has been subjected to such minute, searching, and pitiless criticism as President Wilson. He is blamed, for conducting the war and the ensuing peace negotiations on strictly party lines. He remained, it is charged against him, the President representing the American Democratic Party, when circumstances conspired to make him the representative of the general interests of mankind. He made no attempt to incorporate

with himself such great American leaders as ex-President Roosevelt, ex-President Taft, and the like. He did not draw fully upon the moral and intellectual resources of the States; he made the whole issue too personal, and he surrounded himself with merely personal adherents. And a grave error was his decision to come to the Peace Conference himself. Nearly every experienced critic seems to be of opinion that he should have remained in America, in the rôle of America, speaking occasionally as if a nation spoke. Throughout the concluding years of the war he had by that method achieved an unexampled position in the world.

Says Dr. Dillon:¹ "Europe, when the President touched its shores, was as clay ready for the creative potter. Never before were the nations so eager to follow a Moses who would take them to the long-promised land where wars are prohibited and blockades unknown. And to their thinking he was that great leader. In France men bowed down before him with awe and affection. Labour leaders in Paris told me that they shed tears of joy in his presence, and that their comrades would go through fire and water to help him to realize his noble schemes. To the working classes in Italy his name was a heavenly clarion at the sound of which the earth would be renewed. The Germans regarded him and his humane doctrine as their sheet-anchor of safety. The fearless Herr Muehlton said: 'If President Wilson were to address the Germans, and pronounce a severe sentence upon them, they would accept it with resignation and without a murmur and set to work at once.' In German-Austria his fame was that of a saviour, and the mere mention of his name brought balm to the suffering and surcease of sorrow to the afflicted. . . ."

Such was the overpowering expectation of the audience to which President Wilson prepared to show himself. He reached France on board the *George Washington* in December 1918.

He brought his wife with him. That seemed no doubt a perfectly natural and proper thing to an American mind.

¹ In his book, *The Peace Conference*.

Quite a number of the American representatives brought their wives. Unhappily a social quality, nay, almost a tourist quality, was introduced into the world settlement by these ladies. Transport facilities were limited, and most of them arrived in Europe with a radiant air of privilege. They came as if they came to a treat. They were, it was intimated, seeing Europe under exceptionally interesting circumstances. They would visit Chester, or Warwick, or Windsor *en route*—for they might not have a chance of seeing these celebrated places again. Important interviews would be broken off to get in a visit to some “old historical mansion.” This may seem a trivial matter to note in a History of Mankind, but it was such small human things as this that threw a miasma of futility over the Peace Conference of 1919. In a little while one discovered that Wilson, the Hope of Mankind, had vanished, and that all the illustrated fashion papers contained pictures of a delighted tourist and his wife, grouped smilingly with crowned heads and such-like enviable company. . . . It is so easy to be wise after the event, and to preceive that he should not have come over.

The men he had chiefly to deal with, for example M. Clemenceau (France), Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour (Britain), Baron Sonnino and Signor Orlando (Italy), were men of widely dissimilar historical traditions. But in one respect they resembled him and appealed to his sympathies. They, too, were party politicians, who had led their country through the war. Like himself they had failed to grasp the necessity of entrusting the work of settlement to more specially qualified men. “They were the merest novices in international affairs. Geography, ethnology, psychology, and political history were sealed books to them. Like the Rector of Louvain University, who told Oliver Goldsmith that, as he had become the head of that institution without knowing Greek, he failed to see why it should be taught there, the chiefs of State, having obtained the highest position in their respective countries without more than an inkling of international affairs, were unable to realize the importance

of mastering them or the impossibility of repairing the omission as they went along. . . ."¹

"What they lacked, however, might in some perceptible degree have been supplied by enlisting as their helpers men more happily endowed than themselves. But they deliberately chose mediocrities. It is a mark of genial spirits that they are well served, but the plenipotentiaries of the Conference were not characterized by it. Away in the background some of them had familiars or casual prompters to whose counsels they were wont to listen, but many of the adjoints who moved in the limelight of the world stage were gritless and pithless.

"As the heads of the principal Governments implicitly claimed to be the authorized spokesmen of the human race, and endowed with unlimited powers, it is worth noting that this claim was boldly challenged by the people's organs in the Press. Nearly all the journals read by the masses objected from the first to the dictatorship of the group of Premiers, Mr. Wilson being excepted. . . ."

The restriction upon our space in this *Outline* will not allow us to tell here how the Peace Conference shrank from a Council of Ten to a Council of Four (Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando), and how it became a conference less and less like a frank and open discussion of the future of mankind, and more and more like some old-fashioned diplomatic conspiracy. Great and wonderful had been the hopes that had gathered to Paris. "The Paris of the Conference," says Dr. Dillon, "ceased to be the capital of France. It became a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai teeming with unwonted aspects of life and turmoil, filled with curious samples of the races, tribes, and tongues of the four continents who came to watch and wait for the mysterious to-morrow.

"An Arabian Nights' touch was imparted to the dissolving panorama by strange visitants from Tartary and Kurdistan, Corea, and Aderbeijan, Armenia, Persia, and the Hedjaz—men with patriarchal beards and scimitar-shaped noses,

¹ Dillon, *The Peace Conference*.


and others from desert and oasis, from Samarkand and Bokhara. Turbans and fezes, sugar-loaf hats and head-gear resembling episcopal mitres, old military uniforms devised for the embryonic armies of new states on the eve of perpetual peace, snowy-white burnouses, flowing mantles, and graceful garments like the Roman toga, contributed to create an atmosphere of dreamy unreality in the city where the grimmest of realities were being faced and coped with.

"Then came the men of wealth, of intellect, of industrial enterprise, and the seed-bearers of the ethical new ordering, members of economic committees from the United States, Britain, Italy, Poland, Russia, India, and Japan, representatives of naphtha industries and far-off coal mines, pilgrims, fanatics and charlatans from all climes, priests of all religions, preachers of every doctrine, who mingled with princes, field-m Marshals, statesmen, anarchists, builders-up and pullers-down. All of them burned with desire to be near to the crucible in which the political and social systems of the world were to be melted and recast. Every day, in my walks, in my apartment, or at restaurants, I met emissaries from lands and peoples whose very names had seldom been heard of before in the West. A delegation from the Pont-Euxine Greeks called on me, and discoursed of their ancient cities of Trebizond, Samsoun, Tripoli, Kerassund, in which I resided many years ago, and informed me that they, too, desired to become welded into an independent Greek Republic, and had come to have their claims allowed. The Albanians were represented by my old friend Turkhan Pasha, on the one hand, and by my friend Essad Pasha on the other—the former desirous of Italy's protection, the latter demanding complete independence. Chinamen, Japanese, Koreans, Hindus, Kirghizes, Lesghiens, Circassians, Mingrelians, Bur-yats, Malays, and Negroes and Negroids from Africa and America were among the tribes and tongues foregathered in Paris to watch the rebuilding of the political world system and to see where they 'came in.' . . ."

To this thronging, amazing Paris, agape for a new world, came President Wilson, and found its gathering forces domi-

nated by a personality narrower, in every way more limited and beyond comparison more forcible than himself: the French Premier, M. Clemenceau. At the instance of President Wilson, M. Clemenceau was elected President of the Conference. "It was," said President Wilson, "a special tribute to the sufferings and sacrifices of France." And that, unhappily, sounded the keynote of the Conference, whose sole business should have been with the future of mankind.

Georges Benjamin Clemenceau was an old journalist politician, a great denouncer of abuses, a great upsetter of govern-



M. Clemenceau

ments, a doctor who had, while a municipal councillor, kept a free clinic, and a fierce, experienced duellist. None of his duels ended fatally, but he faced them with great intrepidity. He had passed from the medical school to republican journalism in the days of the Empire. In those days he was an extremist of the left. He was for a time a teacher in America, and he married and was afterwards divorced from

an American wife. He was thirty in the eventful year 1871. He returned to France after Sedan, and flung himself into the stormy politics of the defeated nation with great fire and vigour. Thereafter France was his world, the France of vigorous journalism, high-spirited personal quarrels, challenges, confrontations, scenes, dramatic effects, and witticisms at any cost. He was what people call "fierce stuff," he was nicknamed the "Tiger," and he seems to have been rather proud of his nickname. Professional patriot rather than statesman and thinker, this was the man whom the war had flung up to misrepresent the fine mind and the generous spirit of France. His limitations had a profound effect

upon the conference, which was further coloured by the dramatic resort for the purpose of signature to the very Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in which Germany had triumphed and proclaimed her unity. There the Germans were to sign.

To M. Clemenceau and to France, in that atmosphere, the war ceased to seem a world war; it was merely the sequel of the previous conflict of the Terrible Year, the downfall and punishment of offending Germany. "The world had to be made safe for democracy," said President Wilson. That from M. Clemenceau's expressed point of view was "talking like Jesus Christ." The world had to be made safe for Paris. "Talking like Jesus Christ" seemed a very ridiculous thing to many of those brilliant rather than sound diplomatists and politicians who made the year 1919 supreme in the history of human insufficiency.

(Another flash of the "Tiger's" wit, it may be noted, was that President Wilson with his fourteen points was "worse" than God Almighty. "Le bon Dieu" only had ten. . . .)

M. Clemenceau sat with Signor Orlando in the more central chairs of a semicircle of four in front of the fire, says Keynes. He wore a black frock-coat and grey suede gloves, which he never removed during these sessions. He was, it is to be noted, the only one of these four reconstructors of the world who could understand and speak both French and English.

The aims of M. Clemenceau were simple and in a manner attainable. He wanted all the settlement of 1871 undone. He wanted Germany punished as though she was a uniquely sinful nation and France a sinless martyr land. He wanted Germany so crippled and devastated as never more to be able to stand up to France. He wanted to hurt and humiliate Germany more than France had been hurt and humiliated in 1871. He did not care if in breaking Germany Europe was broken; his mind did not go far enough beyond the Rhine to understand that possibility. He accepted President Wilson's League of Nations as an excellent proposal if it would guarantee the security of France whatever she did,

but he preferred a binding alliance of the United States and England to maintain, uphold, and glorify France under practically any circumstances. He wanted wider opportunities for the exploitation of Syria, North Africa, and so forth by Parisian financial groups. He wanted indemnities to recuperate France, loans, gifts, and tributes to France, glory and homage to France. France had suffered, and France had to be rewarded. Belgium, Russia, Serbia, Poland, Armenia, Britain, Germany, and Austria had all suffered too, all mankind had suffered, but what would you? that was not his affair. These were the supers of a drama in which France was for him the star. . . . In much the same spirit



Mr. Lloyd George

Signor Orlando seems to have sought the welfare of Italy.

Mr. Lloyd George brought to the Council of Four the subtlety of a Welshman, the intricacy of a European, and an urgent necessity for respecting the nationalist egotism of the British imperialists and capitalists who had returned him to power. Into the secrecy of that council went President Wilson with the very noblest aims for his newly discovered American world policy, his

rather hastily compiled Fourteen Points, and a project rather than a scheme for a League of Nations.

"There can seldom have been a statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President in the agilities of the Council Chamber."¹ From the whispering darknesses and fireside disputes of that council, and after various comings and goings we cannot here describe, he emerged at last with his Fourteen Points pitifully torn and dishevelled, but with a little puling infant of a League of Nations, which

¹ Keynes



THE COMMISSION WHICH FRAMED THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

- (1) Viscount Chinda, Japan; (2) Baron Makino, Japan; (3) Leon Bourgeois, France; (4) Lord Robert Cecil, Great Britain; (5) Premier Orlando, Italy; (6) M. Kramarz, Czechoslovakia; (7) Premier Venizelos, Greece; (8) Colonel House, United States; (9) M. Dmowski, Poland; (10) M. Vesnitch, Serbia; (11) Gen. Smuts, Great Britain; (12) President Wilson, chairman; (13) M. Diamandi, Rumania; (14) M. Hymans, Belgium; (15) Wellington Koo, China; (16) Senhor Reis, Portugal; (17) Signor Scialoja, Italy; (18) M. Larnaude, France



THE "BIG FOUR" OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Lloyd George talks with Orlando while President Wilson speaks to Clemenceau. The Council of Ten, with which the Versailles Conference started, was soon reduced to five—and became four when Japan withdrew from consideration of European settlements

might die or which might live and grow—no one could tell. But that much, at least, he had saved. . . .

§ 4

This homunculus in a bottle which it was hoped might become at last Man ruling the Earth, this League of Nations as it was embodied in the Covenant of April 28th, 1919, was not a league of peoples at all; it was the world discovered, a league of "States, dominions or colonies." It was stipulated that these should be "fully self-governing," but there was no definition whatever of this phrase. There was no bar to a limited franchise and no provision for any direct control by the people of any state. India figured—presumably as a "fully self-governing state!" An autocracy would no doubt have been admissable as a "fully self-governing" democracy with a franchise limited to one person. The League of the Covenant of 1919 was, in fact, a league of "representatives" of foreign offices, and it did not even abolish the nonsense of embassies at every capital. The British Empire appeared once as a whole, and then India (!) and the four dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand appeared as separate sovereign states. The Indian representative was, of course, sure to be merely a British nominee; the other four would be colonial politicians. But if the British Empire was to be thus dissected, a representative of Great Britain should have been substituted for the Imperial representative, and Ireland and Egypt should also have been given representation. Moreover, either New York State or Virginia was historically and legally almost as much a sovereign state as New Zealand or Canada. The inclusion of India raised logical claims for French Africa and French Asia. One French representative did propose a separate vote for the little principality of Monaco.

There was to be an assembly of the League in which every member state was to be represented and to have an equal voice, but the working directorate of the League was to vest

in a Council, which was to consist of the representatives of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, with four other members elected by the Assembly. The Council was to meet once a year; the gatherings of the Assembly were to be at "stated intervals," not stated.

Except in certain specified instances the league of this Covenant could make only unanimous decisions. One dissentient on the council could bar any proposal—on the lines of the old Polish *liberum veto*. This was a quite disastrous provision. To many minds it made the Covenant League rather less desirable than no league at all. It was a complete recognition of the unalienable sovereignty of states, and a repudiation of the idea of an overriding commonweal of mankind. This provision practically barred the way to all amendments to the league constitution in future except by the clumsy expedient of a simultaneous withdrawal of the majority of member states desiring a change, to form the league again on new lines. The covenant made inevitable such a final winding-up of the league it created, and that was perhaps the best thing about it.

The following powers, it was proposed, should be excluded from the original league: Germany, Austria, Russia, and whatever remains there were of the Turkish Empire. But any of these might subsequently be included with the assent of two-thirds of the Assembly. The original membership of the league as specified in the projected Covenant was: the United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the British Empire (Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India), China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay. To which were to be added by invitation the following powers which had been neutral in the war: the Argentine Republic, Chile, Columbia, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela.

Such being the constitution of the league, it is scarcely to be wondered at that its powers were special and limited. It was given a seat at Geneva and a secretariat. It had no powers even to inspect the military preparations of its constituent states, or to instruct a military and naval staff to plan out the armed co-operation needed to keep the peace of the world. The French representative in the League of Nations Commission, M. Leon Bourgeois, insisted lucidly and repeatedly on the logical necessity of such powers. As a speaker he was rather copious and lacking in "spice" of the Clemenceau quality. The final scene in the plenary session of April 28th, before the adoption of the Covenant, is described compactly by Mr. Wilson Harris, the crowded Banqueting Hall at the Quai d'Orsay, with its "E" of tables for the delegates, with secretaries and officials lining the walls and a solid mass of journalists at the lower end of the room. "At the head of the room the 'Big Three' *diverted themselves in undertones* at the expense of the worthy M. Bourgeois, now launched, with the help of what must have been an entirely superfluous sheaf of notes, on the fifth rendering of his speech in support of his famous amendments."

They were so often "diverting themselves in undertones," those three men whom God had mocked with the most tremendous opportunity in history. Keynes (*op. cit.*) gives other instances of the levities, vulgarities, disregards, inattentions and inadequacies of these meetings.

This poor covenant arrived at in this fashion returned with President Wilson to America, and there it was subjected to an amount of opposition, criticism, and revision which showed, among other things, how relatively unimpaired was the mental energy of the United States. The Senate refused to ratify the covenant, and the first meeting of the League Council was held therefore without American representatives. The close of 1919 and the opening months of 1920 saw a very curious change come over American feeling after the pro-French and pro-British enthusiasms of the war period. The peace negotiations reminded the Americans, in a confused and very irritating way, of their pro-

found differences in international outlook from any European power that the war had for a time helped them to forget. They felt they had been "rushed" into many things without due consideration. They experienced a violent revulsion towards that policy of isolation that had broken down in 1917. The close of 1919 saw a phase, a very understandable phase, of passionate and even violent "Americanism," in which European imperialism and European socialism were equally anathema. There may have been a sordid element in the American disposition to "cut" the moral responsibilities the United States had incurred in the affairs of the Old World, and to realize the enormous financial and political advantages the war had given the new world; but the broad instinct of the American people seems to have been sound in its distrust of the proposed settlement.

§ 5

The main terms of the Treaties of 1919-20 with which the Conference of Paris concluded its labours can be stated much more vividly by a few maps than by a written abstract. We need scarcely point out how much those treaties left unsettled, but we may perhaps enumerate some of the more salient breaches of the Twelve that survived out of the Fourteen Points at the opening of the Conference.

One initial cause of nearly all those breaches lay, we believe, in the complete unpreparedness and unwillingness of that pre-existing league of nations, subjected states and exploited areas, the British Empire, to submit to any dissection and adaptation of its system or to any control of its naval and aerial armament. A kindred contributory cause was the equal unpreparedness of the American mind for any interference with the ascendancy of the United States in the New World (compare Secretary Olney's declaration in this chapter, § 6). Neither of those Great Powers, who were necessarily dominant and leading powers at Paris, had properly thought out the implications of a League of Nations in relation to these older arrangements, and so their support



of that project had to most European observers a curiously hypocritical air; it was as if they wished to retain and ensure their own vast predominance and security while at the same time restraining any other power from such expansions, annexations, and alliances as might create a rival and competitive imperialism. Their failure to set an example of international confidence destroyed all possibility of international confidence in the other nations represented at Paris.

Even more unfortunate was the refusal of the Americans to assent to the Japanese demand for a recognition of racial equality. Moreover, the foreign offices of the British, the French, and the Italians were haunted by traditional schemes of aggression entirely incompatible with the new ideas. A League of Nations that is to be of any appreciable value to mankind must supersede imperialisms; it is either a super-imperialism, a liberal world-empire of united states, participant or in tutelage, or it is nothing; but few of the people at the Paris Conference had the mental vigour even to assert this obvious consequence of the League proposal. They wanted to be at the same time bound and free, to ensure peace for ever, but to keep their weapons in their hands. Accordingly the old annexation projects of the Great Power period were hastily and thinly camouflaged as proposed acts of this poor little birth of April 28th. The newly born and barely animate League was represented to be distributing, with all the reckless munificence of a captive pope, "mandates" to the old imperialisms that, had it been the young Hercules we desired, it would certainly have strangled in its cradle. Britain was to have extensive "mandates" in Mesopotamia and East Africa; France was to have the same in Syria; Italy was to have all her holdings to the west and south-east of Egypt consolidated as mandatory territory. Clearly, if the weak thing that was being nursed by its Secretary in its cradle at Geneva into some semblance of life, did presently succumb to the infantile weakness of all institutions born without passion, all these "mandates" would become frank annexations. Moreover, all the Powers fought tooth and nail in the Conference for "strategic" frontiers—



the ugliest symptom of all. Why should a state want a strategic frontier unless it contemplates war? If on that plea Italy insisted upon a subject population of Germans in the southern Tyrol and a subject population of Yugo-Slavs in Dalmatia, and if little Greece began landing troops in Asia Minor, neither France nor Britain was in a position to rebuke these outbreaks of pre-millennial method.

Much graver in the long run than these territorial maladjustments was the imposition of a charge for "reparations" upon Germany far beyond her power of payment, and in contravention of the plain understandings upon which she had surrendered. She was put in a position of economic serfdom. She was saddled with a liability for impossibly immense periodic replacements, she was disarmed, and her inevitable default would leave her open to practically any aggression on the part of her creditors. The full potentialities of this arrangement only became apparent a year or so later.

We will not enter here into any detailed account of how President Wilson gave way to the Japanese and consented to their replacing the Germans at Kiau Chau, which is Chinese property, how the almost purely German city of Danzig was practically, if not legally, annexed to Poland, and how the Powers disputed over the claim of the Italian imperialists, a claim strengthened by these instances, to seize the Yugo-Slav port of Fiume and deprive the Yugo-Slavs of a good Adriatic outlet. Nor will we do more than note the complex arrangements and justifications that put the French in possession of the Saar valley, which is German territory, or the entirely iniquitous breach of the right of "self-determination" which practically forbade German Austria to unite—as it is natural and proper that she should unite—with the rest of Germany. There was little recognition of the enormous economic strains and wastage the multiplication of frontiers and the almost complete rearrangement of the central European frontiers were bound to produce. As Mr. Frank Vanderlip has written,¹ "Application of the prin-

¹ *What Next in Europe*, by Frank A. Vanderlip. 1922.



ciples of self-determination as carried out by these Treaties was a most dangerous experiment. Its result has proven to be one of the greatest curses that has fallen upon Europe. That does not mean that self-determination was wrong. But it is now perfectly clear that it was an error to permit self-determination to create a number of new States, each believing itself to be supremely Sovereign, without at the same time controlling the relations of these States to each other. That was a calamity as great as war itself. It was within the power of the treaty-makers of Paris to have so federated these States that the economic impossibilities arising from this unrestrained self-determination would not have been so certain."

These burning questions of 1919-22 may seem presently very incidental things in the larger movement of these times. All these disputes, like the suspicions and tetchy injustices of a weary and irritated man, may lose their importance as the tone of the world improves, and the still adequately apprehended lessons of the Great War and the Petty Peace that followed it, begin to be digested by the general intelligence of mankind.

It is worth while for the reader to compare the treaty maps we give with what we have called the natural political map of Europe. The new arrangements do approach this latter more closely than any previous system of boundaries. It may be a necessary preliminary to any satisfactory league of peoples, that each people should first be in something like complete possession of its own household.

It is absurd to despair of mankind because of these treaties, or to regard them as anything more than feeble first sketches of a world settlement. To do so would be to suppose that there was nothing in France—that land of fine imaginations—better than M. Clemenceau, nothing in America stronger and wiser than President Wilson, and nothing in Britain to steady the Keltic traits of Mr. Lloyd George. The attention we have given to these personalities in this *Outline* is intended less to enhance their importance than to emphasize their unimportance, and to make it clear to the

EFFORT TO RECONSTRUCT THE WORLD 1271

reader how provisional and incidental all that they did must be in the world's affairs. On no statesman, on no particular men or groups of men, on no state or organization indeed, and on no Covenant or Treaty, does the future of our race now depend. The year 1919 was not a year of creation and decision, it was just the first cheerless dawn of a long day of creative effort. The conferences of the Ten, of the Four, of the Big Three, had no trace of creative power; there was no light in the men of Versailles; the dawn was manifest rather as a grey light of critical disapproval that broke through the shutters and staled the guttering candles of the old diplomacy as the conference yawned and drawled to its end. Creation was not there. But a great process of thought spreads throughout the world; many thousands of men and women, in every country, for the most part undistinguished and unknown people, are awakening to their responsibility, are studying, thinking, writing, and teaching, getting together, correcting false impressions, challenging foolish ideas, trying to find out and tell the truth; and upon them it is that we must rest our hope, such hope as we can entertain, of a saner plan to take the place of this first flimsy League and this patched and discomfoting garment of treaties that has been flung for awhile over the naked distresses of our world.

§ 6

The failure to produce a more satisfactory world settlement in 1919-20 was, we have suggested, a symptom of an almost universal intellectual and moral lassitude resulting from the overstrain of the Great War. A lack of fresh initiative is characteristic of a fatigue phase; every one, from sheer inability to change, drifts on for a time along the lines of mental habit and precedent.

Nothing could be more illustrative of this fatigue inertia than the expressed ideas of military men at this time. It is interesting to give here the briefest summary of a lecture that was delivered to a gathering of field-m Marshals, generals, major-generals, and the like by Major-General Sir Louis

Jackson at the Royal United Service Institution in London one day in December, 1919. Lord Peel, the British Under-Secretary of War, presided, and the reader must picture to himself the not too large and quite dignified room of assembly in that building, and all these fine, grave, soldierly figures quietly intent upon the lecturer's words. He is describing, with a certain subdued enthusiasm, the probable technical developments of military method in the "next war."

Outside, through the evening twilight of Whitehall, flows the London traffic, not quite so abundant as in 1914, but still fairly abundant; the omnibuses all overcrowded because there are now not nearly enough of them, and the clothing of people generally shabbier. Some little way down Whitehall is a temporary erection, the Cenotaph, with its base smothered with a vast, pathetic heap of decaying wreaths, bunches of flowers, and the like, a cenotaph to commemorate the eight hundred thousand young men of the Empire who have been killed in the recent struggle. A few people are putting fresh flowers and wreaths there. One or two are crying.

The prospect stretches out beyond this gathering into the grey vastness of London, where people are now crowded as they have never been crowded before, whose food is dear and employment more uncertain than it has ever been. But let not the spectacle be one of unrelieved gloom; Regent Street, Oxford Street, and Bond Street are bright with shoppers and congested with new automobiles, because we must remember that everybody does not lose by a war. Beyond London the country sinks into night, and across the narrow sea are North France and Belgium devastated, Germany with scores of thousands of her infants dwindling and dying for want of milk, all Austria starving. Half the population of Vienna, it is believed, unless American relief comes quickly, is doomed to die of hardship before the spring. Beyond that bleak twilight stretches the darkness of Russia. There, at least, no rich people are buying anything, and no military men are reading essays on the next war. But in icy Petrograd is little food, little wood, and

no coal. All the towns of Russia southward as far as the snow reaches are in a similar plight, and in the Ukraine and to the south a ragged and dingy war drags to its end. Europe is bankrupt, and people's pockets rustle with paper money whose purchasing power dwindles as they walk about with it.

But now we will return to Sir Louis in the well-lit room at the United Service Institution.

He was of opinion that we were on the eve of the most extensive modification of the art of war known to history. It behoved us, therefore—us being, of course, the British and not the whole of mankind—to get on with our armaments and to keep ahead; a fine opening generalization. "It was necessary to develop new arms. . . . The nation which best did so would have a great advantage in the next war. There were people who were crying aloud for a reduction of armaments——"

(Much scorn and amusement among the military gentlemen at this.)

Sir Louis believed that one of the greatest developments in the art of warfare would be brought about in mechanical transport. The tank he treated with ingratitude. These military gentlemen are ungrateful to an invention which shoved and butted them into a sort of victory almost in spite of themselves. The tank, said Sir Louis, was "a freak. . . . The outstanding feature" of the tank, he said, was that it made mechanical transport independent of the roads. Hitherto armies on the march had only been able to spoil the roads; now their transport on caterpillar wheels would advance in open order on a broad front carrying guns, munitions, supplies, bridging equipment, rafts, and men—and incidentally ploughing up and destroying hedges, ditches, fields, and cultivation generally. Armies would wallow across the country, leaving nothing behind but dust and mud.

So our imaginations are led up to the actual hostilities.

Sir Louis was in favour of gas. For punitive expeditions particularly, gas was to be recommended. And here he

startled and disconcerted his hearers by a gleam of something approaching sentimentality. "It *might* be possible," he said, "to come to some agreement that no gas should be used which caused unnecessary suffering." But there his heart spoke rather than his head; it should have been clear to him that if law can so far override warfare as to prohibit any sort of evil device whatever, it can override warfare to the extent of prohibiting it altogether. And where would Sir Louis Jackson and his audience be then? War is war; its only law is the law that the maximum destruction of the forces of the enemy is necessary. To that law in warfare all considerations of humanity and justice are subordinate.

From gas Sir Louis passed to the air. Here he predicted "most important advances. . . . We need not trouble ourselves yet with flying destroyers or flying concrete forts, but in twenty years' time the Air Force Estimates might be the most important part of our preparations for war." He discussed the conversion of commercial flying machines to bombing and reconnaissance uses, and the need for special types of fighting machine in considerable numbers and always ready. He gave reasons for supposing that the bombers in the next war would not have the same targets near the front of the armies, and would secure better results by going further afield and bombing the centres "where stores are being manufactured and troops trained." As everyone who stayed in London or the east of England in 1917-18 knows, this means the promiscuous bombing of any and every centre of population. But, of course, the bombing of those 'prentice days would be child's play to the bombing of the "next war." There would be countless more aeroplanes, bigger and much nastier bombs. . . .

Sir Louis, proceeding with his sketch, mentioned the "destruction of the greater part of London" as a possible incident in the coming struggle. And so on to the culminating moral, that the highest pay, the utmost importance, the freest expenditure, must be allowed to military gentlemen. "The expense entailed is in the nature of an absolutely necessary insurance." With which his particular audience warmly

agreed. And a certain Major-General Stone, a little forgetful of the source of his phrases,¹ said he hoped that this lecture "may be the beginning not of trusting in the League of Nations, but in *our own* right hand and *our* stretched-out arm!"

But we will not go on with the details of this dream. For indeed no Utopia was ever so impossible as this forecast of a world in which scarcely anything but very carefully sandbagged and camouflaged G. H. Q. would be reasonably safe, in which countless bombers would bomb the belligerent lands incessantly and great armies with lines of caterpillar transport roll to and fro, churning the fields of the earth into blood-streaked mud. There is not energy enough and no will whatever left in the world for such things. Generals who cannot foresee tanks cannot be expected to foresee or understand world bankruptcy; still less are they likely to understand the limits imposed upon military operations by the fluctuating temper of the common man. Apparently these military authorities of the United Service Institution did not even know that warfare aims at the production of states of mind in the enemy, and is sustained by states of mind. The chief neglected factor in the calculations of Sir Louis is the fact that no people whatever will stand such warfare as he contemplates, not even the people on the winning side. For as northern France, south-eastern Britain, and north Italy now understand, the victor in the "next war" may be bombed and starved almost as badly as the loser. A phase is possible in which a war-tormented population may cease to discriminate between military gentlemen on this side or that, and may be moved to destroy them as the common enemies of the race. Something of that sort had already happened in Russia. The Great War of 1914-18 was the culmination of the military energy of the Western populations, and they fought and fought well because they believed they were fighting "the war to end war." They were. German imperialism, with its organized grip upon education and its close alliance with an

¹ Cp. Psalm cxxxvi.

aggressive commercialism, was beaten and finished. The militarism and imperialism of Britain and France and Italy were by comparison feeble, disorganized, and disorganizing survivals. They were things "left over" by the Great War. They had no persuasive power. They went on—for sheer want of wits to leave off. No European Government will ever get the same proportion of its people into the ranks and into its munition works again as the governments of 1914-18 did. Such war as still lies ahead of us is a more disorderly but less intensive war.¹

§ 7

This Major-General Stone of the "stretched out arm" is a very convenient figure for the purposes of this history. His luckless misquotation and his contempt for the untried League of Nations serve to illustrate just that prevalent want of intelligence and just that truculent spirit in the influential class of the British people which seemed at that time to be hurrying the great fabric of the British empire on towards irreparable dishonour and disintegration.

For, as the reader will remember, it was the right hand and the stretched out arm of the God of Righteousness of which the Psalmist was speaking (Psalm cxxxvi)—a limb of an altogether different quality from the arm of our spirited Major-General.

The British empire emerged from the great war very severely strained physically and morally. The cream of the younger generation was dead, or weakened by wounds

¹ Here is another glimpse of the agreeable dreams that fill the contemporary military mind. It is from Fuller's recently published *Tanks in the Great War*. Colonel Fuller does not share that hostility to tanks characteristic of the older type of soldier. In the next war, he tells us: "Fast-moving tanks, equipped with tons of liquid gas . . . will cross the frontier and obliterate every living thing in the fields and farms, the villages, and cities of the enemy's country. Whilst life is being swept away around the frontier, fleets of aeroplanes will attack the enemy's great industrial and governing centres. All these attacks will be made, at first, not against the enemy's army . . . but against the civil population, in order to compel it to accept the will of the attacker."

and the distortions of military subjugation. Her routines of government and her habits of freedom had been greatly disorganized by the emergency legislation necessary in the struggle, and her press had been badly disordered by its devotion to propaganda. The news of things foreign had deteriorated notably. The general public was not only badly informed upon its imperial responsibilities but too preoccupied by business cataclysms to attend to them. It was a time of opportunity for the foolish and self-important official and everywhere he made the most of his opportunities.

Everywhere throughout the empire except in those portions that were already self-governing, there was a parallel process at work, an almost systematic exasperation of the subject populations by restraints, unreasonable regulations, slights, arbitrary arrests, and suchlike interferences with liberty. Everywhere the military and official class was out of hand. Everywhere the old Tory element seems to have been bent upon provoking an explosion. This was equally true of India and Egypt and Ireland. We have already told of the Amritsar massacre in India. In these years of neglect and weakened central control a policy of repression, broken promises to the native, and of illusory reforms to still the uneasy consciences at home, stirred even the pacific Indian population to something close upon rebellion. Warnings and remonstrances went for a time unheeded. A régime of conciliation under Lord Reading as viceroy was thwarted and falsified by the home government. In 1922 Mr. Gandhi, a saint-like preacher of passive resistance, was sentenced to six years incarceration, and so made into a martyr. A similar conflict went on in Egypt. But the most tragic and pitiful story of all is the story of the widening breach between the Irish and the English peoples.

In the days of those great and generous Irish statesmen, the brothers Redmond, it had still seemed possible for the two islands to live side by side, co-operating freely and willingly in a state of friendly and equal unity, sharing the imperial responsibilities of Britain and facing the world together. Their close proximity demands so close a bond.

The prosperity of Ireland and England is like the prosperity of Siamese twins, whose bodies are linked arterially. Past wrongs and religious conflicts should not be sufficient to prevent an intelligent and wholesome co-operation. But it was not past wrongs but present wrongs which drove Ireland towards separation. We have told already how Sir Edward Carson, that evil genius of the British peoples, first introduced arms into Ireland and set a horrible process of violence and reprisal going in the land; how at the outset of the war Ireland was cheated of her Home Rule, and how the British government, of which Mr. Asquith was the head, blindly or deliberately insulted Ireland by including this man of blood and sedition in the coalition government. We have told too how the Dublin rebellion was suppressed and punished, and how Ireland was further embittered. The results are plain upon the page of history. In 1914 Ireland came into the great war as freely and gallantly as England. It was still an orderly and civilized country. By the end of that struggle Ireland was a rebel country forcibly held. Extreme imperialism had produced its reaction in an extreme nationalism. Ireland was now set upon becoming a republic entirely independent of Great Britain.

A new Home Rule Bill passed the British parliament in 1920. It established two separate parliaments, one in Ulster and one in the rest of Ireland, but with arrangements for their co-operation and possible fusion. It was, by the standard of previous Home Rule bills, a generous measure. But the Irish would have none of it. The Sinn Feiners who had been elected to the parliament of 1919 would not even appear at Westminster to discuss it. And meanwhile methods of insurrection and exasperation on the one hand and a policy of repression on the other was making the whole country a field of guerilla warfare. The insurgents raided, ambushed, assassinated, and at length fought little pitched battles with small detachments of troops. The English troops, well-behaved at first, were presently tempted and encouraged to embark upon "reprisals." A special auxiliary police, the "Black and Tans," was organized, and

distinguished itself by its rough-handed methods. There was a steady crescendo of outrages. Every murder led to fresh murders on one side or the other. If a soldier or a Black and Tan was killed then someone on the other side was killed, who might or might not have been privy to the initial killing. Each side in this feud sought to outdo the other in ruthlessness. At last no one was safe in his home and his bed. In the night men of one faction or the other might come knocking at the door with some real or fancied accusation. Men were shot at their own doors; presently whole families were massacred. In December, 1920, in revenge for the ambushing of a party of eleven military cadets near Cork, the military broke out, killing and looting so that property to the value of £3,000,000 was destroyed. In such an atmosphere robbery and brigandage flourished.

The Home Rule bill became law in 1921, creating two Irish parliaments, one for the north and one for the south. The northern Parliament was duly elected, and opened by the King in state on May 22, 1921. The southern Irish would have nothing to do with the southern parliament, and it never assembled. Instead there met in Dublin a self-constituted body, the Dail Eireann, professing to be the parliament of Independent Ireland, and electing as its president a Mr. de Valera who had been its chief creator. The King, in opening the northern parliament, had made an extremely conciliatory speech. Mr. Lloyd George, seizing upon this, invited Mr. de Valera and Sir James Craig to a conference upon Irish affairs in London, a truce to violence was called, a truce that was kept as well as the already disorganized state of the country permitted, and on October 11th, 1921, a conference opened in London in which Mr. de Valera and his chosen colleagues from the Dail Eireann practically in the character of men who have conducted an armed insurrection to a successful issue, treated with the representatives of the British government upon the future status of Ireland.

This was a thing almost as agreeable to thoughtful Englishmen as it would have been to an American in 1863 to have

seen Jefferson Davis treating with Abraham Lincoln in Washington upon the future status of the cotton states. For the complete separation of Ireland from Britain promised to be not a merely inconvenient thing, but a very dangerous, and it may be a disastrous thing for both countries. But this practical admission of defeat was a pill which the Englishmen had allowed his chosen friends, the Carsonites, to make up for him and he had to swallow it with as good a grace as possible. The spectacle in Whitehall in October 1921 during the Downing Street Conference was a very curious one. There was a great and defiant display of Irish flags and Irish national symbols, and the behaviour of the London crowd was not simply tolerant but friendly and sympathetic.

After much wrangling a settlement was finally worked out and confirmed both by the British parliament and—with resistance and reluctance—by the Dail Eirann. Subject to a final allegiance to the British crown and certain naval and aerial restrictions, all Ireland, with the exception of Protestant Ulster under the northern parliament, became an independent state, the Irish Free State. This was a great triumph of reasonableness and the desire for peace. It conceded a practical freedom; it reserved a formal union. But it was threatened on either side. Mr. de Valera objected because it divided Ireland and was not sufficiently humiliating for Great Britain, and he incited his followers to revolt against the new Free State. Sir Edward Carson, now a judge and Lord Carson, also did his best, in spite of the decorum customary with judges, to keep alive the spirit of violence and bloodshed in Ulster. So that it was with difficulty and to the tune of nocturnal shots and screams that the Irish Free State struggled into being.

Such briefly was the story of the separation of Ireland from England. Unless there is some great change in the methods of the British Empire with its subject populations, it seems to be likely to prove only the first of still greater disintegrative strains. To British and American people alike this must be a source of profound anxiety and regret.

At one time it had seemed as though the British empire was to be the foster mother of a great and exemplary confederation of free nations, either speaking English or using English as a *lingua franca*, and developing one great tradition of open speech, plain dealing, and justice throughout the world. At one time it had seemed that this great network, strengthened by a deepening understanding and a closer and closer co-operation with the United States of America, might play a leading part in binding all the world together into a still greater unity. Such dreams the writer himself had entertained. But the historian must needs set down his facts—and these that are here related march but ill with such dreams. Yet in Canada and South Africa the British have displayed a capacity for compromise, belated yet sufficient, to atone for much early arrogance and unreason.

§ 8

The story of the continent of Europe in the years immediately following the treaty of Versailles is equally one of disputes, unsettlement, and slow and unsatisfactory readjustment.

Both France and Italy showed evidences of a moral and material overstrain as great or greater than that of the British. Italy was torn between a strong drift towards Bolshevism in the industrial districts, and by a wild outbreak of nationalist truculence in reaction to the socialist trend. In some districts there broke out a war of murders and reprisals like that which was going on in Ireland. The Fascisti, militant nationalists, carried on a sort of war against the Socialists. Poland rose from her ashes, an aggressive power under the influence of France. She sustained an extravagant army. War muttered and smoldered, all over the east of Europe, and presently broke out fiercely between Greece and the Turks in Asia Minor.

In France, just as in Britain, an intensified nationalism dominated the public mind at the conclusion of the war. But France learnt even more reluctantly than Britain the

necessity for "give" as well as "take" after her victory. There was even less realization in France than in Britain of the immense concessions, abandonments, and generousities demanded by the new age that was now dawning upon the world. France also had faith only in her right hand and her outstretched arm. She was cynically suspicious and disdainful of internationalism. She clung to her traditional policy of antagonism to the German and to alliances with Pole and Turk against the central European peoples. She persisted, like Shylock, upon the exact performance of unreasonable and cruel bargains. Against the new Russia—because of the great sums that had been sunken by French citizens in the repudiated Russian loans—she displayed an implacable antagonism.

The immense liabilities for reparation that had been imposed upon the new German republic, and delays in the processes of disarmament and surrender, gave the French government the excuse for a steady aggressive pressure upon her defeated enemy. In 1919, the French occupied Frankfurt, Darmstadt, and Hanau, using among other forces negro troops from her African possessions. Her immediate reason for doing this was because the Germans had sent troops into the Ruhr district to suppress a Bolshevik outbreak. British influence was exerted to prevent a French occupation of the coveted Ruhr valley. This led to some bitterness in France. Presently French and British opinion were in conflict upon the division of the plebiscite areas of Silesia, the French favouring an extreme Pro-Polish solution, the British, a more considerate treatment of the German element. In the territories of the near East the French and British also found themselves discordant allies. In January, 1921, M. Briand became prime minister of France, announcing as the basis of his foreign policy the closest possible alliance with Britain, but the divergent interests and the divergent temperaments of the two nations were all against this dream of a world dominated by an Anglo-French Entente. Neither towards Germany nor towards Russia had the English the

same feeling of a permanent antagonism as the French displayed. The more plain the French dream of a Europe dominated by France became, the more definitely did the British mind move towards the idea of a restored Germany and a revived Russia playing their due part in the affairs of a united Europe. Early in 1922 the government of M. Briand fell, largely because of his attempts to maintain the Anglo-French Entente, and M. Poincaré—who had been President during the war—became prime minister as the embodiment of a stiff French nationalism.

The restoration of the rest of Europe to order and prosperity, and the construction of some system of co-operation among the new and enlarged states that had been evolved by the Treaty of Versailles, was greatly hampered by the intensity of the nationalist feeling evoked by the war, and by this old-fashioned egoism of French policy. Most hopeful perhaps of all the new states was Czecho-Slovakia under its learned president, Mazaryk, and with M. Benes, its foreign minister, one of the ablest statesmen in Europe. Steadily, indefatigably, M. Benes set himself to link the neighbouring states together by treaties of commerce and mutual protection. Gradually he built up a system of alliances which promised to become an eastern European confederation, sufficiently strong to hold its own against any other European power. One of the most remarkable and hopeful things in Czecho-Slovakia was the early stage at which the processes of reconciliation with Germany and Austria set in. From the outset at Prague, from the first year of Bohemian liberation, there was a systematic discouragement of animosity, and a systematic direction of attention to the idea of Europe reunited and healed. The central position of Czecho-Slovakia, the fact that its cultivated and energetic population with their Slavonic language and middle European culture form a natural bridge between western Europe and the Slav world, may give this little state an importance in the new Europe that is coming, altogether out of proportion to its size and population.

§ 9

For a year the United States of America, after its refusal to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, stood out of international affairs. But the days when one state, however great, can isolate itself from the general affairs of mankind are past, and presently America was drawn back towards this universal problem of world reconstruction. In particular she found herself unable to ignore the political disorder and enfeeblement of China, and the presence of the invigorated imperialism of Japan in the Pacific. But also she found her industry and general prosperity suffering seriously from the economic debilitation due to the political disorder of Europe.

In November, 1920, Mr. Warren G. Harding was elected President of the United States in succession to President Wilson. He was a newspaper proprietor in Ohio, a man much more of the simple, direct, middle-western type, the Lincoln type, than any of his immediate predecessors. Neither President Roosevelt nor President Taft nor President Wilson was a really typical ordinary American; President Harding represented his countrymen much more nearly. Said Mrs. Harding when she came to the White House; "We're just folks." And this new President set himself rather to move with and interpret the general mass of American opinion than to lead it into new paths. From the outset he showed that he was not indifferent to the international problem. Slowly and cautiously he felt his way towards some method of intervention that should be consonant at the same time with the general American feeling for world peace and with the general American distrust of diplomatic complications and overseas entanglements.

In 1921 he issued invitations for a Conference at Washington to consider the position of affairs in China and the Pacific and to discuss the question of disarmament in the

world generally. This was not a world conference. Only the powers more directly interested in Pacific affairs were invited, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, Holland, Portugal, and Belgium. Neither Russia nor Germany was included, and their absence was made the occasion of much edifying comment. Nor were the Spanish-speaking peoples present in any form. A great press campaign heralded the gathering, and the delegates assembled in a blaze of publicity.

The conference was on the whole a successful one. What had threatened to be a ruinous and very dangerous competition in naval armaments between the United States, Britain, and Japan was conclusively put an end to for a term of ten years by a Four Power Treaty (the United States, Britain, France, and Japan) an arbitration agreement covered Pacific affairs generally, and a sort of Monroe principle to restrain further aggressions upon China and to promote withdrawals from Chinese regions already invaded, was put upon a fairly sound foundation. It was made clear that the scramble for overseas dominion that had been characteristic of the age of the imperialisms was drawing to

its end, and giving place to the idea of voluntary retrocession. On the other hand France, represented by her premier, M. Briand, set her face resolutely against land disarmament. On the whole the French did not make a very good showing at Washington; the nationalist preoccupations that still obsessed them were out of touch with the broad spirit of compromise and the real desire for world settlement that was manifest there. There was a clash between the French and



President Harding

British on the question of submarine equipment; the British wanted to suppress this weapon altogether and the sympathies of America veered towards the British.

Considerable as were the concrete results of the Washington gathering, the effect of the conference in bringing out new orientations among the nations of the world and in giving a definite form again to liberal aspirations that, after the failure of the League of Nations to play anything but a subordinate part in international affairs, had been very largely dispersed and wasted, the world was manifestly beginning to realize how immense, how lengthy and complicated was the task of reconstruction it had to face, and how necessarily tentative and provisional were all the arrangements of Versailles. It was clear too that liberal thought in America, Britain, China, and Japan was moving in the same direction and towards a common end, that is to say towards a world organization not for rivalry but co-operation. From President Harding came the characteristically American suggestion, shrewd in quality, bold in its intention and cautious in its method, that the way to world peace and an organized world co-operation lay not through any suddenly established League with a precise constitution and rule and limitations, but through the slow development of an Association of Nations, feeling its way through a series of such conferences as this Washington one, to a really workable method of general control for the increasingly common interests of mankind. And the general desire to include the three great absentees, Germany, Russia, and the Spanish-speaking peoples, in any subsequent gathering, went upon record at Washington almost without controversy.

Financial and economic issues had been expressly excluded from the Washington programme. It was felt in America that while Europe remained in a state of contention, indulging in extravagant military establishments and threatening fresh wars, there was no prospect of any beneficial discussion of these matters by America. Accordingly the next logical move after the Washington gathering, was a general European conference. This was proposed by Mr.

EFFORT TO RECONSTRUCT THE WORLD 1287

Lloyd George. France made considerable difficulties and accepted his suggestion with formidable reservations; but finally at Genoa in April, 1922, representatives of Germany and Russia sat down for the first time after the war to discuss the common needs of Europe with the rest of the European peoples. With that the main chasms of division and conflict that had opened in August, 1914, and in November, 1917, may be definitely considered to have closed. The powers might still differ, but now they differed in council and not apart. Slowly but surely the interests of the European commonweal were asserting themselves over the traditions of eighteenth century foreign policy, and over the passions and prejudices of an obsolescent nationalism. The age of general reconstruction had begun. But it was beginning amidst a rapid process of social disorganization and impoverishment and it is still too early to weigh the reconstructive against the disintegrative forces. We cannot yet say whether it is reconstruction or collapse that lies before us.

XLI

THE NEXT STAGE OF HISTORY

§ 1. *The Possible Unification of Men's Wills in Political Matters.* § 2. *How a Federal World Government may Come About.* § 3. *Some Fundamental Characteristics of a Modern World State.* § 4. *What this World Might be were it under One Law and Justice.*

§ 1

WE have brought this *Outline of History* up to the threshold of our own times, but we have brought it to no conclusion. It breaks off at a dramatic phase of expectation. Nobody believes that the system of settlements grouped about the Treaty of Versailles is a permanent arrangement of the world's affairs. These Treaties were the end of the war and not the establishment of a new order in the world. That new order has now to be established. In social and economic as in international affairs we are in the dawn of a great constructive effort, extending over many years, to establish an enduring world peace and a reign of justice in the world. The story of life which began inestimable millions of years ago, the adventure of mankind which was already afoot half a million years ago, rises to a crisis in the immense interrogations of to-day. The drama becomes ourselves. It is you, it is I, it is all that is happening to us and all that we are doing which will supply the next chapter of this continually expanding adventure of humanity.

Our history has traced a steady growth of the social and political units into which men have combined. In the brief period of ten thousand years these units have grown from the small family tribe of the early neolithic culture to the

vast united realms—vast yet still too small and partial—of the present time. And this change in size of the state—a change manifestly incomplete—has been accompanied by profound changes in its nature. Compulsion and servitude have given way to ideas of associated freedom, and the sovereignty that was once concentrated in an autocratic king and god, has been widely diffused throughout the community. Until the Roman republic extended itself to all Italy, there had been no free community larger than a city state; all great communities were communities of obedience under a monarch. The great united republic of the United States would have been impossible before the printing press and the railway. The telegraph and telephone, the aeroplane, the continual progress of land and sea transit, are now insisting upon a still larger political organization.

If our *Outline* has been faithfully drawn, and if these brief conclusions are sound, it follows that we are engaged upon an immense task of adjustment to these great lines upon which our affairs are moving. Our wars, our social conflicts, our enormous economic stresses, are all aspects of that adjustment. The loyalties and allegiances to-day are at best provisional loyalties and allegiances. Our true State, this state that is already beginning, this state to which every man owes his utmost political effort, must be now this nascent Federal World State to which human necessities point. Our true God now is the God of all men. Nationalism as a God must follow the tribal gods to limbo. Our true nationality is mankind.

How far will modern men lay hold upon and identify themselves with this necessity and set themselves to revise their ideas, remake their institutions, and educate the coming generations to this final extension of citizenship? How far will they remain dark, obdurate, habitual, and traditional, resisting the convergent forces that offer them either unity or misery? Sooner or later that unity must come or else plainly men must perish by their own inventions. We, because we believe in the power of reason and in the increasing good-will in men, find ourselves compelled to reject

the latter possibility. But the way to the former may be very long and tedious, very tragic and wearisome, a martyrdom of many generations, or it may be travelled over almost swiftly in the course of a generation or so. That depends upon forces whose nature we understand to some extent now, but not their power. There has to be a great process of education, by precept and by information and by experience, but there are as yet no quantitative measures of education to tell us *how much* has to be learnt or *how soon* that learning can be done. Our estimates vary with our moods; the time may be much longer than our hopes and much shorter than our fears.

The terrible experiences of the Great War have made very many men who once took political things lightly take them now very gravely. To a certain small number of men and women the attainment of a world peace has become the supreme work in life, has become a religious self-devotion. To a much greater number it has become at least a ruling motive. Many such people now are seeking ways of working for this great end, or they are already working for this great end, by pen and persuasion, in schools and colleges and books, and in the highways and byways of public life. Perhaps now most human beings in the world are well-disposed towards such efforts, but rather confusedly disposed; they are without any clear sense of what must be done and what ought to be prevented, that human solidarity may be advanced. The world-wide outbreak of faith and hope in President Wilson, before he began to wilt and fail us, was a very significant thing indeed for the future of mankind. Set against these motives of unity indeed are other motives entirely antagonistic, the fear and hatred of strange things and peoples, love of and trust in the old traditional thing, patriotisms, race prejudices, suspicions, distrusts—and the element of spite, scoundrelism, and utter selfishness that are so strong still in every human soul.

The overriding powers that hitherto in the individual soul and in the community have struggled and prevailed against the ferocious, base, and individual impulses that divide us


from one another, have been the powers of religion and education. Religion and education, those closely interwoven influences, have made possible the greater human societies whose growth we have traced in this *Outline*; they have been the chief synthetic forces throughout this great story of enlarging human co-operations that we have traced from its beginnings. We have found in the intellectual and theological conflicts of the nineteenth century the explanation of that curious exceptional disentanglement of religious teaching from formal education which is a distinctive feature of our age, and we have traced the consequences of this phase of religious disputation and confusion in the reversion of international politics towards a brutal nationalism and in the backward drift of industrial and business life towards harsh, selfish, and uncreative profit-seeking. There has been a slipping off of ancient restraints; a real *de-civilization* of men's minds. We would lay stress here on the suggestion that this divorce of religious teaching from organized education is necessarily a temporary one, a transitory dislocation, and that presently education must become again in intention and spirit religious, and that the impulse to devotion, to universal service and to a complete escape from self, which has been the common underlying force in all the great religions of the last five and twenty centuries, an impulse which ebbed so perceptibly during the prosperity, laxity, disillusionment and scepticism of the past seventy or eighty years, will reappear again, stripped and plain, as the recognized fundamental structural impulse in human society.

Education is the preparation of the individual for the community, and his religious training is the core of that preparation. With the great intellectual restatements and expansions of the nineteenth century, an educational break-up, a confusion and loss of aim in education, was inevitable. We can no longer prepare the individual for a community when our ideas of a community are shattered and undergoing reconstruction. The old loyalties, the old too limited and narrow political and social assumptions, the old too elaborate religious formulæ, have lost their power of conviction, and the



THE GENOA CONFERENCE, 1922

Thirty-four nations were represented, including Germany and Russia, but the United States was not among them



WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WHICH LIMITED NAVAL ARMAMENTS

At the head of the table (right), reading from the farther corner, are: Premier Briand, Senator Underwood, Mr. Root, Senator Lodge, Secretary Hughes, Mr. Balfour, and Lord Lee. At the corner is Ambassador Geddes, and reading down the side from right to left are: Sir Robert Borden (Canada), Senator Pearce (Australia), Sir John Salmond (New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (India), and Senator Schanzer of Italy, with Ambassador Ricci and Senator Albertini. At the farther side, next to Premier Briand, is M. Viviani, and next are General Sarraut, Ambassador

Jusserand, Prince Tokugawa of Japan, with Ambassador Shidehara, and Admiral Kato

greater ideas of a world state and of an economic commonweal have been winning their way only very slowly to recognition. So far they have swayed only a minority of exceptional people. But out of the trouble and tragedy of this present time may emerge a moral and intellectual revival; a religious revival, of a simplicity and scope to draw together men of alien races and now discrete traditions into one common and sustained way of living for the world's service. We cannot foretell the scope and power of such a revival; we cannot even produce evidence of its onset. The beginnings of such things are never conspicuous. Great movements of the racial soul come at first "like a thief in the night," and then suddenly are discovered to be powerful and world-wide. Religious emotion—stripped of corruptions and freed from its last priestly entanglements—may presently blow through life again like a great wind, bursting the doors and flinging open the shutters of the individual life, and making many things possible and easy that in these present days of exhaustion seem almost too difficult to desire.

§ 2

If we suppose a sufficient righteousness and intelligence in men to produce presently, from the tremendous lessons of history, an effective will for a world peace—that is to say, an effective will *for a world law under a world government*—for in no other fashion is a secure world peace conceivable—in what manner may we expect things to move towards this end? That movement will certainly not go on equally in every country, nor is it likely to take at first one uniform mode of expression. Here it will find a congenial and stimulating atmosphere, here it will find itself antagonistic to deep tradition or racial idiosyncrasy or well-organized base oppositions. In some cases those to whom the call of the new order has come will be living in a state almost ready to serve the ends of the greater political synthesis, in others they will have to fight like conspirators against the rule of evil laws. There is little in the political constitution of

such countries as the United States or Switzerland that would impede their coalescence upon terms of frank give and take with other equally civilized confederations; political systems involving dependent areas and "subject peoples" such as the Turkish Empire was before the Great War, seem to require something in the nature of a breaking up before they can be adapted to a federal world system. Any state obsessed by traditions of an aggressive foreign policy will be difficult to assimilate into a world combination. But though here the government may be helpful, and here dark and hostile, the essential task of men of goodwill in all states and countries remains the same, it is an educational task, and its very essence is to bring to the minds of all men everywhere, as a necessary basis for world co-operation, *a new telling and interpretation, a common interpretation, of history.*

Does this League of Nations which has been created by the Covenant of 1919 contain within it the germ of any permanent federation of human effort? Will it grow into something for which, as Stallybrass says, men will be ready to "work whole-heartedly and, if necessary, *fight*"—as hitherto they have been willing to fight for their country and their own people? There are few intimations of any such enthusiasm for the League at the present time. The League does not even seem to know how to talk to common men. It has gone into official buildings, and comparatively few people in the world understand or care what it is doing there. It may be that the League is no more than a first project of union, exemplary only in its insufficiencies and dangers, destined to be superseded by something closer and completer as were the United States Articles of Confederation by the Federal Constitution. The League is at present a mere partial league of governments and states. It emphasizes nationality; it defers to sovereignty. What the world needs is no such league of nations as this nor even a mere league of peoples, but a *world league of men*. The world perishes unless sovereignty is merged and nationality subordinated. And for that the minds of men must first be prepared by experience and knowledge and thought. The

supreme task before men at the present time is political education.

We will not attempt to weigh here what share may be taken in the recasting and consolidation of human affairs by the teachings and propaganda of labour internationalism, by the studies and needs of international finance, or by such boundary-destroying powers as science and art and historical teaching. All these things may exert a combined pressure, in which it may never be possible to apportion the exact shares. Opposition may dissolve, antagonistic cults flatten out to a common culture, almost imperceptibly. The bold idealism of to-day may seem mere common sense to-morrow. And the problem of a forecast is complicated by the possibility of interludes and backwaters. History has never gone simply forward. More particularly are the years after a great war apt to be years of apparent retrocession; men are too-weary to see what has been done, what has been cleared away, and what has been made possible.

Among the things that seem to move commandingly towards an adequate world control at the present time are these:—

(1) The increasing destructiveness and intolerableness of war waged with the new powers of science.

(2) The inevitable fusion of the world's economic affairs into one system, leading necessarily, it would seem, to some common control of currency, and demanding safe and uninterrupted communications, and a free movement of goods and people by sea and land throughout the whole world. The satisfaction of these needs will require a world control of very considerable authority and powers of enforcement.

(3) The need, because of the increasing mobility of peoples, of effectual controls of health everywhere.

(4) The urgent need of some equalization of labour conditions, and of the minimum standard of life throughout the world. This seems to carry with it, as a necessary corollary, the establishment of some minimum standard of education for everyone.

(5) The impossibility of developing the enormous benefits of flying without a world control of the air-ways.

The necessity and logic of such diverse considerations as these push the mind irresistibly, in spite of the clashes of race and tradition and the huge difficulties created by differences in language, towards the belief that a conscious struggle to establish or prevent a political world community will be the next stage of human history. The things that require that world community are permanent *needs*, one or other of these needs appeals to nearly everyone, and against their continuing persistence are only mortal difficulties, great no doubt, but mortal; prejudices, passions, animosities, delusions about race and country, egotisms, and suchlike fluctuating and evanescent things, set up in men's minds by education and suggestion; none of them things that make now for the welfare and survival of the individuals who are under their sway nor of the estates and towns and associations in which they prevail.

§ 3

The attainment of the world state may be impeded and may be opposed to-day by many apparently vast forces; but it has, urging it on, a much more powerful force, that of the free and growing common intelligence of mankind. To-day there is in the world a small but increasing number of men, historians, archaeologists, ethnologists, economists, sociologists, psychologists, educationists, and the like, who are doing for human institutions that same task of creative analysis which the scientific men of the seventeenth and eighteenth century did for the materials and mechanism of human life; and just as these latter, almost unaware of what they were doing, made telegraphy, swift transit on sea and land, flying and a thousand hitherto impossible things possible, so the former may be doing more than the world suspects, or than they themselves suspect, to clear up and make plain the thing to do and the way to do it, in the greater and more urgent human affairs.

Let us ape Roger Bacon in his prophetic mood, and set

down what we believe will be the broad fundamentals of the coming world state.

(i) It will be based upon a common world religion, very much simplified and universalized and better understood. This will not be Christianity nor Islam nor Buddhism nor any such specialized form of religion, but religion itself pure and undefiled; the Eightfold Way, the Kingdom of Heaven, brotherhood, creative service, and self-forgetfulness. Throughout the world men's thoughts and motives will be turned by education, example, and the circle of ideas about them, from the obsession of self to the cheerful service of human knowledge, human power, and human unity.

(ii) And this world state will be sustained by a universal education, organized upon a scale and of a penetration and quality beyond all present experience. The whole race, and not simply classes and peoples, will be *educated*. Most parents will have a technical knowledge of teaching. Quite apart from the duties of parentage, perhaps ten per cent. or more of the adult population will, at some time or other in their lives, be workers in the world's educational organization. And education, as the new age will conceive it, will go on throughout life; it will not cease at any particular age. Men and women will simply become self-educators and individual students and student teachers as they grow older.

(iii) There will be no armies, no navies, and no classes of unemployed people either wealthy or poor.

(iv) The world-state's organization of scientific research and record compared with that of to-day will be like an ocean liner beside the dug-out canoe of some early heliolithic wanderer.

(v) There will be a vast free literature of criticism and discussion.

(vi) The world's political organization will be democratic, that is to say, the government and direction of affairs will be in immediate touch with and responsive to the general thought of the educated whole population.

(vii) Its economic organization will be an exploitation of all natural wealth and every fresh possibility science reveals, by the agents and servants of the common government for the common good. Private enterprise will be the servant—a useful, valued, and well-rewarded servant—and no longer the robber master of the commonweal.

(viii) And this implies two achievements that seem very difficult to us to-day. They are matters of mechanism, but they are as essential to the world's well-being as it is to a soldier's, no matter how brave he may be, that his machine gun should not jam, and to an aeronaut's that his steering-gear should not fail him in mid-air. Political well-being demands that electoral methods shall be used, and economic well-being requires that a currency shall be used, safeguarded or proof against the contrivances and manipulations of clever, dishonest men.

§ 4

There can be little question that the attainment of a federation of all humanity, together with a sufficient measure of social justice, to ensure health, education, and a rough equality of opportunity to most the children born into the world, would mean such a release and increase of human energy as to open a new phase in human history. The enormous waste caused by military preparation and the mutual annoyance of competing great powers, and the still more enormous waste due to the under-productiveness of great masses of people, either because they are too wealthy for stimulus or too poor for efficiency, would cease. There would be a vast increase in the supply of human necessities, a rise in the standard of life and in what is considered a necessity, a development of transport and every kind of convenience; and a multitude of people would be transferred from low-grade production to such higher work as art of all kinds, teaching, scientific research, and the like. All over the world there would be a setting free of human capacity, such as has occurred hitherto only in small places and through precious

limited phases of prosperity and security. Unless we are to suppose that spontaneous outbreaks of super-men have occurred in the past, it is reasonable to conclude that the Athens of Pericles, the Florence of the Medici, Elizabethan England, the great deeds of Asoka, the Tang and Ming periods in art, are but samples of what a whole world of sustained security would yield continuously and cumulatively. Without supposing any change in human quality, but merely its release from the present system of inordinate waste, history justifies this expectation.

We have seen how, since the liberation of human thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a comparatively few, curious and intelligent men, chiefly in western Europe, have produced a vision of the world and a body of science that is now, on the material side, revolutionizing life. Mostly these men have worked against great discouragement, with insufficient funds and small help or support from the mass of mankind. It is impossible to believe that these men were the maximum intellectual harvest of their generation. England alone in the last three centuries must have produced scores of Newtons who never learnt to read, hundreds of Daltons, Darwins, Bacons, and Huxleys who died stunted in hovels, or never got a chance of proving their quality. All the world over, there must have been myriads of potential first-class investigators, splendid artists, creative minds, who never caught a gleam of inspiration or opportunity, for every one of that kind who has left his mark upon the world. In the trenches of the Western front alone during the late war thousands of potential great men died unfulfilled. But a world with something like a secure international peace and something like social justice, will fish for capacity with the finest net of universal education, and may expect a yield beyond comparison greater than any yield of able and brilliant men that the world has known hitherto.

It is such considerations as this indeed which justify the concentration of effort in the near future upon the making of a new world state of righteousness out of our present confusions. War is a horrible thing, and constantly more horrible

and dreadful, so that unless it is ended it will certainly end human society; social injustice, and the sight of the limited and cramped human beings it produces, torment the soul; but the strongest incentive to constructive political and social work for an imaginative spirit lies not so much in the mere hope of escaping evils as in the opportunity for great adventures that their suppression will open to our race. We want to get rid of the militarist not simply because he hurts and kills, but because he is an intolerable thick-voiced block-head who stands hectoring and blustering in our way to achievement. We want to abolish many extravagances of private ownership just as we should want to abolish some idiot guardian who refused us admission to a studio in which there were fine things to do.

There are people who seem to imagine that a world order and one universal law of justice would end human adventure. It would but begin it. But instead of the adventure of the past, the "romance" of the cinematograph world, the perpetual reiterated harping upon the trite reactions of sex and combat and the hunt for gold, it would be an unending exploration upon the edge of experience. Hitherto man has been living in a slum, amidst quarrels, revenges, vanities, shames and taints, hot desires and urgent appetites. He has scarcely tasted sweet air yet and the great freedoms of the world that science has enlarged for him.

To picture to ourselves something of the wider life that world unity would open to men is a very attractive speculation. Life will certainly go with a stronger pulse, it will breathe a deeper breath, because it will have dispelled and conquered a hundred infections of body and mind that now reduce it to invalidism and squalor. We have already laid stress on the vast elimination of drudgery from human life through the creation of a new race of slaves, the machines. This—and the disappearance of war and the smoothing out of endless restraints and contentions by juster social and economic arrangements—will lift the burthen of toilsome work and routine work, that has been the price of human security

since the dawn of the first civilizations, from the shoulders of our children. Which does not mean that they will cease to work, but that they will cease to do irksome work under pressure, and will work freely, planning, making, creating, according to their gifts and instincts. They will fight nature no longer as dull conscripts of the pick and plough, but for a splendid conquest. Only the spiritlessness of our present depression blinds us to the clear intimations of our reason that in the course of a few generations every little country town could become an Athens, every human being could be gentle in breeding and healthy in body and mind, the whole solid earth man's mine and its uttermost regions his playground.

In this *Outline* we have sought to show two great systems of development interacting in the story of human society. We have seen, growing out of that later special neolithic culture, the heliolithic culture in the warmer alluvial parts of the world, the great primordial civilizations, fecund systems of subjugation and obedience, vast multiplications of industrious and subservient men. We have shown the necessary relationship of these early civilizations to the early temples and to king-gods and god-kings. At the same time we have traced the development from a simpler neolithic level of the wanderer peoples, who became the nomadic peoples, in those great groups the Nordic Aryans and the Hun-Mongol peoples of the north-west and the north-east and (from a heliolithic phase) the Semites of the Arabian deserts. Our history has told of a repeated overrunning and refreshment of the originally brunet civilizations by these hardier, bolder, free-spirited peoples of the steppes and desert. We have pointed out how these constantly recurring nomadic injections have steadily altered the primordial civilizations both in blood and in spirit; and how the world religions of to-day, and what we now call democracy, the boldness of modern scientific inquiry and a universal restlessness, are due to this "nomadization" of civilization. The old civilizations created tradition, and lived by tradition. To-day the power

of tradition is destroyed. The body of our state is civilization still, but its spirit is the spirit of the nomadic world. It is the spirit of the great plains and the high seas.

So that it is difficult to resist the persuasion that so soon as one law runs in the earth and the fierceness of frontiers ceases to distress us, that urgency in our nature that stirs us in spring and autumn to be up and travelling, will have its way with us. We shall obey the call of the summer pastures and the winter pastures in our blood, the call of the mountains, the desert, and the sea. For some of us also, who may be of a different lineage, there is the call of the forest, and there are those who would hunt in the summer and return to the fields for the harvest and the plough. But this does not mean that men will have become homeless and all adrift. The normal nomadic life is not a homeless one, but a movement between homes. The Kalmucks to-day, like the swallows, go yearly a thousand miles from one home to another. The beautiful and convenient cities of the coming age, we conclude, will have their seasons when they will be full of life, and seasons when they will seem asleep. Life will ebb and flow to and from every region seasonally as the interest of that region rises or declines.

There will be little drudgery in this better-ordered world. Natural power harnessed in machines will be the general drudge. What drudgery is inevitable will be done as a service and duty for a few years or months out of each life; it will not consume nor degrade the whole life of any one. And not only drudges, but many other sorts of men and ways of living which loom large in the current social scheme will necessarily have dwindled in importance or passed away altogether. There will be few professional fighting men or none at all, no custom-house officers; the increased multitude of teachers will have abolished large police forces and large jail staffs, mad-houses will be rare or non-existent; a world-wide sanitation will have diminished the proportion of hospitals, nurses, sick-room attendants, and the like; a world-wide economic justice, the floating population of cheats, sharpers, gamblers, forestallers, parasites, and speculators

generally. But there will be no diminution of adventure or romance in this world of the days to come. Sea fisheries and the incessant insurrection of the sea, for example, will call for their own stalwart types of men; the high air will clamour for manhood, the deep and dangerous secret places of nature. Men will turn again with renewed interest to the animal world. In these disordered days a stupid, uncontrollable massacre of animal species goes on—from certain angles of vision it is a thing almost more tragic than human miseries; in the nineteenth century dozens of animal species, and some of them very interesting species, were exterminated; but one of the first fruits of an effective world state would be the better protection of what are now wild beasts. It is a strange thing in human history to note how little has been done since the Bronze Age in taming, using, befriending, and appreciating the animal life about us. But that mere witless killing which is called sport to-day, would inevitably give place in a better educated world community to a modification of the primitive instincts that find expression in this way, changing them into an interest not in the deaths, but in the lives of beasts, and leading to fresh and perhaps very strange and beautiful attempts to befriend these pathetic, kindred lower creatures we no longer fear as enemies, hate as rivals, or need as slaves. And a world state and universal justice does not mean the imprisonment of our race in any bleak institutional orderliness. There will still be mountains and the sea, there will be jungles and the great forests, cared for indeed and treasured and protected; the great plains will still spread before us and the wild winds blow. But men will not hate so much, fear so much, nor cheat so desperately—and they will keep their minds and bodies cleaner.

There are unhopeful prophets who see in the gathering together of men into one community the possibility of violent race conflicts, conflicts for "ascendancy," but that is to suppose that civilization is incapable of adjustments by which men of different qualities and temperaments and appearances will live side by side, following different rôles and contribut-

ing diverse gifts. The weaving of mankind into one community does not imply the creation of a homogeneous community, but rather the reverse; the welcome and the adequate utilization of distinctive quality in an atmosphere of understanding. It is the almost universal bad manners of the present age which make race intolerable to race. The community to which we may be moving will be more mixed—which does not necessarily mean more interbred—more various and more interesting than any existing community. Communities all to one patter, like boxes of toy soldiers, are things of the past rather than the future.

But one of the hardest, most impossible tasks a writer can set himself, is to picture the life of people better educated, happier in their circumstances, more free and more healthy than he is himself. We know enough to-day to know that there is infinite room for betterment in every human concern. Nothing is needed but collective effort. Our poverty, our restraints, our infections and indigestions, our quarrels and misunderstandings, are all things controllable and removable by concerted human action, but we know as little how life would feel without them as some poor dirty ill-treated, fierce-souled creature born and bred amidst the cruel and dingy surroundings of a European back street can know what it is to bathe every day, always to be clad beautifully, to climb mountains for pleasure, to fly, to meet none but agreeable, well-mannered people, to conduct researches or make delightful things. Yet a time when all such good things will be for all men may be coming more nearly than we think. Each one who believes that brings the good time nearer; each heart that fails delays it.

One cannot foretell the surprises or disappointments the future has in store. Before this chapter of the World State can begin fairly in our histories, other chapters as yet unsuspected may still need to be written, as long and as full of conflict as our account of the growth and rivalries of the Great Powers. There may be tragic economic struggles, grim grapplings of race with race and class with class. It may be that "private enterprise" will refuse to learn the

lesson of service without some quite catastrophic revolution, we do not know; we cannot tell. These are unnecessary disasters, but they may be unavoidable disasters. Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe. Against the unifying effort of Christendom and against the unifying influence of the mechanical revolution, catastrophe won—at least to the extent of achieving the Great War. We cannot tell yet how much of the winnings of catastrophe still remain to be gathered in. New falsities may arise and hold men in some unrighteous and fated scheme of order for a time, before they collapse amidst the misery and slaughter of generations.

Yet, clumsily or smoothly, the world, it seems, progresses and will progress. In this *Outline*, in our account of palæolithic men, we have borrowed a description from Mr. Worthington Smith of the very highest life in the world some fifty thousand years ago. It was a bestial life. We have sketched too the gathering for a human sacrifice, some fifteen thousand years ago. That scene again is almost incredibly cruel to a modern civilized reader.

Yet it is not more than five hundred years since the great empire of the Aztecs still believed that it could live only by the shedding of blood. Every year in Mexico hundreds of human victims died in this fashion: the body was bent like a bow over the curved stone of sacrifice, the breast was slashed open with a knife of obsidian, and the priest tore out the beating heart of the still living victim. The day may be close at hand when we shall no longer tear out the hearts of men, even for the sake of our national gods. Let the reader but refer to the earlier time charts we have given in this history, and he will see the true measure and transitoriness of all the conflicts, deprivations, and miseries of this present period of bleak and painful and yet on the whole of hopeful change.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

TO conclude this *Outline*, we give here a Table of Leading Events from the year 890 B. C. to 1920 A. D. Following that we give five time diagrams covering the period from 1,000 B. C. onward, which present the trend of events in a graphic form.

It is well that the reader should keep in mind an idea of the true proportions of historical to geological time. The scale of the five diagrams at the end is such that by it the time diagram on page 97 would be about $8\frac{1}{2}$ times as long, that is to say about 4 feet; that on page 49 showing the length of time since the first true men, about 55 feet long, that on page 28 showing the interval since the Eoliths, 555 feet, and that on page 8 representing the whole of geological time would be somewhere between 12 and, at the longest and most probable estimate, 260 miles! Let the reader therefore take one of these chronological tables we give, and imagine it extended upon a long strip of paper to a distance of 55 feet. He would have to get up and walk about that distance to note the date of the painting of the Altamira caves, and he would have to go ten times that distance by the side of the same narrow strip to reach the earlier Neanderthalers. A mile or so from home, but probably much further away, the strip might be recording the last of the dinosaurs. And this on a scale which represents the time from Columbus to ourselves by three inches of space! ¹

¹ "In order to understand the light which the discovery of the vast age of mankind casts on our present position, our relation to the past, and our hopes for the future, let us borrow with some modifications (from Heinrich Schmidt, one of Haeckel's students) an ingenious device for illustrating modern historical perspective. Let us imagine the whole history of mankind crowded into twelve hours, and that we are living at noon of the long human day. Let us, in the interest of moderation and convenient reckoning, assume that man has been upright and engaged in seeking out inventions for only two hun-

Chronology only begins to be precise enough to specify the exact year of any event after the establishment of the eras of the First Olympiad and the building of Rome.

About the year 1,000 B. C. the Aryan peoples were establishing themselves in the peninsulas of Spain, Italy, and the Balkans, and they were established in North India. Cnosos was already destroyed and the spacious times of Egypt, of Thothmes III, Amenophis III and Rameses II were three or four centuries away. Weak monarchs of the XXIst Dynasty were ruling in the Nile Valley. Israel was united under her early kings; Saul or David or possibly even Solomon may have been reigning. Sargon I (2750 B. C.) of the Akkadian Sumerian Empire was a remote memory in Babylonian history, more remote than is Constantine the Great from the world of the present day. Hammurabi had been dead a thousand years. The Assyrians were already dominating the less military Babylonians. In 1100 B. C. Tiglath Pileser I had taken Babylon. But there was no permanent conquest; Assyria and Babylonia were still separate empires. In China the new Chow dynasty was flourishing. Stonehenge in England was already a thousand years old.

The next two centuries saw a renaissance of Egypt under the XXIInd Dynasty, the splitting up of the brief little Hebrew kingdom of Solomon, the spreading of the Greeks in the Balkans, South Italy and Asia Minor, and the days of Etruscan predominance in Central Italy. We may begin our list of ascertainable dates with—

dred and forty thousand years. Each hour of our clock will represent twenty thousand years, each minute three hundred and thirty three and a third years. For over eleven and a half hours nothing was recorded. We know of no persons or events; we only infer that man was living on the earth, for we find his stone tools, bits of his pottery, and some of his pictures of mammoths and bison. Not until twenty minutes before twelve do the earliest vestiges of Egyptian and Babylonian civilization begin to appear. The Greek literature, philosophy, and science, of which we have been accustomed to speak as "ancient," are not seven minutes old. At one minute before twelve Lord Bacon wrote his *Advancement of Learning*, and not half a minute has elapsed since man first began to make the steam engine do his work for him."

B. C.

800. The building of Carthage.
790. The Ethiopian conquest of Egypt (founding the XXVth Dynasty).
776. First Olympiad.
753. Rome built.
745. Tiglath Pileser III conquered Babylonia and founded the New Assyrian Empire.
738. Menahem, king of Israel, bought off Tiglath Pileser III.
735. Greeks settling in Sicily.
722. Sargon II armed the Assyrians with iron weapons.
721. He deported the Israelites.
704. Sennacherib.
701. His army destroyed by a pestilence on its way to Egypt.
680. Esarhaddon took Thebes in Egypt (overthrowing the Ethiopian XXVth Dynasty).
667. Sardanapalus.
664. Psammetichus I restored the freedom of Egypt and founded the XXVIth Dynasty (to 610). He was assisted against Assyria by Lydian troops sent by Gyges.
608. Necho of Egypt defeated Josiah, king of Judah, at the Battle of Megiddo.
606. Capture of Nineveh by the Chaldeans and Medes. Foundation of the Chaldean Empire.
604. Necho pushed to the Euphrates and was overthrown by Nebuchadnezzar II.
586. Nebuchadnezzar carried off the Jews to Babylon. Many fled to Egypt and settled there.
550. Cyrus the Persian succeeded Cyaxares the Mede. Cyrus conquered Cræsus. Buddha lived about this time. So also did Confucius and Lao Tse.
539. Cyrus took Babylon and founded the Persian Empire.
527. Peisistratus died.

B. C.

- 525. Cambyses conquered Egypt.
- 521. Darius I, the son of Hystaspes, ruled from the Hellespont to the Indus.
His expedition to Scythia.
- 490. Battle of Marathon.
- 484. Herodotus born. Æschylus won his first prize for tragedy.
- 480. Battles of Thermopylæ and Salamis.
- 479. The Battles of Plataea and Mycale completed the repulse of Persia.
- 474. Etruscan fleet destroyed by the Sicilian Greeks.
- 470. Voyage of Hanno.
- 466. Pericles.
- 465. Xerxes murdered.
- 438. Herodotus recited his History in Athens.
- 431. Peloponnesian War began (to 404).
- 428. Pericles died. Herodotus died.
- 427. Aristophanes began his career. Plato born. He lived to 347.
- 401. Retreat of the Ten Thousand.
- 390. Brennus sacked Rome.
- 366. Camillus built the Temple of Concord.
- 359. Philip became King of Macedonia.
- 338. Battle of Chaeroneia.
- 336. Macedonian troops crossed into Asia. Philip murdered.
- 334. Battle of the Granicus.
- 333. Battle of Issus.
- 332. Alexander in Egypt.
- 331. Battle of Arbela.
- 330. Darius III killed.
- 323. Death of Alexander the Great.
- 321. Rise of Chandragupta in the Punjab. The Romans completely beaten by the Samnites at the battle of the Caudine Forks.
- 303. Chandragupta repulsed Seleucus.
- 285. Ptolemy Soter died.

B. C.

- 281. Pyrrhus invaded Italy.
- 280. Battle of Heraclea.
- 279. Battle of Ausculum.
- 278. Gauls' raid into Asia Minor and settlement in Galatia.
- 275. Pyrrhus left Italy.
- 264. First Punic War. (Asoka began to reign in Behar
—to 227.) First gladiatorial games in Rome.
- 260. Battle of Mylæ.
- 256. Battle of Ecnomus.
- 246. Shi Hwang-ti became king of Ts'in.
- 242. Battle of Ægatian Isles.
- 241. End of First Punic War.
- 225. Battle of Telamon. Roman armies in Illyria.
- 220. Shi Hwang-ti became emperor of China.
- 219. Second Punic War.
- 216. Battle of Cannæ.
- 214. Great Wall of China begun.
- 210. Death of Shi Hwang-ti.
- 202. Battle of Zama.
- 201. End of Second Punic War.
- 200-197. Rome at war with Macedonia.
- 192. War with the Seleucids.
- 190. Battle of Magnesia.
- 149. Third Punic War. (The Yueh-Chi came into West
ern Turkestan.)
- 146. Carthage destroyed. Corinth destroyed.
- 133. Attalus bequeathed Pergamum to Rome. Tiberius
Gracchus killed.
- 121. Caius Gracchus killed.
- 118. War with Jugurtha.
- 106. War with Jugurtha ended.
- 102. Marius drove back Germans.
- 100. Triumph of Marius. (Wu-ti conquering the Tarim
valley.)
- 91. Social War.
- 89. All Italians became Roman citizens.
- 86. Death of Marius.

B. C.

- 78. Death of Sulla.
- 73. The revolt of the slaves under Spartacus.
- 71. Defeat and end of Spartacus.
- 66. Pompey led Roman troops to the Caspian and Euphrates. He encountered the Alani.
- 64. Mithridates of Pontus died.
- 53. Crassus killed at Carrhæ. Mongolian elements with Parthians.
- 48. Julius Cæsar defeated Pompey at Pharsalos.
- 44. Julius Cæsar assassinated.
- 31. Battle of Actium.
- 27. Augustus Cæsar princeps (until 14 A. D.)
- 4. True date of birth of Jesus of Nazareth.

A. D. Christian Era began.

- 6. Province of Mœsia established.
- 9. Province of Pannonia established. Imperial boundary carried to the Danube.
- 14. Augustus died. Tiberius emperor.
- 30. Jesus of Nazareth crucified.
- 37. Caligula succeeded Tiberius.
- 41. Claudius (the first emperor of the legions) made emperor by pretorian guard after the murder of Caligula.
- 54. Nero succeeded Claudius.
- 61. Boadicea massacred Roman garrison in Britain.
- 68. Suicide of Nero. (Galba, Otho, Vitellus, emperor. in succession.)
- 69. Vespasian began the so-called Flavian dynasty.
- 79. Titus succeeded Vespasian.
- 81. Domitian.
- 84. North Britain annexed.
- 96. Nerva began the so-called dynasty of the Antonines.
- 98. Trajan succeeded Nerva.
- 102. Pan Chau on the Caspian Sea. (Indo-Scythians invading North India.)

A. D.

117. Hadrian succeeded Trajan. Roman Empire at its greatest extent.
138. Antonius Pius succeeded Hadrian.
(The Indo-Scythians at this time were destroying the last traces of Hellenic rule in India.)
150. [About this time Kanishka reigned in India, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan.]
161. Marcus Aurelius succeeded Antonius Pius.
164. Great plague began, and lasted to the death of M. Aurelius (180). This also devastated all Asia.
180. Death of Marcus Aurelius.
(Nearly a century of war and disorder began in the Roman Empire.)
220. End of the Han dynasty. Beginning of four hundred years of division in China.
227. Ardashir I (first Sassanid shah) put an end to Arsacid line in Persia.
242. Mani began his teaching.
247. Goths crossed Danube in a great raid.
251. Great victory of Goths. Emperor Decius killed.
260. Sapor I, the second Sassanid shah, took Antioch, captured the Emperor Valerian, and was cut up on his return from Asia Minor by Odenathus of Palmyra.
269. The Emperor Claudius defeated the Goths at Nish.
270. Aurelian became emperor.
272. Zenobia carried captive to Rome. End of the brief glories of Palmyra.
275. Probus succeeded Aurelian.
276. Goths in Pontus. The Emperor Probus forced back Franks and Alemanni.
277. Mani crucified in Persia.
284. Diocletian became emperor.
303. Diocletian persecuted the Christians.
311. Galerius abandoned the persecution of the Christians.

A. D.

- 312. Constantine the Great became emperor.
- 313. Constantine presided over a Christian Council at Arles.
- 321. Fresh Gothic raids driven back.
- 323. Constantine presided over the Council of Nicæa.
- 337. Vandals driven by Goths obtained leave to settle in Pannonia.
Constantine baptized on his deathbed.
- 354. St. Augustine born.
- 361-3. Julian the Apostate attempted to substitute Mithraism for Christianity.
- 379. Theodosius the Great (a Spaniard) emperor.
- 390. The statue of Serapis at Alexandria broken up.
- 392. Theodosius the Great emperor of east and west.
- 395. Theodosius the Great died. Honorius and Arcadius redivided the empire with Stilicho and Alaric as their masters and protectors.
- 410. The Visigoths under Alaric captured Rome.
- 425. Vandals settling in south of Spain. Huns in Pannonia, Goths in Dalmatia. Visigoths and Suevi in Portugal and North Spain. English invading Britain.
- 429. Vandals under Genseric invaded Africa.
- 439. Vandals took Carthage.
- 448. Priscus visited Attila.
- 451. Attila raided Gaul and was defeated by Franks, Alemanni, and Romans at Troyes.
- 453. Death of Attila.
- 455. Vandals sacked Rome.
- 470. Ephthalites' raid into India.
- 476. Odoacer, king of a medley of Teutonic tribes, informed Constantinople that there was no emperor in the West. End of the Western Empire.
- 480. St. Benedict born.
- 481. Clovis in France. The Merovingians.
- 483. Nestorian church broke away from the Orthodox Christian church.

A. D.

493. Theodoric, the Ostrogoth, conquered Italy and became King of Italy, but was nominally subject to Constantinople.
(Gothic kings in Italy. Goths settled on special confiscated lands as a garrison.)
527. Justinian emperor.
528. Mihiragula, the (Ephthalite) Attila of India, overthrown.
529. Justinian closed the schools at Athens, which had flourished nearly a thousand years. Belisarius (Justinian's general) took Naples.
531. Chosroes I began to reign.
543. Great plague in Constantinople.
544. St. Benedict died.
553. Goths expelled from Italy by Justinian. Cassiodorus founded his monastery.
565. Justinian died. The Lombards conquered most of North Italy (leaving Ravenna and Rome Byzantine). The Turks broke up the Ephthalites in Western Turkestan.
570. Muhammad born.
579. Chosroes I died.
(The Lombards dominant in Italy.)
590. Plague raged in Rome. (Gregory the Great—Gregory I—and the vision of St. Angelo.) Chosroes II began to reign.
610. Heraclius began to reign.
619. Chosroes II held Egypt, Jerusalem, Damascus, and had armies on Hellespont. Tang dynasty began in China.
622. The Hegira.
623. Battle of Badr.
627. Great Persian defeat at Nineveh by Heraclius. The Meccan Allies besieged Medina. Tai Tsung became Emperor of China.
628. Kavadh II murdered and succeeded his father, Chosroes II.

A. D.

- Muhammad wrote letters to all the rulers of the earth.
629. Yuan Chwang started for India. Muhammad entered Mecca.
632. Muhammad died. Abu Bekr Caliph.
634. Battle of the Yarmuk. Moslems took Syria. Omar second Caliph.
635. Tai Tsung received Nestorian missionaries.
637. Battle of Kadessia.
638. Jerusalem surrendered to Omar.
642. Heraclius died.
643. Othman third Caliph.
645. Yuan Chwang returned to Singan.
655. Defeat of the Byzantine fleet by the Moslems.
656. Othman murdered at Medina.
661. Ali murdered.
662. Moawija Caliph. (First of the Omayyad caliphs.)
668. The Caliph Moawija attacked Constantinople by sea—Theodore of Tarsus became Archbishop of Canterbury.
675. Last of the sea attacks by Moawija on Constantinople.
687. Pepin of Hersthal, mayor of the palace, reunited Austrasia and Neustria.
711. Moslem army invaded Spain from Africa.
714. Charles Martel, mayor of the palace.
715. The domains of the Caliph Walid I extended from the Pyrenees to China.
- 717-18. Suleiman, son and successor of Walid, failed to take Constantinople. The Omayyad line passed its climax.
732. Charles Martel defeated the Moslems near Poitiers.
735. Death of the Venerable Bede.
743. Walid II Caliph—the unbelieving Caliph.
749. Overthrow of the Omayyads. Abdul Abbas, the first Abbasid Caliph. Spain remained Omayyad. Beginning of the break-up of the Arab Empire.

A. D.

751. Pepin crowned King of the French.
755. Martyrdom of St. Boniface.
768. Pepin died.
771. Charlemagne sole king.
774. Charlemagne conquered Lombardy.
776. Charlemagne in Dalmatia.
786. Haroun al Raschid Abbasid Caliph in Bagdad (to 809).
795. Leo III became Pope (to 816).
800. Leo crowned Charlemagne Emperor of the West.
802. Egbert, formerly an English refugee at the court of Charlemagne, established himself as King of Wessex.
810. Krum of Bulgaria defeated and killed the Emperor Nicephorus.
814. Charlemagne died, Louis the Pious succeeds him.
828. Egbert became first King of England.
843. Louis the Pious died, and the Carlovingian Empire went to pieces. Until 962 there was no regular succession of Holy Roman Emperors, though the title appeared intermittently.
850. About this time Rurik (a Northman) became ruler of Novgorod and Kieff.
852. Boris first Christian King of Bulgaria (to 884).
865. The fleet of the Russians (Northmen) threatened Constantinople.
886. The Treaty of Alfred of England and Guthrum the Dane, establishing the Danes in the Danelaw.
904. Russian (Northmen) fleet off Constantinople.
912. Rolf the Ganger established himself in Normandy.
919. Henry the Fowler elected King of Germany.
928. Marozia imprisoned Pope John X.
931. John XI Pope (to 936).
936. Otto I became King of Germany in succession to his father, Henry the Fowler.
941. Russian fleet again threatened Constantinople.
955. John XII Pope.

A. D.

960. Northern Sung Dynasty began in China.
962. Otto I, King of Germany, crowned Emperor (first Saxon Emperor) by John XII.
963. Otto deposed John XII.
969. Separate Fatimite Caliphate set up in Egypt.
973. Otto II.
983. Otto III.
987. Hugh Capet became King of France. End of the Carolingian line of French kings.
1016. Canute became King of England, Denmark, and Norway.
1037. Avicenna of Bokhara, the Prince of Physicians, died.
1043. Russian fleet threatened Constantinople.
1066. Conquest of England by William, Duke of Normandy.
1071. Revival of Islam under the Seljuk Turks. Battle of Melasgird.
1073. Hildebrand became Pope (Gregory VII) to 1085.
1077. Henry IV does penance at Canossa.
1082. Robert Guiscard captured Durazzo.
1084. Robert Guiscard sacked Rome.
1087-99. Urban II Pope.
1094. Pestilence.
1095. Urban II at Clermont summoned the First Crusade.
1096. Massacre of the People's Crusade.
1099. Godfrey of Bouillon captured Jerusalem. Paschal II Pope (to 1118).
1138. Kin Empire flourished. The Sung capital shifted from Nanking to Hang Chau.
1147. The Second Crusade. Foundation of the Christian Kingdom of Portugal.
1169. Saladin Sultan of Egypt.
1176. Frederick Barbarossa acknowledged supremacy of the Pope (Alexander III) at Venice.
1187. Saladin captured Jerusalem.
1189. The Third Crusade.

A. D.

1198. Averroes of Cordoba, the Arab philosopher, died. Innocent III Pope (to 1216). Frederick II (aged four), King of Sicily, became his ward.
1202. The Fourth Crusade attacked the Eastern Empire.
1204. Capture of Constantinople by the Latins.
1206. Kutub founded Moslem state at Delhi.
1212. The Children's Crusade.
1214. Jenghis Khan took Peking.
1215. Magna Carta signed.
1216. Honorius III Pope.
1218. Jengis Khan invaded Kharismia.
1221. Failure and return of the Fifth Crusade. St. Dominis died (the Dominicans).
1226. St. Francis of Assisi died. (The Franciscans.)
1227. Jengis Khan died, Khan from the Caspian to the Pacific, and was succeeded by Ogdai Khan. Gregory IX Pope.
1228. Frederick II embarked upon the Sixth Crusade, and acquired Jerusalem.
1234. Mongols completed conquest of the Kin Empire with the help of the Sung Empire.
1239. Frederick II excommunicated for the second time.
1240. Mongols destroyed Kieff. Russia tributary to the Mongols.
1241. Mongol victory at Liegnitz in Silesia.
1244. The Egyptian Sultan recaptured Jerusalem. This led to the Seventh Crusade.
1245. Frederick II re-excommunicated. The men of Schwyz burnt the castle of New Habsburg.
1250. St. Louis of France ransomed. Frederick II, the last Hohenstaufen Emperor died. German interregnum until 1273.
1251. Mangu Khan became Great Khan. Kublai Khan governor of China.
1258. Hulagu Khan took and destroyed Bagdad.
1260. Kublai Khan became Great Khan. Ketboga defeated in Palestine

A.D.

- 1261. The Greeks recaptured Constantinople from the Latins.
- 1269. Kublai Khan sent a message of inquiry to the Pope by the older Polos.
- 1271. Marco Polo started upon his travels.
- 1273. Rudolph of Habsburg elected Emperor. The Swiss formed their Everlasting League.
- 1280. Kublai Khan founded the Yuan Dynasty in China.
- 1292. Death of Kublai Khan.
- 1293. Roger Bacon, the prophet of experimental science, died.
- 1294. Boniface VIII Pope (to 1303).
- 1295. Marco Polo returned to Venice.
- 1303. Death of Pope Boniface VIII after the outrage of Anagni by Guillaume de Nogaret.
- 1305. Clement V Pope. The papal court set up at Avignon.
- 1308. Duns Scotus died.
- 1318. Four Franciscans burnt for heresy at Marseilles.
- 1347. Occam died.
- 1348. The Great Plague, the Black Death.
- 1358. The Jacquerie in France.
- 1360. In China the Mogul (Yuan) Dynasty fell, and was succeeded by the Ming Dynasty (to 1644).
- 1367. Timurlane assumed the title of Great Khan.
- 1377. Pope Gregory XI returned to Rome.
- 1378. The Great Schism. Urban VI in Rome. Clement VII at Avignon.
- 1381. Peasant revolt in England. Wat Tyler murdered in the presence of King Richard II.
- 1384. Wycliffe died.
- 1398. Huss preached Wycliffism at Prague.
- 1405. Death of Timurlane.
- 1414-18. The Council of Constance. Huss burnt (1415).
- 1417. The Great Schism ended, Martin V Pope.
- 1420. The Hussites revolted. Martin V preached a crusade against them.

A. D.

1431. The Catholic Crusaders dissolved before the Hussites at Domazlice. The Council of Basle met.
1436. The Hussites came to terms with the church.
1439. Council of Basle created a fresh schism in the church.
1445. Discovery of Cape Verde by the Portuguese.
1446. First printed books (Coster in Haarlem).
1449. End of the Council of Basle.
1453. Ottoman Turks under Muhammad II took Constantinople.
1480. Ivan III, Grand-duke of Moscow, threw off the Mongol allegiance.
1481. Death of the Sultan Muhammad II while preparing for the conquest of Italy. Bayazid II Turkish Sultan (to 1512).
1486. Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope.
1492. Columbus crossed the Atlantic to America. Rodrigo Borgia, Alexander VI, Pope (to 1503).
1493. Maximilian I became Emperor.
1498. Vasco da Gama sailed round the Cape to India.
1499. Switzerland became an independent republic.
1500. Charles V born.
1509. Henry VIII King of England.
1512. Selim Sultan (to 1520). He bought the title of Caliph. Fall of Soderini (and Machiavelli) in Florence.
1513. Leo X Pope.
1515. Francis I King of France.
1517. Selim annexed Egypt. Luther propounded his theses at Wittenberg.
1519. Leonardo da Vinci died. Magellan's expedition started to sail round the world. Cortez entered Mexico city.
1520. Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan (to 1566), who ruled from Bagdad to Hungary. Charles V Emperor.

A. D.

- 1521. Luther at the Diet of Worms. Loyola wounded at Pampeluna.
- 1525. Baber won the battle of Panipat, captured Delhi, and founded the Mogul Empire.
- 1527. The German troops in Italy, under the Constable of Bourbon, took and pillaged Rome.
- 1529. Suleiman besieged Vienna.
- 1530. Pizarro invaded Peru. Charles V crowned by the Pope. Henry VIII began his quarrel with the Papacy.
- 1532. The Anabaptists seized Münster.
- 1535. Fall of the Anabaptist rule in Münster.
- 1539. The Society of Jesus founded.
- 1543. Copernicus died.
- 1545. The Council of Trent (to 1563) assembled to put the church in order.
- 1546. Martin Luther died.
- 1547. Ivan IV (the Terrible) took the title of Tsar of Russia. Francis I died.
- 1549. First Jesuit missions arrived in South America.
- 1552. Treaty of Passau. Temporary pacification of Germany.
- 1556. Charles V abdicated. Akbar Great Mogul (to 1605). Ignatius of Loyola died.
- 1558. Death of Charles V.
- 1563. End of the Council of Trent and the reform of the Catholic Church.
- 1564. Galileo born.
- 1566. Suleiman the Magnificent died.
- 1567. Revolt of the Netherlands.
- 1568. Execution of Counts Egmont and Horn.
- 1571. Kepler born.
- 1573. Siege of Alkmaar.
- 1578. Harvey born.
- 1583. Sir Walter Raleigh's expedition to Virginia.
- 1601. Tycho Brahe died.

A. D.

1603. James I King of England and Scotland. Dr. Gilbert died.
1605. Jehangir Great Mogul.
1606. Virginia Company founded.
1609. Holland independent.
1618. Thirty Years War began.
1620. *Mayflower* expedition founded New Plymouth. First negro slaves landed at Jamestown (Va.).
1625. Charles I of England.
1626. Sir Francis Bacon (Lord Verulam) died.
1628. Shah Jehan Great Mogul. The English *Petition of Right*.
1629. Charles I of England began his eleven years of rule without a parliament.
1630. Kepler died.
1632. Leeuwenhoek born. Gustavus Adolphus killed at the Battle of Lützen.
1634. Wallenstein murdered.
1638. Japan closed to Europeans (until 1865).
1640. Charles I of England summoned the Long Parliament.
1641. Massacre of the English in Ireland.
1642. Galileo died. Newton born.
1643. Louis XIV began his reign of seventy-two years.
1644. The Manchus ended the Ming dynasty.
1645. Swine pens in the inner town of Leipzig pulled down.
1648. Treaty of Westphalia. Thereby Holland and Switzerland were recognized as free republics and Prussia became important. The treaty gave a complete victory neither to the Imperial Crown nor to the Princes.
War of the Fronde; it ended in the complete victory of the French crown.
1649. Execution of Charles I of England.
1658. Aurungzeb Great Mogul. Cromwell died.

A. D.

1660. Charles II of England.
1674. Nieuw Amsterdam finally became British by treaty and was renamed New York.
1683. The last Turkish attack on Vienna defeated by John III of Poland.
1688. The British Revolution. Flight of James II. William and Mary began to reign.
1689. Peter the Great of Russia. (To 1725.)
1690. Battle of the Boyne in Ireland.
1694. Voltaire born.
1701. Frederick I first King of Prussia.
1704. John Locke, the father of modern democratic theory, died.
1707. Death of Aurungzeb. The empire of the Great Mogul disintegrated.
1713. Frederick the Great of Prussia born.
1714. George I of Britain.
1715. Louis XV of France.
1727. Newton died. George II of Britain.
1732. Oglethorpe founded Georgia.
1736. Nadir Shah raided India. (The beginning of twenty years of raiding and disorder in India.)
1740. Maria-Theresa began to reign. (Being a woman, she could not be empress. Her husband, Francis I, was emperor after 1745 until his death in 1765, when her son, Joseph II, succeeded him.)
Accession of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia.
1741. The Empress Elizabeth of Russia began to reign.
- 1755-63. Britain and France struggled for America and India. France in alliance with Austria and Russia against Prussia and Britain (1756-63); the Seven Years War.
1757. Battle of Plassey.
1759. The British general, Wolfe, took Quebec.
1760. George III of Britain.
1762. The Empress Elizabeth of Russia died. Murder of

A. D.

Tsar Paul, and accession of Catherine the Great of Russia (to 1796).

1763. Peace of Paris; Canada ceded to Britain. British dominant in India.

1764. Battle of Buxar.

1769. Napoleon Bonaparte born.

1774. Louis XVI began his reign. Suicide of Clive. The American revolutionary drama began.

1775. Battle of Lexington.

1776. Declaration of Independence by the United States of America.

1778. J. J. Rousseau, the creator of modern democratic sentiment, died.

1780. End of the reign of Maria-Theresa. The Emperor Joseph (1765 to 1790) succeeded her in the hereditary Habsburg dominions.

1783. Treaty of Peace between Britain and the new United States of America. Quaco set free in Massachusetts.

1787. The Constitutional Convention of Philadelphia set up the Federal Government of the United States. France discovered to be bankrupt. The Assembly of the Notables.

1788. First Federal Congress of the United States at New York.

1789. The French States-General assembled. Storming of the Bastille.

1791. The Jacobin Revolution. Flight to Varennes.

1792. France declared war on Austria. Prussia declared war on France. Battle of Valmy France became a republic.

1793. Louis XVI beheaded.

1794. Execution of Robespierre and end of the Jacobin republic. Rule of the Convention.

1795. The Directory. Bonaparte suppressed a revolt and went to Italy as commander-in-chief.

A. D.

1797. By the Peace of Campo Formio Bonaparte destroyed the Republic of Venice.
1798. Bonaparte went to Egypt. Battle of the Nile.
1799. Bonaparte returned. He became First Consul with enormous powers.
1800. Legislative union of Ireland and England enacted January 1st, 1801.
Napoleon's campaign against Austria. Battles of Marengo (in Italy) and Hohenlinden (Moreau's victory).
1801. Preliminaries of peace between France, England, and Austria signed.
1803. Bonaparte occupied Switzerland, and so precipitated war.
1804. Bonaparte became Emperor. Francis II took the title of Emperor of Austria in 1805, and in 1806 he dropped the title of Holy Roman Emperor. So the "Holy Roman Empire" came to an end.
1805. Battle of Trafalgar. Battles of Ulm and Austerlitz.
1806. Prussia overthrown at Jena.
1807. Battles of Eylau and Friedland and Treaty of Tilsit.
1808. Napoleon made his brother Joseph King of Spain.
1810. Spanish America became republican.
1811. Alexander withdrew from the "Continental System."
1812. Moscow.
1814. Abdication of Napoleon. Louis XVIII.
1815. The Waterloo campaign. The Treaty of Vienna.
1819. The First Factory Act passed through the efforts of Robert Owen.
1821. The Greek revolt.
1824. Charles X of France.
1825. Nicolas I of Russia. First railway, Stockton to Darlington.
1827. Battle of Navarino.
1829. Greece independent.

A.D.


- 1830. A year of disturbance. Louis Philippe ousted Charles X. Belgium broke away from Holland. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha became king of this new country, Belgium. Russian Poland revolted ineffectually.
- 1832. The First Reform Bill in Britain restored the democratic character of the British Parliament.
- 1835. The word socialism first used.
- 1837. Queen Victoria
- 1840. Queen Victoria married Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.
- 1848. Another year of disturbance. Republics in France and Rome. The Panslavic conference at Prague. All Germany united in a parliament at Frankfort. German unity destroyed by the King of Prussia.
- 1851. The Great Exhibition of London.
- 1852. Napoleon III Emperor of the French.
- 1854. Perry (second expedition) landed in Japan. Nicholas I occupied the Danubian provinces of Turkey.
- 1854-56. Crimean War.
- 1856. Alexander II of Russia.
- 1857. The Indian Mutiny.
- 1858. Robert Owen died.
- 1859. Franco-Austrian war. Battles of Magenta and Solferino.
- 1861. Victor Emmanuel First King of Italy. Abraham Lincoln became President, U. S. A. The American Civil War began.
- 1863. British bombarded a Japanese town.
- 1864. Maximilian became Emperor of Mexico.
- 1865. Surrender of Appomattox Court House. Japan opened to the world.
- 1866. Prussia and Italy attacked Austria (and the south German states in alliance with her). Battle of Sadowa.


A.D.

1867. The Emperor Maximilian shot.
1870. Napoleon III declared war against Prussia.
1871. Paris surrendered (January). The King of Prussia became William I, "German Emperor."
The Peace of Frankfort.
1875. The "Bulgarian atrocities."
1877. Russo-Turkish War. Treaty of San Stefano.
Queen Victoria became Empress of India.
1878. The Treaty of Berlin. The Armed Peace of forty-six years began in western Europe.
1881. The Battle of Majuba Hill. The Transvaal free.
1883. Britain occupied Egypt.
1886. Gladstone's first Irish Home Rule Bill.
1888. Frederick II (March), William II (June), German Emperors.
1890. Bismarck dismissed. Heligoland ceded to Germany by Lord Salisbury.
1894-5. Japanese war with China.
1895. "Unionist" (Imperialist) government in Britain.
1896. Battle of Adowa.
1898. The Fashoda quarrel between France and Britain.
Germany acquired Kiau-Chau.
1899. The war in South Africa began (Boer war).
1900. The Boxer risings in China. Siege of the Legations at Peking.
1904. The British invaded Tibet.
1904-5. Russo-Japanese war.
1906. The "Unionist" (Imperialist) party in Great Britain defeated by the Liberals upon the question of tariffs.
1907. The Confederation of South Africa established.
1908. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1909. M. Bleriot flew in an aeroplane from France to England.
1911. Italy made war on Turkey and seized Tripoli.
1912. China became a republic.

A.D.

1913. The Balkan league made war on Turkey. Bloodshed at Londonderry in Ireland caused by "Unionist" gun running.
1914. The Great War in Europe began (for which see special time chart pp. 576-7).
1917. The two Russian revolutions. Establishment of the Bolshevik régime in Russia.
1918. (Nov.) The Armistice.
- 1919-1920. The Peace of Versailles.
1919. The British withdrew from Archangel. Denikin was defeated. Yudenitch nearly took Petersburg. Koltchak retreated into Siberia.
1920. First meeting of the League of Nations, from which Germany, Austria, Russia, and Turkey were excluded, and at which the United States was not represented. Koltchak was shot. Poland attacked Russia, and Wrangel invaded her from the south and was driven off.
1921. The Conference at Washington under President Harding.
1922. The great Famine in Russia. The Conference at Genoa.





INDEX

4

1

1

11

9

206.

1

1

21

1

INDEX

NOTE.—The Roman numerals I, II, III, IV, indicate the volume; the Arabic figures 1, 2, 3, etc., indicate the page number.

A

AAE (ar) VALLEY, III 883
 Aaronson, Aaron, I 169
 Abbasids (ā bās' idz), II 703, 709,
 III 738, 743, 749, 784, 806, IV
 1316
 Abd Manif (abd man ēf'), II 675
 Abdal Malik (abd al ma'lik), II
 701
 Abelard, P., III 854
 Abolitionist Movement, IV 1135
 Aboukir (a boo kēr'), III 1043-
 44
Aboukir, cruiser, IV 1217
 Abraham the Patriarch, I 181,
 271, 273, 285, 286, II 593, 676
 Absolutism, III 898
 Abu Bekr (a' boo bek' ěr), II 676,
 678, 684, 688, 689, 690, 692,
 707, IV 1316
 Abul Abbas, II 704, IV 1316
 Abul Fazl (a' bool fa'zl), III 816
 Abydos (ā hī' dos), I 344-49
 Abyssinia, I 159, 163, II 693, IV
 1155
 Abyssinian Christians, II 621-38
 -672-77; language, I 156
 Academy, Greek, I 362-65
 Academy of Inscriptions, III 998
 Acre, I 201, III 1044
 Acropolis (ā krop' ō lis), I 315-
 46
 Act of Union, IV 1189
 Actium (āk' ti ūm), battle of, II
 528, IV 1312
 Acts of the Apostles, II 604-6
 Adam and Eve, IV 1108
 Adams, Prof. G. B., III 720
 Adams, John, III 985
 Adams, Samuel, III 975, 989

Adams, William, IV 1160
 Addington, III 1051
 Aden, I 163, 183, II 705, IV 1167
 Adowa (a' dō wa), battle of, IV
 1165, 1198, 1328
 Adrianople, II 571, III 803, IV
 1198; Treaty of, III 1072
 Adriatic, I 267, II 399, 464, 473,
 484, 556, 579, 623, 635, III 727,
 758, 1056, IV 1205
 Adriatic river, I 117-18
 Ægæan Isles, II 482, IV 1311
 Ægean (ē jē' ěn) cities, I 223;
 civilization, I 201-2, 274, 309;
 Dark Whites, II 458; hunters, I
 327
 Ægina (ē jī' nā), I 346
 Æneid (ē' nē id), the, II 458
 Æolic dialect, I 310
 Aeroplanes, I 3, IV 1082, 1215,
 1219
 Aeschylus (ēs' kil ūs), I 209, IV
 1310
 Afghanistan, I 156, 187, II 444,
 446, 647, 648, 665, III 812, 941
 Afghans III 793
 Afrasyab, sayings of, III 788
 Africa, I 58, 108, 114, 147, 158,
 159, 166, 274, II 502, 522, III
 793, 821; peoples of, I 85, 108,
 140, 142, 144, 162-63, 183, 193,
 201, 223, III 836; languages of,
 I 161-63; early trade with,
 I 205, 266; Moslems in, II
 694, 697, 704, III 716, 727, 743,
 746, IV 1316; voyages and trav-
 els in, I 205, II 522, III 868-72,
 935; Phœnicians in, II 459, 586,
 662; Roman, II 481, 490-

- 96, 512, 579, 623; Vandals in, II 572, 623, 635, IV 1314; slavery in, III 877, 912; modern exploitation of, III 1031-37, IV 1144, 1154
- Africa, Central, I 162, II 485; East, I 41, 304; South (*see* South Africa, West, II 208, III 899)
- African lung fish, I 24
- Agincourt, III 862
- Agriculture, early, I 103, 111, 112, 131, 138, 162, 175, 245, 297; slaves in, I 251; Arab knowledge of, II 711; in Great Britain, III 957-60
- Agriculturists, I 256, 259, 264
- Agrimentum (äg ri men' tūm), II 480
- Agrippina (äg ri pī' nā), II 539
- Ahriman (a' ri mān), II 645-46
- Ainu (i' noo), I 140, III 946, IV 1160
- Air, the, I 3, 21
- Aisne (ān), IV 1212; battle of the, III 723
- Aix-la-Chapelle, III 742
- Akbar (ak' bār), III 814, 817, 939, IV 1322
- Akhnaton (ak na' ton), I 241. (*See* Amenophis IV)
- Akkadia (and Akkadians), I 175, 235
- Akkadian-Sumerian Empire, I 181, IV 1308
- Alabama, the, IV 1128, 1140
- Alamanni, II 570, III 724, IV 1314
- Alans, II 566, 571, 642, IV 1312
- Alaric (āl' ā rik), II 571, 579, IV 1314
- Alaska, I 197, IV 1201
- Alban, St., III 725
- Alban Mount, II 459
- Albert, Prince Consort, IV 1120, 1182, 1327
- Albigenses (āl bi jen' sēz), III 771-75
- Alcares (āl car' ez), III 893
- Alchemists, III 857
- Alcibiades (āl si bi' ā dēz), I 362
- Alemæonidæ (älk mē on' i dē), I 323
- Alcohol, discovery of, II 711
- Aleuin (āl' kwin), III 736
- Alemanni. (*See* Alamanni)
- Aleppo, III 754
- Alexander the Great, I 180, 184, 186, 192, 205, 242, 243, 269, 355, 365, 366, 374, II 409, 411, 422, 441, 457, 465, 479, 519, 522, 538, 558, 563, 580, 615, 665, III 727, 751, 794, 827, 883, 989, IV 1310; empire of (maps), II 403, 407; mother of, II 465
- Alexander, son of Alexander the Great, II 404
- Alexander II, king of Egypt, II 512
- Alexander I, tsar of Russia, III 1054-59, 1063-65, 1071, IV 1101, 1170, 1172, 1326
- Alexander II, tsar of Russia, IV 1327
- Alexander III (pope), III 777, IV 1318
- Alexander VI (pope), III 879, IV 1321
- Alexandretta, II 388, 391
- Alexandria, I II 391, 398, 405-6, 425, 441, 475, 510, 541, 548, 554, 580, 605, 709, III 770, 1043, 1047; IV 1314, museum at, I 367, II 413, 421, 488, 503, 657; culture and religion of, I 367, II 423, 608, 620, 710; library at, II 415, 421; Serapeum, II 424, 425
- Alexandrian cities, I 266
- Alexius Comnenus (ä lek' si ūs kom nē' nūs), III 750-57
- Alfred, king, III 730, 830, IV 1317
- Algæ, I 7
- Algebra (äl' je brā), I 207, II 711, III 768
- Algeria, I 100, 206
- Algiers, III 806, 911, IV 1165
- Ali (a' lē), nephew of Muhammad,

- II 676, 678, 684, 698, 703, III 743, IV 1316
 Alkmaar (alk mar'), siege of, III 901, 904
 Allah, II 679, 692, 698-99
 Alleghany mountains, III 965
 Allen, Grant, I 133
 Alp Arslan (alp arslan'), III 750
 Alphabets, I 218, 219, 311, II 435, 647, 659-61
 Alpine Race, I 142
 Alps, the, I, 32, 53, 75, II 483, 487, 520, 623, III 734 740, 878
 Alsace, II 570, III 884, 918, 928 IV 1131
 Alstadt, III 864
 Altai (al' ti), the, II 563, 654
 Altamira (al tă mēr' ä), cave of, I 93, IV 1307
 Aluminium, IV 1078
 Alva, General, III 900-03
 Alyattes (ä li ät' ez), I 325
 Amadis (äm' ä dis) de Gaul, III 848
 Ambar, III 817
 Amber, I 105, 115, II 548-49
 Amenophis (äm ě nō' fis) II, I 280
 Amenophis III, I 185, 208, 236, 240
 Amenophis IV, I 181, 208, 236, 240-41, 246, 273, II 422, 458
 America, I 58, 59, 101, 208, III 939, IV 1090; prehistoric, I 101, 108, 148, 150, 194, 195; races of, I 139, 142, 161, 194; languages of, I 161; discovery of, II 656, 662, III 729, 763, 797, 869, 877, 936, 954, IV 1321; European settlements in, III 935-39, 956-58, 964-79, 990, IV 1324.
See also United States
 America South, I 193, III 849, 872, 875-77, 1066, IV 1152, 1322, 1326
 American Indians, I 112, 123, 139, 148, 161-63, 215, III 849, 874, 939, IV 1160
 American king-crab, I 7
 American population, I 150
 Amiens, III 1047, IV 1228
 Amir, III 804
 Amirs, III 788
 Amman (Philadelphia), II 641, 643
 Ammon, I 240, 241, II 392, 409, 423, 619
 Ammonites, I 46
 Ammonites, a people, I 286
 Amœba (ä mē' bā), I 13
 Amorites, I 176, 272
 Amos the prophet, I 287
 Amphibia, I 24, 26, 28, 53-54, 55
 Amphictyonies (äm fik' ti ōn iz), I 322, II 674, 679
 Amphion, cruiser, IV 1210
 Amphipolis (äm fip' ō lis), II 380
 Amritzar (äm rit' sār), IV 1151
 Amur (a moor'), III 944
 Anabaptists, III 839-45, IV 1322
 Anabasis (ä nāb' ä sis), the, I 352
 Anagni (a nan' yē), III 779, IV 1320
 Anatolia, III 750, 800
 Anatolian peninsula, II 643
 Anatomy, II 413, 414, III 860
 Anaxagoras (än äk säg' ō rās), I 359, 366, 372
 Andaman (än' dā măn) Islands, I 140
 Andes, I 32, 53
 Angelo, St., IV 1315
 Angles, II 572, 623, III 725, 730, 744
 Anglia, East, III 716
 Anglo-Norman feudalism, III 719
 "Anglo-Saxon," IV 1183
 Anglo-Saxons, II 582, 623, 630, III 722, 811, 832
 Animals, I 7, 17-18, 21-22, 55, 56, 64, 66, 101, 110, 114, 125, 245.
(See also Mammals)
 Anio, the, II 469, 628
 Anna Comnena (kom nē' nă), III 758
 Annam, II 654, 662, III 946, IV 1164, 1165
 Anne, queen, III 913
 Antarctic birds, I 44
 Antigonus (än tig' ō nās), II 405
 Antimony, I 106
 Antioch, II 544, 606, 621, 636, 641, 691, III 756, IV 1313

- Antiochus (än tī ō kūs) III, II 486, 494, 496
 Antiochus IV, II 588
 Antonines, II 542, 546, 554, 560, IV 1312
 Antoninus (än tō nī' nūs), Marcus Aurelius, II 542, 543, 557, III 835, IV 1313
 Antoninus Pius, II 542, 551, IV 1313
 Antony, II 526, 528
 Antwerp, III 864, 867
 Anu, I 235
 Anubis (ä nū' bis), Egyptian god, I 225
 Anytus (än' itūs), I 362
 Apamea (äp ä' mē' ä), II 641
 Apes, I 63, 67, 70, 221; anthropoid, I 61, 63, 66
 Aphelion, I 28, 30
 Apion, II 512
 Apis (ä' pis), II 391, 608
 Apollo, I 322, 333, II 629
 Apollonius (ä pō lō' ni ūs), II 413
 Appian Way, II 472, 518
 Apples, I 112
 Appomattox Court House, IV 1327
 Aquileia (ä kwē lā' yä), II 473, 577
 Aquinas (ä kwī' nūs), III 854
 Arabia, I 108, 119, 156, 158, 163, 172, 181, 207, 219, 265, 273, 288, II 411, 549, 638, 644, 655, 671, 672, 676, 682, 689, 690, 698, III 727, 754, 783. (*See also* Arabs)
 Arabian Nights, the, II 704
 Arabic language and literature, I 157, 159, II 546, 701, 704, 708 III 842
 Arabs, I 235, II 586, 655, 671, 679, 688, 691, 693, 700, 704, 712, III 716, 738, 794, 831, 842; culture of, II 708-13, III 351
 Aral sea, I 156, 163, II 397
 Aral-Caspian region, I 326
 Arameans, I 178, 251, 257, II 586, 652, 671
 Aramic, II 647
 Arbela (ar bē' lä), battle of, II 393, 491, IV 1310
 Arcadius, II 571, IV 1314
 Archæopteryx (ar kē op' tēr iks), I 44
 Archæozoic (ar kē ō zō' ik) period, I 28. (*See also* Azoic)
 Archers, II 379
 Archimedes (ar ki mē' dēz), II 413, 488, 550
 Architecture, III 737, 865
 Arctic birds, I 44; circle, II 653; Ocean, I 156; seas, III 823
 Ardashir (ar dā shēr'), I, II 636, 645, IV 1313
 Ardennes, IV 1211
 Argentine republic, I 164, IV 1152
 Argon, III 799
 Argonne, III 1018
 Argos, II 465
 Ariadne (äri äd' ni), I 204
 Arians (äri änz), II 610, 618
 Aridæus (äri dē' ūs), II 383, 404
 Aristagoras (äri s tāg' ō rās), I 351
 Aristarchus, II 392
 Aristides (äri s tī' dēz), I 321, 346, 357
 Aristocracy, I 173, 259, 316
 Aristodemus (äri s tō dē' mūs), I 345
 Aristophanes (äri s tof' ä nēz), I 210, IV 1310
 Aristotle, I 208, 313, 323, 365-7 II 387, 391, 401, 408, 412, 422, 448, 506, 546, 580, 708, 710, III 768-69, 828, 851, 856, 928; *Politics* of, I 317, 320, II 474, 478
 Arithmetic, I 207
 Arius (äri' ūs), II 610, 618
 Arizona, IV 1201
 Ark of bulrushes, I 197
 Ark of the Covenant, I 236, 275, 280
 Arles (arl), II 618, 627, IV 1314
 Armadillo, giant, I 101, 194
 Armenia (and the Armenians), I 295, 328, II 405, 518, 538, 542, 564, 566, 620, 636, 640, III 743, 749, 794, 798, 801, 836
 Armenian language, I 154, 295
 Arno, II 464, 473
 Arras, III 1012, IV 1214
 Arrow, II 520

- Arrow heads, I 103, 104, 113, 130
 Arrow straighteners, I 89
 Arsacids (ar sās'idz), II 538, IV 1313
 Arses, I 352
 Art, Buddhist, II 441; Cretan, I 201, 202; Neolithic, I 127; Palæolithic, I 91-92, 96, 122, 130
 Artabanus¹ (ar tǎ bā'nās), I 344
 Artaxerxes II, I 352, 370
 Artaxerxes III, I 352
 Artillery, II 380, III 804
 Artisans, I 256, 264
 Artois (ar twa'), Count of. (*See* Charles X)
 Aryan, languages and literature, I 154, 159, 164, 166, 292, 293-94, 299, II 396, 458, 647, III 930; peoples and civilizations, I 129, 154, 161, 181, 234, 237, 274, 291, 294, 298, 299, 313, 324, 325, 328, II 397, 427-28, 458, 459, 561, 566, 568, 576, III 826, 851, 867, 874
 Aryan Way, the, II 429, 435, 437, 447, 454, 461
 As, Roman coin, II 483
 Ascalon, I 274
 Asceticism, II 432
 Ashdod, I 236, 274
 Ashtaroth (āsh'tǎ roth), I 275, 278, 280
 Asia, general and early period, I 58, 65, 73, 74, 86, 100, 106, 115, 156, 158-63, 182, 266, 294 323, 325, II 552, 563, 568, 575, 644, 648, III 749, 779, 784-86, 794, 836, 851, 869, 930, IV 1158, 9, 1313; Greeks in, I 335, II 385, 399, 405; Romans in, II 408, 492, 512, 549, 556; tribes and people of, II 520, 561, 569, III 793, 807, 814, 817, 944, 951; Christianity in, II 531, 615, 620, 637, III 749, 793, 796; Turks in, II 638, 639, 696, 701, III 727, 743, 744, 801, 803; voyages and travels in, II 648, 665, III 872, 877, IV 1156-57
 Asia, Central, I 100, 139, 162, 163, 294, 326, II 558, 705, III 788, 821, 878, 943-44-45; tribes, people, and civilization of, I 172, II 396, 519, 621, III 807
 Asia, Eastern, I 139, 142, II 664
 Asia, Southeastern, languages of, I 160
 Asia, Western, I 88, 147, III 784, 851; tribes, people, and civilization of, I 142, 207, 223, III 851
 Asia Minor, I 106, 155, 209, 258, 294, 327, 335, II 405, 531, 637, 641, 701, III 792, 818; tribes and people of, I 201, 274, 324, 325, II 397, 458; Greeks in, I 310, 311, 317, 324, 350, IV 1313; Gauls in, II 405, 462, IV 1311; Turks in, II 701, 706; III 749, 784, 792, 801; IV 1281
 Asiatics, intellectual status of, IV 1157
 Asoka (a sō'ka), King, I 181, II 422, 444, 446, 502, 649, 668, III 814, IV 1311
 Aspasia (ās pā'shi ā), I 356, 361
 Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., IV 1193, 1214
 Ass, wild, I 206
 Assam, IV 1148
 Assisi (a sē'zi), III 774
 Assur, I 177, II 423
 Assurbanipal. (*See* Sardanapalus)
 Assyria (and Assyrians), I 177-79, 186, 192, 204, 213, 230-33, 247, 253, 271, 284-88, 325-26, 328, 335, 351, II 392, 458, 542, 587, III 927, IV 1308
 Assyrian language and writing, I 156, 218
 Asteroids, I 2
 Astrologers, III 858
 Astronomy, I 2, 194, 230, 372, II 711, III 794, 858
 Athanasius, II 610, 618
 Atheism, III 1023
 Athene (ā thē'nē), I 359
 Athens, I 253, 309-23, 340-52, II 380, 384, 387, 394, 469, 472, 478, 551, 606, 642, IV 1178, 1198, 1220; social and political, I

- 209, 316-19, 358, 360-64, II 375, 377, 472, 473, III 829; literature and learning, I 353, 373, II 412, 413, 419, 631, 658, IV 1315
- Atkinson, C. F., III 1020
- Atkinson, J. J., I 77, 124, III 1030
- Atlantic Ocean, I 73, 116, 117, 139, 156, II 548, 662, 695, III 763, 878, 952; navigation of, I 206, III 868, 872, 876, IV, 1076, 1321
- Atmosphere, I 3, 6,
- Aton (a' ton), Egyptian god, I 241
- Atonement, II 592, 605
- Attalus (ät' ä lüs), II 383
- Attalus I, II 406
- Attalus III, II 408, 512, IV 1311
- Attica (ät'ikä), I 340, 342, II 469
- Attila (ät' i lă), II 575-77, 626, 650, III 717, IV 1314
- Aughrim, battle of, IV 1187
- Augsburg, III 890-95
- Augurs, Roman, II 475
- Augustine, St., Bishop of Hippo, II 609, 622, III 751, IV 1314
- Augustus, II 425, 549
- Augustus Cæsar, Roman Emperor, II 533, 538, 551, 558, 615, 754, IV 1312
- Aurangzeb. (*See* Aurungzeb)
- Aurelian, emperor, II 542-44, 570, 619, 636, IV 1313
- Aurignacian (aw rig nă' shun) age, I 95, 299
- Aurungzeb (aw rŭng zăb'), III 814, 939, IV 1324
- Auscum, battle of, II 465, IV 1311
- Austerlitz, battles of, III 1054, IV 1326
- Australia, I 81, 193, II 656, IV 1144, 1151, 1167; aborigines of, I 140, 142
- Australian language, I 166; lung-fish, I 24; throwing-stick, I 89
- Australoids, I 142, 162, 193
- Austrasia, III 721, 722
- Austria, III 884, 888, 915, 924-28, 935, 963, 1000, 1007, 1015, IV 1143; wars with France, III 1015, 1020, 1042, 1047, 1054, 1061, IV 1327, war with Prussia, IV 1127, 1130, 1327; in Great War, IV 1207, 1227, 1268, 1328,
- Autocracy, I 351, III 906
- Automobiles, IV 1082
- Avars, II 577, 582, 635, 640, 696, III 724, 746, 792
- Avebury, I 109, 181, II 459
- Avebury, Lord, I 106
- Averroes (ă ver' ō ēz), II 710, III 768, 851, 854, IV 1319
- Avicenna (ăv i sen' ä), IV 1318
- Avignon (a vē nyon'), III 763, 780, 807, 830, IV 1320
- Axes, ancient, I 103, 106, 112-13, 132
- Axis of earth, I 58
- Ayesha (ī' ä shă), II 683, 698
- Azilian age, I 94, 99, 117, 133, 155
- Azoic (a zo' ik) period, I 7, 9, 28
- Azores, III 869
- Aztecs, III 874
- Aztec civilization, I 195

B

- BAAL, I 227, 275, 284
- Baalbek (bal bek'), II 641, 672
- Babel, Tower of, I 175
- Baber, III 812, 886, 939, IV 1322
- Baboons, I 63, 66, 221
- Babylon (and Babylonia), I 177, 187, 207, 213, 218, 235, 248, 255, 259, 269, 271, 283, 286, 325, 328, 329, 334, 352, 372, II 392, 394, 399, 404, 421, 428, 437, 451, 461, 509, 520, 522, 549, 586, 609, 644, 652, 671, III 749, 811, 961, 1031, IV 1308-9; religion of, I 228, 230, 235, 236, 238, 269, 289, II 410, 444
- Babylonians I 194
- Bacchus, II 528

- Bacharach, III 865
 Back Bay, III 976
 Bacon, Francis, Lord Verulam, I 366, III 859, IV, 1323
 Bacon, Roger, IV 1075
 Bactria (and Bactrians), II 406, 564, 636
 Baden, IV 1129
 Badr (bad' ěr), battle of, II 679, 700, IV 1315
 Baedeker, III 925
 Baganda, I 193
 Bagaudæ, III 840
 Bagdad, II 704, 710, III 738, 743, 749, 759, 784, 792, 806, 811, IV 1205, 1219, 1317, 1319
 Bagoas (bă gō' äs), I 352
 Bahamas, III 938, IV 1167
 Baikal (bi kal'), III 786
 Baldwin of Flanders, III 760, 900
 Balearic Isles, II 572
 Balfour, Rt. Hon. A J., IV 1255
 Balkan Peninsula, I 100, 156, 181, 309, 326, II 405, III 734, 821, 867, IV 1142, 1197, 1205, 1308, 1329
 Balkash, lake, III 786
 Balkh, III 790, 798
 Ball, Dyer, II 664
 Ball, John, III 838
 Ball, Sir Robert, I 28, 29
 Balliol College, III 776
 Balloons, I 3
 Baltic Sea, I 59, 101, 156, 162, II 523, 549, 554, 566, 570, 663, III 728, 730, 744, 748, 810, 866, 918, 951, IV 1223
 Baltimore, Lord, III 967
 Baluchistan. (*See* Beluchistan)
 Bambyce (băm bi' sē), II 640
 Bannockburn, III 862
 Bantu, I 161, 166
 Barbados, III 938
 Barbarians, III 952-54
 Barbarossa, Frederick. (*See* Frederick I, emperor)
 Barca family, II 484
 Barcelona, III 728, 864
 Bards, I 221, 299, 301
 Barley, I III, 298, II 575
 Baroda (ba rô' dă), III 941
 Barons, Revolt of the, III 905
 Barras (ba ra') III 1027, 1041
 Barrows, I 108, 291, 297, 301
 Barry, Comtesse du. (*See* Du Barry)
 Basle, Council of, III 781, 835, IV 1321
 Basque language, I 164, 166, 174, 291; race, I 164, 165, 293, IV 1186
 Basra, II 710, IV 1218
 Bassompierre, III 1005
 Bastille, III 999, IV 1325
 Basu, Bhupendranath, I 305, 308
 Basutoland, IV 1168
 Batavian Republic, III 1056
 Bats, I 41
 Bauernstand, I 260
 Bavaria (and Bavarians), III 724, 732, 861, IV 1129, 1180
 Bayezid (bi e zēd'), II, Sultan, III 806, IV 1321
 Baylen, III 1056
 Bazaine, General, IV 1130
 Beaconsfield, Lord, III 913, IV 1142, 1143, 1150
 Bears, I 68, 76, 92, 94
 Beauharnais, Josephine de, III 1041, 1057
 Beauty, artistic, I 203
 Beaver, European, I 68
 Beazley, Raymond, III 745
 Bede, the Venerable, II 626, III 725, IV 1316
 Bedouins, I 256, 271, II 643, 672, 681, 688, 696
 Beech, fossil, I 51
 Bees, I 51
 Behar, IV 1311
 Behring Straits, I 101, 150, 162, 163
 Bektashi, order of dervishes, III 802
 Bel, I 236, 275, 334
 Belgium, III 721, 756, 883, 901, 1015, 1020, 1028, 1036, 1064, 1071, IV 1206, 1208-10, 1211, 1327
 Belisarius, II 629
 Bellerophon (bē ler' ō fon), frigate, III 1064

- Bel-Marduk (bel mar' dook), I
 237, 241, II 394, 423, 619
 Belshazzar, I 237, 334
 Beluchistan (bel oo chi stan'), IV
 1167
 Benaiah, I 279
 Benares (be na' rēz), II 429, 434,
 440, 461, 564, 649
 Benedict, St., II 628, 633, 708, III
 777, IV 1315
 Benedictines, II 630, 631, III 848
 Benes M., IV 1283
 Beneventum, II 465
 Bengal, I 262, 307, II 398, 428,
 432, III 814, 941, 942
 Bengal, Bay of, I 163
 Bengalis, III 788
 Benin, II 502
 Benjamin, tribe of, I 276
 Beowulf (bā' ō wulf), I 302, 308
 Berar, III 814
 Berber language, I 157, 158, 293
 Berbers, I 193
 Bergen, III 864, 866, 868
 Berkeley, George, IV 1188
 Berlin, Treaty of, IV 1143, 1169,
 1259, 1328
 Bermuda, IV 1167
 Bernard, brother, III 774
 Bes, Egyptian god, I 225
 Bessemer process, IV 1077
 Bessus, satrap, II 395
 Bethlehem, II 591
 Beth-shan, I 278
 Bhurtpur (bhērt poor'), III 940
 Bible, the, I 178, 275, 281, II 412,
 421, 586, 589, III 737, 771, 776,
 832, 833, 842, 846, 850, 896,
 927
 Birch tree, I 51
 Birds, I 3, 42, 44, 55
 Birkenhead, Lord. (*See* Smith,
 Sir F. E.)
 Birth-rate in ancient Athens, I
 323
 Biscay, Bay of, III 1053
 Bismarck, Prince, IV 1126, 1128,
 1174, 1178, 1328
 Bison (bi' sōn), I 68, 75, 90, 92,
 100, 193
 Bithynia, II 406, 496, 512, 519,
 524, 578, 617
 Black and Tans, IV 1278
 Black Death, III 835, IV 1320
 Black Friars, III 775
 Black Hundred, IV 1115
 Black lead, I 7
 Black Prince, III 862
 Black Sea, I 117, 156, 163, 181,
 253, 294, 310, 325, 350, 356, II
 405, 520, 523, 567, 570, 617,
 624, 640, III 744, 748, 754,
 790
 Blake, Admiral, III 912, 942
 Bleriot, M., IV 1328
 Blind bards, I 299
 Blood sacrifice, II 605, 608, III
 831
 Blue Mountains, III 965
 Blücher, Marshal, III 1064
 Blues, faction of the, III 931
 Blunt, W. S. I 144
 Bo Tree, II 434, 446
 Boadicea (bō ā de se' ā), II 540,
 IV 1312
 Boars, I 68
 Boas, Franz, I 143
 Boats, I 197, 201. (*See also*
 Ships)
 Body, painting of, I 91
 Bœotia (bē ō' shi ā), I 346
 Boer Republics, IV 1155, 1179,
 1185
 Boer War, II 498, IV 1115, 1179
 Boethius (bō ē' thi ūs), II 710
 Bohemia (and Bohemians), II
 572, III 727, 754, 833, 834-35,
 845, 916
 Bohemond, III 758
 Bokhara (bō kha' ra), II 563,
 710, III 796, 797
 Boleyn, Anne, III 891
 Bolivar (bol' i var), General, III
 1066
 Bologna (bō lōn' ya), III 850,
 851, 864, 889
 Bolshevists, IV 1101, 1224, 1235,
 1239, 1243, 1281-82
 Bombay, III 942
 Bonaparte, Joseph, III 1053, 1056,
 1066, IV 1326

- Bonaparte, Louis, III 1053
 Bonaparte, Lucien, III 1045
 Bonaparte, Napoleon. (*See* Napoleon I)
 Boncelles (bon sel'), I 66
 Bone carvings, I 95; implements, I 89, 94, 112
 Boniface, St., IV 1317
 Boniface VIII, Pope, III 779, IV 1320
 Boniface, Roman Governor, II 574
 Book-keeping, Aramean, I 249
 Books, I 243, II 415, 419, III 841, 842, 846. (*See also* Printing)
 Bordeaux, III 864
 Borgia, Alexander. (*See* Alexander VI, Pope)
 Borgia, Cæsar and Lucrezia, III 879
 Boris, king of Bulgaria, III 747, IV 1317
 Borneo, I 148, II 662
 Bosnia, IV 1180, 1328
 Bosphorus, I 117, 156, 310, 311, 324, 335, 340, 343, 350, II 390, 597, 617, 639, 640, 701, 704, III 756, 802
 Bosses, American, I 316
 Boston, Mass., III 976, 979
 Bostra, II 643
 Botany Bay, IV, 1144
 Botticelli (bot i chel' i), III 867
 Boulogne, III 864, 1054
 Bourbon, Constable of, III 889, IV 1322
 Bourbon, Duke of, III 1000
 Bourbons, III 1048, 1063
 Bourgeois (boor zhwa'), Léon, IV 1263
 Bournville, IV 1096
 Bow and arrow, I 96, 113, II 519-20
 Bowmen, Mongol, III 799
 Boxer rising, IV 1158, 1159
 Boyle, Robert, IV 1079, 1188
 Boyne, battle of the, IV 1187, 1324
 Brachiopods (bräk' i ö podz), I 9, 19
 Brachycephalic (bräk i sə fäl' ik) skull, I 143
 Brahe (bra' hě), Tycho, III 858, IV 1322
 Brahma, II 449, III 815
 Brahminism (and Brahmins), I 262-64, II 429, 440, 443, 454, 649, 667, 668, 670, III 786, 818, 940, IV 1148
 Brain, I 57, 77, 87
 Brandenburg, elector of, III 919
 Brass, I 106
 Brazil, III 875, 877, 884
 Bread in Neolithic Age, I 111
 Bread-fruit tree, I 51
 Breasted, J. H., I 247
 Breathing, I 21
 Bremen, III 747, 864-66
 Brennus, II 464, IV 1310
 Breslau, III 864
 Brest-Litovsk (brest lě tov' sk), IV 1225
 Breton language, I 293
 Briand M., IV 1283, 1285
 Briareus (brī' a roos), I 267
 Brienne, III 1040
 Brindisi (brēn' dē zē), III 746
 Bristol, III 837
 Britain, I 59, 109, 265, II 502, 551, 631, III 716, 727, 744; invasions of, II 572, 623, IV 1314; Roman, I 208, II 518, 522, 537-42, 582, III 715, 725, IV 1312; Keltic, II 572. (*See also* England and Great Britain)
 British Association, IV 1111
 British Civil Air Transport Commission, IV 1082
 British Empire (1815), IV 1144, (1914), IV 1166-68
 British Empire, political life of, II 505, IV 1281
 British Museum, 935
 "British" nationality, IV 1184, 1191
 "British schools," IV 1086
 Britons, ancient. (*See* Britain)
 Brittany, I 148, II 572, III 728, 884
 Broglie, Marshal de, III 999
 Broken Hill I 83
 Brontosaurus (bron tō saw' rūs), I 40

- Bronze, I 106, 115, 298; Chinese vessels of, I 190; ornaments, I 112; weapons, I 106
 Bronze Age, I 106, 132, 133, 181, 183, 201
 Brown, Campbell, II 711
 Bruce, Robert the, III 862
 Bruges (broozh), III 864, 866, 900
 Brunellesco (broo ně les' kō), III 867
 Brunswick, Duke of, III 1015, 1018
 Brussels, III 1019, IV 1211
 Brutus, II 502, 526
 Bubonic plague, II 626
 Buda-Pesth (boo' dă pest), III 889
 Buddha (bud' ā), I 181, 262, II 431, 434, 446, 453, 549, 590, 599, 608, 627, 644, 646, 667, 670, III 773, 981, IV 1309; life of, II 428; teaching of, II 434, 451, IV 1092
 Buddhism, I 262, II 422, 428, 599, 627, 647, 649, 654, 661, 667-68, 676, III 784, 786, 787, III 794, 798, 807, 945. (*See also* Buddha)
 Buddhist art, II 441
 Budge, Wallis, I 183, 239
 Buffon, Comte de, IV 1109
 Building, I 184
 Bulgaria (and Bulgarians), II 537, 571, 624, 676, III 734, 747, 750, 778, 802, 810, IV 1142, 1197, 1198, 1218, 1228, 1317
 Bulgarian atrocities, IV 1328
 Bulgarian language, I 294
 Bull fights, Cretan, I 267
 Bunbury, I 205
 Burgoyne, General, III 977
 Burgundy (and Burgundians), II 572, 623, III 722, 861, 887, 900, 928, 1007
 Burial, early, I 82, 91, 108, 122, 131, 182, 291, 297, 301-2
 Burke, Edmund, IV 1188
 Burmah (and Burmese), I 112, 188, III 799, 946, IV 1167
 Burmese language, I 160
 Burnet, I 359
 Burning the dead, I 297
 Bushman language, I 166
 Bushmen, I 92, 144, 214
 Butter in Neolithic Age, I 111
 Butterflies, I 14, 51
 Buxar, III 942, IV 1325
 Byzantine architecture, III 736
 Byzantine church. (*See* Greek Church)
 Byzantine Empire, II 537, 580, 639, 657, 689-92, 695, 700, 712, III 717, 730, 731, 737, 743-46, 750, 751, 759, IV 1315-16
 Byzantium (bi zăn' tyüm), II 390, 655, 689, 690, 697, 708, III 733, 740, 752, 783, 810, 931 (*See also* Constantinople)
- C
- CABUL '(ka' bul), II 395, III 812
 Cadbury, Messrs., IV 1096
 Cadiz (kā' diz), III 1043
 Caen (kan), III 1013
 Cæsar, title, etc., II 540, 583, 607, 611, III 731, 736
 Cæsar, Julius, I 111, 133, 181, II 409, 477, 499, 505, 518, 523, 529, 545, 551, 558, III 731, 1042, 1045
 Cæsars, the, II 539, 555, 578
 Cahors, III 886
 Caiaphas (kī' ā fās), II 602
 Caillaux, M., IV 1207
 Cainozoic (kī nō zō' ik) period, I 32, 34, 45, 48, 55, 65
 Cairo, II 710
 Calabria, II 489, III 741, 746
 Calcutta, III 942
 Calder, Admiral, III 1053
 Calendar, the, I 129
 Calicut, III 872, 940
 California, I 256
 Caligula (kā lig' ū lă), II 539, IV 1312
 Caliphs, II 688, 690, 696, 708, III 716, 738, 743, 749, 806, 826, IV 1316, 1317, 1321

- Callimachus (kǎ lim' ă kǎs), II 415
 Callisthenes (kǎ lis' thě nēz), II 401
 Calmette, IV 1207
 Calonne, III 998-1010
 Cambodia, II 662
 Cambridge, University of, II 546, IV 1120, 1182
 Cambridge, Mass., III 977
 "Cambaluc," III 798
 Cambyzes (kām bi' sēz), I 334, II 391, IV 1310
 Camels, I 58, 205, 331
 Camillus (cǎ mil' ūs), II 471 511, 515, IV 1310
 Campanella, III 896
 Campo Formio, peace of, III 1042
 Camptosaurus (kāmp tō saw' rus), I 40
 Canaan (and the Canaanites), I 272, II 671
 Canada, I 6, 164, III 939, 964-70, 977, IV 1144, 1147, 1151, 1167, 1171, 1325
 Canary Isles, III 869
 Candahar, II 398
 Candles, ceremonial, II 425
 Cannæ (kǎn' ē), battle of, II 488, 491, IV 1311
 Cannes, III 1064
 Cannibalism, I 293, III 873, 875
 Cannon, III 917-53
 Canoes, I 198
 Canterbury, III 725; archbishops of, III 725, IV 1316
 Canton, II 655, 664
 Canusium (cǎ nŭz' i ūm), II 552
 Canute, III 744, IV 1318
 Cape Colony, IV 1155
 Capernaum, II 601
 Capet (ka pǎ'), Hugh, III 739, 861, IV 1318
 Capitalism, III 866, 960, IV 1088, 1098, 1234
 Caporetto, battle of, IV 1225
 Cappadocia, II 405, 640, 643
 Capua (kǎp' ū ă), II 488, 518
 Carboniferous Rocks I 27
 Cardinals, III 780, 807
 Caria (kā' ri ă), II 383-84, 640
 Caribou (kǎr i boo'), I 76, 123, 138, 150
 Carolingians, III 739, IV 1317, 1318
 Carlyle, Thomas, III 924, 1003, 1025
 Carnac, I 108, 298
 Carnivores, early type of, I 57
 Carnivorous animals, I 44
 Carnot (kar nō'), L. N. M., III 1027, 1041
 Carolina, III 938, 967, 968, 975
 Carpathians, III 747
 Carrhæ, II 520, 557, 636, IV 1312
 Carson, Sir Edward, I 321, IV 1115, 1193-95, 1278
 Carthage (and the Carthaginians), I 181, 201, 205-9, 231, 267, 286, 311, II 390, 411, 457, 459, 465, 510, 523, 527, 548, 567, 578, 585, 588, III 716, 768, 826, 868, IV 1309, 1311, 1314; war with Rome, II 465, 480, 498
 Carvings, Palæolithic. (*See* Art)
 Casement, Sir Roger, IV 1195
 Cash, Chinese, II 651
 Caspian Sea, I 117, 156, 162, 294, 326, 335, II 396, 519, 522, 566, 570, 647, 654, III 745, 790, 836, IV 1247, 1312, 1319
 Caspian-Pamir region, II 566
 Cassander, II 405
 Cassiodorus (kās i ă dör' ūs), II 630, 633, 708, III 715, IV, 1315
 Cassiterides (kās i ter' i dēz), I 206
 Cassius, Spurius, II 470
 Caste, I 261, 262
 Castile, III 873, 884
 Castlemaine, Lady, III 912
 Cat, I 58, 221
 Catalonians, III 869
 Catapult, II 380
 Caterpillars, I 81
 Cathars, III 771
 "Cathay," III 798
 Catherine the Great, III 925, 948, 952, 989, IV 1325
 Catherine II, III 931, 1055
 Catholicism, III 824, 832, 844,

- 854, 878, 896, 915, 922, 931, 967,
IV 1186, 1187, 1190
Catiline, II 524
Cats, Marcus Porcius, II 485, 489,
493, 498, 502, 510, 543
Cattle, I 68, 100, 205. (*See also*
Animals)
Caucasian languages, I 154, 174
Caucasians, I 142-44, 154-59,
III 824
Caucasus (kaw' kă sŭs), I 106,
165, 335, II 640
Caudine Forks, IV 1310
Cavaliers, III 909
Cavalry, II 379
Cave drawings, I 93-4; dwellings,
293; men, I 65, 71, 75, 87
Cavour, IV 1125
Cawnpore, IV 1149
Caxton, William, III 842
Celebes (sel' e bēz), pile dwell-
ings, I 108
Celibacy, II 425, III 752, 832
Celsus, II 414
Celt-Iberian script, I 218
Celtic, III 900. (*See* Keltic)
Celts, bronze, I 132
Cenotaph (Whitehall), IV 1272
Ceremonies, early use of, I 126
Cervantes (sĕr vān' tēz), III 822
Ceylon, II 434, 446, 549, 665, III
942, IV 1167
Chæroneia (kēr ō nē' ā), battle of,
II 377, 380, IV 1310
Chalcedon (kāl sē' don), II 619,
638
Chaldea (and the Chaldeans), I
179, 186, 237, 257, 284, 354, II
394, 520, 671, IV 1309
Chaldean writing, I 218
Chalons, III 1009
Champagne, depart., IV 1214,
1224
Chancellor, Lord, of England, III
845
Chandernagore, III 942
Chandragupta (chan dra goop' ta)
II 444, 457, IV 1310, 380, 1105
Chang Daoling, II 447
Chang-tu, II 448
Channa, the charioteer, II 430
Channing, III 979, 1026
Chapman, G., I 301
Charcoal, III 961
Chariots, I 177, 303, II 379, 393
Charlemagne, emperor, II 446,
653-54, III 722-27-28-30, 747,
777-79, 794, 814, 817, 830, 884,
893, 898, 921, 1052, IV 1317
Charles V, emperor, III 822, 847,
866, 884, 900, 915, 925, IV
1321-22
Charles I, king of England, III
899-906-8-9-11, 920, 924, 958,
967, 1003
Charles II, king of England, III
860, 912, 921, 926, 938, 967
Charles VII, king of France, III
862
Charles IX, king of France, III
968
Charles X, king of France, III
1067
Charles III, king of Spain, III
952
Charlotte Dundas, steamboat, IV
1076
Charmides (kar' midēz), I 362
Charon, II 502
Charter House, London, III 837
Château Thierry, IV 1227
Chateauroux, Duchess of, III 923
Chatham, Earl of. (*See* Pitt,
William)
Cheese, I 111
Chellean age, I 62, 69, 76-79, 86
Chelles, I 76
Chemistry, II 711
Chemosh (kē' mosh), I 280
Chen, L. Y., I 195, 217, 663
Chen, Tuan, II 447
Cheops (kē' ops), I 184
Chephren (kef' ren), I 184, 238
Cherry-tree, II 518
Chieftains, I 134, 304
Child labour, IV 1094, 1095
Chimpanzee, I 61, 68, 206
Chin, absence of, I 71
China, I 81, 106, 112, 163, II 446,
548, 646, 647, 649, 689, III
796, 814, 862, 878, 945-46;
history (*early history and great*

- age of*), I 181, 187-92, 243, 263, II 397, 398, 544, 558-67, 639, 650-55, IV 1308, 1313, 1315; (10th to 18th century), III 783, 784-99, 814, 819, 835, 945, 951, IV 1319, 1320; (20th century), IV 1155-59, 1328; Christianity in, III 791, 851; civilization and culture, I 146, 150, 181, 188, 264, 307, 314, II 621, 646, 650, 654, 712, III 784, 829, 836; other religions of, I 243, II 442, 444, 448, 450, 451, III 945; social, II 510, 650, 651, IV 1160. (See also Chow, Han, Kin, Ming, Shang, Sung, Suy, Tang, Tsing, Wei, and Yuan dynasties)
- China, Great Wall of, I 192, 264, II 542, 665, IV 1311
- Chinese, the, I 61, 161; classics, 217, II 660; coinage, II 651; emperor, I 230, 293, II 575; language, I 160, 163, 166, 215, 217, II 659-60, 661; script, I 214, 217, 265, II 659, III 946
- Chios (kī'os), III 757
- Chnemu, Egyptian god, I 229
- Chosroes (koz' rō ēz) I, II 638, 695, III 896, IV 1315
- Chosroes II, II 538, 637-38, 643, 672, III 761, IV 1315
- Chow dynasty, I 181, 190, 191, 243, II 447, IV 1308
- Christ. (See Jesus of Nazareth)
- Christian IX, IV 1126
- Christian era, IV 1312
- Christian science, III 852
- Christianity, I 289, II 532, 585, 637, III 787, 810, 817, 844, 927, 949-50, IV 1109-10, 1112; history (*early*), II 504, 605, 618, 620, III 727, 730, IV 1313; (*middle ages*), III 727, 742, 750-53, 765, 775, 834, and Buddhism, II 443, 455, and Islam, II 685, 687, 700, 706, III 760, 794, 833; and Judaism, III 831; and learning, II 628, *sqq*; missions and propaganda II 501, 655, III 724, 794-96, 807, 829, 1049, IV 1086-87, 1160-62; official, II 619, III 731, 949, IV 1108; ritual of, II 425, 455, 555, 608, 609, 619; III 770, 831, 842, sects, II 611, III 784, 796; spirit of, II 425, 555, 592, III 840, IV 1092. (See also Jesus of Nazareth)
- Chronicles, book of the, I 275
- Chronology, III 727
- Chrysostom II 426
- Chu Hsi II 663
- Ch'u, state of, I 191
- Church, the, II 617, 621, 711, III 765, 767, 770, 777, 831, 845, 859, 860, 957, IV 1320-21
- Churches, orientation of, I 230
- Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, IV 1219
- Cicero, M. Tullius, II 500, 504, 527, 530
- Cilicia, II 500, 640, III 749, 758, 798
- Cilician Gates, II 705, III 756
- Cimmerians, I 295, 324, 327, II 397, 561, III 801
- Circumcision, I 148
- Citizenship, I 317, 318
- City States, Chinese, I 191; Greek, I 314, 322, 370, II 377, 466; Sumerian, I 175
- Civilization, II 656, III 819, 826-27, 840-41, 897; early, I 169; Aegean, I 201-2; Hellenic, I 311; prehistoric, I 145, 296, 302-4, primitive, I 194, 308, III 825. (See also Culture)
- Civil War in America IV 1138-41
- Clans, I 298
- Class consciousness, IV 1089, 1098; distinction, I 173, 259; war, I 260
- Classes, social, I 255, 264
- Classics, study of the, IV 1080
- Classification, III 852
- Claudius, emperor (A.D. 41-54), II 539, IV 1312
- Claudius, emperor (A.D. 268-270), II 570 IV 1313
- Claudius, Appius, decemvir, II 470

- Claudius, Appius, the Censor, II 473-74, 477
 Claudius, Consul, II 480
 Clay documents, I 174, 183, 237; modelling, Palæolithic, I 93
 Clemenceau, G. B., IV 1255-56
 Clement, II 426
 Clement V (pope), III 780, IV 1320
 Clement VII (anti-pope), III 780, IV 1320
 Cleon, I 360
 Cleopatra, II 523, 529
 Cleopatra (wife of Philip II), II 383, 385
 Clergy, taxation of, III 765
 Clermont, III 752, IV 1318
Clermont, steamer, IV 1076
 Cleveland, President, IV 1202
 Climate, change of, I 21-35, 45, 51, 59, 108, 297, II 561, 567, effect of, I 326
 Clitus (klī' tūs), II 401, III 827
 Clive, Robert, Lord, III 942, IV 1146, 1183, 1325
 Clodius, II 524
 Clothing, I 109, 112
 Clovis, III 721, 722, IV 1314
 Clyde, Firth of, IV 1076
 Cnossos (nos' ōs), I 181, 201-5, 213, 223, 248, 257, 309, 311, 324, 327, II 458, IV 1308
 Coal, I 25, 27, III 961, IV 1075, 1081
 Cockroaches, I 25
 Code Napoléon, III 1050
 Coinage, earliest, I 208; Athenian, I 209; Carthaginian, II 479; Lydian, I 325; Roman, II 466, 483
 Coinage of stamped leather, III 768
 Coke, III 961
 Cole, Langton, I 199
 Collectivism, IV 1102
 Cologne, III 737, 864, 866
 Colonies, British, III 964, 966, IV 1167; scramble for, IV 1143-55
 Colorado, I 38
 Colosseum, III 716
 Columba, St., III 725
 Columbus, Bartholomew, III 870
 Columbus, Christopher, III 869, 884, IV 1307, 1321
 Comedy, Greek, I 371
 Comet, I 2, II 626
 Commagene (kom' ā jē' nē), II 640
 Commodus (kom' ō dūs), II 543, 544
 Commons, House of, III 905-14, 920, 971, III 983, 999, IV 1090
 Commune, French Revolution, III 1016, 1024
 Communism, III 835, 840, 954, 957, 1030, IV 1102
 Communist Faith, IV 1241, 1245
 Communities, I 298, III 824, 828
 Community of obedience, III 981; of will, III 981
 Comnena, Anna. (*See* Anna)
 Comnenus, Alexius. (*See* Alexius)
 "Companions," equestrian order, II 377, 379
 Compass, II 656, III 877
 Concert of Europe, III 1065, 1066, IV 1073
 Concord, Mass., III 976, 979
 Concord, Temple of, II 511, IV 1310
 Condor, the, I 3
 Condorcet (kon' dōrsā'), III 1049
 Confederate States, IV 1136, 1138
 Conference at Washington, IV 1284
 Confucianism, II 447, 451, 663, 664
 Confucius, I 181, 264, II 447, 451, 461, 599, 638, 644, 657
 Congo, I 162, IV 1154
 Congress, American, III 985, IV 1132, 1135, 1137
 Congress, 1st Colonial, III 975
 Conifers, I 38
 Connecticut, III 967, 968, 975
 Conrad II, III 742
 Conrad III, III 742
 Conscription, IV 1139
 Constance, III 833
 Constance, Council of, III 776, 781, 833, IV 1320
 Constantine I the Great, II 446,

- 501, 531, 544, 571, 579, 612,
615, 619, 634, 636, 638, 645,
669, III 814, 953, IV 1313
- Constantine, King of Greece, IV
1220
- Constantinople, II 571, 575, 583,
617, 626, 633-38, 672, 690, 696,
701, III 733, 745, 747, 750, 760,
777, 788, 790, 797, 803, 810,
812, 866, 870, 900, 930, IV 1124,
1198, 1205, 1314-21. (*See also*
Byzantium)
- Consuls, Roman, II 467
- Convicts sent to New England,
III 969
- Cooking, I 103
- Co-operative Societies, IV 1096
- Copernicus (kō pēr' nī kūs), III
858, IV 1322
- Copper, I 2, 105, 106, 194, III
874, IV 1078
- Copper axes, I 132
- Coptic language, I 158
- Corday, Charlotte, III 1013
- Cordoba (kōr' dō ba), II 710
- Corfu (kōr foo'), III 864
- Corinth (and Corinthians), I 311,
346, II 384, 391, 497, 504, 510,
522, 525, 552, 578, 606, IV 1311
- Corinth, isthmus of, I 346
- Cork, IV 1279
- Cornish people, I 155
- Corwall, I 105, 206, II 623, 715,
728, 912
- Cornwallis, General, III 978
- Corrosive sublimate, II 711
- Corsets, I 203
- Corsica, II 484, 572, III 1040
- Cortez, III 875, IV 1321
- Corvus, the, II 481
- Cossacks, III 928, 944, 945
- Coster, printer, III 841, IV 1321
- Cotton industry, III 961
- Cotylosaur (kot' ilō sawr), I 26
- Councils, Church, III 752, 776,
781, 833, 835, 850, IV 1314, 1320
- Counting, I 154
- "Counts of Asia Minor," III 818
- Court system, I 255
- Couvade (ku vad'), I 148
- Cow, sacred to Brahmins, IV 1149
- Cow deities, I 227
- Crab-apples, I 112
- Crabs, I 7
- Craig, Sir James, IV 1229
- Cranach, III 887
- Cranganore II 425, 549
- Cranium, of apes, I 71; Piltdown.
(*See* Piltdown)
- Crassus, II 490, 519, 525, 566,
636, 691, IV 1312
- Crawley, A. E., I 134
- Creation, story of, I 271, 285, IV
1108
- Crecy, III 862
- Crediton, III 727
- Creeds, Christian, II 610, 621, III
751, IV 1314
- Cremation, I 297
- Cressy, cruiser, IV 1217
- Cretan Labyrinth, I 202, language,
I 166, 281; script, I 218
- Crete (and Cretans), I 181, 201,
204, 223, 267, 274, 324, 325
- Crimea, III 797, 835
- Crimean War, IV 1124, 1327
- Criminals, Roman, II 503; used
for vivisection, II 413-415
- Critias, I 362
- Croatia, II 635
- Crocodiles, I 39, 45
- Cræsus (krē' sūs), I 207, 323, 330,
332, 334, II 428, IV 1309
- Cro-Magnon-race, I 87, 92
- Cromwell, Oliver, III 909, 911,
972, IV 1187
- Cromwell, Thomas, III 882
- Cross, in Buddhist ritual, II 442,
true, II 638, III 761
- Crown, the power of the, III 914
- Crucifixion, II 607
- Crusades, II 707, III 758, 761,
774, 777, 804, 834, 862, 900, IV
1087, 1318, 1319, 1321
- Crustaceans, I 23
- Crystal Palace, IV 1121
- Crystals, I 14
- Ctesiphon (tes' i fon), II 638, 642,
644-46, 655, 695, 704, III 761,
811, IV 1218
- Cuba, III 877, IV 1144, 1202

- Cubit, length of, I 282
 Culture, Aryan, I 298-307; Helio-
 lithic, I 148-150, 170, 181, 188,
 192, 198, 213, 298, II 427, III
 874, IV 1160; Neolithic, I 101,
 108, I 115, 127, 145, 146, 155,
 170, 182, 188; prehistoric and
 primitive, I 75. (*See also* Civi-
 lization) I 121
 Cumont, Franz, II 425
 Cuneiform (*kū' nē i fūrm*), I 176,
 218, 267
 Cup, pebble, I 89
 Currency, III 1033-34, IV 1074,
 1096, 1104, 1234
 Curtiss, IV 1082
 Cusæans, II 402
 Custozza, IV 1129
 Cuvier (*ku-vyā*), IV 1109
 Cyaxares (*siāk' sā rēz*), I 328,
 IV 1309
 Cycads (*si' kădz*), I 37, 51
 Cynics, I 367
 Cyprus, I 106, 201, 329, 350, II
 390, 405, IV 1143
 Cyrenaica (*sir ē nā' ikă*), II 512
 Cyrene (*si rē' nē*), II 545
 Cyrus, the Great, I 179, 209, 237,
 251, 269, 284, 323, 329, 330,
 334, II 379, 398, 428, 457, 538,
 558 642, 644, IV 1309
 Cyrus, the Younger, I 352
 Czecho-Slovakia, IV 1283
 Czecho-Slovaks, III 1069
 Czechs (*cheks*), II 572, III 833
- D
- DACIA, II 542, 570, 582, III 749
 Dædalus (*dē' dă lūs*), I 203
 Dagon, I 236, II 423
 Dalai Lama (*da li' la' ma*), II 453
 Dalmatia, II 572, 623, 635, III
 727, 732, IV 1268
 Damascus, I 207, 266, II, 538, 638,
 643, 671, 690, 691, 701, 704, 710,
 III 836, IV 1315
 Damask, I 266
 Damietta, III 761
 Damon, friend of Pericles, I 359
 Dancing, I 299
- Danelaw, III 730, IV 1317
 Danes, III 728, 730, 735, 900, IV
 1317
 Dante, III 843
 Danton, III 1011, 1019-24
 Danzig, III 865, 933, IV 1268
 Danube, I 156, 295, 335-39, II
 380, 386, 396, 519, 520, 538, 542,
 549, 556, 561, 564, 568, 570,
 572, 575, 582, 624, 635, 648, III
 727, 747, 755, 823, 951, IV 1218,
 1312
 Danubian provinces, III 1072, IV
 1124
 Dardanelles, I 310, III 801, IV
 1218
 Darius (*dă rī' ūs*) I 239, 335, 339,
 340, 343, 347, II 395, IV 1310
 Darius II, I 351
 Darius III, II 388, 393, 399, 404,
 519, 558, III 802, 1059
 Dark ages, the, II 626
 Dartmouth, Lord, III 991
 Darwin, Charles, I 66, IV 1110
 Darwin, Prof. G. H., I 29
 Darwinism, IV 1110, 1113
 David, King, I 279, 281, II 585,
 591, 597, 839, IV 1308
 Davids, Rhys, II 432, 434, 441
 Davis Jefferson, IV 1140
 Dawes, III 976
 Day, length of, I 4, 51
 Dead, eating the, I 182
 Dead Sea, I 117
 Debtor, slavery as fate of, I 249
 Deccan, the, III 793
 Decimal notation, II 710
 Decius, Emperor, II 543, 570, 612,
 IV 1313
 Declaration of Independence, III
 978, 981
 "Decline and Fall of the Roman
 Empire" (Gibbon), III 948-54
 Deer, I 70
 Defoe, Daniel, III 918, 957, 991
 Deformities, I 148
 Delaware, III 968, 975
 Delhi, III 786, 812, 940, 941, IV
 1149, 1319, 1322
 Delhi Monguls, III 788
 Delian League, I 322, 356

Delos, Island of, I 319, 322
 Delphi, I 322, 330, II 379, 405, 552
 Delphi, oracle of, I 314, 330
 Delphic amphictyony, II 380
 Demeter (de mē' tēr), II 381, 554
 Democracy, I 317, 320, II 468, III 958, 983
 Demos, I 317
 Demosthenes (dē mos thē nēz), I 371, II 376, 384, 396, 485, 527
 Deniker, I 101,
 Denikin, General, IV 1245-47
 Denmark, I 108, 110, II 556, III 744, 845, 891, 912, 925, 936, 951, 1069, IV 1126, 1146, 1318
 Deportation, I 178
 Dervishes, III 802
 Descartes (dā kart'), IV 1109
 Deshima, IV 1162
 Deuteronomy, Book of, I 273
 de Valera, IV 1279-80
 Devon, III 912
 Dewlish, I 76
 Dialects, I 309
 Diaspora (dī ās' pō rā), II 421, 585, 588
 Díaz (dē' as), III 869, IV 1321
 Dickens, Charles, III 864
 Dierorerus (dī krō rē' rūs), I 54
 Dictator, Roman, II 471
 Diderot (dēd rō'), III 995
 Diet (assembly), III 916, 931
 Dillon, Dr., IV 1254
 Dinosaurs (dī' nō sawrz), I 41, 45
 Dinotherē (dī' nō thēr), I 54
 Diocletian, II 544, 578, 612, 615, 619, IV 1313
 Dionysus, god, I 381
 Dionysius of Syracuse, II 448, 480
 Dipiodocus (dīp lod' ō kūs), I 40, 41
 Disease, infectious, I 125
 Dispensations, papal, III 765, 773
 Disraeli, Benjamin. (*See* Beaconsfield, Earl of)
 Divans, II 705
 Divination, II 475
 Divus Cæsar, II 540
 Dixon line, III 968, 969
 Dnieper (nē' pēr), I 156, II 523, 567, 570, III 790, 944

Doctors, I 224
 Dog, the, I 58, 103, 107, 110, 114, 221,
 Dolmens, I 108
 Domazlice, III 835, IV 1321
 Dominic, St., III 774-75, IV 1319
 Dominican Order, III 775-76, 796, 877, IV 1160, 1319
 Domitian, II 540, IV 1312
 Don, river, I 156, II 566, 567, III 944
 Don Cossacks, III 944
 Donatello, III 867
 Doric dialect, I 309
 Dorset, I 76
 Dortmund, III 866
 Dostoevski, (dos tō ef' ski), IV, 1198
 Douglas, Senator, IV 1137
 Dover, III 864
 Dover, Straits of, II 518
 Dragon flies, I 25
 Dragonnades, III 922, 938
 Draft riots, IV 1139
 Dravidian civilization, I 181, 187, II 427, III 824; language, I 160, 161, 174
 Dravidians, I 147, 161, 165, 262, 308, 324, III 815
 Drepanum (drep' ā nūm), II 482
 Dresden, cruiser, IV 1217
 Dresden, battle of, III 1060
 Drogheda, III 911
 Drought, IV 1247
 Druids, I 136
 Drums, Neolithic, I 113
 Drusus, Livius, II 515
 Dubarry, Comtesse, III 923
 Dublin, IV 1187, 1195
 Duma, the, IV 1222
 Dumouriez (du moo ryā'), General, III 1018
 Dunbar, battle of, III 911
 Duncce, derivation of, III 855
 Dunkirk, III 912
 Duns Scotus, III 854, IV 1320
 Dupleix (du plā'), III 942
 Durazzo (du rad' zō), II 579, III 746, 750, 758
 Durham, University of, IV 1121
 Düsseldorf, I 71

Dutch language, III 722, 900, people, III 722; Republic, III 900-03, 1068; settlements and seaman-ship, I 83, III 872, 935, 968, IV 1156, 1163. (*See also* Hol-land)

Duyvendak, Mr., II 663

Dwellings, Neolithic, I 112

Dyeing, II 711

Dynamics, III 858

E

EARTH, the, I 1-5, 11, 58, 59

East, orientation to, I 228, 230

East India Company, III 942, 974, IV 1144

Easter, feast of, I 129

Easter lamb, II 606

Eastern (Greek) Empire. (*See* Byzantine Empire)

Ebenezer, I 275

Ebro, river, II 484, 487

Ecbatana (ek bāt' ānā), II 646

Echidna (ekid' nā), I 55

Economists, French, III 996

Economus, (ē kon' ō mā's), battle of, II 481, IV 1311

Eden, garden of, IV 1108

Edessa, II 640, III 757, 759

Edom, III 927

Education, II 259, 263, 264, II 631, III 817, 828, 849, 955, 956, 988, 1049, IV 1074, 1080-81, 1086, 1087, 1102

Edward I, III 905

Edward VI, III 904, 906

Edward VII, III 915, IV 1184

Edward, Prince of Wales, son of George V, IV 1195

Egbert, III 728, 730, IV 1317

Eggs, I 38, 55, 112

Egibi (ē gē' bē), I 257

Eginhard, III 733, 734

Egmont, Count of, III 771, 901

Egypt, I 106, 159, II 405, 537, 580, 587-588, 591, 638, 663, 671, 693, 705, III 762, 773, 821, 836, IV 1315; history (*early*), I 133, 150, 169, 179-82, 186, 201, 210, 218, 223, 237, 247, 253, 259, 266, 271, 280, 286, 314, 323-325, 331,

334, 342, 350, 351, 367, II 537, 671, III 874, IV 1308; (*and Greece*), (*and Rome*), II 391, 398, 411, IV 1308, II 493, 512, 523, 525, 549, (*and Islam*), II 696, 700, 704, 710, III 743, 749, 784, 793, 802, 806, IV 1318-19, 1321; (*modern pe-riod*), III 1042, 1044, 1051, IV 1146, 1154, 1167, 1328; Christianity in, II 621, 628, III 754, 831; Jews in, II 412, 451, 588, IV 1321; Kingship in, I 240, 255, II 534; religious sys-tems, I 183, 227-230, 239-243, 288, II 391, 421, 423, 441, 554, 608

Egyptian language, I 158

Egyptian script, I 218

Egyptian shipping, II 265

"Egyptians" (Gipsies), III 818

Eireann Dale, IV 1279, 1280

Elam (e' lām), I 174, 328

Elamite language, I 166

Elamites, I 174, 179, 235, II 394, III 783

Elba, III 1063

Elections, II 506, III 988

Electricity, IV 1079, 1082

Electrum, I 209

Elephants, I 58, 69, 75, 100, 198, 328, II 396, 466, 482, 491, 692

Eli, judge, I 275, 276

Elixir of life, III 857

Elizabeth, Queen of England, III 902, 906, 942, 965

Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, III 925, IV 1324

El-lil, I 175

Ellipse, I 28

Emancipation, IV 1139

Emden, cruiser, IV 1217

Emesa (em' e sā), II 641

Emirs, II 704

Emperor, title of, II 583

Emperors of Germany, III 884

Employers and employed, III 960, IV 1088

Enclosure Acts, III 957-62

"Encyclopædists," the, III 995

England, II 626, III 743, 744, 861,

- 886, IV 1116, 1165; history (*early*), I 53, 100, II 647, III 715, 724, 730, 744, IV 1317; (*under the Normans*), III 745, IV 1318; (*in the 13th and 14th centuries*), III 857, 866; *Civil war*, III 904, 909-11, 967; (*war with Holland*), III 909-11, 968; (*war with Spain*), III 912; (*reign of Charles II*), III 912; (*in 18th century*), III 911-14; (*and America*), III 938-40; (*union with Ireland*), IV 1326; political and constitutional, II 475, 477, III 870, 898, 899, 913-14, 916, 920; religion, III 724-30, 780, 830, 845, 591, 906, 907, 912, 938, IV 1320; social, II 836, 928, 956, 1012, IV 1320. (*See also* Britain, Great Britain, and the Great War)
- English, the, III 725, 744, IV 1314
- English language, I 154, II 660, III 725, 843
- English seamen, III 872
- Entelodont (*en tel' o dont*), I 52
- Eoanthropus (*ē ō ān thrō' pūs*), I 62, 70-75. (*See also* Man)
- Eocene (*e' ō sēn*) period, I 53, 55
- Eohippus, I 57
- Eolithic age, I 73
- Eoliths, I 67, 68, IV 1307
- Ephesus (*ef' esūs*), II 349, 388, 606, III 757
- Ephesus, Council of, II 619
- Ephthalite (*ef' thā lit*) coins, II 649
- Ephthalites, II 648, IV, 1314, 1315
- Epics, I 299, 302
- Epictetus (*ep ik tē' tūs*), II 504
- Epicureans (*ep i kūrē' āns*), I 367, 371, II 655
- Epirus (*ē pī' rūs*), II 383, 384, 464, III 746
- Equality, II 687, III 981
- Equisetums (*ek wisē' tūmz*), I 25
- Erasistratus, II 414, 415
- Eratosthenes (*er ā tos' the nēz*), I 11, II 412, 413, 419
- Erech, I 175
- Eretria, I 341
- Erfurt, III 1056
- Eridu (*ā' ri doo*), I 174, 180, 198, III 811
- Esarhaddon (*ē sār hād' ōn*), I 236, 237, 283, 328, IV 1309
- Essad Pasha, IV 1257
- Essex, II 642, III 715
- Esthonian Army, IV 1246
- Esthonians, III 928
- Ethiopia (and Ethiopians), I 186, 241, II 392, IV 1309
- Ethiopian dynasty, I 182, IV 1309
- Ethiopic language, I 158
- Ethnologists, I 142
- Etiquette in China, II 448
- Etruria, II 463
- Etruscans, II 458, 460-61, 471, 475, III 828, IV 1308, 1310
- Euclid, II 413, 711
- Euphrates, I 150, 175, 179, 185, 188, 197, 228, 241, 284, 326, II 519, 538, 556, 580, 636, 642, 672, IV 1312
- Euripides (*ū rip' i dēz*), I 362, II 377, 402
- Europe, I 154, 162, 164, 195; Christianity in, II 531, 620, 628, III 727, 763, 770, 776, 781, 794, 828, 842, 844, 849, 890, 916, 927, 929, 955; common cause in, III 753-54; Concert of, III 1066, 1067, IV 1073; feudalism in, III 718, 720; history (general), I 343, II 623-26, III 717-18, 731, 785, 819, 865, 886, 891, 898, 915, 918, 924, 931, 936, 941, 947, 954, 956, 1053, 1060, 1065, 1066-71; Huns in, II 576, 648; Imperialism in, IV 1165, 1169-70; industrial revolution in, III 961; intellectual development in, II 712, III 769, 828, 851, 857; languages of, I 164; literature of, III 843; "Marriage with Asia," II 399; mechanical revolution in, IV 1083; monarchy in, III 896, 901, 918-25, 935; Mongolians in, II 566, III 791, 851; Moslems in, II 701, III 716, 722, 743, 802,

- 869; natural political map of, III 1070; peoples and races of, I 101, 139, 142, 291, II 566, 572, III 818, 950; Powers of, III 928-30, 935, 963, IV 1171; prehistoric, I 59, 68, 73, 75, 83, 86, 96, 103, 106, 115, 141, 148, 154, 169, 181, 192, 223, 230, 298, 299, 325, 326, III 874; social development in, III 822, 842, 861, 885, 899, 904, 930, 954-59, IV 1088, 1090-2. (*See also* Great War)
- Europeans descended from Neolithic man, I 104-5
- Euryptolemus (ǔ rip tol' ě mǔs), I 358
- Eusebius (ǔ sē' bi ũs), II 617
- Evans, Sir John, I 138
- Everlasting League, III 883, IV 1320
- Evolution of the Earth, I 3
- Examinations, I 261, II 661
- Excommunication, III 760
- Executive, the, IV 1103
- Exodus, book of, I 272
- Experience, I 220
- Exploration, I 206-207
- "Expropriated," the, IV 1089
- Ex votos, I 224, II 425
- Eylau (i' lou), battle of, III 1054
- Ezekiel, I 285, 287
- F**
- FABIAN SOCIETY, IV 1099
- Fabius, II 489-90
- Factories, growth of, III 960
- Factory Act, IV 1095, 1326
- Factory system, IV 1083, 1094
- Faizi (fa' i zi), III 816
- Falkland Isles, battle of, IV 1217
- Family groups, I 109, 169, 304
- Faraday, M., IV 1076
- Farming, Arab knowledge of, II 711
- Farrar, F. W., II 542
- Fascisti, IV 1281
- Fashoda (fa.shō'da), IV 1154, 1197, 1328
- Fatepur-sikri (fāt ē poor' sik' ri), III 816
- Fatima (fāt'imā), II 698 III 743
- Fatimite caliphate, III 743, 754, 806, IV 1318
- Fauna, early, I 99
- Fausta, II 616
- Faustina (faws tī' nǎ), II 542
- Fear, I 123
- Feasts, Aryan, I 298
- Feathers, I 44, 48
- Federal, IV 1140
- Ferdinand I, emperor, III 915
- Ferdinand, king of Bulgaria, IV 1198, 1205, 1220
- Ferdinand, king of Spain, III 870, 884
- Fermentation, I 298
- Ferns, I 23, 25
- Ferrero (fer rā'rō), II 466, 505, 516
- Fetishism, I 122, 129
- Feudal system, the, III 718
- Fezzan, I 116
- Fiefs, III 719
- Field of the Cloth of Gold, III 886
- Fielding, H., III 957, IV 1084
- Fiji, IV 1167
- Finance, II 509-511, III 886, 898
- Finland (and the Finns), II 566, III 1057, 1069
- Finland, Gulf of, III 951
- Finnish language, I 159
- Finno-Ugrian language, II 578
- Fire, early use of, I 75, 78
- Fish, I 8, 21, 53
- Fisher, Lord, IV 1223
- Fisher, Osmond, I 76
- Fishing, I 113
- Fiume (fū'mā), IV 1268
- Flame projectors, IV 1213
- Flanders, III 745, 756
- Flavian dynasty, II 540, IV 1312
- Flax, I 112
- Fleming, Bishop, III 776
- Flemings, the, III 722, 759, 861
- Flemish language, III 722
- Flint implements, I 62, 67, 71, 75, 87, 90, 95, 105, 113, 138

- Flood, story of the, I 271, 285
 Florence, III 864, 867, 879-82, 886, 922, 925, IV 1321
 Florentine Society, IV 1081
 Florida, III 968
 Flowers, Cainozoic, I 51
 Flying machines, I 203, III 856, IV 1082
 Fontainebleau (*fon tăn blō*'), III 1053, 1061
 Food, I 13, 21, 80-1, III, 170
 Fools, I 298
 Foot of apes, men, and monkeys, I 63
 Ford businesses, IV 1096
 Forests, I 35, 103
 Fort St. Augustine, III 968
 Fossils, I 6, 10, 23, 45, 51, 65, IV 1109
 Foucher, II 442
 Four Power Treaty, IV 1285
 "Fourteen Points," the, IV 1252, 1259
 Fowl, domesticated, I 111, 112
 Fox, the, as food, I 111
 France, I 107; history (*to Revolutionary period*), I 92, 206, II 572-73, 623, 647, 696, III 717, 721, 722, 727, 739, 759, 766, 771, 779, 836, 840, 850, 861-62, 877-90, 898-901, 916-21, 927, 936, 952, 957, 964, IV 1321; (*Revolutionary period*), III 840, 927, 1044, IV 1325; (*Napoleonic period*), III 1039-1072, IV 1325; (*to Great War*), III 1063-65, 1071, IV 1090, 1122-30, 1206, 1325; (*Great War*), III 722, IV 1210; Imperialism, IV 1196-97; overseas dominions, III 939, 964-71, 978, IV 1146. (*See also* Franks, Gaul)
 Francis, St., of Assisi, III 773, 845, 948, IV 1319
 Francis I, emperor, IV 1322
 Francis II, emperor, IV 1326
 Francis I, king of France, III 884-91, IV 1321
 Francis Ferdinand, archduke, IV 1207
 Franciscan Order, III 773-75, 854, 877, IV 1319-20
 Frankfort, III 864, IV 1123, 1327, 1328; Peace of, IV 1130, 1172, 1328
 Franklin, Benj., III 989
 Franks, the, II 570, 577, 582, III 717, 721-27, 732, 738, 747, 757, 811, 826, IV 1313
 Frazer, Sir J. G., I 115, 131, 133
 Frederick I (Barbarossa), emperor, III 759, 766, 769, 777, IV 1318
 Frederick II, emperor, III 760, 761, 767, 791, 797, 830, 844, 884, 915, IV 1112, 1319
 Frederick III, emperor, III 884
 Frederick I, king of Prussia, III 924, IV 1324
 Frederick II (the Great), king of Prussia, III 924, 932, 948, 952, 986, IV 1324
 Frederick III, king of Prussia, IV 1177
 Frederick, don, III 902
 Frederick, Margrave of Brandenburg, III 834
 Free discussion, III 841; trade in Athens, II 472
 Free intelligence, I 254
 Freedom, I 251, II 964
 Freeman's Farm, III* 977
 French language, I 154, II 582, III 721, 744, 843, 883, 900
 Freud, I 125
 Freya (*frī' ā*), III 724
 Friars, the, III 847, 855. (*See also* Franciscan Order)
 Friedland (*frēd' lant*), battle of, III 1064, IV 1326
 Frisian coast, II 556; language, III 900
 Frisians, the, III 724
 Frog, the, I 24
 Froissart (*frwa sar'*), III 838
 Fronde, the, III 920
 Fu, S. N., II 653-54, 663, 664
 Fuggers, the, III 886-88, 956
 Fugitive Slave Bill, IV 1135
 Fulas, I 193
 Fulton, R., IV 1076

Furnace, blast, IV 1077; electric,
IV 1077
Future life, belief in, I 122, II 554

G

- GÆLIC, I 293, IV 1186
Gage, General, III 975, 979
Galatia, II 462, IV 1311
Galatians, II 405, 406, III 801
Galba, II 540, IV 1312
Galerius, II 612, 614, IV 1313
Galicia, IV 1215
Galilee, II 601, 604, 609, 641
Galileo (gālilē'ō), Galilei, III
858, 859, IV 1107, 1322
Gallas, language of the, I 158
Galvani, IV 1076
Gama, Vasco da (vās kō'da ga'-
ma), III 873, 941, IV 1321
Gamaliel, II 605
Gambia, I 206
Games, I 322
Gametes (gām ēts'), I 22
Gandhara (gand ha'ra), II 442
Gandhi Mi, IV 1277
Ganesa (ga nā'sha), II 452
Gang labour, I 257, 279
Ganges, I 163, 187, 261, 262, II
396, 398, 427, 444, III 784
Gas, I 296, II 656
Gas in warfare, IV 1214, 1273
Gaspee, vessel, III 974
Gath, I 274
Gaul (and the Gauls), I 181, II
397, 407, 462, 470-73, 483, 487,
515-18, 522, 558, 570, 577, 580,
623, 631, III 718, 721, 738, 951,
IV 1311, 1314
Gaulish language, I 293
Gautama (gou'ta ma). (*See*
Buddha)
Gaza, I 253, 274, II 387, 391
Gazelle, I 58
Gaztelu, III 892
Generalissimos, III 788
Genesis, book of, I 129, 272
Geneva, III 883, 948, IV 1263
Genoa (jen'ō ā) and the Genoese,
III 754, 759, 797, 835, 864, 866,
868, 1036
Genoa Conference at, IV 1248
Genserik (jen' sēr ik), II 572, IV
1314
Gentiles, the, II 598
Geography, I 2
Geology, IV 1109
Geometry, II 710
George I, III 913, 914, IV 1324
George II, III 914, IV 1324
George III, III 914, 973, IV 1324
George V, III 915, IV 1184, 1195
George, Lloyd, IV 1215, 1232-
1237, 1255-1256, 1260, 1279,
1286
Georgia, III 968, 975, IV 1324
Gerasa (jer' ā sā), II 641
Gerash, II 643
Gerbert (gār' ber), II 710
German language, I 154, 293, III
722, 843, 900; songs and tales,
III 738
Germany, I 100, 107, 328; history
(to *Saxon kings*), II 515, 518,
523, 537, 551, 556-558, 570, 574-
75, 620, III 721-23, 728, 733,
824; (*Saxon kings to Napole-*
onic period), III 740, 747, 753,
760, 766, 777, 780, 822, 839-
45, 862, 866, 873, 883-95, 898,
900, 919, 927-30, 938-40, 948-52,
969, 971, 977, 1052-53, IV 1317,
1322; (*War of Liberation to*
the Great War), III 1060, 1069,
IV 1080, 1088-91, 1122-30, 1164
-66, 1172; (*Great War*), IV
1195; class distinction in, I
260; Imperialism of, IV 1165,
1172-1182, 1205
Gethsemane, II 602
Ghent, III 864, 883, 900
Gibbon, Edward, II 547-52, 575,
576, 610, 614, 616, 626, 638, III
737, 740, 745-47, 945-53, 962,
963, 995, IV 1112
Gibraltar, I 118, 206, II 548, III
716, IV 1167
Gideon, I 275
Gigantosaurus (jī gān tō saw' rūś),
I 41
Gilbert, Dr., III 859, IV 1323
Gilboa, Mount, I 278

- Gills, I 23, 53
 Gin, I 208
 Giotto (jot' ō), III 867
 Gipsies, III 818, 819
 Gipsy language, III 819
 Giraffe, I 58
 Girondins, III 1015
 Gizeh (gē zē), I 184, 228
 Glacial Age. (*See* Ice Age)
 Gladiators, II 502, 504, 518, 545, 549, 627, IV 1311
 Gladstone, W. E., I 355, IV 1195, 1328
 Glasfurd, A. I. R., I 112, 125
 Glass, II 711
 Glastonbury, I 109, 297
 Glaucia, II 515
 Glyptodon (glip' tō don), I 101, 194
 Gneisenau (gnī' zē nou), cruiser, IV 1216
 Gneiss (nīs), fundamental, I 6
 Gnosticism (nos' ti sism), II 609, 620
 Goats in lake dwellings, I 110
 Gobi Desert, I 163, II 562, 654, 665, 666
 God, I 125, II 609, 619, 702, 860; idea of one true, I 288, 289, II 410, 437, 451, 554, 585, 588, 593, 675, 677, 682, 690, III 817; of Judaism, I 369, II 423, 687; Kingdom of, II 591, III 794, 831, 929
 Godfrey of Bouillon, III 756, 900, IV 1318
 Gods, I 223-27, 232, 240, II 423; Aryan, I 314; Egyptian, I 227-30, 240-43, Greek, I 314, 369; Japanese, II 442; tribal, I 135, 225, 229
 Coethe, III 1012
 Gold, I 105, 115, 194, II 520, III 768, 1033
 Golden Bough, I 115
 Golden Horde, the, III 814, 944
 Goldsmith, Oliver, III 958, IV 1188, 1189, 1255
 Golgotha, II 602
 Good Hope, Cape of, III 941, IV 1321
Good Hope, cruiser, IV 1217
 Goods, consumable, III 1034
 Gorham, Nathaniel, III 986
 Gorilla, I 63, 66, 206
 "Gorillas," I 231
 Goshen, land of, I 272
 Gospels, the, II 590, 591-93, 601-604, 611, 619, III 832
 Gotha (gō' ta), aeroplane, IV 1216
 Gothic architecture, III 864; language, I 293
 Goths, II 543-44, 561, 566, 571, 577-82, 623, 627, 629, 635, III 716, 721, 744, IV 1313-14
 Gough, General, IV 1225
 Government, I 231, II 474, 475, 476, III 829, IV 1073-74
 Gracchi, the, II 515, III 830
 Gracchus, Caius, II 513, IV 1311
 Gracchus, Tiberius, II 508, 511, IV 1311
 Grain, as food, I 111, 114, 172
 Granada, III 869
 Grand Dukes, IV 1245
 Grand Remonstrance, III 908
 Granicus (grā nī' kūs), battle of the, II 388, IV 1310
 Grant, General, IV 1138, 1140
 Grape, I 298
 Graphite, I 7
 Grasses, I 51, 58
 Gravelotte (grav lot'), IV 1130
 Gravesend, III 912
 Gravitation, law of, III 859
 Gray, G. B. I 273
 Great Britain, history (*general*), III 928, 1056, (*and India*), III 814-17, 939-43; (*and America*), III 936, 939, 961, 964-66, 971-73; (*and French Revolution*), III 1012, 1020; (*in Napoleonic period*), III 1042-44, 1051, 1053, 1057, IV 1325; (*war with Turkey*), III 1071; (*Crimean war*), IV 1124; (*suspicion of Russia*), IV 1142; (*in alliance against Germany*), IV 1180-1; (*the Great War*), IV 1207; (*effect of*

- Great War on*), IV 1229; constitutional, political, and social, II 508, III 957-58, 983, 1008, 1027, IV 1079-80, 1090, 1182-83, 1326-27; expansion and Imperialism, III 930, IV 1144-55, 1160, 1165, 1167, 1183-85, 1328. (*See also* Britain and England)
- Great Exhibition, the, IV 1121, 1327
- Great Mogul, III 940, 942
- Great Schism. (*See* Papal Schism)
- Great War, the III 723, 850, 907, 918, IV 1207, 1329
- Greatness, III 989
- Greece (and the Greeks), I 85, 106, 112, 274, 321-325, II 458, 459, III 826, 842, 874; history (*to war with Persia*), I 201-205, 223, 274, 309, IV 1309; (*war with Persia*), I 335, 338-39, IV 1310; (*to 15th century*), I 354, 364, 370, II 375-81, 386, 391, 405, 462, 570, 640, 641, III 758, 779, 801-6, IV 1320; (*War with Turks*), IV 1281; (*modern*), III 1071, 1072, IV 1198, 1326; civilization, I 311-323, 371, II 467-68, 504, 641, IV 1218, 1220; constitutional, I 313-323, 368-372, II 377-78, 467; religion, I 231, 312-313, II 381, 422, III 724; thought and learning, I 309, 366-369, II 408-412, 500, 657, 658, 708
- Greek alphabet, I 219; archipelago, I 117, 253; Church, II 621, 637, III 733, 737, 751-52, 777, 1071, IV 1314; language and literature, I 154, 179, 293, 299, 309-311, 360, 364, 370, II 376, 411, 421, 546, 551, 580, 605, 634, 642, 704, 708, III 725; warfare, III 737, 842
- Greek (Eastern) Empire, *see* Eastern (Greek) Empire
- Green, J. R. III 836
- Green flag, III 743
- Greenland, I 73, III 729, 868
- "Greens," faction of the, III 931
- Gregory, Sir R. A., III 859
- Gregory I, the Great, II 630, 664, III 716, 725, 777, 836, 850, IV 1315
- Gregory VII, III 750, 751, 763, 777, 832, 850, IV 1318
- Gregory IX, III 762, 767, 830, IV 1319
- Gregory XI, III 780, 807, IV 1320
- Grey, Sir Edward, IV 1207
- Grey Friars. (*See* Franciscan Order)
- Grimaldi race, I 87, 92, 117
- Grimm's Law, I 155
- Grisons, II 582
- Grote, I 362
- Growth, I 13
- Guadalquivir (gaw däl kwiv' ér), III 872
- Guianas, the, IV 1144, 1146
- Guilds, I 259
- Guillotine, III 1022
- Guiscard (gēs kar'), Robert, III 746, 758, IV 1318
- Gulf Stream, I 17
- Gum-tree, I 51
- Gunpowder, II 656, III 790, 862, 953
- Guptas (goop' täs), II 649
- Gurkhas, IV 1149
- Gustavus Adolphus, III 918, 936
- Gutenberg, III 841
- Guthrum, III 730, IV 1317
- Gwalior, III 941
- Gyges (gī' jēz), I 325, IV 1309
- Gupta Empire, II 649

H

- HAARLEM (har' lem), III 900, 902, IV 1321
- Habsburgs, III 779, 822, 883-86, 915, 918, 926, 932, 1061, 1063
- Hackett, IV 1111
- Hadrian, II 542, 552, IV 1313
- Hadrian, tomb of, III 716
- Hadrian's wall, II 542
- Hague Conferences, IV 1170
- Haig Sir Douglas, IV 1220
- Hair, I 47, 55

- Halicarnassus (hāl i kār nās' ūs),
 I 253, 350, II 388, 390
 Hall, I 207
 Ham, son of Noah, I 141
 Hamburg, III 864, 866
 Hamilcar, II 483, 487
 Hamilton, Alexander, III 989
 Hamilton, Sir William, IV 1079
 Hamites, I 161, 188, 234
 Hamitic languages, I 158, 165,
 166; ships, I 200
 Hammond, III 955
 Hammurabi (hām moo ra' bē), I
 177, 181, 185, 187, 235, 250, 272,
 II 394, IV 1308
 Han dynasty, I 192, 244, 263, II
 447, 522, 560, 561, 564, 650, IV
 1313
 Hancock, III 975
 Hang Chau (hang' chou), III 786,
 IV 1318
 Hannibal, II 484-492, 494
 Hanno, I 181, 206, 210, 223, 231,
 II 484, 522, 548, III 869, IV
 1310
 Hanover, III 1027
 Hanover, elector of. (*See* George
 I)
 Hanoverian dominions, III 928
 Hanoverian dynasty, III 914, 920
 Hansa towns, III 866-73
 Hanse merchants, III 951
 Harcourt, Sir William, IV 1100
 Harding, Warren G., IV 1284-1286
 Hare, the, I 111
 Hariti, II 442
 Haroun-al-Raschid (ha roon al
 ra' shēd), II 704, 706, III 738,
 IV 1317
 Harpagos, (har' pā gōs), I 331
 Harpalus (har' pā lūs), II 384, 396
 Harpoons, I 89
 Harran, II 642
 Harris, H. Wilson, IV 1263
 Harvey, John, III 860, IV 1322
 Hasan, son of Ali, II 699, 703
 Hasdrubal, II 484-488
 Hastings, Warren, III 943, IV
 1146, 1183
 Hatasu (ha' ta soo), Queen of
 Egypt, I 185
 Hathor, I 229, 240, II 423, 424
 Hatra, II 642
 Hatred, II 484
 Hauran, II 643, 672
 Hawk gods, I 227
 Hearths, I 297
 Heaven, Kingdom of, II 591, 594,
 600, 604, IV 1107. (*See also*
 God)
 Hébert, III 1023
 Hebrew language, I 156, II
 586, 588-89; literature, I 286-
 287; prophets, II 618; thought,
 I 369; moral teaching, I 207.
 (*See also* Jewish)
 Hebrews, I 236, 272-274, II 671.
 (*See also* Jews)
 Hecataeus (hek ā tē' ūs), I 210
 Hector, I 302
 Hedgehogs, I 57
 Hegira (hej' i rā), II 678, 683,
 688, IV 1315
 Heidelberg man, I 62, 69, 70, 71,
 82
 Hekt, I 229
 Helena, Empress, II 638, III 761
 Helena, mother of Constantine, II
 616
 Heligoland, IV 1179, 1328
 Heliolithic (hē li ō lith' ik) cul-
 ture, I 148, 150, 165, 170, 181,
 188, 192, 213, 298, II 427, III
 874, IV 1160
 Heliolithic peoples, I 192
 Heliopolis (hē li op' ō lis), (Baal-
 bek), II 641
 Hellenes, I 309
 Hellenic civilization, I 311, II 695,
 III 851; tradition, II 580
 Hellenism, II 443, 586
 Hellespont, I 323, 349, 370, II 380,
 387, 538, 640, 692, III 757, 819,
 IV 1310, 1315
 Helmolt, H. F., II 690, 695, III
 817
 Helmont, van, I 296
 Helots, I 313
 Hen (*See* Fowl, domesticated)
 Henriot, III 1024
 Henry II, German Emperor, III
 742

- Henry V, German Emperor, III 742
 Henry VI, German Emperor, III 766
 Henry II, King of England, IV 1186
 Henry III, King of England, III 905
 Henry V, King of England, III 862
 Henry VII, King of England, III 870, 904, 906
 Henry VIII, King of England, III 882, 886, 888, 889, 904, 906, IV 1322
 Henry of Prussia, Prince, III 986
 Henry the Fowler, III 740, 745,
 Henry, Patrick, III 972, 989
 Hephæstion (hē fes' tī ōn), II 402, 523
 Heraclea (her ā klē' ā), II 465, IV 1311
 Heraclius (her āk' li ūs), II 634, 638, 643, 655, 671, 689-691, III 761, IV 1315
 Heraldry, I 260
 Herat, II 395, 621
 Herbivorous animals, I 41
 Hercules, demi-god, II 409, 528
 Hercules, son of Alexander, II 404
 Hercules, temple of, I 223
 Herdsmen, I 256, 259
 Hereditary rule, III 826
 Heredity, I 220
 Heretics, III 775
 Heristhal, III 722
 Hermon, Mount, I 111, 169
 Herne Island, I 206
 Hero, II 413, 557
 Herodes Atticus (her ō' dēz āt' i kūs), II 552
 Herodians, II 596
 Herodotus (hē rod' ō tūs), I 170, 207, 210, 231, 251, 259, 289, 322, 328-331, 334, 342, 350, 357, 361, 363, II 410, 416, 509, 548, 634, 664, 692, IV 1310
 Herods, the, II 587, 591, 597
 Herophilus (hē rof' i lūs), II 413, 414, 415
 Herzegovina (hērt sē gov' ě nā), IV 1180, 1328
 Hesperornis (hes pēr ōr' nis), I 48
 Hesse (hes' ě) and Hessians, III 727, 890, IV 1129
 Hezekiah, King, I 283
 Hieratic script, I 218
 Hiero (hī' ěr ō), II 480, 483, 488
 Hieroglyphics, I 200, 218
 Hieronymus, (hī ěr on' i mūs) of Syracuse, II 488
 High Carts III 787 (*See also* Kao-ku
 Hildebrand. (*See* Gregory VII)
 Himalayas, I 32, 53, 163, II 563
 Hindu deities, II 449, 453; priests, I 306; schools, III 818
 Hindu Kush, III 812
 Hinduism, II 649, III 940
 Hindus, I 261, 295, 304, II 555, III 788, 815, 818, 941
 Hindustan, III 786, 814
 Hipparchus, II 413
 Hippas, I 340
 Hippo, II 574, 622
 Hippopotamus, I 38, 68, 75
 Hippopotamus deities, I 183, 226
 Hira, II 690, 691
 Hiram, King of Sidon, I 279-281
 Hirth, II 448, 450, 600
 Histiaüs, I 338, 351, II 579
 Hittites, I 177, 181, 185, 208, 271, 274, 275, 295, 335
 Hi-ung-nu. (*See* Huns)
 Hogue, cruiser, IV 1217
 Hohenlinden, battle of, III 1047
 Hohenstaufens (hō en stou' fēn), III 742, 778, 866, 883, 915
 Hohenzollerns, III 919, 924, 1061, IV 1127, 1130, 1174-82
 Holland, II 558, 623, III 727, 841, 866, 873, 877, 901, 904, 911, 918, 938, 968, IV 1020, 1028, 1036, 1051-53, 1061, 1146, 1152, 1327
 Holly, I 51
 Holstein, III 1069
 Holy Alliance, III 1065, 1066, 1072, IV 1090, 1170, 1172
 Holy Land. (*See* Crusades and Palestine)

- Holy Roman Empire, III 734, 742, 746, 810, 866, 882, 886, 895, 897, 940, IV 1326
- Homage, III 720
- Home Rule Bill, I 321, IV 1278-79
- Homer, I 112, 208, 219, 309, II 520, 546
- Homo antiquus. (*See* Neanderthal man; Heidelbergensis, *see* Heidelberg man; Neanderthalensis, *see* Neanderthal man; primigenius, *see* Neanderthal man; apiens, *see* Man, true)
- Homo Rhodesiensis, I 83
- Homo Sapiens, I 83, 86
- Homs, II 641
- Honduras (hon dūr' ās), British, III 938
- Honey, I 298
- Honorias, II 575
- Honorius, II 571
- Honorius III, pope, III 766, IV 1319
- Hopf, Ludwig, I 130
- Hophni, I 276
- Horn, Count of, III 901
- Horn implements, I 89, 104
- Horrabin, F., I 116
- Horses, I 57, 64, 68, 90, 173, 294, 296-297, II 568
- Horticulture, I 245
- Horus, I 240, 243, II 423, 425, 442, 607-608
- Hotel Cecil, II 642
- Hottentot language, I 166
- House of Representatives, IV 1135-37
- Households, growth of, I 248
- Houses, stone, I 297
- Howard, the philanthropist, III 1026
- Hrdlicka, Dr., I 101
- Hsia, Empire of, III 790
- Hubbard, II 664
- Hue, II 442
- Hudson Bay Company, III 938
- Hudson Bay Territory, I 161
- Hudson River, III 977, IV 1076
- Hugo, Victor, III 1047
- Huguenots, III 928, 938, 968
- Hulagu, III 792, 797, 799, 811, 835, IV 1319
- Hulbert, H. B., I 160
- Human association, IV 1104
- Human sacrifice, I 115, 131, 135, 150, 194, II 420, III 874
- Hungary (and the Hungarians), I 105, II 571, 578, 611, III 727, 747, 756, 780, 792, 802, 806, 821, 867, 888-89, 915, 944, 1069, IV 1090, 1321. (*See also* Austria)
- Huns, I 190-192, 243, II 398, 520, 549, 556, 561-577, 648, 653, 666, III 748, 784, 786, 792, 824, 951, IV 1314
- Hunter Commission, IV 1151
- Hunting, I 90, 101, 111, 123, 326
- Husein, son of Ali, II 699, 703
- Huss, John, III 781, 833, 887, 948, 957, 1320
- Hussites, III 834, 839, IV 1320
- Hut urns, I 114
- Hutchinson, I 167
- Hutton, IV 1109
- Huxley, Professor I 141, IV 1111
- Hwang-ho (hwāng' hō), river, I 187, 191, II 663, III 798, 663
- Hyæna, cave, I 76
- Hyænodon (hī ē' no don), I 52
- Hyde Park, IV 1121
- Hyksos, I 181, 184, II 671
- Hyracodon (hī rāk' o don), I 52
- Hystaspes (his tās' pēz), I 335, IV 1310

I

- IBERIAN language, I 291
- Iberians, I 99, 142, 144, 181, 201, 274, 291, 297, 302, II 458. (*See also* Mediterranean race)
- Ibex, I 92
- Ibn Batuta (ibn ba too' ta), III 836
- Ibn-rushd. (*See* Averroes)
- Ibrahim, son of Muhammad, II 685
- Icarus ('ik' ā rās), I 203
- Ice, effect of, I 58, 59

- Ice Age, I 53, 58, 59, 67, 74, 81, 162, 326
- Iceland, III 729, 868, 936
- Icelandic language, I 293
- Ichabod, I 276
- Ichthyosaurs (ik' thi ō sawrz), I 39, 45
- Iconium, III 750
- Ideograms, I 215, 216
- Ideographs, I 215
- Idumeans, II 586
- Ignatius, St., of Loyola, III 847, 849, 948, IV 1322
- Iliad, the. (*See* Homer)
- Ilkhan, Empire of, III 799, 807
- Illyria, II 380, 383, 386, 484, 493, 802, IV 1311
- Immortality, idea of, II 424, 436, 555
- Imperator, title of, II 583
- Imperial preference, IV 1183-1185
- Imperialism, I 320, IV 1115-16, 1118-19, 1156-57, 1169, 1196-98
- Implements, bronze, I 132; Chellean, I 69; copper, I 105; earliest use of, I 67; flint, I 71, 75, 78, 90, 113; horn, I 89, 104; iron, I 106-7; Neolithic, I 103, 104, 113, 130; Palæolithic, I 75, 103, 138; Pliocene, I 67; stone, I 66, 79, 103, 104, 266; use of by animals, I 67; wooden, I 75
- Inca of Peru, III 875
- India, 108, 112, 192, 308, 335, II 406, 444, 502, 522, 548, 564, 646, 699, 706, III 786, 812, 818, 826, 952, 1042; history (*Alexander in*), II 387, 395, 399, 441, 522; (*Indo-Scythians in*), II 564, 648, IV 1313; (*Ephthalites in*), II 648, 649, 650, IV 1314; (*Mongols in*), II 567, 793, 818; (*17th and 18th centuries*), III 939-942, 945; (*British in*), III 788, 814, 941-44, 963, 971, IV 1144-51, 1160, 1167, 1183, 1325, 1327, 1328; civilization, social development and culture, I 145, 181, 187, 261-65, 305, 314, II 427, 443, III 818, 827, IV, 1148-51; European settlements in, III 939-43, 963, 971, IV 1324; languages of, I 160, 161, 294, III 819; peoples and races, I 138, 140, 145, 161, 162, 181, 329, II 397, 650, III 784, 874; religions of, II 454, 620, 645, III 786, 794, 818, 849; South, II 425; trade of, II 411, 548, III 941; travels and voyages to, II 549, 662, 665, III 798, 868-72, IV 1157, 1314, 1321; Turks in, III 788
- Indian corn, I 112
- Indian ocean, I 107, 199, III 872
- Indians, American. (*See* American Indians)
- Indies, East, I 45, 150, 162, 165, 193, 198, 265, III 942, IV 1146, 1156
- Indies, West, III 870, 936, 992, 1144
- Individual, the free, I 251
- Individuality, in reproduction, I 13
- Indo-European languages. (*See* Aryan languages)
- Indo-Iranian language, I 294; people, I 555
- Indore, III 941
- Indo-Scythians, II 564, 636, 648, IV 1312, 1313
- Indulgences, III 773, 887
- Indus, I 163, 308, 335, II 394, 399, 405, 444, 519, 538, III 812, IV 1310
- Industrial Revolution, III 961, IV 1083-87, 1095
- Industrialism, III 960
- Infanticide, I 135
- Infinite, II 663
- Influenza, IV 1073
- Information, IV 1103
- Inge, Dean, II 601, IV 1106
- Innocent III, pope, III 761, 766, 777, 850, IV 1319
- Innocent IV, III 760, 767, 796
- Inns, early, I 209
- Innsbruck, III 891
- Inquisition, the, III 775, 849, 894, 1066

Insects, I 3, 23, 25
 Instruments, Neolithic musical, I 113
 Interglacial period, I 58, 67, 69, 73, 75
 "International," the, IV 1099
 International relationship, III 1036
 Internationalism, IV 1116
 Intoxicants, I 298, 308
 Investitures, III 720, 752, 764
 Ion, poet, II 357
 Iona, III 725
 Ionians, I 323, 324, 337, 340, 347, 350 III 801
 Ipsus (ip'sūs), battle of, I 237
 Irak, II 706
 Iran (ē ran'), II 520, 646
 Iranians, II 648
 Ireland, I 85, 105, 109, 308, 321, 620, III 715, 725, 745, 778, 861, 911-13, IV 1115, 1116, 1166 1183-96, 1278, 1328, 1329
 Irish Catholics, III 908-11, 928; language, I 155, 293; prisoners, III 969; race, I 293
 Irish Free State, IV 1280
 Irish sea, I 73
 Iron, I 2, 78; as currency, I 208; use of, I 106, 172, 191, 194, III 961, IV 1076-8, 1309
 Iron Age, I 106-7
 Ironsides, III 909
 Iroquois (ir ō kwoi') tribes, III 970
 Irrigation, I 174
 Irving, Washington, III 938
 Isaac, patriarch, I 271-272
 Isabella of Castile, III 870, 884
 Isaiah, II 595
 Ishmael, I 272
 Ishtar, I 236
 Isis, I 229, 239, II 423, 424, 441, 442, 554, 555, 592, 607, 608
 Iskender, II 398
 Islam, I 289, II 455, 600, 658, 675, III 824, 878; and Christianity, II 707, III 742, 794, 831; propaganda of, II 687, 701, III 727, 794, 807, 828, 940, IV 1086-87; teaching of, II 685, III 742,

818, 828, IV 1093. (*See also* Moslems, and Muhammadanism)
 Isocrates (ī sok' rā tēz), I 362, 364, 371, II 375, 399, 408
 Ispahan (is pa han'), III 812
 Israel, Kingdom of (and Israelites), I 269, 325, III 826, 927, IV 1308. (*See also* Jews)
 Issik Kul (is' ik kool), II 665
 Issus, battle of, II 388, 393, 692, III 756, IV 1310
 Italian language, I 154, II 458, III 883
 Italy (and Italians), I 105, 181, 201, 274, II 458, 459, 540, 630, III 801, 826, IV 1311; history (*Greeks in*), I 310, 356, II 458, 464-65, IV 1310-11, (*Gauls in*), II 397, 463, 483; (*Roman*), II 465, 473, 506, 511-15, 537, III 828; (*invasion by Hannibal*), II 487-489; (*Goths in*), II 570, 623, III 721, 745, IV 1315; (*Huns in*), II 576; (*Lombards in*), II 576, 624, 635, III 732, 836, IV 1315; (*Charlemagne in*), III 732, 733; (*Germans in*), III 734, IV 1322; (*Normans in*), III 745, 746, 754; (*Saracens in*), II 746; (*Magyars in*), III 747; (*13th-18th cent.*), III 764, 766, 769, 777, 806-7, 866, 878-81, 889, 898, 915-22, IV 1322; (*Napoleonic period*), III 919, 1028, 1041-42, 1051, 1056, IV 1326; (*to unification of*), III 731, 732, IV 1090-91, 1116; (*Kingdom of*), IV 1124-9, 1165, 1198, 1215, 1327, imperialism of, IV 1165, 1197-8. (*See also* Rome and Great War)
 Ivan III, III 809, IV 1321; IV (*the Terrible*), III 810, IV 1322
 Ivory, trade in, I 265
 Ivy, fossil, I 51

J

JACOB, patriarch, I 271
 Jacobins, French, III 1011, 1021, 1032, 1040, IV 1325

- Jacquerie, III 839, IV 1199, 1320
 Jade, I 115
 Jaffa, III 1043
 Jaipur (jī'poor'), III 940
 Jamaica, III 938, IV 1144, 1167
 James I, I 109, III 899, 920, 938, 965
 James II, III 913, IV 1187
 James, St., II 597
 James, Henry, IV 1253
 Jameson, Dr., IV 1115
 Jamestown, III 969, 991
 Janissaries, III 802, 811
 Japan, I 140, II 442, 446, 663, 799, 869-70, 946, IV 1160-65, 1327
 Japanese, I 63, II 442, IV 1159
 Japanese language and writing, I 160, III 659
 Japhet, I 141
 Jarandilla, III 892
 Jarrow, III 725
 Java, I 67, III 872
 Jaw, chimpanzee, I 70; human, *ib.* Piltown (see Piltown)
 Jefferson, Thos., III 978, 989
 Jihad (jē'had'), "holy war," III 759
 Jehan (jē'han'), Shah, III 814
 Jehangir, III 814
 Jehovah, I 275, 279, 284, 314, II 422
 Jena (yā'nā), battle of, III 1054, 1056, IV 1174, 1326
 Jengis Khan (jen'giskan), III 784, 786, 788, 794, 801, 808, 944, IV 1319
 Jerome of Prague, III 834
 Jerusalem, I 238, 269, 279-82, II 421, 538, 587, 588, 595, 597, 601, 606, 621, 638, 643, 693, 695, III 743, 753, 756-62, 778, 798, IV 1178, 1316, 1318, 1319
 Jesuits, III 797, 807, 817, 847, 877, IV 1080, 1160, 1322
 Jesus, spirit and teachings of, I 289, II 504, 589, 618, 638, 646, 676, 684, III 731, 742, 764, 770, 794, 807, 831, 840, 845-46, 948, 981, 1031, IV 1092-3, 1107, 1312
 Jewellery, iron, I 106
 Jewish religion and sacred books, I 271, 287, 288, II 410, 421, 422, 451, 554, 587, 592, 709, IV 1108
 Jews, I 186, 238, 269, 284-89, 311, II 412, 423, 585-89, 627, 672-76, 691, 705, 709, III 716, 748, 768, 801, 829, 925, 932, IV, 1308 (See also Judaism)
 "Jingo," IV 1143
 Jingo, queen, IV 1160
 Joab, I 279
 Joan of Arc, III 862
 Job, Book of, I 112, 287
 Jodhpore (jōd'poor'), Raja of, III 816
 John, King of England, III 760
 John II, king of Portugal, III 869
 John III, king of Poland. (See Sobiesky, John)
 John X, pope, III 740, IV 1317
 John XI, pope, III 740, IV 1317
 John XII, pope, III 740, 751, 777, IV 1317-8
 John, St., II 597; Gospel of, II 590, III 726
 Johnson, Samuel, IV 1189
 Jones, H. Stuart, II 530, 551
 Joppa, I 274
 Jordan, river, I 271, II 691
 Joseph, St., II 591
 Joseph II, emperor, III 925, IV 1324
 Josephine, empress. (See Beauharnais)
 Josephus, II 512, 586
 Joshua, I 274
 Josiah, king of Judah, IV 1309
 Judah, kingdom of, I 281, III 927
 Judaism, II 454, 585, 687, III 824, 831. (See also Jews)
 Judas, II 602
 Judea, I 181, 271, 373, II 451, 554, 586, 601, 674, 700
 Judges, Book of, I 275
 Judges of Israel, II 478, 826
 Jugo-Slavs (ū'go-slavz). (See Yugo-Slavs)
 Jugurtha (joo'gēr' thā), II 519, IV 1311

Julian, the Apostate, II 645, IV 1314
 Julius III, III 893
 Jung, I 125, 368
 Jungle fowl, I 112
 Juno, I 206
 Junot, Mme., III 1040
 Jupiter, II 422, 459, III 724
 Jupiter, planet, I 2
 Jupiter Serapis, II 423
 Justinian, II 624, 654, III 721, 732, 836, IV 1073, 1315
 Jutes, II 572, 623, III 730
 Jutland, battle of, IV 1217

K

КААБА (ka' ābā), II 674, 682, 699
 Kadessia, battle of, II 692, IV 1316
 Kadija (ka dē' jā), II 675
 Kaffirs, I 208
 Kaisar-i-Hind, II 583, III 814
 Kaisar-i-Roum, II 583
 Kaiser, Austrian, II 583; German, II 583
 Kali (ka' lē), II 452
 Kalifa. (*See* Caliph)
 Kalinga, II 444
 Kalmucks (kāl' mŭks), I 138, 146, II 562, 808
 Kanishka (ka nish' ka), II 649, 668, IV 1313
 Kansas, IV 1135
 Kao-chang, II 666
 Kao-ku, III 787
 Karakorum (ka ra kōr' ām), III 791, 815
 Karma (kar' mā), doctrine of, II 438
 Karnak, I 185
 Kashgar (kash gar'), II 563, 649, 665, 695, III 790, 798
 Kashmir, Buddhists in, II 446
 Kavadh, II 644, 655, 671, III 1059, 1315
 Kazan (ka zan'), III 797
 Keane, A. H., I 165
 Keith, Dr. A., I 70

Keltic languages, I 293, 308, II 458, 623
 Keltic race, I 181, 293, II 397, 405, 572, III 715, IV 1186
 Kent, Duke of, IV 1095-96
 Kent, Kingdom of, III 715
 Kepler, III 858
 Kerensky, IV 1223
 Kerne Island, I 206
 Keynes, J. M., IV 1263
 Khalid (ka lēd'), II 690
 Khans, II 666, III 792, 808, 826, IV 1319
 Kharismia, III 784, 788, IV 1319
 Khazars (ka zarz'), III 747
 Khedive, the, of Egypt, IV 1167
 Khirgiz, III 787
 Khitan people, III 786, 798
 Khiva (kē' va), III 784
 Khokand (kō kand'), II 563, III 790
 Khorasan (kō' ra san'), II 703, 710
 Khotan (kō tan'), II 649, III 798, IV 1313
 Khyber Pass, II 395, 564, 665, III 941
 Kiau-Chau (kyou' chou'), IV 1165, 1268, 1328
 Kidnapped children sent to New England, III 969
 Kieff, III 745, 809, 815, IV 1317; Grand Duke of, III 790
 Kin Empire, III 786, 808, IV 1318-19
 Kings, Book of, I 178, 275, 278, 282
 Kings (and kingship), I 134, 231, 247, 255, 275, 304, 312, II 444, III 826, 878, 918, 971, 1066; divine right of, III 904, 907
 Kioto (kyō' tō), IV 1163
 Kipchak, Empire, III 793, 809
 Kipling, Rudyard, IV 1114, 1157, 1184
 Kirghis (kir gēz'), III 787; steppe, II 654
 Kitboga, III 811
 Kitchen-middens, I 108, 110, 155
 Kiwi, I 193
 Knighthood, II 476, III 886

- Knights, I 260, III 862; of the Shire, II 475, III 904
 Knives, flint, I 104
 Knots, records by means of, I 195
 Knowledge, diffusion of, II 408, 592
 Koltchak, Admiral IV 1245-47
 Konia, III 750
 Königsberg, III 864, 1060
 Koran, II 680, 687, 702, III 941
 Korea, II 659, III 946, IV 1160
 Korean alphabet, II 658; language, I 160
 Kosciusko (kos i ūs' kō), III 935
 Krapina, I 71
 Kremlin, the, III 925
 Krishna (krish' nā), II 452
 Krüdener, Baroness von, III 1065
 Krum, Prince of Bulgaria, III 734, 747, IV 1317
 Krupp, firm of, IV 1211
 Kshatriyas (ksha trē' yaz), I 262
 Kuan-yin, II 442
 Kublai Khan (koo' bli kan), III 792, 807, 826, IV 1319, 1320
 Kuen-lun (kwen loon') mountains, I 187, II 563, 665
 Kufa, II 710
 Kushan (koo shan') dynasty, II 649
 Kusinagara, II 668
 Kut, IV 1219
 Kutub, III 786, IV 1319
- L
- LABOUR, I 246, 257, 264, III 876, IV 1096, 1174
 Labour Colleges, II 500
 Labourers, Statute of, III 838
 Labrador, II 76, 123, 138, IV 1119
 Labyrinth, Cretan, I 202
 Lacedemon (las e dē' mōn), II 311
 Lacedemonians, II 316, 331, 340, 342
 Ladé, II 340
 Ladrones (la drōnz'), III 872
 Ladysmith, II 498
 Lafayette (la fā yet'), General, III 1002-5, 1012, 1015
 Lagash (lā' gāsh), I 180
 Lahore, III 790
 Lake dwellings, I 109, 114, 133. (*See also* Pile dwellings)
 Lamarck IV 1109
 Lamas, Grand, II 442
 Lamballe, princess de, III 1018
 Lamps, Palæolithic, I 93-94
 Lance head, bronze, I 132
 Land, tenure of, I 246, 264
 Lang, Andrew, I 77
 Langley, Prof., IV 1082
 Languages of mankind, I 126, 133, 153, 166, 174, 217, 293, 299, II 458
 Laodicea (lā ō di sē' ā), III 757
 Lao Tse (la' ot zē), II 447, 451, 599, 652, 663, 670, III 784, IV 1092, 1309
 Lapland, I 159
 Larsa, I 180
 Las Casas (las ka' sas), III 877, 991
 Lateran, the, III 733, 742, 751, 763, 769-72, 777
 Latin emperors, III 778, 915; language and literature, I 176, 293, II 473, 546, 551, 580-582, 623, 631, III 721, 737, 749, 810, 843
 Latins, the, II 458-61, IV 1311-1315
 Latium, II 460
 Laud, Archbishop, III 907
 Law, I 318, II 635, III 717
 Lawrence, General, IV 1149
 League of Nations, IV 1251-52, 1259-67, 1284, 1286, 1329
 Learning, I 231, III 794
 Leather, Arabian, II 711; money, I 209, III 768
 Lebanon, I 279, II 641, 643
 Lecointre (lekwantr'), III 1005
 Lee, General, III 986, IV 1138
 Leeuwenhoek, (lā' vën huk), III 860
 Leege, II 424, 555
 Legion of Honour, III 1049
 Leicestershire, III 839
 Leipzig (līp' sik), III 864, battle of, III 1060
 Leipzig, cruiser, IV 1216

- Lemberg, IV 1215
 Lemming, I 59
 Le Moustier, I 76
 Lemurs, I 57, 63
 Lena, river, III 951
 Lenin (len'in), IV 1101, 1224, 1242, 1245
 Leo I, II 577; Leo III, III 733, 737, 777; Leo X, III 884-87, IV 1321
 Leo the Isaurian, II 701
 Leonidas (lē on' i dās), I 345
 Leopold I, of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, III 1071, IV 1120, 1327
 Leopold, king of Belgium, IV 1122
 Lepanto, battle of, III 822, 868
 Lepers, III 773
 Lepidus (lep' i dus), II 527
 Levant, the, III 877
 Levantine lake, I 198
 Leverhulme, Lord, IV 1096
 Levites, I 280
 Leviticus, Book of, I 273
 Lex Valeria, II 469
 Lexington, III 975, IV 1325
 Leyden, III 900
 Lhasa, II 453
 Liang-chi-chao, I 191
 Liao-tung (lē ou' toong'), IV 1164
 Liberal Party, III 1185
 Liberia, I 206, IV 1155
 Libraries, I 285, II 415
 Libyan script, I 218
 Licinian Rogations and Laws, II 470, 512, 652
 Licinius, II 470
 Liège (li āzh'), IV 1211
 Liegnitz (lēg' nits), battle of, III 791, IV 1319
 Life, I 3, 14, 49; early forms of, I 3-12, 18-27; intellectual development of human, I 219-222
 Light, essential to plants, I 22
 Ligny (lē nyé'), III 1064
 Ligurian republic, III 1036
 Lilybaeum, II 481
 Limerick, Treaty of, IV 1187
 Lincoln, Abraham, I 355, IV 1131-1141, 1327
 Lion, the, I 68, 76, 100, 304, 326
 Lippi, Filippo, III 867
 Lisbon, II 545, III 759, 864, 872, 892, 941
 Lissa, battle of, IV 1129
 Literature, prehistoric, I 299
 Lithuania, III 809, 928
 Liu Yu, II 654
 Lizards, I 45
 Llama, I 58, 194
 Lloyd, I 357
 Lloyd, L., I 300
 Lob Nor, III 798
 Lochau (lō chou'), III 891
 Locke, John, III 973, 995, IV 1324
 Lockyer, Sir Norman, I 230
 Logic, study of, III 851
 Loire (Iwar), the, III 721
 Lombardy (and Lombards), II 582, 624, 626, 630, 635, III 721, 732, 836, 902, 1052, 1125, 1315
 London, III 837, 864, 866, 908, 933, 943, 974, 1053, 1061, IV 1120, 1166, 1188, 1216, 1228, 1327
 London, Royal Society. (*See* Royal Society of London)
 London, University of, IV 1121
 Londonderry, IV 1329
 Longinus (lon jī' nūs), II 551
 Long Island Sound, III 967
 Longwy (lon vē'), III 1016
 Loos, IV 1214
 Lopez de Recalde, Inigo. (*See* Ignatius, St., of Loyola)
 Lords, House of, II 477, 502, III 905, 910-13, 920, 983
 Lorraine, IV 1131, 1183
 Lost Ten Tribes, I 178
 Louis the Pious, III 722, 737-738, IV 1317
 Louis VII, III 759; IX, III 763, 796, IV 1319; XI, III 862; XIV, III 912, 920-21, 922, 931, 938, 998, 1019, 1047; XV, III 922, 926-28, 948, 1048, IV 1324; XVI, III 924-26, 952, 989, 997, 1026, 1063; XVII, III 1063; XVIII, III 1063, IV 1325
 Louis Philippe, III 1067, 1327
 Louisiana, III 939, 971

- Louvain University, IV 1255
 Lower Palæolithic stage, I 83
 Loyalty, modern conceptions of, IV 1114-15
 Loyola (loi ō' lā), St. (*See* Ignatius, St., of Loyola)
 Lu, II 447
 Lubbock, Sir John. (*See* Avebury, Lord)
 Lubeck, III 866
 Lucerne, Lake of, III 882
 Lu-chu Islands, II 653
 Lucknow, III 941, IV 1149
 Lucretius (lū krē' shi ūs), II 500, 550, IV 1109
 Lucullus (lū kŭl' ūs), II 518
 Luke, St., II 590
 Lunar month, I 129
 Lung-fish, I 24
 Lungs, I 24, 57
 "Lur," bronze, I 132
 Lusitania, liner, IV 1217
 Luther, Martin, III 843-47, 887, 891, IV 1321, 1322
 Lutterworth, III 776
 Lützen (lut' sēn), III 918
 Lutzow, Count, III 835
 Luxembourg, IV 1129, 1207
 Luxembourg Palace, III 1045
 Luxor, I 185, 240
 Lvoff, Prince, IV 1222
 Lyceum, Athens, I 365, 367
 Lycia, sea-battle of, II 700
 Lycurgus (li kēr' gŭs), I 210
 Lydia (and Lydians), I 209, 323, 325, 329-31, 332-34, II 379, 405, 428, 494, III 801, IV 1309
 Lydian language, I 166; script, I 218
 Lyell, Sir C., IV 1109
 Lyons, II 578, III 1021
 Lysimachus (li sim' ā kŭs), II 405
- M
- McClellan, General, IV 1138
 Macaulay, Lord, II 463, III 955-56
 Macaulay Island, I 206
 Maccabeans, II 587, 674
 Macedon, II 642
 Macedonia (and the Macedonians), I 201, 311, 317, 339, 349, 371, II 376, 395, 399, 404, 411, 444, 465, 488, 493, 672, III 718, 802, 827, 952, 1068, IV 1310
 Machiavelli (ma kē a vel' ē), N., III 879, 887, 895, 924, IV 1174, 1321
 Machinery, III 961, IV 1085
 Madagascar, I 193
 Madeira, III 869
 Madhurattha Vilasini (mad' hoo-rat'-t'havila' si nē), II 434
 Madison, III 989
 Madras, I 305, II 444, III 823, 942
 Mæander (mē ān' der), III 757
 Mælius, Spurius, II 470, 513
 Magdalenian Age, clothing, II 418, hunters, I 326
 Magdeburg, III 864
 Magellan, Ferdinand, III 872, IV 1321
 Magenta, IV 1125, 1327
 Magic and magicians, I 134, 224
 Magna Carta, III 905, IV 1319
 Magna Græcia, I 310, 325, II 464
 Magnesia, II 408, 494, IV 1311
 Magnetism, III 859
 Magyar language, II 578, III 747
 Magyars (ma jarz'), II 578, 624, III 746, 792
 Mahaffy, I 365, II 398
 Mahrattas, III 940
 Maillard, III 1003
 Maimonides (mī mon' i dēz), II 709
 Maine, III 967-68
 Mainz (mints), III 736, 842
 Maize, I 112, 150, 193
 Majuba, IV 1154, 1185, 1328
 Malaba Coast, II 425
 Malabar, II 549
 Malay-Polynesian languages, I 161
 Malays, I 188
 Mallet, III 995
 Malory, Sir Thomas, I 301
 Malta, III 911, 1043, IV 1144, 1165
 Mamelukes, III 802, 806, 811

- Mammals, I 46, 51-60, 65. (*See also* Animals)
- Mammoth, I 59, 64, 68, 75, 78, 90, 92, 100
- Man, I 3, 18, 63, 64, 100, 105, 106, 111, 134; ancestry of, I 49, 61, 65, IV 1110; brotherhood of, II 60, early, I 85, 87, 90, 100, 106, 114, 121, 137, 266, II 418, III 1030; Eoanthropus, I 70; Heidelberg, I 62, 69, 70, 82; life of common, I 246; as mechanical power, IV 1085; Neanderthal, I 62, 70, 86, 90, 91, 107, 122; primeval, I 78, 81; and the State, III 928
- Manchester, IV 1094
- Manchu (*män choo'*) language, I 160
- Manchuria, II 562, 662, III 946, IV 1158, 1164, 1165, 1180
- Manchus, III 808, 946
- Mandarins, I 263
- Mangu Khan, III 792, 796, IV 1319
- Mani (*ma'nē*), II 646, 676, 684, 685, 687, IV 1313
- Manichæans (*mänikē' ānz*), II 620, 646, 701, III 771
- Manichæism, II 646, III 787
- Manif (*ma nēf*), II 682
- Mankind, I 137, 290, 373; brotherhood of, III 929
- Manlius, Marcus, II 470, 485, 513
- Manny, Sir Walter, III 837
- Manresa (*man rä'sā*), Abbey of, III 848
- Mansfield, Lord, III 992
- Mansur, II 704
- Mantua (*män'tyū ā*), III 1020
- Manuscripts, II 416, 647, III 842
- "Manzi," III 798
- Manzikert (*män'zi-kért*), III 750
- Mara, Indian god, II 432
- Marat (*marā'*), III 1011-15,
- Marathon, I 340-345, 355, 357
- Marchand, Colonel, IV 1154
- Marcus Aurelius. (*See* Antoninus)
- Mardonius (*mar dō ni ūs*), I 349
- Marduk (*mar dook*), a god, I 227
- Marengo, III 1047, IV 1326
- Maria Theresa, III 925, 933, IV 1324
- Marie Antoinette, III 997
- Maria Louise, Archduchess, III 1057
- Mariner's compass, II 656
- Maritime power, I 205
- Marius (*mär'i ūs*), II 498, 515-517, 525, IV 1311
- Mark, St., II 590, 595, 596-97-98
- Marly, III 1003
- Marne, IV 1212, 1226
- Marozia, III 740, IV 1317
- Marriage and intermarriage, I 227, 240, 258, 305
- Mars, god, III 724
- Mars, planet, I 2, 3
- Marseillaise, the, III 1019
- Marseilles (*mar sālz'*), I 311, 458, 487, III 761, 774, 864, 889, 1021, IV 1320
- Marston Moor, III 909
- Martel, Charles, III 722, 724, IV 1316
- Martin V, Pope, III 776, 781, 833
- Marx, Karl, IV 1088, 1089, 1098, 1101, 1105, 1181, 1239-41
- Marxists, I 260, IV 1240, 1245
- Mary, the Egyptian, II 684, 685
- Mary, the Virgin, II 592
- Mary I, Queen of England, II 608, III 904, 906
- Mary II, Queen of England, III 913
- Maryland, III 967-69, 975
- Mas d'Azil, I 99
- Masai hunters, I 327
- Masked Tuaregs, I 158
- Mason, Capt. John, III 967
- Mason and Dixon line, III 968, 969, IV 1135
- Maspero, I 240, 243
- Mass, the, III 831
- Massachusetts, III 967, 968, 975, 982, 988, 992, 1026
- Massage, I 148
- Massinissa, King, II 491
- Mathematics, II 708, 710, III 794
- Matthews, St., II 590, 594, 604
- Maulvi Muhammad, Ali, II 680

- Mauritius, III 942
 Maxentius, II 615
 Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico,
 IV 1128, 1129, 1327, 1328
 Maximilian I, III 884, IV 1321
 Maximin, II 575
 Maya (ma'ya) writing, I 194
 Mayence. (*See* Mainz) \
 Mayflower, the, III 938, 967, 969
 Mayor, II 503
 Mayor of the Palace, III 722
 Mazarin, Cardinal, III 920, 930
 Mazaryk, IV 1283
 Mazdaism, II 647, 687
 Mecca, II 673, 674, 687, 696, 704
 Meccan allies, IV 1315
 Mechanical Revolution, the, IV
 1073-83, 1106, 1120, 1148, 1155,
 1169, 1238
 Medes, I 179, 186, 237, 283, 295,
 323, 328, 342, 351, 354, II 397,
 461, 561, IV 1309
 Media (mē'di ā), I 178, 286, 329,
 335, II 396, 520, 538
 Medici (med'ichē) family, III
 867, 879-87
 Medicine, II 414, 708, 711
 Medina (mědē'nā), II 644, 655,
 671, 673, 678, 679, 685, 688, 691,
 696-699, 701-704,
 Mediterranean, I 142, 156, 163,
 170, 175, 198, 201, 204, 271, 310,
 II 406, 457, 480, 520, 545, 556,
 558, 578, 586, 640, 663, 701, III
 730, 743, 822, 866, 868, 874, 878,
 911
 Mediterranean, alphabets, I 219,
 311, II 659; civilization, I 148,
 181; early, I 162, 219, II 580;
 navigation of, I 198, 200, 205,
 II 525; race and peoples, I 99,
 107, 139, 142, 144, 159, 163,
 193, 274, 293, 295, 322, II 458,
 554; valley, I 73, 116, 118, 170,
 271
 Medway, III 912
 Meerut, IV 1149
 Megabazus (meg ā bā'zūs), I 340
 Megalithic monuments, I 109, 148
 Megara (meg' ā rā), I 346
 Megatherium, I 101, 194
 Megiddo, I 283, IV 1309
 Melanesia, I 150
 Melasgird, III 750, IV 1318
 Memphis, I 334, 372, II 391, 423
 Menahem (men' ā hem), I 283, IV
 1309
 Menelaus (men ē lā' ūs), I 300
 Menes, (mē' nēz), I 181, 190
 Mengo, IV 1154
 Mercator's projection, II 563
 Mercenary armies, III 882
 Merchants, I 257, 261
 Mercia, III 715, 725, 730
 Mercury, god, II 469
 Mercury, planet, I 2
 Merodach (mer' ō dāk), I 235
 Merovingians, III 722, 914
 Merv, II 821
 Merycodus (mer i kō' dūs), I 54
 Mesopotamia, I 100, 133, 169, 170,
 177, 181, 183, 197, 223, 234, 245,
 312, II 399, 522, 542, 580, 636,
 637, 639, 641, 671, 690, 692, 704,
 III 798, 808, 810, 827, IV 1218
 Mesozoic (mes ō zō' ik), I 34
 Mesozoic period, I 9, 10, 37, 51,
 65, 66, III 823
 Messiah, I 286, II 554, 585, 592,
 597, 604
 Messina (mě sē' nā), Straits of,
 II 465, 472, 479
 Metallurgy, IV 1078
 Metals, I 105, 106, 193, 194, 208,
 III 857
 Metaurus, II 489
 Methodist revival, III 948
 Methuselah, I 129
 Metternich, III 1067, IV 1090
 Metz, III 1004, IV 1130, 1131
 Mexico (and the Mexicans), I 146,
 188, 194, 195, III 869, 875, 877,
 IV 1128, 1135, 1140
 Mey, Peter van der, III 902
 Michael VII, emperor, III 750
 Michael VIII. (*See* Palæologus,
 Michael)
 Michelangelo, III 867
 Michelin guides, I 214
 Micklegarth, III 730
 Microscope, III 860

- Middelburg, III 866
 Midianites, I 275
 Midsummer day, I 228, 230
 Midwinter day, I 230
 Migrations, I 104-5, II 563-69, 573
 Miharagula (mi hēr ā goo' lā), II 650, IV 1315
 Miklagard, III 730
 Milan, II 577, 578, III 864, 867, 881, 882, 889, 1052, 1069
 Miletus (milē' tūs), I 311, 320, 338, 349, II 388
 Military organization, I 175; service, I 319; tactics, III 916
 Milk, I 91, 111, 172, II 561
 Millet, II 575
 Milligan, Joseph, I 167
 Miltenburg, III 865
 Miltiades (mil' ti' ā dēz), I 338, 357
 Milvian Bridge, II 615
 Minerals, I 7
 Ming, II 663
 Ming dynasty, I 217, II 656, 658, III 796, 808, 849, IV 1320
 Minos (mī' nos), I 181, 202, 325
 Minotaur (min' ō tawr), I 202
 Minstrels, I 300
 Miocene (mī' ō sēn) period, I 53, 54
 Mirabeau (mē ra bō), III 1001, 1006-9, 1012
 Misraim and Misrim, I 273
 Missionaries (and missions), II 446, III 724, 725, 794, 796, 849, IV 1154, 1322
 Mississippi, III 971
 Mitanni, I 177
 Mithraic inscriptions, II 504
 Mithraic Sun-day, II 592
 Mithraism, II 554, 607, 608, 645, III 770, 831, IV 1314
 Mithras, II 424, 555, 608, 645
 Mithridates (mīth ri dā' tēz), II 517, 518, IV 1312
 Mo Ti, II 599
 Moa, I 193
 Moab (and Moabites), I 275, 286, III 927
 Moawija. (*See* Muawija)
 Mæsia, II 582, III 749, IV 1312
 Moghuls, Delhi, III 788
 Mogul, Great, IV 1167, 1323
 Mogul dynasty, III 814, IV 1324
 Mohammed. (*See* Muhammad)
 Mokanna, II 704
 Moloch, I 280
 Moltke, Count, IV 1176
 Moluccas, III 872
 Monarchy, III 900, 901, 919-26, 932, 935, 938, 1065
 Monasteries (and monasticism), II 627, III 725, 784, 832
 Monastir (mō nas tēr'), IV 1218
 Money, I 207, 208, II 457, 468, 509, 651, III 1034. (*See also* Currency)
 Mongolia, II 558, 561, 662, III 791-99, 946
 Mongolia, Northern, III 787
 Mongolian languages, I 163, 166; races and peoples, I 142, 150, 163, 193, 294, 325, II 396, 397, 519, 520, 562-569, 624, III 801, 822, 826, 930, 944, 945, IV 1157-65
 Mongoloid tribes, I 193, III 873
 Mongols, II 558, 562, 576, 693, III 762, 783, 793, 801, 807, 809, 810, 822, 826, 851, 867, 877, 944, 953, IV 1319, 1320, 1321
 Monkeys, I 57, 63, 66
 Monks. (*See* Monasteries)
 Monmouth, cruiser, IV 1217
 Monosyllabic language, I 160
 Monotheism, II 687
 Monroe, President, III 1066, IV 1129
 Monroe doctrine, IV 1128, 1140, 1152, 1202
 Mons, IV 1211
 Monte Cassino, II 629, 630
 Montesquieu, III 995
 Montezuma (mon tē zoo' mǎ), III 875
 Montfort, Simon de, III 905
 Montreal, III 939
 Montserrat, III 848
 Moon, I 2, 4, 128
 Moorish buffoon, II 576
 Moorish paper, III 842

- Moors, II 503, III 877
Moose, I 69
Moral ideas, I 289
Moravia, II 572
More, Sir Thomas, III 896, IV 1084
Moreau, General, III 1047, IV 1326
Morelly, III 996
Morning Post, IV 1095
Mornington, Lord, IV 1146
Morocco, I 206, III 824, IV 1155, 1185, 1180
Morris, William, III 997
Mortar, pebble, I 89
Morte d'Arthur, I 301
Mosasaurs (mō'să sawrz), I 39, 45
Moscow, III 809, 815, 925, 1059, IV 1326
Moscow, Grand Duke of, III 809, IV 1321
Moscow, Tsar of, III 944
Moses, I 181, 186, 197, 234, 272, II 285, 646
Moslem schools, III 818; universities, II 710
Moslems, the, II 690-94. 697-701, 705, III 742, 747, 752, 759, 773, 786, 792, 809, 817, 822, 842, IV 1148, 1316-19; in Europe, II 700-704, III 716, 722, 728, 732, 746, 768, 869, 925, IV 1319. (*See also* Crusades and Islam)
Mosses, I 23
Mosso, I 198
Most, III 834
Mosul, III 756, 811
Mother, I 125
Motley, III 901
Mounds, I 110, 124
Mountains, I 3, 32, 33, 53
Mousterian Age (and implements), I 62, 76, 79, 86
Muawija (mooa wē'ya), II 696, IV 1316
Mudfish, I 23, 57
Muehlon, Herr, IV 1254
Muhammad (mă hăm'ăd), prophet, I 289, II 590, 600, 644, 655, 664, 671, III 806, 817, 831; life of, II 675, 698, 699; teaching of, II 685-688, 702
Muhammad II, sultan, III 881, IV 1321
Muhammad-Ibn-Musa, II 710
Muhammadan communistic movement, III 840
Muhammadanism, II 702, III 716, 815. (*See also* Islam and Muhammad)
Mulberry tree, II 545
Mules, I 141
Mülhausen (mul'hou zĕn), III 1037
Müller, Max, I 226
Mummies, I 148
Munich (mū'nik), III 864
Münster (mun'ster), III 839, IV 1199, 1322
Münster, Bishop of, III 839
Munzuk, II 577
Murad I, III 803
Murat (mu'ra'), III 1060
Murray, Professor, II 415
Murzuk, I 116
Muscovites, III 928
Muscovy, empire of, III 925
Musical instruments, I 113
Musk ox, I 59, 64, 75, 100
Muskets, III 917
Mycale (mik'ă lē), I 349, 353, IV 1310
Mycenæ (mī sē' nē), I 106, 311, 324, 326
Mycenean (mī sē nē'ăn) architecture, II 459
Mycerinus (mis ě rī' nŭs), I 184
Mylæ, II 481, IV 1311
Myos-hormos, II 549
Myres, Professor J. L., I 300
Myron, I 356
Mysteries, religious, II 381
Mythology, I 130, 368
- N
- NABATEAN KINGS, II 642
Nabonidus (năb ō nī' dus), I 237-38, 246, 269, 280, 285, 329, 334, II 394, 428

- Nadir Shah (na'dēr sha), III 941, IV 1324
- Nagasaki, (na ga sa' kē), IV 1162
- Nalanda, II 667
- Nankin, III 786, IV 1318
- Nansen, Dr., IV 1247
- Naples, II 464, 524, 629, III 768, 864, 896, 1037, 1053, 1067, IV 1125, 1315
- Napoleon I, III 768, 895, 1015, 1020, 1027, 1039, 1066, IV 1073, 1075, 1146, 1325-26; III, II 583, IV 1122-30, 1327-28
- Narbonne, III 864
- Naseby, III 909
- Nasmyth, IV 1077
- Natal, IV 1155
- Nathan, I 279
- "National Schools," IV 1086
- Nationalism, IV 1116-20, 1196
- Nationalization, IV 1102
- Natural rights, selection, I 15
- Nautilus, Pearly, I 46
- Naval tactics, Roman, II 481
- Navarino (nāv ā rē' nō), battle of, III 1071, IV 1326
- Navigation, early, I 197-201, 296-97
- Nazarenes, II 604-606
- Neanderthal (nā an' der tal) man, I 62, 70, 83, 85, 86, 91, 107, 122, II 501, 508
- Nebuchadnezzar (neb ū kād nez'-ār) (the Great) II, I 179, 186, 205, 269, 282, 284, 328, II 390, 394, IV 1309
- Nebulæ, I 1
- Necho (nē' kō), Pharaoh, I 186, 207, 283, II 412, 522, 548, III 868, IV 1309
- Necker, III 1005
- Needles, bone, I 89
- Negroes, I 61, 67, 142, 157, 182, 193, II 549, III 877, 969, 991, 992
- Negroid race, I 87, 139, 145, 182
- Nehemiah, I 286
- Nelson, Horatio, III 1043, 1053
- Neohipparion, I 54
- Neolithic Age, I 73, 107, 109-110, 154-55, 162-64, 181, 182, 296; agriculture, I 112, 130, 174, 326; civilization and culture, I 103, 128-135, 145-46, 154, 169-72, 180, 183, 188, 197, 299-302; man, I 100, 127, 130-35, 145, 162, 213, 266, 302, 307, III 987
- Neo-platonism, II 609, III 851
- Nepal (nē pawl'), II 428, 662, 665, III 946
- Nephthys (nef' this), I 239
- Neptune, planet, I 2
- Nero, II 539-40, 606, 628, IV 1312
- Nerva, II 540
- Nestorian Christians, II 621, 637, 647, 655, II 693, 708, III 784, 796, 799
- Nestorian Monument, II 655
- Netherlands, the, III 884, 892, 900, 921, 938, 1069-1071. (*See also* Dutch Republic and Holland)
- Nets, flax, I 112
- Neustadt (noi' stat), III 864
- Neustria, III 722-23, IV 1316
- Neva, river, III 925
- New Amsterdam, III 938, 968-69
- New England, I 59, III 868, 938, 967-69
- Newfoundland, III 938, IV 1167
- New Guinea, I 140, 142, 166
- New Habsburg, III 883, IV 1319
- New Hampshire, III 967, 968, 975
- New Harmony (U. S. A.), IV 1096
- New Jersey, III 968, 975, 983, IV 1249
- New Lanark, IV 1094-95
- Newmarket, III 913
- New Mexico, IV 1201
- New Orleans, III 939
- New Plymouth, III 967
- Newton, Sir Isaac, II 419, 550, III 859, IV 1323
- Newts, I 24
- New Year, festival of, I 228
- New York, II 507, 545, III 864, 938, 968, 975, 977, 986, IV 1076, 1325
- New Zealand, I 193, IV 1151, 1167
- Niarchus, II 384
- Nicæa (ni'sē' ā), II 618-19, III 748, 756, IV 1314
- Nice, Province of, IV 1124

- Nicene (nī' sēn) Creed, II 618, III 737, IV 1107
 Nicephorus, (nī sef' ō rūś), III 734, IV 1317
 Nicholas I, tsar, III 1071, IV 1095, 1124, 1327 II, IV 1170
 Nicholas of Myra, II 618
 Nicholson, Gen. John, IV 1149
 Nickel, I 2, IV 1078
 Nicomedes (nik o mē' dēz), King of Bithynia, II 512
 Nicomedia, II 578, 613, 617
 Niemen (nē' mēn), III 1054
 Nietzsche (nē' chē), IV 1176
 Nieuw Amsterdam. (*See* New Amsterdam)
 Nile, the, I 118, 138, 162, 183, 193 198, 199, 266, 312, II 542, III 824, IV 1154; battle of, III 1043, IV 1326; delta, I 183, 164, 228; valley, I 182, 265, IV 1308
 Nineveh (nin' ē vē), I 177, 179, 186, 237, 285, 328, II 392, 635, 639, 642, 644, III 811, IV 1309, 1315
 Nippur (nip poor'), I 133, 169, 175, 181, 267, III 811
 Nirvana (nir va' nā), II 436, 438, 445
 Nish, II 544, 570, 575, 616, IV 1313
 Nisibin, II 642
 Nitrate of silver, II 711
 Nitric acid, II 711
 Noah, I 141
 Nobility, I 249, 255
 Nogaret, Guillaume de, III 779, IV 1320
 Nomadism (and Nomads), I 111, 137, 172, 303, II 397, 648, 671, III 783, 787, 809, 819-21, 825-26, 828, 831
 Nominalism, III 853
 Nonconformity, III 846
 Nordic race, I 159, 193, 201, 291, 325, II 376, 381, 396, 564, 566, III 718, 744, 801, 826, 832, 851, 930, 946, IV 1186
 Normandy (and the Normans), III 730, 744-45, 750-56, 861, 1007, IV 1318; dukedom of, III 739, 744
 Norse language, I 293, III 730
 Northmen, II 556, III 728, 743-44, 748, 832, IV 1186
 North Sea, the, I 73, II 556, III 735, 866-68
 Northumberland, IV 1086
 Northumbria, kingdom of, III 716, 727
 Norway, I 100, II 622, III 727, 744, 778, 845, 891, 936, 1069, IV 1318
 Norwegian language, I 293
 Norwich, III 837
 Nottingham, III 908, IV 1075
 Nova Scotia, III 868
 Novgorod (nov gō rod'), III 745, 810, 864, 866, IV 1317
 Nubia, I 250
 Nubian wild ass, I 206
 Numbers, use of, I 127
 Numerals, Arabic, I 207, II 710, III 768
 Numidia (and Numidians), II 486, 491, 496, 514, 551
 Nuns, III 832
 Nuremberg, III 864; Peace of, III 890
 Nürnberg '(nurn berch), cruiser, IV 1216
- O
- OAK, I 59
 Oars, I 200
 Obedience and will, III 824-30
 Obi (ō' bē), river, II 397, III 951
 Occam, III 854, 857, IV 1320
 Ocean, I 3
 Oceania, I 193
 Octavian. (*See* Augustus)
 Odenathus (od e nā' thūs), II 636, 672, IV 1313
 Odin, III 724
 Odöacer (o dō ā' sēr), III 734, IV 1314
 Odysseus, II 520
 Odyssey. (*See* Homer)
 Ecumenical councils, II 618
 Offerings, I 224
 Ogdai Khan, III 791, 792, IV 1319
 Oglethorpe, III 968, IV 1324

Ohio (ō hī' ō), I 59, III 971
 "Old Man" in religion, I 124, 134-35, III 1030
 Oligarchies, I 316, 318
 Oligocene (ol' i gō sēn) period, I 52, 53, 65, 66
 Olney, Mr., IV 1202, 1264
 Olympiad, first, I 322, IV 1308
 Olympian games, I 322
 Olympias, II 381, 396, 404, 413, 465
 Olympus, mount, I 344
 Omar I, caliph, II 690-2-5-6, III 762, IV 1316
 Omayyads (ō mī' yādz), II 698, III 738, 743, IV 1316
 O'Neil of Tyrone, I 109
 Opossum, I 57
 Oracles, I 242, 314, 330
 Orange, house of, III 904
 Orange, Duke of, III 903
 Orange River, IV 1154
 Orang-outang, I 61
 Orbit of earth, I 28, 58
Orient, ship, III 1043
 Orientation of temples, I 228, 230
 Origen (or' i jēn), II 609
 Orissa, II 454
 Orlando, Signor, IV 1255-56, 1259
 Orleans, II 577, III 864, IV 1090
 Ormonde, Duke of, III 955
 Ormuz, III 798
 Ormuzd (ör' müzd), II 645, 646
 Ornaments, I 112
 Ornithorhynchus (ör nith ō ring'-kūs), I 55
 Orpheus (ör' füs), II 554
 Orphic cult, II 381
 Orsini (ör sē nē), family, III 780
 Orthodox Church. (*See* Greek Church)
 Osborn, Professor H. F., I 85, II 550
 Osiris (ō sir' is), I 240, II 423
 Osman, House of, III 803
 Ostia, II 510
 Ostracism, I 321
 Ostrogoths, II 567, 571, 623, III 744, IV 1315
 Othman, II 696, 698, IV 1316
 Otho, Emperor, II 540

Otis, James, III 972
 Otranto, III 806
 Otters, I 38, 68
 Otto I, III 740, 747, 777, IV 1317
 Otto II, III 742, IV 1318
 Otto III, III 742, IV 1318
 Otto of Bavaria, III 1072
 Ottoman Empire, III 801-806, 811, 813, 817, 819, 866, IV 1321.
 (*See also* Turkey and Turks)
 Ottoman Turks, III 788
 Oudh (oud), III 940, 942, IV 1148, 1149
 Ovid, I 11
 Owen, Robert, IV 1094-99, 1326
 Ownership, III 1030
 Ox, great, I 100
 Ox-carts, I 274
 Oxen, I 110, 205, 296, 303
 Oxford, II 546, 710, III 776, 836, 851, 854, 855, 864, 909, 948, 955, 963, 1003, IV 1120, 1182
 Oxide, of iron, I 7
 Oxus, II 650
 Oxydactylus (ok si dak' ti lŭs), I 54
 Oxygen (ok' si jēn), I 21

P

PACIFIC OCEAN, I 46, 81, 148, 193, 265, III 790, 823, 872, 874, 946, IV 1179
 Paddling in navigation, I 200
 Padua, II 577
 Paine, Thomas, III 978, 989
 Painted pebbles, I 94, 99
 Painting, Palæolithic, I 92
 Paionia, I 349
 Palæoanthropus Heidelbergensis (pāl ē ō ān thrō'pŭs hī' dēl bērg-en' sis), I 69
 Palæolithic, lower, I 83
 Palæolithic age, I 62, 73, 83, 88, 96, 105, 182; art, I 91-92, 122, 129; implements, I 75, 79, 103, 138; man, I 82, 85, 100, 107, 114, 127, 135-36, 139, 145, 153, 167, 193, 213, 266, II 418, III 873, 1030
 Palæologus (pāl ē ol' ō gŭs), Mi-

- chael (Michael VIII), III 779;
 Zoe, III 810
 Palaeopithecus (pāl ě ō pi thē' kūs),
 I 65
 Palaeozoic (pāl ě ō zō' ik) period,
 I 7, 16, 22-25, 27, 31, 49, 53, 56,
 166
 Palais Royal, III 1001
 Palermo (pāl ěr' mō), II 482
 Palestine, I 253, 272-274, 281, II
 458, 585, 672, III 749-52, 760,
 773, 784, 793, 798, 811, IV 1178,
 1319
 Pali (pa' li) language, II 429
 Palma, Cainozoic, I 51
 Palmyra (pāl mī' rā), II 636, 641,
 672, IV 1313
 Palos (pa' lōs), III 870
 Pamir (pa mēr') Plateau, II
 396
 Pamirs, II 665, 696, III 790, 808,
 867
 Pampeluna (pam pē loo' na), III
 847, IV 1322
 Pamphylia (pām fil' i ā), III 757
 Panama Canal, IV 1204
 Panama, Isthmus of, III 872, 875
 Pan-American Conferences, IV
 1170, 1202
 Pan Chau, IV 1312
 Pan-German movement, IV 1179
 Panipat (pa' nē pūt), III 812, IV
 1322
 Pannonia (pan ō' ni ā), II 571,
 623, IV 1312
 Panther in Europe, I 328
 Papacy (incl. popes), policy of,
 III 769; outline of, III 776; and
 the Great War, III 850; and
 world dominion, III 936; mis-
 cellaneous, II 622, 630, III 716,
 722, 732, 746, 750, 759, 776, 780,
 794, 807, 831, 844, 850, 873, 887,
 929, IV 1090, 1320. (See also
 Rome, Church of)
 Papal Schism, III 780, 833, IV
 1320
 Paper, introduction and use of,
 I 183, II 419, 711, III 841, 878
 Papua (pa' pu ā), type of mankind
 in, I 140
 Papuan speech, I 166
 Papyrus (pā pī' rūs), I 183, II
 419, 712
 Parchment, II 712
 Parchment promissory notes, III
 768
 Pariahs, I 262
 Paris, Peace of, III 971, IV 1325;
 during the Revolution, III 999;
 Napoleon in, III 1040, 1054,
 1060, 1064; capitulation of, III
 1061; rising against Charles X,
 III 1067; revolution of 1848, IV
 1092; siege of, IV 1130; Zeppe-
 lin raids on, IV 1215-16, 1248-
 61; Peace Conference at, IV
 1264-71; miscellaneous, III
 864, 979, 1049, IV 1088,
 1328
 Paris, University of, III 849, 855,
 956
 Parker, E. H., II 558
 Parliament, government by, III
 878; English, III 904, 914, 942,
 971, IV 1189, 1327; Polish, III
 935
 Parliamentary Monarchy in Eu-
 rope, III 926
 Parma, III 767
 Parmenio (par mē' ni ō), II 384,
 401
 Parsees, II 645, III 818
 Parthenon (par' thē nōn), I 356
 Parthia (and Parthians), II 397,
 406, II 519, 538, 542, 556, 561,
 636, 642, IV 1312
 Paschal II, IV 1318
 Passau (pas' ou), Treaty of, III
 891, IV 1322
 Passover, Feast of the, II 601
 Passy (pa sē'), III 1006
 Pasteur (pas tur'), II 419
 Patricians, Roman, II 467-74
 Patriotism, I 318, II 472, III 930
 Pattison, Professor Pringle, III 855
 Patzinaks, III 748
 Paul, St., II 405, 504, 600, 601,
 605, IV 1107
 Paul, Tsar of Russia, IV 1325
 Paulicians, II 620
 Pauline epistles, II 606

- Pauline mysteries, II 608
 Pavia (pa vē' ā), III 889
 Peace, universal, I 289, III 769
 Peace Conference. (*See* Paris)
 Peas, as food, I 112
 Peasant revolts, III 838, 888, 957
 IV 1087, 1320
 Peasants, I 154, 247
 Pecunia, I 208
 Pecus, I 208
 Peers, Council of, III 907
 Pegu (pe goo'), III 799
 Peisistratidæ (pī sis tra' ti dē), I 323
 Peisistratus (pī sis' trā tūs), I 316, 340-346, II 469, IV 1309
 Pekinese language, I 160
 Pekin, I 230, III 786, 793, 815, 925, IV 1158, 1319, 1328
 Peloponnesian War, I 353, IV 1310
 Pelycosaurus (pel' i kō sawrz), I 26
 Pendulum, invention of, II 702
 Penelope, I 305
 Penn, William, III 968
 Pennsylvania, III 968, 969, 982, 990
 Pentateuch, I 271, 285
 Pepi, I 184, II 411, III 896
 Pepin (pep' in) III 722, 727, IV 1317; son of Charlemagne, III 732; of Heristhal, III 722, IV 1316
 Pepys, Samuel, III 912
 Pergamum (pēr' gā mūm), II 406, 512, 519
 Pericles (per' iklēz), I 318, 352, 372, II 544, III 836, 867, IV 1310; Age of, I 363, 372
 Perihelion, I 28, 30, 59
 Peripatetic school, II 413
 Periplus, of Hanno, I 206, 231
 Perkin, IV 1173
 Permian Rocks, I 27
 Perry, Commodore, IV 1163, 1327
 Persepolis (pēr sep' ō lis), I 372, II 394, 690-91
 Persia (and the Persians), I 108, 140, 202, 207, 283-284, 295, 316, 325, 329, II 380, 385, 398, 405, 464, 519, 523, 549, 555, 558, 561, 569, 642, 647-8, 654, 658, 672, 689-693, III 743, 745, 749, 783, 788, 794-98, 808, 821, 840, 862, 941, 952, IV 1313; history (*rise of*), I 179, 184, 186, 192, 237, 251, 316, 317, 319, 323, 325-329; (*Empire*), II 538, IV 1313; (*war with Greece*), I 334; (*war with Alexander*), II 387, 391-397, IV 1331; *Sassanid Empire*, II 544, 635-637, 644, 704, IV 1315; (*Islam and Persia*), II 692, 5, 6, 9, 702, 704, III 743; (*Mongol Empire*), III 792, 810, 815; religion of, II 423-24, 615, 620, 636, 644-45, 655, III 818
 Persia, Turks in, III 788
 Persian Gulf, I 163, 170, 175, 199, II 396, III 798
 Persian language, I 154, 179, 295, III 819
 Peru, I 146, 148, 194-195, III 874-75, IV 1160, 1322
 Peshawar (pē shaw'r'), II 441, 665
 Pestilence, I 99, II 544, 560, 626, 652, III 716, 721, 732, 754, IV 1073, 1313, 1318
 Peter, St., I 112, II 603, III 733, 779; the Great, III 925, 944, IV 1124, 1324; the Hermit, III 753
 Peterhof, III 925
 Petition of Right, III 907
 Petra (pe' trā), II 672
 Petrie, Flinders, I 182
 Petrograd, III 925, IV 1222
 Petronius (pē trō' ni ūs), II 545
 Petschenegs, III 748
 Phalanx, II 379
 Phanerogams, I 25
 Pharaohs, the, I 184, 202, 239, 240, 247, 273, 280, II 411, 522, 548
 Pharisees, II 588, 595
 Pharsalos (far sā' lōs), battle of, II 525, IV 1312
 Pheidippides (fi dip' i dēz), I 341
 Phidias (fid' i ās), I 356
 Philadelphia (ancient), II 641, III 757; U. S. A., III 968, 978, 986, IV 1325
 Philip, of Hesse, III 891
 Philip of Macedon, I 354, 365, 371,

- II 399, 408, 413, 448, 579, IV 1310
 Philip, King of France, III 780
 Philip II, King of Spain, III 892, 901, 915, 925, 978
 Philip, Duke of Orleans, III 1001, 1026, 1067
 Philippine Islands, III 872, IV 1144, 1162, 1202
 Phillistia (and Philistines), I 181, 236, 274, II 458
 Philonism, II 609
 Philosophy, primitive, I 121; Greek, I 368, II 420; mediæval, III 853; experimental, III 859
 Philotas (fī lō' tās), II 384, 401
 Phinehas, I 276
 Phocians (fō' shi ānz), II 379
 Phœnicia (fē nish' ā), and Phœnicians, I 201, 213, 223, 265, 272, 278, 282, 340-47, II 390, 405, 411, 586, 662; language and script, I 156, 218; colonies, I 311, II 459
Phœnix, steamship, IV 1076
 Phonetic spelling, II 660
 Phonograms, I 215
 Phrygia (frij' i ā), and Phrygians, I 311, 324, II 397, 405, 458, III 801
 Phrygius, II 384
 Physics, II 711
 Physiocrats, III 996
 Piacenza (pya chen' tsa), III 752
 Pictographs, I 215
 Picts, II 548
 Picture writing, I 183, 195, 218
 Piedmont, III 1020
 Pig, I 215; unclean to Moslems, IV 1149
 Pigtales, Chinese, III 808, IV 1159
 Pilate, Pontius, II 601
 Pile dwellings, I 106, 170. (*See also* Lake dwellings)
 Pilgrim Fathers, III 991
 Pilgrims, III 746, 753
 Pillnitz, III 1015
 Pittdown skull, I 62, 70
 Pindar (pin' dār), II 386
 Pins, bone, I 112
 Piracy, III 911
 Pisa, III 859, 864
 Pithecanthropus (pith e kân thrō pūs) erectus, I 62, 68
 Pitt, William, the "Younger," III 1051
 Pius VII, III 1052
 Pixodarus (pik sō dār' ūs), II 384
 Pizarro (pi zar' ō), III 875, IV 1322
 Placentia (plā sen' shi ā). (*See* Piacenza)
 Plague. (*See* Pestilence)
 Plaiting, Neolithic, I 104
 Planets, I 2
 Plants, I 7
 Plassey, battle of, III 942, IV 1324
 Platæa (plā tē' ā), battle of, I 345, 350, 358, IV 1310
 Plato, I 355, 362, 363, II 408, 447, 582, 638, III 851-52, 896, IV 1099, 1310
 Playfair, IV 1109
 Plebeians, Roman, II 467, 499, 500
 Pleistocene (plis' tō sēn) Age, I 53, 59, 62, 64, 101, 159, 246
 Plesiosaurs (plē' zi ō sawrz), I 39, 45
 Pliny, the elder, I 170; the younger, II 551, 711
 Pliocene (pli' ō sēn) Age, I 53, 59, 62, 67, 266
 Plotinus (plō tī' nūs), II 609
 Plunkett, Sir Horace, IV 1196
 Plutarch, I 321, 356, II 381, 386, 400, 404, 486, 514, 517, 526, 616, III 1042
 Pluvial Age, I 126, 163, 302
 Plymouth, III 1064; (New England), III 991
 Plymouth Company, III 966
 Po, valley of the, II 397, 462, 473, 483
 Pocahontas (pō kā hon' tās), III 966
 Pockock, R. I., I 92
 Pockock, Roger, I 294, II 568
 Poitiers, III 722, 862, IV 1316
 Poland, III 748, 780, 791, 806, 810, 862, 920, 928, 932-34, 942,

- 951, 959, 964, 1007, 1014, 1055-1057, 1065, 1069-1071, IV 1246, 1268, 1281-82, 1324, 1327
- Polish language, I 294
- Political ideas, common, II 532
- Politics (and Politicians), II 507, III 822, 929
- Polo, Maffeo, III 797
- Polo, Marco, III 797, 800, 869, 879, IV 1320
- Polo, Nicolo, III 797
- Polyclitus (pol i kli' tūs), I 356
- Polynesia, I 150, 165; languages of, I 161, 165; peoples of, I 108, 149, 161
- Pompadour, Madame de, III 923
- Pompeii ((pom pā' yē), II 502
- Pompey, II 518, 522, 525, 526, 555, 566, 588, 645, IV 1312
- Pondicherry, III 942
- Pontifex Maximus, III 731
- Pontus, II 570, 640
- Poor, the, III 954
- Poor Laws, III 896
- Pope Alex., IV 1189
- Popes. (*See* Papacy)
- Poplicola (pop lik' ō lā), Valerius, II 469
- Poppæa (pō pā' ā), II 539
- Popular education, Christianity and, III 822
- Port Arthur, IV, 1158, 1164
- Port Sunlight, IV 1096
- Porto Rico, IV 1202
- Portugal (and Portuguese), I 206, 293, II 572, 582, III 780, 1056, IV 1186, 1314, 1318-21; overseas trade and expansion of, III 868-73, 875-77, 935, 941, 992, IV 1144-45, 1152, 1160
- Porus (pō' rūs), king, II, 395, 444
- Posen, III 1060, IV 1091, 1130, 1183
- Post horses in ancient Persia, I 335
- Potash, II 711
- Potato, I 196
- Potomac, river, III 986
- Potsdam, III 924
- Pottery, I 103, 109, 130, II 459, 711
- Poultry. (*See* Fowl)
- Powers, Great, III 897, 930, 936, 963, 964, 1068, IV 1123-4, 1143
- Prague, III 834, 858, IV 1091, 1327; University of, III 833
- Prayer-flags, Buddhist, II 453
- Prayer-wheels, II 453
- Presbyterianism, III 907
- Prescott, III 892
- Press, free, III 988; in politics, II 476
- Prester John, II 693, III 799
- Pretorian Guard, IV 1245
- Priam (pri' ām), I 344
- Pride, Colonel, III 910
- Priestcraft (incl. Priesthood and Priests), I 126, 131, 134, 191, 224-244, 255, 258, 279, 303, 308, 313, II 444, 688, III 764, 832-33, 929; Priests, I 194
- Primal law, I 77, 124
- Prince, character of a, III 879
- Princes, an exclusive class, I 260
- Princeton, Univ. of, IV 1249
- Printing, I 222, II 418, 474, III 841, 851, 857, IV 1321; Chinese, II 651
- Priscus (pris' kūs), II 575, III 717, IV, 1314
- Prisoners as slaves, III 991
- Prisons, English, III 1027
- Private enterprise, III 959, IV 1234-35; ownership, III 959; property, III 914
- Probus, (prō' būs), emperor, II 570, IV 1313
- Production, distribution and profits of, III 960; of machinery, III 960
- Profit, III 1022
- Prokop the Great, III 835
- Proletariat, I 260, II 468, IV 1089, 1098
- Promissory notes, early, I 208
- Property, I 251, 257, III 828, 901, 996, 1026, IV 1074, 1088, 1102
- Prophets, Jewish, I 287-289

- Proterozoic (prot ěr ō zō' ik) period, I 7, 9, 16, 18
 Protestantism, III 833, 850, 891, 900-912, 916, 922, 925, 936, 949, 955-57, 967-68, IV 1160, 1186-90
 Provence, III 1061
 Proverbs, book of, I 287
 Providence, Rhode Island, III 974
 Prussia, III 918, 924, 928-33, 963, 1000, 1007, 1015, 1054, 1056, 1064, 1069, IV 1125-30, 1174, 1327-28
 Przemysl (pshe'm'isl), IV 1215
 Psalms, I 287
 Psammetchus (sa met' i kās), I 186, 283, 325, IV 1309
 Pskof, III 864
 Pteria (tē' ri ā), I 331
 Ptolemies, II 405, 411, 446, 587
 Ptolemy (tol' ē mi) I, II 384, 411, 415, 421-23, 657, IV 1310; Ptolemy II, II 414-15; Ptolemy III, II 415
 Public opinion, growth of, III 831
 Public schools. (See Schools, public)
 "Pul," Assyrian monarch, I 283
 Pultusk, III 1054
 Punch, IV 1118, 1183
 Punic (pū' nik) language, II 543; wars, I 181, II 466, 472, 478, IV 1311
 Punjab, I 187, II 398, 441, III 793, 812, 941, IV 1310
 Puritans, III 912, 968
 Pyramids, I 133, 184, 228, 253, 266; battle of the, III 1043
 Pyrenees, I 164, II 572, 701, III 716, 721, 728, 921, 1061, IV 1316
 Pyrrhus (pir' ūs), II 465, 479, III 746, IV 1311
 Pytho (pi' thō), I 330
- Q
- QUACO, IV 1325
 Quadrupedal reptiles, I 39
 Quartzite implements, I 138
 Quebec, III 939, IV 1324
 Quipus, I 195
 Quixada (kē ha' da), III 892
- R
- RA, I 240
 Races of mankind, I 87, 99, 117, 137-151
 Radiolaria, I 7
 Ragusa (ra goo' za), III 864
 Rahab, month of, II 679
 Railways, IV 1075, 1131-1133, 1141, 1326
 Rajgir, II 432
 Rajput (raj poot') clans, II 650
 Rajput princes, III 940
 Rajputana, II 650, III 862, 940
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, III 965
 Ramah, I 277
 Rambouillet (ron boo yā'), III 1003
 Rameses (rām' ē sēz) II, I 181, 186, 272, 273, 282, II 412, IV 1308
 Rameses III, I 240, 274
 Raphael, III 867
 Rasputin (ras poot' in), IV 1222
 Ratisbon, Diet of, III 890
 Ratzel, II 569
 Ravenna, II 571, 575, 579, 624, III 737, IV 1315
 Rebus, I 217
 Reconstruction, Ministry of, IV 1233
 Red Cross, III 883
 Red Indians, II 562, III 970
 Red Sea, I 159, 163, 170, 199, 200, 272, 279, 282, II 411, 545, 549
 "Red Sea" river, I 117
 Redmond, John, IV 1193, 1195
 Reed pipes, I 113
 Reform Bill, IV 1090, 1327
 Reformation, the, II 614, III 845, 850, 888, 955, 957
 Regicide, III 912
 Reindeer, I 64, 75, 76, 90, 93, 94, 101, 114
 Reindeer Age, I 79, 89, 93

- Reindeer men, I 101, 107, 114, 122, 133, 296
- Religion, I 123-25, 131, 227, II 421-25, 600, III 848, 996, IV 1113; "Old Man" in, I 124-25, 131
- Religious wars, III 891
- Remus (rē' mūs) and Romulus (rom' ū-lūs), II 460
- Renaissance, III 821, 867
- Renascence, III 821
- Rent, I 247, 256
- Reparation, I 207
- Representation, political, II 506, III 983, IV 1103
- Reprisals, IV 1278
- Reproduction, I 13, 15; of amphibibia, I 24, 55; of mammals, II 55
- Reptiles, I 24, 25, 26
- Republicanism III 928, 949, 1036
- Republics, I 316, III 824, 826
- Retailers, I 257
- Revere, Paul, III 976, 979
- "Revisionists," IV 1099
- Revolution, IV 1093, 1101
- Reynolds, Sir Joshua, IV 1189
- Rhine, II 518, 520, 538, 542, 556, 564, 570, 575, III 741, 887, 918, 921, 951, 1018, 1061, IV 1125
- Rhineland, II 623, III 721, 746, 756, 900
- Rhinoceros, I 57, 59, 64, 67, 75
- Rhode Island, III 967, 968, 975, 981, 986
- Rhodes, II 406, III 757
- Rhodesia, I 300, IV 1168
- Rhodesian Cave, I 83
- Rhondda, Lord, IV 1232
- Rhone valley, II 623
- Rice, II 662, 663
- Richard I, Cœur de Lion, III 759, 905
- Richard II, III 839, IV 1320
- Richelieu, Cardinal, III 920, 930, 938
- Ridgeway, W., I 106
- Riga, III 864, 866, IV 1223
- Righteousness, II 410
- Rio de Oro (rē' o dā ō' rō), I 206
- Ritual, III 831. (*See also* Christianity)
- Riviera (rē vē ār' a), French, II 458; Italian, III 1036
- Robert of Sicily. (*See* Guiscard, Robert)
- Robertson, III 892
- Robespierre (rō bes pyär'), III 1011, 1021, 1040, IV 1325
- Robinson, J. H., III 779, 938
- Rochefort, III 1064
- Rocks, I 5-10, 18, 27, 31
- Roger I, King of Sicily, III 766
- Rolf the Ganger, III 730, 744, IV 1333
- Roman coins, II 466
- Roman Empire, II 531; social and political state of, II 543, 550-57, 560, 567, III 851; fall of, II 567, 570, 572; separation into Eastern and Western Empires, II, 578, 582; later Roman Empire (Western), II 615, 623, 633, 638, 654, 658, III 716, 731, 734, 746, 841, 950, 951, IV 1313. (*See also* Eastern (Greek) Empire)
- Roman law, II 472, 635; roads, II 472, 557
- Roman Republic (19th century), III 1037, IV 1327
- Romansch language, III 722, 883
- Rome, II 517, 522, 532, 564, 583, 588, 606, 623, 628, 635, 641, 654, 672, III 725, 806, 867, 879, 887, 961, IV 1125, 1129, 1178; early history of, II 457-463, 470, IV 1309, 1310; war with Carthage, II 465; social and political state of, II 466-478, 484, 492, 512, 522, 529, 650, III 828, IV 1084, 1313; assemblies of, II 476, 477, 499, 500, 506, 518; patricians and plebeians, II 467-74, 499-500; Senate, II 467, 471, 474-78, 493, 494-97, 506-16, 526-28, 539; Consuls of, II 467, 477; colonies of, 468, 472, 539; Punic wars, I 181, II 465, 472, 478, IV 1311, 1331; military system of, II 498, 519, 534; bequests to,

- II 512, IV 1311; Social war, II 516, IV 1311; monarchy in, and the fall of the Republic, II 526-535; Roman Empire (*see above*); II 626, III 716, IV 1315; true cross at, II 638, III 761; "duke of," III 716; Pepin crowned at, 732; in 10th century, III 740; sacked by Guiscard, III 746, IV 1333; Germans raid, III 889, IV 1322; Charlemagne crowned at, III 898
- Rome, Church of (inc. general Christian associations), II 607-609, 622, III 716-17, 725, 731-34, 750, 754, 764, 769-80, 807, 882, 887, 897, 913, 1048. (*See also Catholicism and Papacy*)
- Romulus and Remus, II 460
- Roosevelt, Theodore, IV 1200, 1203, 1249, 1254
- Rose, Holland, III 1041, 1043, 1050
- Roses, Wars of the, III 862
- Ross, Sir Denison, II 647
- Rostro-carinate implements, I 62, 79, 266
- "Roum," Empire of, III 801
- Roumania (and the Roumanians), II, 582, III 749, 792, 802, 1069, 1072, IV 1198, 1220
- Rousseau (roo sō'), J. J., III 996, 1012, 1021, 1040, IV 1325
- Rowing, I 207, II 481
- Roxana, II 399, 404
- Royal Asiatic Society, II 668
- Royal families, marriage of, I 259
- Royal Society of London, II 658, III 922, IV 1081
- Rubicon (roo' bi kōn), the, II 525
- Rudolf I, German Emperor, III 883, IV 1320
- Rulers, deification of, II 526, 534, 540
- Ruling families, I 316
- Rumansch language. (*See* Romansch language)
- Rump Parliament, III 910
- Rurik, 631, III 745, IV 1317
- Russia, I 100, 101, 154, 162, 181, 286, 326, 335, II 396, 519, 556, 561, 566, 570, 579, 586, 617, 689, III 730, 743, 745, 748, 793, 807, 809, 814, 822, 840, 862, 878, 919, 921-32, 944-46, 949, 951, 963, 1007, 1053, 1058, 1072, IV 1101, 1124, 1143, 1158, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1180, 1181, 1199, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1220, 1221, 1239-1248, 1282, 1317, 1329. (*See also Great War*)
- Russian language, I 154, 291, II 660
- Russo-Japanese War, II 663
- Rustam, II 692
- Rusticiano, III 797
- Ruth, Book of, I 274
- Rutilius, P. Rufus, II 515

S

- SAAR (sar) VALLEY, IV 1268
- Sabbath, Jewish, II 588, 592, 607
- Sachsenhausen (sach' sen houzen), III 864
- Sacraments, I 131, 134
- Sacrifice, I 131, 191-94, 223, 304, III 874, IV 1108; human, I 115, 131, 135, 150, 194, II 504, III 874
- Sadducees, II 588
- Sadowa (sa' dō va), battle of, IV 1129, 1327
- Safiyya (sa fyē' ja), II 684, 685
- Sagas, I 302, III 729
- Saghalién (sa ga lēn'), IV 1165
- Sahara, I 73, 163, 193, 205
- Sails, use of, I 200
- St. Andrew's, III 1012
- St. Angelo, castle of, III 716, 740, 763, 889
- St. Gall, monastery of, III 747
- Saint-Germain-en-Laye, III 1003
- St. Gothard Pass, III 867
- St. Helena, III 1064, IV 1167
- St. John, Gospel of, II 592
- St. Just, III 1022
- St. Lawrence river, III 938
- St. Médard, III 728
- St. Paul, II 663

- St. Peter's, Rome, II 609, III 887
- St. Petersburg. (*See* Petrograd)
- Sainte Menehould, III 1010
- Sakas (sa' kas), II 648
- Sakya (sa' kya) clan, II 429
- Saladin (säl' ä din), III 759, 783, IV 1318
- Salamis (säl' ä mis), I 346, 354, 358, II 481, 692, IV 1310
- Salisbury, Lord, IV 1328
- Salmon of Reindeer Age, I 94
- Salonika, IV 1218, 1220
- Salt, I 116
- Salvation, Christian theory of, IV 1108
- Salvation Army, II 424, III 849
- Samaria, I 178, 286
- Samarkand, II 395, 399, 563, 621, 665, 667, III 790, 812
- Samnites, II 462, IV 1310
- Samoan Islands, IV 1202
- Samos, I 311, 356
- Samoyed (säm ö yed) language, I 159
- Samson, I 275, 285
- Samuel, Book of, I 275-278
- Samurai (säm' u ri), II 663, IV 1162
- San Casciano, III 879
- Sancta Sophia, Church of II 635, III 804
- Sanderson, F. W., III 956
- Sandracottus. (*See* Chandragupta)
- Sandstone, I 5
- Sandwich Islands, IV 1202
- Sanscrit, I 294, 308, II 661, 816
- Sans Souci (san soo sē'), park of, III 924
- San Stefano, treaty of, IV 1142, 1143, 1169, 1328
- Santa Maria, ship, III 870
- Sapor I, II 636, 646, IV 1313
- Saracens, III 740
- Sarajevo (sä ri' vō), IV 1119, 1207
- Saratoga, III 977
- Sardanapalus (sar dā nā pā' lūs), I 179, 237, 282, 285, 325, IV 1309
- Sardes, III 757
- Sardinia, I 205, 483, 572, III 884, 1069, IV 1124
- Sardis, I 324, 331, 340, 349, II 388
- Sargon I, I 133, 175, 177, 237, 266, II 616, III 896,
- Sargon II, I 178, 186, 236, 282, 328, IV 1308, 1309, 1330
- Sarmatians, I 295, 561, III 749
- Sarum, Old, III 914
- Sassanids (säs' ä nidz), II 538, 646, 704, IV 1313. (*See also* Persia)
- Saturn, planet, I 2
- Saturninus (sät ūr nī' nūs), II 515
- Saul, king of Israel, I 278, IV 1308
- Saul of Tarsus. (*See* Paul, St.)
- Savannah, III 938, 968
- Savannah*, steamship, IV 1076
- Save, river, II 578
- Savoy, III 912, 925, 1019, 1069, IV 1124
- Saxe-Coburg-Gotha family, IV 1177
- Saxony (and the Saxons), II 572, 623, 696, III 724, 727-32, 738 744, 919, 925, 1060
- Saxony, Duke of, III 835; Elector of, III 888
- Sayce, Professor, I 198, 248, 257
- Scandinavia, I 100, 293, II 549, 556, 566
- Scharnhorst, cruiser, IV, 1216
- Scheldt, the, III 754, 1019
- Schism, the Great, III 780, 807, 833, IV 1320
- Schleswig-Holstein, IV 1126
- Schmalkalden, III 890
- Schmalkaldic league, III 890
- Schmidt, Dr., III 817
- Schmit, E., III 816
- Scholars, II 420
- Schools, monastic, III 737; public, III 956
- Schurtz, Dr., II 574, 690, 695
- Schwill, II 710
- Schwyz (shvits), III 881, 883, IV 1319
- Science, II 410, 710, III 857-58;

- exploitation of, IV 1078-81;
 and religion, II 601, III 858,
 859, IV 1112-13
 Science and Art Department, IV
 1121
 Scientific research, III 854
 Scilly Isles, I 206
 Scind (sind), III 793
 Scipio, Lucius, II 494
 Scipio, P. Cornelius, II 487
 Scipio (sip'iō), Africanus, the
 Elder II 489-93, 496, 498, 511,
 557
 Scipio Africanus Minor, II 489,
 496, 513
 Scipio Nasica (nă sî'kă), II 496,
 513
 Scorpion, I 23, 25
 Scorpion, sea. (*See* Sea-scorpion)
 Scotch colonists, I 109
 Scotland, I 59, 109, 110, II 548,
 III 715, 745, 780, 845, 861,
 908-11, 928, 944, IV 1116, 1166
 Scott, Michael, III 768
 Scott, Sir Walter, IV 1182
 Scriptures, Arabic, II 659; Chris-
 tian, II 647, 655
 Scythia (sith'iă) and the Scyth-
 ians, I 237, 253, 295, 328, 337-
 339, 386, 397, 399, 503, 519-22,
 523, 549, 561, 562, 564, 576, III
 744, 749, 792, 809, 1060, IV
 1310
 Sea, depth of, I 3
 Sea fights, ancient, I 346-348
 Sea power, ancient, II 387-89,
 699
 Sea trade, III 868
 Seamanship, early, I 197, 201,
 205, 207, 258, 265, III 868
 Seas, primordial, I 6, 7, 18, 46
 Sea-scorpion, I 7, 22
 Seasons, the, I 127, 129
 Seaweed, I 22
 Secunderabad (se kün dër ä bad'),
 II 398
 Sedan, IV 1130, 1228
 Seeley, Sir, J. R. III 822
 Seine, the, I 139
 Seleucia, II 642
 Seleucid (sě lû' sid) dynasty, II
 405, 408, 441, 446, 493, 538,
 587, 636, IV 1311
 Seleucus I (sě lû' kă's), II 405, 444
 Selfishness, II 439
 Self-mutilation I 135
 Selim (să lēm'), sultan, III 806
 Seljuks (sel jook's'), II 707, III
 749-53, 784, 793, IV 1318. (*See*
also Turks)
 Semites (and Semitic peoples), I
 150, 156-161, 207, 218, 227, 234,
 256, 294, 295, II 671, 693, III
 783, 851, 930
 Semitic languages, I 156, 157, 166
 Seneca (sen' ě kă), II 504
 Senegal river, I 206
 Sennacherib (se năk' ěr ib), I 179,
 186, 236, 283, IV 1309
 Sepulchre, Holy, III 743, 752, 756,
 757, 798
 Sequoias (sě kwoi' äz), I 51
 Serapeum (ser ä pē' ūm), II 423-
 24, III 831
 Serapis (serä' pis), II 423-25,
 442, 554, 607, 608, 619, IV 1314
 Serbia (and the Serbs), II 544,
 570, 623, 635, 696, 802, 1072,
 IV 1198, 1207, 1218-21
 Serfdom, II 617
 Sergius III, Pope, III 740
 Serpent in religion, I 130, 148,
 IV 1108
 Servants, domestic, I 257
 Set, Egyptian god, I 225
 Seton-Karr, Sir H. W., I 138
 Seven Years' War, III 971, IV
 1324
 Severus (sě vēr' ūs), Septimus, II
 543
 Seville, III 872
 Sex, I 134
 Shale, I 5
 Shalmaneser (shălmă nē' zěr), I
 178, 283
 Shamanism, III 791, 809, 828
 Shamash, I 235
 Shang dynasty, I 181, 190
 Shanghai (shăng hī'), IV 1165
 Shang-tung, IV 1164
 Shaving the face, II 401
 Sheep in lake dwellings, I 110

- Shekel, I 209, 210
 Sheldonian Theatre, III 956
 Shell Age, supposed, I 67
 Shellfish, I 7
 Shells, as ornaments, I 87
 Shem, I 141
 Shen-si, II 653
 Sherbro Island, I 206
 Shi-Hwang-ti, Emperor, I 181,
 192, 244, II 560, 561, 564, 664,
 III 896, IV 1311
 Shiites (shē' its), II 699-702, III
 743, 749, 759, 815, 940
 Shiloh, I 276
 Shimei, I 279
 Shimonoseki '(shē' mō nō sek' ě),
 Straits of, IV 1163
 Shipbuilding, III 744, IV 1078
 Ships, earliest, I 197, 201
 Shishak (shī' shāk), I 186, 281
 Shrines, I 223, 322
 Siam (and Siamese), I 188, II
 662
 Siamese language, II 160
 Sian-fu, II 655, 664, 669, IV 1316
 Siberia, I 101, 159, 162, II 548,
 563, 653, III 793, 812, 944 IV
 1245
 Siberian language, I 294
 Siberian railway, IV 1164, 1198
 Sicilies, Two, III 884, 1056
 Sicily, I 201, 205, 311, 390, 458,
 465, 480, 482, 483, 493, 496,
 498, 510, 518, 572, III 743, 746,
 756, 766-68, 779, 867, 1044,
 1068, IV 1125, 1309
 Sickles, earthenware, I 174
 Siddhattha Gautama (sid hat' t'ha
 gou' ta ma). (See Buddha)
 Sidon, I 201, 205, 258, 270, 282,
 340, II 390
 Sieyès (syā yes'), III 1046
 Sign-language, I 153
 Sikhs (sēks), III 941, IV 1148,
 1149
 Silbury Hill, I 109, 136
 Silesia, III 791, 934
 Silk, I 285, II 545
 Silver as standard of value, I
 208
 Sin, idea of, III 875
 Singer, Dr., II 413-14
 Singing, I 113
 Sinn Feiners, IV 1278
 Sinope (sīnō' pē), II 640
 Siris, I 349
 Sirius (sir' i ūs), a star, I 228
 Sirmium, II 578
 Sistrum, II 424
 Siva, II 449
 Sivapithecus (si vā pi thē' kūs), I
 65
 Siwalik Hills, I 65
 Skins, use of, as clothing, I 112;
 inflated, as boats, I 197
 Slate, I 5
 Slavery (and slaves), I 248-251,
 314-18, 371, II 467, 503-504,
 546, 606, 617, 706, III 811, 828,
 877, 961, 969-70, 990, 995;
 American, III 1031, IV 1135-
 36, 1327
 Slavic tribes, II 542
 Slavonian dialect, I 294
 Slavonic languages, III 747
 Slavs, II 635, 696, III 724, 732,
 738, 749
 Sloth, I 194
 Smelting, I 105-6
 Smerdis, I 334
 Smilodon (smī' lo don), I 58
 Smith, Elliot, I 145, 148
 Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E., IV 1193
 Smith, John, III 966
 Smith, Worthington, I 77
 Smithsonian Institute, IV 1082
 Smyrna, III 757
 Sobiesky (sō byes' ki), John (John
 III), III 933, IV 1324
 Social Contract, III 982, 996
 Social Democrats, IV 1181
 Social War, the, II 516, IV
 1311
 Socialism, III 986, 1032-37, IV
 1094, 1239, 1327
 Society, beginning of human, I
 304
 Socrates (sok' rā tēz), I 112, 361,
 363-366, 372, II 432, 451
 Soderini, III 879-81, IV 1321
 Soghdian language, II 642
 Soissons, III 722

- Solar year, I 129
 Solent, the, I 139
 Solferino (sol'fě rě' nō), battle of, IV 1125, 1327
 Solis, Ensign, III 903
 Solomon, King, I 186, 278-286, 585
 Solon, I 210, 332
 Solutrė, I 90, 123
 Solutrian Age, I 326, III 874
 Somaliland, I 138, 163, 206
 Somalis, language of, I 158
 Somersett, J., III 992
 Somme, the, I 139; battle of, III 1026, IV 1225
 Sonnino, Baron, IV 1255
 Sonoy, Governor, III 903
 Soothsayers, I 314
 Sophists, Greek, I 361
 Sophocles (sof' ō klēz), I 362
 Soudan, tribes of, I 116
 Soul, the, I 134
 South Africa, I 83, 84, II 498, IV 1164, 1167, 1171, 1185, 1192, 1328
 South Sea Islanders, I 67
 Southampton, III 864
 Soviets (sov' yets), IV 1223
 Sowing, and burial, I 131; and human sacrifice, I 135
 Space, I 1, 12
 Spain, I 92, 100, 107, 145, 164, 181, 201, 206, 293, II 458, 459, 606, 635, III 716, 780, 822, 842, 862, 929; history (*Carthaginians in*), II 484, 490; (*Romans in*), II 492, 498, 511, 514, 522, 540, 556, 586; (*Vandals in*), II 572, IV 1314; (*under the Goths*), II 623, 732; IV 1314; (*Moors in*), II 696, III 738, 743, 877, 926, IV 1316; (15th-16th cent.), III 868-70, 877-88, 892, (17th-18th cent.), III 898-904, 911, 915, 922, 926, 935, 964, IV 1202; (19th cent.), III 978, 1066, IV 1129, 1202; overseas dominions, I 196, III 873, 876; colonial expansion, III 936-38, 971, 978, 992, 1066, IV 1144, 1165
 Spanish language, I 154, II 582, III 843, 875
 Sparta, I 311-315, 341-345, 353, 360-362, II 378
 Spartacus (spar' tā kās), II 518, IV 1312
 Species, I 13, 17, 23, 139, 141
 Speech, development of, I 71, 77, 122, 129, 154, 165, 215-218
 Sphinx, the, I 228
 Spices, Oriental, III 941
 Spiders, early, I 25
 Spinnerets of spiders, I 25
 Spoleto (spō lā' tō), II 628
 Spores, I 22
 Spy, I 71
 Stag, I 94, 100
 Stagira (sta jir' ā), I 365
 "Stalky and Co.," IV 1114
 Stambul (stām bool'), I 806
 Stamp Acts, III 974
 Stamps used for signatures, II 418
 Stars, I 1, 3; and early man, I 127
 Stars and Bars, IV 1138
 Stars and Stripes, IV 1138
 State, the, II 501, 534, III 882, 928, IV 1105
 States-General, the, III 916, 998-99, 1131-33, IV 1325
 Steam, use of, IV 1076, 1081
 Steamboat, introduction of the, IV 1076
 Steam-engine, invention of, III 960, IV 1075, 1076
 Steam-hammer, IV 1077
 Steam-power, III 960
 Steamship, early, I 197-201, 206, 258, 265, III 868
 Steel, I 266
 Stegosaurus (stēg ō saw' rūs), I 40
 Stein, Freiherr von, III 1056
 Steno, IV 1109
 Stettin, III 864
 Stilicho (stil' i kō), II 571, 579, IV 1314
 Stockholm, IV 1223
 Stockmar, Baron, IV 1122
 Stoicism, I 368, 371, II 605
 Stone, early use of, I 297

Stone, Major-Gen., IV 1275
 Stone Age, I 65, 69, 73, 79, 103, 110, 182, 201, 266
 Stonehenge, I 108, 148, 181, 230, 298, IV 1308
 Stopes, Dr. Marie, I 37
 Story-telling, primitive, I 129
 Strabo's Geography (*strā' bō*), I 11
 Strafford, Earl of, III 908-10, IV 1187
 Strata, geological, I 6
 Strikes in ancient Rome, II 469
 Stuart dynasty, III 913
 Sturdee, Admiral, IV 1217
 Styria, III 884
 Subiaco (*soo bē a' kō*), II 628
 Submarine warfare, IV 1217, 1225
 Sudan, the, IV 1167
 Sudras, I 262, II 668
 Suetonius (*sū ētō' ni ūs*), II 539, 616
 Suevi (*swē' vi*), II 572, 623, IV 1314
 Suez, I 159, 182, 207
 Suffering, cause of, II 435
 Suffrage, manhood, III 983
 Sugar, II 711
 Suleiman (*soo lā man'*), the Magnificent, II 696, 701, 806, 889, IV 1316, 1321
 Sulla, II 517-18, 524, IV 1312
 Sulphuric acid, II 711
 Sulpicius (*sūl' pish' i ūs*), II 516
 Sultan, Turkish, II 583
 Sumatra, III 800
 Sumer {(incl. Sumeria and Sumerians), I 174, 181, 187-88, 194, 217, 223, 232-239, 245, 251, 266, 290, 314, 328, II 379
 Sumeria, II 663
 Sumerian language and writing, I 133, 166, 174, 175, 183, II 659
 Sun, the, I 1, 2; worship, I 130, 227, II 424
 Sunday, II 607, III 831; schools, IV 1086
 Sung, II 663
 Sung dynasty, II 656, 658, III 786, 792, IV 1318

Sunnites, III 749, 759, 817
 "Sunstone," I 148
 Superior Lake, I 215
 Surrey, III 961
 Susa, I 174, 253, 334, 337, 346, 347, 371, 372, II 394, 396, 399
 Sussex, I 70, III 715, 961
 Suy dynasty, II 653
 Swabians, III 721
 Swastika (*swäs' ti kă*), I 148, 300
 Sweden (and the Swedes), I 100, II 570, 622, 727, 845, 891, 912, 916, 925, 933, 936, 942, 951, 968, 1060, 1069
 Swedish language, I 293
 Swift, Dean, IV 1188, 1189
 Swimming-bladder, I 23
 Swine, keeping of, III 864
 Switzerland (including the Swiss), I 106, 108, 113, 170, 297, II 582, III 747, 888, 919, 965, 1006, 1016, 1028, 1036, 1051, 1068, IV 1321, 1326
 Swords, bronze, I 132
 Sykes, Ella and Percy, II 564
 Sykes, Sir Mark, II 639, 675, 677, 702, III 801, 804
 Syndicalism, IV 1100
 Syracuse, I 362
 Syria (and Syrians), I 100, 163, 178, 186, 241, 257, 271, 283-84, 334, 351, II 390, 636, 639, 643, 675-78, 692, III 749, 758, 777, 784, 792-93, 810, 812, 831, IV 1124, 1197,
 Syrian language, II 708

T

TABRIZ, III 800
 Tabu, I 124
 Tachov (*tak' hov*), III 834
 Tadpoles, I 24, 55
 Taft, William, IV 1249, 1254
 Tagus valley, III 892
 "Tain," an Irish epic, I 308
 Tai-tsung, II 655, 664, 669-670, III 784, IV 817, 1315, 1316
 Talleyrand, III 1063
 Tallien, III 1024
 Tammany, II 507

